
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HISTORY OF GERMANY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

TREITSCHKE'S HISTORY OF GERMANY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

TRANSLATED BY EDEN & CEDAR PAUL

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON

VOLUME FOUR

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INTRODUCTION.

WITH the present volume of the German History, which reproduces the greater part of the third volume of the original, Treitschke leaves behind the series of European congresses and conferences which supplemented the Congress of Vienna, and introduces his readers to the domestic politics of the States united in the Germanic Federation and the intimate life of their courts and peoples. The narrative, rich in passages characterised by profound insight, picturesque description, and warm feeling, strikingly illustrates the great breadth of his survey, and his consummate art as a writer. Occasionally it also brings into prominence that psychic blindness and unconquerable prejudice, bordering at times on malignity, which vitiate his judgments upon some other countries, and especially Great Britain, and which for non-German readers mar so much of his work, viewed as pure history.

This one-sidedness is exemplified at the outset by his story of the proceedings of the Verona congress, called in August, 1822, to consider the unrest in Europe. The congress was particularly important from the standpoint of Great Britain, since it marked her separation from the Continental Powers on a fundamental question of political principle. The congress did not get beyond the affairs of Spain, which was in the throes of revolution, and whose South American colonies had declared their independence, and had already reconstructed themselves on a republican basis. France wished to win the Powers for a strong attitude on the Spanish question, and sought their sanction to a declaration of war upon her restless neighbour, nominally for the suppression of a movement menacing to her own tranquillity and security, yet not without the thought of reasserting her traditional influence in the peninsula and reviving her military prestige.

It was upon this question that Great Britain finally went apart from the allies. Canning had become Prime Minister in August, on the death by his own hand of the brilliant

Castlereagh, created Marquess of Londonderry the year before in just reward for his distinguished public services; but the change of men led to no immediate change in the general lines of British policy. Londonderry, an adept in the arts and devices of European diplomacy, was himself to have represented Great Britain at Verona. The Duke of Wellington went in his place, but bound by the same mandate that was to have guided his colleague. One principle upon which the British Government was specially insistent was that of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States. In sympathy with this principle Great Britain had already refused to cooperate with the Powers which wished to bring pressure to bear upon the revolted Spanish colonies, with a view to restoring them to the renounced allegiance, or to do anything whatever to prejudice the claim of the colonies to dispose of their fate according to their own will. That attitude was a direct repudiation of the policy represented by the Powers of the Holy Alliance, which were as ready to tilt at revolution and democracy in the new world as in the old; and once again the wisdom of Castlereagh's refusal to allow his country to be drawn into Czar Alexander's net was justified. Alone of the Powers represented at the congress, therefore, Great Britain stood aloof.

Treitschke attributes the action of Great Britain on the Spanish question and that of the Spanish colonies to mere jealousy for British commerce. Of course, that aspect of the question could not be ignored at a time when Europe was slowly recovering from a series of long and exhausting wars, though in recognising its claims Canning acted on behalf of the interests of all mercantile and maritime countries without distinction. It is paltry to overlook the fact, however, that the larger and truer reason for her abstention was Canning's unwillingness to risk another great conflagration in the interest either of Spanish imperialism on the one hand or of French ambition on the other. Of the country which thus refused to share responsibility for a policy which threatened to disturb and destroy the hardly-won tranquillity of Europe, Treitschke would nevertheless malevolently say, "English commerce would thrive most securely if the Continent were never at rest, if the economic energies of all nations of Continental Europe were paralysed by civil war!" That is not truth, but a piece of bad-tempered misrepresentation which has no rightful place in a history. But the odious idea that in all her

foreign policy Great Britain was actuated solely by commercial interest was one of Treitschke's obsessions—one of the many bees in his fertile Slavic brain; and so successful was he in popularising this idea amongst his countrymen that there are German publicists of authority in their own country who still refuse to believe that the British attitude in the present war proceeded from any other consideration.

Great Britain's decision meant the rupture of the Great Alliance; but with her withdrawal from an uncongenial association, in which she had little influence except that of barren protest, she regained complete independence. "Every nation for itself," said Canning, "and God for us all!". Great Britain had been willing to accept the principle of intervention in an individual case, where the country concerned had become a common danger to Europe: she was not willing to make it the basis of a policy of general meddlesomeness in the interest of Continental autocracy. France received her mandate to go to war with Spain, and her troops invaded that country in April, 1823. The action of the Powers in the matter was closely watched by the United States Government. Already it had formally acknowledged the independence of the South American colonies. On December 2nd, President Monroe published his famous declaration—later to be recognised as a binding doctrine of State policy—warning Europe against any attempts to stem the tide of democracy on the American continent.

The Congress of Verona was the occasion of much bad blood amongst the minor German Sovereigns. Austria and Prussia were the only German States to take part in the august palaver, and even the Germanic Federation, as such, was left outside. The other kingdoms did not know why they were not summoned along with their allies. They had failed as yet to perceive how little they counted, and were intended to count, in a political union which yet was broadly based on the principle of parity. There had once been three hundred German sovereign States, and now there were little more than thirty. It is true that each of these States, however petty, had nominally retained complete political independence; but for that reservation Metternich cared little, so long as he was able to dictate their attitude in the Federation. It was his policy to bring them all into line as members of the Diet, and there make them for federal purposes the servitors of Austria.

How successfully, and with what stratagems, he achieved this bold design is told in the present volume.

Baron von Blittersdorff, Baden's envoy at Frankfort, said: "A hundred times in Vienna I have asked Prince Metternich what it was he really wished to make of the Federation, but could never secure a definite answer." The reason was that the answer could not be put into definite words. Yet the objects of Metternich were never for a moment uncertain. He intended so to rule the Federation as to make it a bulwark against liberalism and nationalist movements of every kind. It was to be used as a weapon against internal even more than external enemies, against inside political even more than outside military aggression, against intellectual conquests even more than conquests by the sword. Above all, he was determined that the Federation should not prove a step on the way to German unity. There was logic in this attitude of Metternich, for he knew well that the empire which he served—and served faithfully according to his lights—made up as it was of so many ethnical elements, would crumble to pieces if ever the ferment of nationalism gained a strong hold upon its inflammable peoples.

Not only were popular movements and aspirations to be crushed in the nation, but sympathy with them in the Diet was to be suppressed. Accordingly, Metternich would not rest until that body had been purged of all the envoys who failed to fall in with his reactionary aims. The rigid censorship enforced outside was applied to the Diet itself. Books might not be admitted into its library without being first approved by the envoy of the State from which they were issued; even the right of petition was subjected to the censorship, in order that the Diet might not be troubled by importunate memorials unawares.

In his determination to show no quarter to liberal tendencies, Metternich did not hesitate to manipulate the federal law. On the proposal of individual States the Diet was to be empowered to alter the constitutions of those States, even to the extent of prohibiting the publication of parliamentary proceedings. Here Prussia, herself steeped in reaction, faithfully aided Austria in her dark designs. Thus by a stroke of the pen the independent sovereignty guaranteed to all the allies, great and small, by the Act of Federation was practically annulled. On December 23, 1823, the Diet went to the length of passing a

resolution to the effect that even in its own proceedings no appeal should be made to principles and doctrines at variance with the existing basis of the Federation. Treitschke confesses that "never before in this educated [German] nation has the hatred of culture been so unashamedly displayed"; but instead of placing the blame on the right shoulders he attributes it, with more than usual perversity, to the "foreign domination which oppressed Germany."

Amongst the middle-sized States Bavaria and Würtemberg for a time offered a more or less genuine resistance to the dictator and his policy. Each of these States regarded itself as the heart of "pure Germany," and both were agreed that neither Austria nor Prussia could be considered German at all. Baron von Wangenheim, the pushing Würtemberg envoy, revived the *Trias* idea and indulged the hope of creating a union of "pure German" States which should rank equally with the two great Powers. He got so far as to create in the Diet a combination—an *entente* or diplomatic group, as it would be called in these days—which for a time worked independently and was able to exercise a certain amount of effective obstruction. King William of Würtemberg even ventured to take up an attitude of open hostility to the major Powers, but was promptly committed to Coventry.

Before long all the liberal members of the Diet were either extruded or suppressed, and the Diet became more than ever an Austrian committee. The Austrian president even claimed and exercised the right to keep its archives, and these, studiously guarded, were only thrown open for inspection by the other envoys at his discretion. The triumph of Metternich was consummated when the time came for renewing the Carlsbad Decrees, which in 1819 had been promulgated in the first instance for five years. Without demur the federal Governments agreed to these symbols of darkness and despotism being made a permanent part of the armoury of autocracy in its struggle with democracy. Weary of isolation, and wishful to rehabilitate himself in the esteem of his more powerful neighbours, even the liberal King of Würtemberg made no open protest. Friedrich von Gentz faithfully summed up the effect of the Austrian chancellor's policy in the words, "Henceforward the revolutionary system cannot gain the upper hand in Germany without the destruction of the Germanic Federation."

It is difficult to believe that Treitschke wrote in complete

good faith when he ascribed the humiliating position to which Metternich succeeded in reducing the federal States, and Prussia no less than the rest, to foreign influence. "As long as Austria, England, Denmark, and Holland belonged to the Germanic Federation," he writes, "its central authority must deteriorate either in sterile quarrels or in futile stagnation." He does not say how England, Denmark, and Holland could either have helped or hindered Germany's humiliation. If, on the other hand, Austria's influence was mischievous and demoralising, it must not be forgotten that Prussia was a willing accomplice in her crimes against the intellectual and political aspirations of the German peoples. It is charitable to remember that Treitschke, as he himself said, "wrote for Germans," and that when he wrote the need still existed for stimulating and strengthening the pride and self-esteem of the regenerated nation.

Austria's selfishness and indifference to the interests of Germany at times took cynical forms. All that she cared about Germany was that she should still dominate her. The greater part of the Hapsburg empire was, in fact, excluded from the Germanic Federation, as was indeed a considerable part of Prussia. Austria wished to exercise imperial power without recognising imperial responsibilities. She showed this in a fateful way by opposing Prussia's proposals in relation to the creation of a federal army. Prussia wished to make this army sufficiently strong and efficient to afford the federated territories some substantial sense of security, and had she had her way all the States would have undertaken a genuine and not merely a nominal share in bearing the burden of national defence. The federal army was to be equal to one per cent. of the population, a ratio which would have given a force of three hundred thousand men, to be furnished by the various States in "contingents" proportionally to the number of their inhabitants. Austria, however, was lukewarm in the matter, and the other States, particularly those of the south, were suspicious of an arrangement which, if faithfully carried out, would have placed at the disposal of the two major Powers so preponderant an armed force. The contingents were never forthcoming in the allotted numbers, with the consequence that the duty of providing for Germany's safety was left primarily to Prussia.

Such as it was, however, the federal army proved a singu-

larly heterogeneous formation, devised on no common plan, clad in uniforms of as many colours as Joseph's coat, an army without uniformity of system, training, equipment, or administration, or even a commander-in-chief, for this officer, who should have been the symbol of unity and efficiency, was only to be chosen in the event of war. This dangerous form of particularism brought about a severe retribution half a century later, when, as the outcome of the Schleswig-Holstein dispute, Austria on the fateful twelfth of June, 1866, summoned the States represented in the Diet to mobilise with her, for the purpose of enforcing federal execution against Prussia. The response was what, but for Austria's constitutional inability to face facts, might have been foreseen. Her allies rallied to her side half-heartedly with "contingents" far below the legal strength, ill-equipped, and armed on all sorts of systems. Such opposition as she had to meet in Germany, therefore, Prussia was able to suppress almost without effort, and the Bohemian campaign, which changed the entire course of German history, was practically fought and won in a fortnight.

Prussia's policy at home during the years covered by the present survey was characterised by complete stagnation in political life, yet by marked progress in civil organisation and commercial and material prosperity. Prussia's special share in the reactionary excesses of that time was the notorious "persecution of the demagogues," an episode which to-day even historians of moderate conservative leanings recall as an indelible stain upon their country's reputation. One wonders at the tractability of the Prussians at that time under humiliations and aggravations which would have roused to fiery outbursts a liberty-loving people. Treitschke counts it as a virtue in Arndt that, in spite of imprisonment, deprivation of office, and all the other indignities which were heaped upon him by the suborned instruments of the prevailing terror, he "displayed no bitterness." Was it really a virtue, however—was it good policy or even good patriotism—so to suffer oppression gladly? For the effect was not to evoke magnanimity in the King and his creatures, but to convince them that they were engaged in a good and necessary work, and were doing it well. Many of the men who were too liberal for the Prussia of that day, like the publicists Karl Follen and Franz Lieber, emigrated to the United States, the precursors of the still larger flow of German citizens which resulted from the revolution of

1848, to America's gain but to their own country's permanent injury.

But that was not the worst. From that time dates, too, the tendency to State exaltation which had proved so mischievous a feature of Prussian political life in many ways. Hegel, who had been called to Berlin university in 1819, had taught the adoration of the State, and represented the Prussian State in particular as something consummate and final. A crack-brained disciple improved on the master, however, for he compared Prussia to "a gigantic harp, strung in God's garden to lead the world chorus." The theory that the State was the expression of ultimate reason led to the deduction that everything in the State as it existed and everything done by it was rational. It was inevitable that the acceptance of the pernicious conception of the State as all-powerful and all-good should have justified the Government in the intolerant use of its authority. Entrenched behind it, the bureaucracy also was confirmed in its privileged position, and became more arrogant and aggressive. A school of radical writers rose up in fierce resistance to this conception, so fatal to the growth of liberty, but it never became sufficiently influential to win more than a momentary *succés d'estime.* The doctrine of the "State as power" therefore advanced, almost unimpeded, conquering and to conquer, and Treitschke himself, who could speak of Ludwig Börne's question, "Is the State our end or the individual within the State?" as a question too futile for discussion, was responsible for much of its later success. The bad like the good that men do lives after them, and the worst fruits of this doctrine were to be seen only after his lifetime.

Reactionary as Prussian policy was in political matters, however, in the sphere of civil administration it was for the time distinctly progressive and in some things it showed great foresight. Long before his death in 1822, Hardenberg had fallen into moral as well as physical decay, but the work of internal reconstruction went on without his stimulus. Faithless though he was on the constitutional question, Frederick William III was all the more concerned to build up the system of local government. The law establishing provincial diets, passed in 1823, marked an important break with the old system of administration, which had combined feudal privilege with arbitrary government from above.

Treitschke condones the King's perfidy in refusing the

promised constitution by the gratuitous plea that amongst the mass of the people the idea of a national Diet had never taken root, and that even those who looked for it were such good monarchists that they readily acquiesced in provincial assemblies as a satisfactory substitute. After extolling the "Teutonic idea of liberty," which has shown itself so different from all other ideas of the kind, he adds, "The more intelligent [of the delegates], firm in their loyalty to the King, felt that it was not for them to anticipate the decisions of the Crown." The truth is, that the great majority of the delegates, whether intelligent or not, were large landowners, of strong conservative leanings, who would as readily have been without even provincial governments as with them. Metternich had urged the King in November, 1818, not to go beyond the grant of provincial diets, and to establish even these in a "circumscribed form." They were so circumscribed, in fact, that the people at large neither cared nor knew much about them, for they were excluded from direct participation in their affairs; their sessions were held in secret; and even their proceedings were so jealously withheld from public knowledge that only bald summaries of events were published when the assemblies had dispersed. The chief importance of the provincial diets lay in the fact that they were part of a comprehensive scheme of administrative devolution. During the next five years a system of circle diets was created for the various provinces, so that now—the towns having had self-government since the introduction of Stein's Municipal Ordinance of 1808—only the later reforms in the administration of the rural communes were needed in order to complete the edifice of local self-government. Another notable domestic reform of the period was the land legislation passed in the interest of the peasant proprietors. Nothing was done for the rural labourers, however, and the condition of servitude established by the early Servants' Ordinances suffered no alleviation; substantially these degrading regulations have remained unchanged to the present day.

It was at this time of awakening and reconstruction that Germany laid the broad foundations of her system of public and technical schools. This enlightened measure was the result of a deliberate recognition of the impossibility of competing with older industrial countries, and particularly England, unless the fullest use were made of the aids offered by education and science. Compulsory elementary education had already been

introduced in some of the States, and in the second and third decades of the century technical colleges and schools, in the interest of many trades and crafts, sprang up in all parts of the country. Nothing is more creditable to Prussia than the eagerness with which the new movement was taken up by the industrial towns. When, in 1824, Berlin set up a technical school, and put it under the famous pedagogue K. F. von Klöden, other Prussian towns at once followed suit, e.g., Breslau, Stettin, and Elberfeld. Hearing of Berlin's experiment, Goethe wrote: "We are now assured of the comprehensive care with which the Prussian State is endeavouring to keep pace with the incessant advances in technical methods effected by our neighbours." England, strong in her belief in the "practical man," and scornful of educational enthusiasts, made the fatal mistake of regarding this new departure with the utmost indifference.

Nevertheless, the country's material prosperity was held back by other causes than the presence in the field of earlier and stronger rivals, and one of the principal obstacles to commercial progress was the multiplicity of customs systems. It was on the question of customs policy that Prussia won her greatest diplomatic success in her dealings with the other States. The Federation might not have been intended as a stepping-stone to political unity, but with the increase of commercial intercourse and the development of road and water transport, it was impossible that the States should continue to be independent customs areas, regardless of all considerations of common interest and welfare. Particularism stubbornly held out for a long time, but in the end it was compelled to make to necessity the surrender which it refused to make to patriotism.

The idea of tariff unions and agreements had long been in the air, and there was behind it not only the pressure of the new industrialism, but the warm advocacy of far-sighted statesmen and men of science. It was owing to the enlightened efforts of Motz, then a provincial lord lieutenant, that Prussia in October, 1819, concluded the first tariff convention; and though it was only with the little neighbouring State of Schwarzburg-Sondershausen it marked a distinct advance. The middle-sized States were alarmed, and, fearing the extension of Prussian influence, Bavaria invited Würtemberg, Baden, and the two Hesses, with the Thuringian States, to a conference

with a view to common action on the same lines, though it led to no immediate practical result. Soon Prussia induced other North German States to join the dual union, and in February, 1828, Motz, now Minister of Finance, scored a triumph when he secured the accession of Hesse-Darmstadt. The month before Bavaria and Würtemberg had also concluded a customs union of their own. Now Saxony hatched the ingenious design of coalescing the Mid-German States in a similar union, which was to drive a wedge between north and south and so prevent Prussia from extending her customs conquests further, and this took effect in September of the same year. The design failed, however, for, interest proving stronger than jealousy, the northern and southern groups of States concluded, a few months later, a convention in virtue of which reciprocal freedom of trade was introduced within their respective areas. Now Prussia could afford to bide her time. She had secured union with the south, and her own large territory and multifarious natural resources and industries made her independent of her small neighbours. It was her policy, therefore, to wait until these obstructive States had convinced themselves that they had greater need of her than she had of them, and that without Prussia's leadership, and except on Prussia's conditions, a customs union of all Germany would be impossible.

Treitschke is unsparing in his contemptuous condemnation of the States which thus dared to oppose the ambitious scheme which Prussian benevolence was maturing for their good. They were certainly short-sighted, but not as wicked as the historian would have his readers believe. In fairness it must be remembered that these States suspected that Prussia was chiefly concerned for her own material interests, and wished to impose upon them an economic domination which would impede their free development. Moreover, they were unable to distinguish—and could it have been otherwise? —between Prussia as a political and as a commercial force, and in politics Prussia represented at that time the powers of darkness and evil. Nor was this fear of Prussian encroachment altogether unjustifiable. Writing at a later date Motz clearly disclosed the mailed fist when he said: "The Prussian State has the capacity and the power to subordinate to its own supreme interests the interests of the federal States, and after the experiences of the last thirteen years we know that the

love of these States can only be won through fear and respect for the existing political status." He was for simply destroying the rival Mid-German union, and making its members sue for mercy on bended knees.

Nevertheless, Prussia had achieved a feat of which she was justifiably proud, and her success was increased when Electoral Hesse joined the northern union in 1831. Customs unity, with freedom of trade, had been secured for an area containing a population of twenty millions, and Motz was confident that seven millions more would before long be added by the adhesion to the Prusso-Bavarian union of the members of the rival Sonderbunds. Nearly all the German territories were now affiliated to one or other of the customs combinations. Only Baden of the larger States discreetly kept out of the hurly-burly, for she had a question of territorial right to adjust both with Prussia and Bavaria, and wanted to make her alliance part of a larger settlement. The Prussian customs law was indeed, as Treitschke says, making victorious progress, but it was too soon to claim that "the great affairs of the nation were no longer settled in Frankfort and Vienna, but in Berlin." Twenty years later Prussia was still to endure the humiliation of Olmütz.

Motz's deserts in the customs episode cannot well be exaggerated. Nor was this his only service to Prussia. He restored the country's finances, introducing large economies without sacrificing efficiency, raised its credit, did much for the development of the postal and road systems, and gave a great stimulus to internal navigation and shipping. Thanks to him Prussia was able, in 1824, to wrest from England a valuable navigation treaty, and freedom of traffic on the Rhine was won against the opposition of Holland by the Rhine Navigation Act of 1831, which made that river free to the sea. Most wonderful of all, in spite of his cleverness and independence of mind, he never lost his fickle King's confidence and respect.

Perhaps the portions of the present volume of the History which will possess the greatest interest for the general reader, as distinguished from the specialist and the professed student, are Treitschke's masterly study of the life of the North German courts and peoples during the early decades of the last century and his brilliant review of the intellectual currents of the period. Particularism is still tenacious of its rights in Germany, yet, strong as is the individualistic trait which marks the life of the

modern German State, it gives but a very inadequate suggestion of the narrow, self-satisfied, jealous, and often cantankerous, spirit in which the Federal States—and the small ones almost more than the larger—clung to their traditions and customs a century ago. There was hardly one of the pompous princelets who did not think of his little territory as the peculiar pride of Germany and the apple of her eye. A cordial enemy of this unabashed particularism, Treitschke does not spare its weaknesses, its vanity, egoism, and arrogance, and, carried away by his prejudices, he has done something less than justice to its better parts. Yet the picture which he paints is full of life and colour, and if to the non-German reader the canvas, in parts, appears to suffer from excess of detail, the effect as a study of "still-life" is fascinating.

It will be remembered that, though of Saxon ancestry, Treitschke in middle life became a Prussian by naturalisation, in order the better to emphasise his attachment to the cause of national unity and his conviction that it could come only through Prussia. It might be thought, therefore, that in reviewing the life of his own country, in those years of transition, Treitschke would have a specially difficult task, since the King of Saxony paid for his attachment to Napoleon by surrendering two-fifths of his territory to Prussia. Nevertheless, nothing could be more agile than the historian's escape from his dilemma. What he does is to represent Prussia as an unwilling receiver of stolen goods. Prussia, he says, took the territory against her wish; it was forced upon her by the other bad Powers, and she could not help herself. That is a good example of history as written for Germans. History as written for other people gives an altogether different account of the transaction, which never was obscure. The truth is that Prussia wanted not merely the two-fifths of Saxony which she received but the whole; Stein and Hardenberg fought for it at the Congress of Vienna to the last; it was Great Britain and France who opposed their immoderate demand and eventually, with the cooperation of Austria, frustrated it. Naturally all the other German States were indignant at Prussia's covetousness, and rejoiced that it was at least restrained. "In the great catastrophes of history," Treitschke writes, in reference to another passage in Saxon history, the desertion by the reigning family of the Evangelical religion, "the association between crime and punishment is apt to be inseparable." The

words deserve to be remembered. In the case of Saxony they certainly applied. Her betrayal of Germany in the Napoleonic wars was not creditable, and it drew upon her a just if a severe retribution. There was no reason to apologise for this fact, and no justification at all for perverting it.

If otherwise the historian does not speak harshly of that inglorious episode in his country's history, the reason may be that there were incidents in the relations to Napoleon of some portions of Prussia herself which are not recalled with pride in these days, and elsewhere Treitschke has recorded and lamented them. What is curious about the Saxon episode is that the King never understood why he should have been required to pay the penalty of defeat at Prussia's hands, and to the last regarded his treatment as a legitimate grievance. His indulgent subjects for the most part accepted his view of the matter, receiving him with acclamation on his return to Dresden from captivity, and never abating their old loyalty and affection. Prussians lived long in the memory of that comfortable and gifted people, not as the liberators of Germany but as the spoliators of a German kingdom quite as good as their own. Even to-day, as many incidents in the still greater War of Liberation have shown, these tribes are still estranged by deep-seated antipathy.

WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON

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ERRATA.

p. 110, l. 11, for "Holy" read "old."

p. 127, l. 10, for "as an equipoise to" read "to redress the balance of."

p. 301, l. 11, for "transitional forms" read "social relationships."

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AUSTRIA'S HEGEMONY AND THE INCREASE IN THE POWER OF PRUSSIA.

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THE GREAT POWERS AND THE TRIAS.

§ 1. THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA.

MARVELLOUSLY, and beyond all expectation, had fortune favoured the Austrian court at Laibach. Unbounded was the delight with which Gentz extolled this glorious congress, this crown of his diplomatic career; and Adam Müller already saw in imagination the dawn of a new day breaking over Europe; the doctrines of international law held by the advocates of natural rights were perishing, and Christian law was entering into its heritage. But the brilliant position of the Viennese cabinet could not endure, unless it were possible to delude the czar as to his nearest duties and interests, to keep him from all participation in the irresistibly progressive Greek struggle for freedom; and even this well-nigh incredible success was granted to the fortunate Viennese statesmen, not so much as the outcome of their own adroitness, as owing to the morbid mood of the Czar Alexander.

How wretched and unhappy a mortal had now become the mighty ruler, whose bold dream it had been to unite all Christendom in the Holy Alliance. At forty-five all the pleasures of life had already palled; he was estranged from his wife; he was weary of his old amours. Now came the death of his favourite daughter, Sophie Narishkin. Restless and unstable, crushed by God's wrath, he sought consolation in the life of a recluse, varied only from time to time by one of those sudden journeys which the czars were accustomed to take in the interior of their wide domains, journeys upon which, in accordance with ancient Russian tradition, the autocrat sees nothing, learns nothing, amends nothing. He had never understood the art of persistent work. The tedium of this barren existence mocked at him. Amid the brooding discontent of his loneliness, his weak spirit was in the end completely

overpowered by the sinister suspicion from which he had never been free since that day of horror when he had received the crown from the hands of his father's assassins. He saw everywhere the spectre of revolution. While still at Laibach, he had issued orders for the institution of a secret military police which, at a cost of 40,000 roubles per annum, was solely devoted to keeping the officers of the guard under observation. The populace and the army were united in demanding atonement for the terrible disgrace inflicted upon eastern Christendom. Although the formal protectorate over the Greek church which the court of St. Petersburg had claimed since the peace of Kutchuk-Kainarji was by no means admitted outside Russia, the "White Czar" was by all the rayah nations regarded as supreme head of the Orthodox church, and his prestige would be gravely endangered if the murder of the patriarch of Constantinople were to remain unpunished. But the Porte, which was much better informed than the czar concerning the secret intrigues of Russian agents in the Balkan peninsula, was even now demanding of the northern power that it should take firm action in a contrary sense. In defiance of the treaties, after the suppression of Ypsilanti's revolt, Turkish troops were retained for months in the Danubian principalities close to the Russian frontier, ravaging after their kind. Foreign ships which had hitherto been accustomed to sail freely through the Dardanelles under the Russian flag, were now forbidden to pass, so that the trade of Odessa was seriously affected.

How often, in the past, had Russia, for much slighter cause, declared war upon her hereditary enemy, and how alluring on this occasion did the situation seem. The greater part of the Ottoman forces was engaged in the struggle with the Greek rising, while Austria, insufficiently armed, could not venture to denude Italy of troops. If the autocrat whose coat of arms bore the double eagle of Byzantium should now throw his sword into the scale on behalf of the cause of the Hellenes, he could count upon military successes, and also, to begin with at least, upon a chorus of approval from the liberal world. All the philhellenes were still hoping that the infidels would be driven out of Europe; W. Müller prophesied a hero's end for his favourite, Lord Byron:

Victorious on Byzant's walls, a glorious death shall strike thee down,
Freedom's wreath thy forehead covers, at thy feet lies Turkey's crown.

But it was these very exhortations of the liberals which made the czar recoil in alarm. It would seem that he had no knowledge of the subterranean workings of Capodistrias' underlings, and he took it as a personal affront when the Porte reproached him with inciting its Christian subjects to rebellion. Every fresh liberal newspaper which urged him to the holy war served merely to increase his mistrust of the Greek revolt. Never would he soil his hands by an alliance with the revolution. There were, indeed, moments of hesitation. In July, 1821, the Russian envoy left Constantinople. He had demanded guarantees for the security of Greek worship, and had been answered by Sultan Mahmud with that arrogant contempt which the Porte has ever allowed itself when the giaours fell out. A Russian state paper requested the powers to consider under what conditions non-Christian Turkey could still be tolerated in the society of European nations. War appeared inevitable, and in great concern Ancillon wrote to Vienna that the czar now seemed to have made up his mind to undertake a war of annihilation against the infidels.[1] But on this occasion also Alexander's sword remained in the scabbard. Vainly did Capodistrias endeavour to arouse his emperor's enthusiasm for the ideals of earlier days; vainly did Czartoryski warn him against those foreign monarchs who were now dragging him down to their level, when, but for that, his star would have shone high above them; vainly did Frau von Krüdener hasten to St. Petersburg to preach the crusade against Islam. The czar refused to see his old friend. His suspicion regarding the world-wide designs of the revolutionary party continually received fresh nourishment from the letters sent by his brother Constantine from Warsaw, describing the secret intrigues of the Polish malcontents. He now gave willing credence to the prophecy which Metternich had reiterated in countless memorials, that the first Russian soldier who crossed the Prut would give the signal for a gigantic conflagration in Poland, Germany, Italy, and France. He applied his Christian doctrine of legitimacy to the sultan whom he had formerly excluded from the Holy Alliance, and applied it also to the case of the rayah nations, subjects with no legal rights, bound to their Mohammedan rulers by no bond of loyalty, and compelled year by year to redeem their forfeited lives by the payment of the haratch. Nor did he change his mind when, in January, 1822,

[1] Ancillon to Krusemark, July 27, 1821.

the national assembly of Epidaurus solemnly proclaimed the liberation of the Hellenes from the Ottoman yoke, and declared, with perfect truth, that their cause had nothing to do with that of the demagogues, but that they were fighting solely for national freedom.

Beyond question, Alexander's peaceable attitude was not determined solely by his horror of the revolution, but also by political considerations which were still completely hidden from the German courts. The Turks had never reckoned their northern neighbours as Franks; and Russia, a semi-Asiatic power, was much better informed about the complicated relationships in the east than was any other European court. It could not elude the mistrustful gaze of the czar that the existence of an independent Greek state would be more likely to run counter to the future plans of Muscovy than to favour these, and that Hellenism, gaining strength, might in days to come extend its own hand towards the imperial crown of Byzantium. In short, after many vacillations, Alexander returned to his resolve to leave the Greek revolution to itself (this meaning, to his mind, to its well-deserved overthrow). Anything suggesting liberalism was suspect. In the autumn of 1821, even his old confidant Prince Galitzin fell into disfavour, for the well-meaning Moravian enthusiast had not concealed his philhellenist sentiments, and in educational matters had shown himself more tolerant than the fanatical Russian popes considered permissible.

England and Austria, the two faithful patrons of the Turk, rivalled one another in their endeavours to strengthen the czar in his peaceful sentiments. In October, 1821, Metternich received a despatch from Lord Castlereagh which put his mind completely at rest as to the harmlessness of the note of protest sent to Troppau by his English friend. The British minister, now Marquis of Londonderry, invited Metternich to meet him in Hanover at the court of King George; there it would be possible "to settle all the trifling differences of opinion which inevitably arise from time to time between courts, even when their sentiments are perfectly harmonious." [1] In Hanover, the Austrian was received with open arms. The Guelph ruler spoke with warm admiration of the wisdom of Emperor Francis, called for three cheers in honour of his great ally,

[1] Castlereagh to Metternich, Aix-la-Chapelle, October 1, 1821.

and unfolded principles whose purity charmed his guest—for to the English monarch his own tory ministers seemed far too liberal. The two statesmen, meanwhile, renewed their long-standing friendship, easily coming to an understanding about all European questions, and most readily of all concerning the maintenance of peace in the east. It was their intention to issue simultaneously, warnings to the czar against war, and exhortations to the Porte to practise moderation. But since oriental finesse at once recognised that neither of the two courts was in the mood to back up its friendly admonitions by force of arms, and since the *Oesterreichische Beobachter* continued to make excuses for Turkish cruelty and to cast suspicion upon every Greek victory, the pashas of the masterful Mahmud continued undisturbed to make war after their customary manner. They persisted in the use of the time-honoured Ottoman methods of pacification—ravishing, flaying, impaling, drowning in sacks, decapitating, and burning; and whoever had an ear for the despair of a nation driven to madness must recognise that the subjugation of the Greeks desired by Metternich and Castlereagh, had long before become impossible. A war so horrible could end in no other way than by the utter destruction or by the liberation of the Greeks.

The sterile cunning of the Hofburg was, indeed, still competent to outwit the czar. The first thing was to get "the dreamer" Capodistrias away from the court of St. Petersburg. Throughout the winter, in innumerable letters and memorials, Metternich played upon the Russian monarch's fears, displaying before his eyes the spectre of the world-conflagration, and pretending that all the malcontents in Germany were longing for the day on which the czar would declare for the revolution! He went so far as to say that he had learned from the trusty Rechberg that the Munich liberals were merely waiting until the Russians should open the game, in order to secure an alteration in the Bavarian constitution.[1] To these fables, Metternich continually appended the ardent assurance that his policy was no longer dictated by Austrian considerations, but that all his thoughts were now devoted to the sacred common cause of European legitimacy. Finally, in the spring of 1822, Tatishcheff, who had formerly been envoy in Madrid, paid two visits to Vienna to treat with Metternich behind the back

[1] Bernstorff to Krusemark, September 29, 1821; Krusemark's Report, March 3, 1822.

of the Russian envoy Golovkin (who had penetrated the Austrian designs), hoping by friendly persuasion to induce the Hofburg to withdraw its envoy from Constantinople. Tatischeff was reputed an extremely able diplomatist, but Metternich said scornfully, "Happily I am an experienced fisherman." His sophistical arts actually enabled him, not merely to repel all the suggestions of the Russian statesman, but actually to talk over the czar into a pliable mood which strongly resembled a conviction of guilt. Alexander declared himself ready to resume diplomatic relationships with the Porte, although to proposals at intermediation from the powers the sultan continued to return the defiant answer, "Do not interfere in our affairs!" The Austrian made the czar's change of front easy, proposing his good offices to secure the evacuation of the Danubian principalities and the reopening of the Dardanelles, an offer which was not very seriously made, for it was Metternich's principle that the mere possibility of a war between the imperial powers and the Porte might initiate a general European conflagration. There was no longer any talk of atonement for the patriarch's murder, while as regards an amnesty to the Greek rebels, the great powers were inclined to negotiate with the Porte, and such negotiations, in accordance with oriental custom, might have lasted for years.

In short, Alexander had completely turned away the light of his countenance from the Christians in the Balkan peninsula, and it was with good reason that Russia grumbled at this czar who in so pusillanimous a manner renounced the opportunity of waging a just national war. To his emperor, Metternich, with loud trumpetings, announced the defeat of Russia, "wherein we have secured the fullest victory that perhaps any cabinet has ever gained over another." Shortly before, he had introduced into one of his letters the utterance of proverbial wisdom that boasting is the most ridiculous of all qualities. Accustomed only to look forward to the very next day, he imagined that he had annihilated the work of Peter the Great and all his successors, and failed utterly to recognise that the enduring power of world relationships and of national passions must sooner or later lead the Russian state back into the paths of Catharine. The unprecedented good fortune of these years had already raised his pride to such a height that he regarded everyone who differed from him as almost insane. Since he himself had not outgrown the sugary tastes

of the eighteenth century courts, and knew of nothing more beautiful than an insipid Italian opera, it seemed to him extraordinary that all liberals should prefer the new German music, but it showed, after all, that wickedness and bad taste were always associated.

Nor was a repercussion lacking in St. Petersburg. In September, Capodistrias left the court, on furlough for an indefinite term, but, as he well knew, for ever. Golovkin also begged permission to resign, and was replaced by Tatishcheff, who had been so cleverly outwitted. Thus there had fallen into disfavour all the notable men who had successively gained the czar's confidence: Speranski, Stein, Czartoryski, Galitzin, and Capodistrias. One only remained inviolably secure in the autocrat's favour from beginning to end of this mutable reign, the stupid, coarse, and spiteful General Araktcheyeff, a martinet of the commonest stamp, servile to his superiors and insolent to his inferiors. Just as a gentle and yielding woman is not infrequently inspired by an elemental attraction towards some utterly heartless man, so Alexander's soft nature could not get along without this evil companion who in his cheerful self-assurance knew nothing of deliberation or hesitation. The general hatred which the tyrannical behaviour of the favourite inspired, was extended also to his protector. After Alexander had lowered his flag to the Turk, popular affection was gradually withdrawn from the czar who had once been so idolised; and the more isolated he felt among his Russians, the more strongly did he cling to the league of the great powers.

During these proceedings, the Prussian court had supported its Austrian friend, but half-heartedly and with reluctance; for although Prussia, in her unconditional desire for peace, wished to prevent the outbreak of war in the east, the Prussian court could not afford to disregard the philhellenism of public opinion as wholly as did the Hofburg, which could always count with certainty that Austrian subjects would never permit themselves an opinion upon foreign policy. Turcophil fanaticism such as was displayed by the *Oesterreichische Beobachter* was impossible in the columns of the *Preussische Staatszeitung*, for almost all the members of good society, not excepting Baron von Stein and the Westphalian nobles, were strongly on the side of the Greeks. On one occasion, in July, 1821, Ancillon went so far as to propose that through joint negotiations with the Porte the Christian powers should secure some

degree of legal protection for the Greeks. It is true that Bernstorff hastened to repudiate his friend's memorial, declaring it an expression of private opinion, and that in September, upon urgent representations from Metternich, he exhorted the courts of Munich and Stuttgart to take action against the revolutionary intrigues of the philhellenes, writing that among the apostles of freedom none had displayed such insolence as Professor Thiersch of Munich. Now, too, public recruiting of volunteers for the Greek army was prohibited everywhere, and Thiersch was forbidden to pursue the feud with Gentz which he had begun in the *Allgemeine Zeitung*.[1] But nothing more was done; collections of money for the Greeks continued, and even in Prussia the authorities winked at what was going on. As long as Alexander still hesitated, the court of Berlin was careful to avoid anything which might imperil the friendship with Russia. Bernstorff refused the invitation to Hanover, lest the meeting should assume the aspect of a European conspiracy against Russia; and notwithstanding Metternich's requests the king declined to write personal letters to his imperial friend in St. Petersburg in support of the Hofburg's labours on behalf of peace.[2]

People breathed more freely in Berlin when the danger of war in the east passed away. Emperor Francis willingly forgot these trifling differences of opinion, seeing that in the summer of 1822 the king of Prussia furnished him with an all too unambiguous proof of devotion. The Prussian envoy in Vienna, General Krusemark, died, a diplomat of the old school who, despite his veneration for the Hofburg, had never failed to take frank note with his straightforward soldier's vision of the disorder in Austrian financial and military affairs and of the intolerable conditions that prevailed in Lombardy. Metternich lost no time in doing everything in his power to secure a successor after his own heart, and, since the party of Voss-Buch was now in the ascendant, the king, in an unlucky hour, was persuaded to send Prince Hatzfeldt to Vienna. Metternich received his old friend with the words, "You were just the man we wanted"; and Emperor Francis declared with much gratification, "Now that we are thus more firmly allied we shall be able to defeat the revolutionary

[1] Instruction to Krusemark, September 29; Zastrow's Report, October 26, 1821.

[2] Bernstorff to Krusemark, December 25, 1821, and January 26, 1822.

spirit everywhere and utterly." [1] Long before, after the battle of Jena, Prince Hatzfeldt had, as governor of Berlin, displayed a brainless weakness which verged upon treason, and had escaped well-deserved punishment only because Napoleon intervened menacingly on his behalf. He subsequently attached himself to the small body of francophils, for the Napoleonic despotism seemed to him at least more tolerable than the revolutionary ideas of Stein and Hardenberg. As late as February, 1813, when in Paris, he adjured the Imperator to conciliate the Prussian court by a few trifling concessions, so that Germany might be preserved from the scourge of revolution. After the wars of liberation, which he could not contemplate with unmixed feelings, he foresaw "a life and death struggle between aristocracy and democracy," and just as he had formerly considered Napoleon the buckler of authority, so now it seemed to him that Austria was the shield. He lived and moved in the good old time, when the nobleman was still supreme; and he recommended the princes to surround themselves with counsellors from the high nobility, saying, "I hope for a return to those happy days of my youth when order, discipline, religion, and morality were still recognised virtues in all classes of society." As envoy in Brussels he entered into friendly relationships with the detested minister van Maanen, and, entirely upon his own initiative, suggested to the Netherland court that respect for "the bad constitution" should not be pushed to an extreme.

Such was the elderly hotspur of the reactionary party who for five years was to occupy what was then the most important post in the diplomatic service. He found all things excellent in his beloved Austria. "Here one can sleep peacefully," he wrote, gratified to the soul, "amid a good people, protected by a loyal army and an admirable police." It was only against the superior civilisation of the Lombards and the Venetians that he was prone, like Metternich, to indulge in expressions of ostentatious contempt. How delighted was he when Emperor Francis obdurately rejected Countess Teresa Confalonieri's humble petitions on behalf of her imprisoned husband. The first of that long series of high-spirited women whom united Italy honours to-day as the heroines of national freedom, was in Hatzfeldt's eyes merely the wife of a criminal. Even the Austrian officialdom seemed to him to be in part already

[1] Hatzfeldt's Report, July 6, 1822.

"gangrené"—for the adept greedily accepted this fine image of the liberal "cancer," as well as the four other metaphors of his master, Metternich. His verbose reports, scrawled in a brutal and barely legible handwriting, differed strikingly from those customary in Prussian diplomatic circles, where measured and strictly relevant treatment was characteristic. They abound in invective against the liberal "good-for-nothings"; and upon every other page recurs the threat, "il faut terrasser pour toujours le monstre révolutionnaire."[1] Basking in the sun of imperial favour, he gradually lost all feeling of Prussian pride. He was in the habit of showing his official papers with unseemly confidence to the Austrian chancellor; towards his own cabinet he often assumed a tone which might have been proper for an Austrian agent at the Prussian court; and he regarded himself as the guardian of Europe. For in all the grosser human aberrations we find a cosmopolitan trait. Just as the world of vice and crime has ever been an international power, so also does political fanaticism, as soon as it transcends the ultimate bound, cease to have the soil of the fatherland beneath its feet. Fortunately the prince's influence in Berlin was by no means extensive. It was very rarely that in moments of weakness Bernstorff gave credence to the Austrian bogey tales, and the further Bernstorff himself as the years passed became removed from the paths of Metternich's policy, the more of a nuisance did he find the old blusterer, who, without a single idea of his own, seemed a mere double of Zichy, the Austrian envoy in Berlin, and who towards the end of his life sometimes entered into conflict with his own chief at home. Witzleben always read the reports from the Viennese embassy with disgust, and would sometimes make a clean copy of the worst passages so that in private conversation he might warn the king against this excess of partisan intolerance.

In close alliance with Prussia, having come to an understanding with England, on fair terms with Russia, Metternich could look forward without much concern to the fourth congress which, in accordance with the last arrangements, was to be held in Verona. It was at least certain that the eastern question (the term was now becoming current) would give but

[1] Hatzfeldt's Reports, December 30, 1822, January 25 and February 6, 1826, etc., etc.

little trouble. It was true that, in Spain the situation had changed for the worse. Radicalism was ever on the increase, it was already proposed to suppress monasteries and to abolish primogeniture; the mob, which hated His Catholic Majesty, was singing savage songs of defiance. King Ferdinand secretly despatched urgent appeals for help to the great powers, and at length, in July, 1822, ventured on a coup d'état. The attempt miscarried. Distrusting the good faith of the sovereign, the members of the moderate parties fled in all directions; the radicals alone held their ground in the capital, and the Bourbon was a prisoner in his own palace. In the rigidly orthodox northern provinces, the party of the "serviles" assembled their forces, priests and monks preaching a crusade against the revolution; in Urgel, a regency was established, which declared that it acted in the name of a monarch who no longer possessed free initiative, and despatched agents to all the courts. Civil war was imminent, and what could be the upshot of such a war under a prince who had betrayed and ill-used all parties alike? "The king's fall is inevitable," wrote Bernstorff mournfully; "he possesses all the qualities competent to secure his own destruction, but none that may avail him for rescue." [1]

In France, the first attempts at intervention were already being tentatively made. In December, 1821, an ultra ministry had been constituted, under the leadership of Villèle. The victory of this party immediately resulted in severe measures against the radical secret societies, and all through 1822 the country was disturbed by odious political trials. The ultra newspapers were now with increasing impetuosity demanding war against Spain, saying that the affronts to the cousin of the Most Christian King must be avenged, that the focus of the latest of revolutions must be destroyed, and that the subordinate part which of late years France had played in Europe must be atoned for by the brilliant successes of a legitimist crusade. The heir of the revolution had been unable to master the Spaniards, but to the heir of St. Louis the task would be easy! Villèle, an able and cautious man, vainly attempted to control this blind zeal. Some of his own colleagues were accessory to the plans of the war party; and Montmorency, the foreign minister, was simultaneously engaged in diplomatic intercourse with the Cortes government in Madrid and the regency in Urgel. Since the autumn of 1821, a small army had been

[1] Bernstorff to Hatzfeldt, July 26, 1822.

stationed on the Pyrenees frontier as a sanitary cordon against the spread of yellow fever into France. The troops remained here long after the epidemic had subsided; the force was gradually increased; the guerillas of the orthodox army, fleeing northward before the regiments of General Mina, were hospitably received by the French, and were permitted to equip for a renewed struggle. Thus the state which vaunted itself as guardian of legitimacy was daily infringing the prescriptions of international law; and since Mina, with the Cortes troops, was everywhere victorious, a war between France and Spain became increasingly probable.

At this crucial hour a momentous change took place at the English court. On August 13th, shortly before the meeting of the congress of Verona, Castlereagh killed himself in an attack of melancholia, and with genuine distress Metternich mourned the loss of this irreplaceable man, "my alter ego." Lord Liverpool had long felt that the deplorable mediocrity of his cabinet rendered the introduction of fresh blood essential, and also that some mitigation of high-tory stubbornness was desirable, and he therefore decided to fill the vacant office by the appointment of George Canning, the most liberal-minded and intelligent member of the tory party, an object of suspicion alike to King George and to the court of Vienna. Thus it was that a resolute representative of English interests and the English commercial policy once again acquired a predominant influence in Downing Street, whereas all the other great powers had nothing better than a barren conservative doctrinairism to oppose to the doctrines of the revolution. From his youth upwards, Canning had lived solely for the idea of England's power. Even in the struggle with revolutionary France he did not, like Burke, see a war of principles, but a contest for the British mastery of the seas. It was merely as a means to an end that in the columns of the *Anti-Jacobin*, with mordant humour, he mocked the ideas of the revolution. Quite without scruple, when he was a member of the Portland ministry, and during a time of peace, he ordered the robber-campaign against Copenhagen, because he considered this coup de main desirable for English commerce; and equally without scruple did he promise the Spanish juntas his support against Napoleon. Through unfortunate misunderstandings and personal intrigues he was subsequently excluded from the cabinet at a time when his personal ambition made

him passionately desirous of power, and he had to look on wrathfully while lesser men reaped the fruits of his vigorous statecraft, and while Castlereagh represented victorious England at the peace congresses. Now at length, after years of ill-humoured waiting, destiny brought him the satisfaction of being able to re-establish the half lost independence of English policy, of breaking up the torpid league of the great powers, and of putting a glorious crown upon his life as a statesman by five years of brilliant successes.

In home affairs, he remained always a conservative, for although he looked far beyond the prejudices of the rigid high tories, and although, as half an Irishman, he vigorously advocated Catholic emancipation and also favoured the reform of the severe customs laws, he unconditionally opposed the new idea around which the whig party was beginning to reassemble its forces, the idea of parliamentary reform. Nothing, it seemed to him, could be more dangerous to the efficiency of British policy than genuine popular representation in the lower house. But demanding for England the right to live in accordance with her own peculiar wishes, he made the same demand for every other nation, so long as no interference with British commerce was involved. Now British commerce would thrive most securely if the continent were never at rest, if the economic energies of the nations of continental Europe were paralysed by civil wars; then the fortunate island could consolidate undisturbed that dominion over the seas which she regarded as her natural heritage. To the cosmopolitan doctrine of legitimate sovereign rights, Canning firmly opposed the sober proposition: "The harmony of the political world is as little affected by the multiplicity of political forms as is the harmony of the physical world by the varying size of the planets." As regards the Spaniards, he was guided by the principles to which Castlereagh had also given expression in a posthumous instruction, namely, that England could never agree that the court of Paris, by invading Spain, should acquire a predominant influence in the Iberian peninsula. But how much more favourable was England's position than it had been in the previous year.[1]

In Troppau and Laibach, Castlereagh's protests had been but half-hearted, for personally he had strongly desired that Austria should intervene in Italy, and had disapproved merely of the doctrinaire manifestoes of the eastern powers. But

[1] Concerning Canning and Germany, see Appendix XVI.

Canning could unreservedly interpose a blunt negative in the Spanish affair, and he was all the more determined to do this because he took an utterly dispassionate view of the great European league. Castlereagh had never had courage to withdraw formally from the Grand Alliance. His successor at the foreign office regarded it as a fetter upon England, all the more since (in defiance of its original aim) it was now concerned solely with the police supervision of Europe. Whereas Castlereagh had looked up to Metternich in friendly admiration, Canning was the ablest statesman of his day, and penetrated the futility of the great Viennese magician. After studying for a time the serpentine evolutions of Metternich's policy, Canning declared in plain terms that the Austrian was the greatest liar and rogue in Europe, and henceforward disregarded with dry sarcasm all the unctuous political sermons of the Hofburg. He knew that England's small army could hardly dare to encounter the French in Spain in the open field. He therefore held another weapon in readiness for the chastisement of his neighbours should they venture upon an invasion of Spain. England's recognition of the independence of the South American republics (already, in fact, largely won), would inflict a severe blow upon French and Spanish interests; the British flag would become supreme in the newly opened market; and perhaps England could secure in the west a second and greater Portugal, an immeasurably vast field of commercio-political exploitation.

Equally English was Canning's opinion regarding the disorders in the east. While still at the university he had been distinguished for his classical attainments, and had in earlier days even written philhellenist poems. Now he did not withhold human sympathy from the Greek rebels. Yet he was far from inclined to countenance the slightest mitigation of the oppressive tyranny exercised by England over the Greeks of the Ionian islands. Like the enormous majority of his countrymen, he regarded the persistence of the Turkish empire as a European (by which he meant an English) necessity, because the economic helplessness of the Balkan peoples served to ensure a convenient market for British merchants. Lest Turkey, England's trusty ally, should be weakened, Canning did not desire that the Greeks should ever secure more than the rights of a semi-independent vassal state, similar to those already possessed by Serbia. The struggle against Russia's eastern

policy seemed to him far more important than the future of the Hellenes. In his mistrust of the court of St. Petersburg, he was quite at one with Castlereagh and the high tories; but he wished to fight the Russian plans by deeds, and not, like Metternich, merely by playing a waiting game.

Beyond question it was to the general advantage that the clear light of a vigorous national policy should at length diffuse its beams athwart the murky atmosphere of the European reaction. Canning, moreover, moved with the times; he recognised the justification for some of the youthful energies that were stirring among the peoples; were it only by chance, his conceptions of a policy that should enhance England's power coincided with many of the most cherished hopes of continental liberalism. He utilised this advantage with the hand of a master. Just as in former years the two Pitts had employed the high-sounding phrase of the European balance of power as an oratorical wrapping for the concealment of their policy which aimed at the maintenance of England's command of the sea, so now their successor availed himself of the new catchword of national freedom which subsequently, as a well-tried heritage, was handed down to the verbal treasury of Lord Palmerston. The liberals listened with delight when the handsome man, with inspired flashing eyes and broad smooth brow, made one of his telling and thoughtful speeches, and when, ever at the right moment, he interrupted the keenly logical presentation of his ideas upon England's commercial interests, by a carefully calculated attack upon the detested Holy Alliance, a solemn invocation on behalf of national independence, or some classical quotation breathing the spirit of freedom. Since, as a legacy from Napoleonic days, veneration for free England still persisted, by a strange turn of destiny this insular aristocrat soon came to be regarded as one of the heroes of cosmopolitan liberalism, while the island people, which of all peoples in the world is animated by the most vigorous national egotism, was now extolled as the magnanimous defender of universal national freedom. For Metternich, Canning was a terrible enemy. The Hofburg knew how to deal with the ideologues of the revolution. But this Englishman, so marvellous a combination of fire and ice, of impulse and sobriety, who, firmly supported by the economic energies of the greatest financial power in the world, defended the cold calculations of his commercial policy with all the force

of popular eloquence, and marshalled the public opinion of Europe on behalf of British sea-power—remained an enigma to the statesmen of Vienna. Within a few weeks of the day upon which he had assumed the direction of English foreign policy, he had been bespattered by the Austrian diplomatists with a flood of invective which betrayed plainly enough their secret alarm.

Such was the posture of affairs when in September Czar Alexander and the statesmen of the great powers met in Vienna for preliminary conversations. For the general appeasement, the czar manifested a "European sentiment" which recalled the days of Laibach. He did not hesitate to admit remorsefully to the Prussians that he had at one time hoped to promote the welfare of humanity by acceding to the plans of the innovators, and that in the Greek affair, too, he had erred more than once. But now the innovators had been unmasked, and all that remained was to overpower the revolution, and at length to restore tranquillity to Europe. He had been compelled to run counter to the wishes of his entire nation, but the destruction of the Grand Alliance would be the greatest of all evils, and private interests could not be taken into account where a matter of so much importance was concerned. Thus transformed was the prince who had once announced to the world the doctrines of Christian liberalism; he had even adopted the catchwords of Metternich, whose habit it was to stigmatise as self-seeking every manifestation of healthy nationalist statecraft. One thing only was unchanged; Alexander still retained the pious unction of earlier days. "Politics," he said to Hatzfeldt, "is no longer what it used to be. It no longer rests upon egotism; the principles of our Holy Alliance are as pure as the alliance itself; as yet, however, only a few men fully understand this statecraft." Thus there was general agreement that the Greek question was to be "killed" at the congress, and as the sultan's troops, since the assassination of the dangerous rebel Ali Pasha, had been almost everywhere successful, the members of the areopagus of Christian Europe again, as so often before, enjoyed the philanthropic hope that the Christians in the east were about to be utterly subjugated by their lawful ruler, the Grand Turk.[1]

[1] Reports of Bernstorff, September 9 and 14; of Hatzfeldt, September 5; Bernstorff to Ancillon, September 8, 1822.

Far more difficult was it to come to an understanding regarding the future of Spain. How often had the czar resisted the war party in Russia with the contention that he must reserve all his military forces for the contest with the revolution in the west. Passionately, therefore, did he demand a common crusade on the part of the Grand Alliance against Spain, "the headquarters of Jacobinism." The gloomy mistrust by which he was now completely dominated, made him receptive to the despairing appeals for help issued by the Madrid court. He seriously believed that King Ferdinand's life was in danger, although the enormous majority of the Spaniards, despite all the incitements of the radicals, continued to regard His Catholic Majesty with the old idolatrous veneration. The German powers opposed a vigorous resistance to this idea, for they knew that the French government could never allow the passage of a coalition army, and they were confirmed in their opinion by the reports of Wellington, who now came to Vienna as British plenipotentiary, and who on his way thither had had an interview with Villèle.[1] Just as little was Metternich willing to permit the unaided intervention of France, for he dreaded the opposition of England, and he regarded the French army, "cette armée gangrenée," with mistrust. Consequently three of the great powers were agreed in the honest desire to leave the "Spanish fever" to run its course. In Vienna, Montmorency, the French representative, was still reticent, but it was manifest from his bearing how embittered was the party struggle in France, the ultras urging war, while King Louis and Villèle continued to resist. Since Alexander held obstinately to his idea of European intervention, this Spanish affair began, quite unexpectedly, to assume a threatening aspect. Even Wellington was not free from anxiety. His outlook was ever that of the military commander, and he could see nothing outside the circle of English interests, but within these limits his views were commonly sound. He at once recognised the danger that the czar, were his Spanish proposals absolutely rejected, might perhaps resume the old Russian designs upon the east, for Alexander, after he had so painfully disappointed the hopes of his subjects, could not venture to return from Verona without having gained some success.

In addition to the problems of Southern Europe, Metternich

[1] Bernstorff's Report, September 9; Bernstorff to Ancillon, October 16, 1822.

and Bernstorff proposed that German federal politics should be discussed at the congress. They did not go so far as to desire that the foreign world should intervene directly in German affairs. But they claimed for the Grand Alliance a right of supervision over the tranquillity of the whole of Europe, and already contemplated the institution of a European central board which should collect news from the entire world concerning demagogic intrigues. They therefore considered it their duty to inform the congress as to the stricter principles which were to prevail thenceforward at the Bundestag. Behind this design was concealed the intention to enlighten the czar regarding German concerns, for the refractory king of Würtemberg continued to cherish secret hopes of Russian help, and they wished to induce Alexander to give his brother-in-law an express reminder of federal duty.[1]

This new attack upon the German territorial constitutions, like the Carlsbad coup d'état, was determined by appeals for help from the constitutional courts of the south. The placable mood of the grand duke of Baden had been of short duration. His situation was in any case a difficult one, for under the new service regulations the officials were extremely independent, and the spokesmen of the liberal opposition were almost all members of the official body. Berstett had already on one occasion angrily demanded his congé, on the ground that he could no longer control his subordinates. Meanwhile the diet had again assembled, and on this occasion the liberals displayed a cheerful lust for battle which led to numerous disputes between the two chambers. Acrimonious quarrels about money, in which there was right on both sides, were inevitable in these sovereign petty states. The costs of diplomatic representation were disproportionately heavy, and since the diet did not dare to propose that some of the embassies should be abolished, in Baden, as in most of the other middle-sized states, the salaries of the envoys were ridiculously small. "Live penuriously," wrote Berstett wrathfully to Blittersdorff, the federal envoy, "let everyone know how stingily you are treated, so that the matter may become a public scandal, and the diet may be forced to vote a larger sum."[2] Conse-

[1] Bernstorff, Summary of the Affairs to be discussed by the forthcoming Meeting of the Cabinets, Vienna, September, 1822; Berstett's sketch, Agreement of the Powers in Vienna concerning the Objects of the Congress of Verona.

[2] Berstett's Tender of Resignation, March 1, 1822; Berstett to Blittersdorff, October 6, 1821.

quently for months past the old martinet of a grand duke had been cherishing secret anger against his loyal estates, and the restless Blittersdorff, who had recently been dreaming of a league of the lesser powers, now availed himself of the prince's ill-humour to play a new part. He offered to go to Vienna in order to represent to the two great powers the desperate situation of Baden, but the visit was to be a profound secret, for otherwise he would for ever lose his prestige at the Bundestag. In the end of September he appeared at the Vienna assembly, and Bernstorff wrote, "All that he brings is a cry of despair." In a memorial dated September 27th, Blittersdorff described the state of affairs in Baden with monstrous exaggeration, speaking as if the state were on the brink of revolution, and demanding the help of the great powers against the omnipotent caste of civil servants.[1]

In Bavaria too, meanwhile, that party which three years earlier had contemplated a coup d'état, had been unceasingly at work. In the year 1821, it was proposed to appoint Prince Charles, a favourite of the king and of the army and an outspoken advocate of absolutism, to the head of the ministry of war. After prolonged disputes, the plan fell to the ground, being defeated chiefly through the opposition of the crown prince, whose sentiments were strictly constitutionalist. Then addresses were once again circulated in the army by certain hotspurs, asking that all soldiers should swear fealty to the constitution, and demanding a more secure status for the officers. The whole disturbance was of trifling significance, for on this occasion also the great majority of the officers were indisputably loyal, but the timid king suffered from renewed alarms.[2] Passionate dissensions followed concerning military economies, which even Wrede regarded as necessary; Prince Charles resigned his commission in a rage, and broke completely with the field-marshal.[3] The diet reassembled in the year 1822, and now sedulously abstained from any incautious action. It is true that the hot-blooded Behr, who, having just been elected burgomaster of Würzburg, was reluctantly compelled to relinquish his seat as parliamentary delegate of the university, endeavoured to stir up the popular representatives by a fierce

[1] Blittersdorff's Reports, Vienna, September 26 and 28; Bernstorff to Ancillon, September 27, 1822.

[2] Blittersdorff, Memorial concerning Conditions in Bavaria, February 5; Küster's Report, January 22, 1822.

[3] Zastrow's Report, May 22; Schaffgotsch's Report, June 5, 1822.

appeal. He adjured them, "not to leave unheeded the first attack, made from Carlsbad, upon the constitution," and continued, "the question at stake is the legal freedom or slavery of the bourgeois class, upon whose neck the nobility is attempting more than ever to place its foot." But the writing was immediately suppressed, and the chambers refused to enter upon a hopeless struggle against the federal decrees. The irrepressible Hornthal also made a number of stormy scenes. At the close of the session, Aretin, editor of *Alemannia*, extolled Bavarian freedom in the flowery and metaphorical style which in these early days of parliamentarism was demanded from our orators, saying: "Whilst the officials of non-constitutional states may lie upon thorns, the officials of constitutional states have a soft couch, and nowhere is that couch softer than in Bavaria." He then spoke with contempt of those in Bavaria and elsewhere who three years earlier had desired to close for ever this house of representatives: "But the temple of Janus was reopened, and once again began the war, the holy war against arbitrariness and selfishness, against prejudice and demoralisation." On the whole, the course of the debates was peaceable, although this diet effected little of value. Count Rechberg and his colleagues were, however, seriously alarmed by some of the isolated passionate speeches, and Metternich, not reposing full confidence in Blittersdorff's accounts, and acting on private information from Munich, resolved upon a personal interview with the friendly ministers of the two cabinets that had begged for assistance.[1]

In the beginning of October, the Vienna meeting terminated, and the participants, slowly and by various routes, made their way to Verona. Metternich and Bernstorff spent three days in Salzburg, meeting Rechberg there, and hearing his complaints. As Bernstorff wrote, Rechberg manifested on this occasion all the weakness of his position and his character, lamenting that without foreign aid the constitutional system would in Bavaria inevitably triumph over all authority. But the Prussian exclaimed: "God guard us from ever taking such a step, for this would justify the mistrust of our German federal allies."[2] Immediately afterwards, on October 7th, the two emperors visited the king of Bavaria at Tegern See. From all the neighbouring mountain regions the countryfolk

[1] Metternich to Berstett, September 26, 1822.
[2] Bernstorff to Ancillon, October 7 and 16, 1822.

had assembled to greet the distinguished guests, and especially the daughter of their beloved Max, the empress Caroline Augusta. On the Parapluie, where the emperors with their royal host had admired the view, their signatures were cut in the stone, and at the door of the old monastery church a marble tablet announced to posterity the memorable fact that 257 court-personages had assembled here at one time. When King Max Joseph was enjoying himself it was very difficult to engage him in serious political conversations, but the guests were able to learn from their extremely friendly reception how firm was this prince's attachment to the Grand Alliance. At this time Metternich and Bernstorff had resumed their journey southward, and they met Berstett in Innsbruck. The Badenese statesman was far more courageous than Rechberg. He was incensed because Blittersdorff had given so gloomy a picture of affairs, and subsequently reproached the latter for his excess of zeal, saying: "We are no worse off than our neighbours, anyhow." [1] He promised, however, to accept unhesitatingly the decisions of the two great powers, and to resist the diet strenuously. Upon his return, he readily secured his sovereign's approval for this new "Innsbruck system." [2]

The congress, which began at length on October 20th, recalled with its brilliant festivals the never-to-be-forgotten days of Vienna. Emperor Francis put in an appearance surrounded by several archdukes; the king of Prussia was accompanied by the young princes William and Charles, and Alexander Humboldt was also in his train as an indefatigable cicerone. Italy was represented by a number of petty princes, and also by Napoleon's cheerful widow with her lover Neipperg. In this legitimist society, the talented crown prince of Sweden had an unenviable part to play, for most of the courts strongly desired the dethronement of the house of Bernadotte. With Emperor Francis, in especial, the expelled Vasas were high in favour. Metternich already opined that Charles John was "nearly ripe"; and Gentz lost his temper every day at sight of "this exasperating Oscar." All the princes rivalled one another in display, and the Most Christian King, who was kept at home in the Tuileries by an attack of gout, was at least

[1] Berstett to Grand Duke Louis, January 26, 1823.

[2] Berstett to the Grand Duke, Innsbruck, October 7; to Blittersdorff November 14 and 27, 1822.

represented by five envoys. A host of distinguished foreigners newswriters, place-hunters, and adventurers, surged daily across the picturesque Piazza d'Erbe; and whenever there was a race or a display of fireworks in the Roman amphitheatre, the Austrian police shepherded the countryfolk in from the neighbouring villages, because the population of modern Verona, together with the serene guests, was insufficient to fill the gigantic structure. It was natural enough that after the tedium of Troppau and Laibach the polite world should wish to enjoy life once more; but when contrasted with the drumhead courts-martial which were still engaged in their bloody work in Naples, and with the miseries which Metternich's spies had brought upon so many noble-minded Lombard patriots, the pleasures of the courts had an odious aspect, and Byron once again expressed the heartfelt sentiments of liberal Europe when in his masterly satire *The Age of Bronze* he apostrophised the Italians who, with fettered hands, gazed through dungeon bars at the junketings of their despots. The poet exhorted the czar to return home to shave and wash the Bashkir hordes instead of forging plans against the liberties of the Spaniards, and with cruel mockery he described the tripartite rule of the monarchs of the east:

> An earthly trinity! which wears the shape
> Of heaven's, as man is mimick'd in the ape,

The Austrian statesmen anticipated "golden fruits" from the assembly. But the days of their unalloyed successes were approaching an end, and this most brilliant of the diets of princes held by the Grand Alliance was also the most sterile. In Troppau and Laibach, Metternich, whose plans were then definite, had victoriously faced the vacillating great powers, whereas in respect of the Spanish question, which now thrust all other disputed matters into the background, he had not as yet formed any clear views of his own. He neither desired a French campaign nor a coalition war against the Spanish rebels, and yet he urgently wished that the revolutionary government of Madrid should be solemnly expelled from the community of legitimist powers, hoping that by this means the Spaniards "of a right way of thinking" might be encouraged to effect the liberation of their king. Thus was the Austrian placed between the millstones of Russian and English policy, after

hoping in his arrogance that he would sway both countries in accordance with his will. It is true that he now had the ear of Alexander, but he could not hope to maintain this influence, acquired at such pains, unless he should at least seem to follow the czar's caprices. What a disaster for Austria it would be if Alexander should withdraw in a pique from the negotiations of the western world, in order to make a renewed attack upon the sultan, the best friend of the Hofburg! Greeted on all hands as "the benefactor of Europe" and overwhelmed with flattering assurances of gratitude, the czar now desired to enjoy the fruits of the magnanimity he had displayed in the east, and to effect the permanent overthrow of the revolution in the west. With growing impatience, he demanded a general European war against the Spanish rebels; at any rate the French (whom he by no means trusted) might make the first move, for a Russian army stood ready on the Polish frontier to follow up this blow. The bold suggestion encountered the opposition of Wellington, who showed his disapproval with a dry, bitter, and morose humour, with a stubborn pride which considered that nothing in the wide world mattered except English interests. Every word he spoke betrayed the tacit hostility of the tories to Russia, and served merely to increase the czar's eagerness. Metternich's arts as mediator were of no avail with the Iron Duke. With martinet rigidity he fulfilled the orders of the English cabinet, and since his ultra-conservative sentiments were beyond dispute, he was armed against the reproach of favouring the revolution. As Bernstorff soon perceived, the glaring contrast between English and Russian policy determined the course of the congress, and led to its issue, which was one unexpected by all parties.[1]

Metternich, in order to prove to the czar the soundness of his principles, handed in on October 18th, before the formal opening of the congress, a memorial whose introduction contained an extremely strong condemnation of the Spanish rebels. The aim of the alliance was the destruction of the revolution. Consequently the constitution of 1812 must not simply be amended, but abolished; while the king must be liberated and placed in a position to provide his country with new institutions, for a return to the "indescribable" system of recent years must be avoided at all hazards. But this high-sounding opening was followed by a feeble conclusion. Metternich

[1] Bernstorff to Ancillon, November 15, 1822, January 21, 1823.

expressed the hope that it might be possible to secure the common aim by the simultaneous recall of the envoys of all the great powers. Threats of war against Spain might even endanger the internal repose of France; on the other hand, the alliance could not refuse its support to the court of Paris. The memorial concluded with the pious wish that a harmonious understanding might be secured.[1] These indefinite phrases could not satisfy the warlike impetuosity of the czar. He demanded deeds, not words; and it was thanks to his advice that the amiable and somewhat dull-witted Montmorency, who as a zealous ultra himself desired war, decided on his own initiative upon an ill-considered step. The Frenchman had received definite instructions to proceed with caution, but on October 20th, in the first formal sitting, he propounded three questions to the allies. Would they also recall their envoys from Madrid if France broke off diplomatic relations with Spain? Upon the outbreak of war between France and Spain would they be prepared to give moral support to the court of the Tuileries? Finally, in case of need, would they furnish material aid?

Thus a war was placed in prospect—a war for which but one excuse could be offered, that the repose of France seemed to be threatened by the Spanish revolution. In reality, the Madrid government had its hands full with the civil war, and hitherto, except for an exchange of unfriendly notes, had not taken a single hostile step against the allies. It was not France but Spain which had occasion to complain of threats, for the French army in the Pyrenees continued to infringe the laws of neutrality. The four powers, after long and laborious confidential deliberations, answered the French questions on October 30th. The Russian reply was bellicose. "Since the month of April, 1820," it began, "Russia has not ceased to point out the consequences of the triumph of the Spanish revolution." All her anticipations had been fulfilled. France was to-day endangered by the Spanish revolt just as recently Austria had been endangered by the revolution in Italy, and it was with immense satisfaction that the czar learned that this opinion was now shared by the French government. France would do Europe a great service by extinguishing the revolutionary conflagration, and in answer to all three enquiries Russia promised

[1] Metternich, Mémoire confidentiel à propos de l'Espagne et du Portugal, handed to Bernstorff on October 18, 1822.

loyal support. How muffled in comparison were the tones of Metternich's reply. Here the three questions were likewise answered in the affirmative, but with the proviso that a special understanding must be secured should material aid be desired. Bernstorff's utterance was yet more cautious. He had laid his objections before the king, and in Verona, as previously in Troppau, Frederick William was firmly resolved that no needless sacrifices should be imposed upon his people. Consequently Prussia, while promising the joint recall of her envoy, and pledging herself in case of war to give moral support to the court of France, declared that material aid could be furnished by the king only in so far as the necessities of his situation and the duties he had to fulfil towards his kingdom might leave open to him the possibility (la faculté) of giving such aid—and all the statesmen of the eastern powers were well aware that in the king's view no such possibility existed. Wellington, finally, replied with a blunt refusal. It might have been by chance, or it might have been because he had seen a draft of the Russian reply before writing his own, but in any case his memorial opened, as if in order to make a mock of the czar, with the very same words as those of Russia, and proceeded to draw the precisely opposite conclusions. "Since the month of April, 1820," he began, "the British government has never missed an opportunity of recommending his Britannic Majesty's allies to avoid intervention in the internal affairs of Spain." He went on to describe how dangerous, costly, and in the end how fruitless, such intervention would prove; he declared in plain terms that for England non-intervention in foreign affairs remained the rule; and he declined to vouchsafe any answer to Montmorency's questions so long as he was not fully informed regarding the negotiations between Spain and France.

Neither in Troppau nor in Laibach had England expressed any such decisive opposition, and all the more serious therefore did these weighty sentences sound in the mouth of the military commander who never uttered an idle word. Everyone felt that England was taking the first step to detach herself from the alliance. But the czar stormed onwards. He wanted definite results, and the German powers, however much they might desire peace, could not wholly reject his impetuous exhortations. It was essential to maintain the appearance of harmony, and above all to prevent dissensions in the east. "In

the end," declared Bernstorff to Ancillón, "we were compelled to give up all idea of a common understanding with England, and, in order to avoid a breach with Russia, we had to adopt a middle course." It is true that this middle course was an extremely precipitous one. Recently Bernstorff had been considering whether it might not be possible, through diplomatic intercession in Madrid, to bring about a change in the constitution by indirect means.[1] On October 31st, Metternich proposed that representations should be made to the Spanish cabinet, and that, if these were disregarded, the envoys should be recalled. The two other eastern powers accepted this proposal, but on November 1st Wellington entered a formal protest, and thenceforward held deliberately aloof from the discussions about Spain. Metternich and Bernstorff did not yet abandon hopes of peace, for they imagined that the diplomatic intercession in Madrid would encourage "those of the right way of thinking" in Spain.[2] Incapable of understanding the force of national passions, they had absolutely no idea of the effect which such utterly unwarranted threats would have upon the pride of a nation which had defied even a Napoleon.

Step by step they were now urged onwards by the czar, along the downward path leading to war. On November 18th, in a protocol, the powers pledged themselves to give assistance to the French court in three specified contingencies: first, if Spain should venture an armed attack upon France or an attempt at revolutionist propaganda; secondly, if King Ferdinand should be deposed, or if his life or that of any member of his family should be endangered; and thirdly, if any change should be effected in the legitimate succession to the Spanish throne There were also other cases in which assistance was to be given to France when the three powers, acting through their envoys in Paris, were unanimous about the matter. This addition was not intended to be so definite as it sounded. The German powers had agreed to it with reluctance, in response to Alexander's demand, failing to reflect how greatly the activities of the war party in the Tuileries would be stimulated by such indefinite promises.[3] Meanwhile an agreement was reached

[1] Bernstorff, Esquisse sur les relations entre l'Espagne et la France, October 22, 1822.

[2] The phrase is used by Ancillon in a ministerial despatch issued as late as December 10, 1822.

[3] Bernstorff's Report to the king, November 22, 1822.

concerning the despatches to be sent to Madrid, this also being effected under the continual urging of the czar. The Prussian despatch, dated November 22nd, was worded with exceptional stringency, for the king had been profoundly horrified by the perjury of the Spanish army. The document drew a terrible picture of the Spanish revolution, and went on to ask whether the Madrid government was willing and able to remedy such manifest evils, and whether, in especial, it was willing to restore King Ferdinand to liberty.[1] Despite all their severity, not one of the despatches from the eastern powers gave any definite expression to what was really demanded from the Madrid cabinet. They were plainly designed to pave the way for the immediate recall of the three envoys, and could be answered by the Cortes government in no other way than with a proudly worded refusal, for it was with an identical demand for "the liberation of the king" that Austria had from Troppau opened the campaign against Naples.

With this news Montmorency set out on his return to Paris, on November 21st, to secure the king's approval, and in his absence Chateaubriand, the vainest of the vain, took over the leadership of the French embassy. The powers had no confidence in the literary diplomatist. In the enigmatic transformations of his busy political career, he had displayed himself now as an ultra and now as a friend of the *charte*, and having been recently appointed envoy in Berlin had done absolutely nothing there except hold a few conversations with the flirtatious duchess of Cumberland. The little man radiated self-satisfaction now that he had entered the inner council of Europe as first plenipotentiary of France. To the general astonishment he showed himself to be even more bellicose than Montmorency. He was an enthusiast for the liberation of the Bourbon ruler, his monarch's cousin; he gratefully recognised what an admirable school he was attending here among the banner-bearers of legitimacy; and he did not hesitate to send an absolutely false report to his court, giving assurance of the warlike intentions of the three eastern powers. Thus rudderlessly was Europe drifting towards a war which Austria and Prussia, at least, had never desired; and Bernstorff sadly admitted to Ancillon that the outcome of this congress was not shaping itself in accordance with Prussia's wishes. Whereas in

[1] Bernstorff's Report, November 17; Instruction to von Schepeler, chargé d'affaires in Madrid, November 22, 1822.

Troppau, in Laibach, and throughout the Greek affair, Alexander had everywhere yielded to Metternich's arts of persuasion, here in Verona the czar proved the victor. He did not indeed secure a formal declaration of war on the part of the alliance against the Spanish revolution, but he brought about preparations for a war of France against Spain—a war in which it was still generally assumed that the other powers were likely to become involved.

How big a price was to be paid for this Russian achievement. In two memorials, dated November 19th and 20th, Wellington declared that England could take no part in the last steps of the powers, and that, speaking generally, she was not willing to intervene in the internal affairs of other states unless her own interests were threatened. This was Canning's withdrawal from the Grand Alliance. On November 24th, by bringing up for discussion the independence of the South American states, Wellington loosened in the scabbard the sharp sword which England held ready for use. Canning had written to him in urgent terms to the effect that for England American questions were now far more important than European, and that unless the American complication were turned to England's advantage, an opportunity would be lost which could not possibly recur. Of the freedom of the new world, of the awakening of young and growing nations, no syllable was breathed in these sober commercio-political disquisitions, since Canning reserved high-sounding phraseology for his parliamentary speeches. In the American seas, the British flag was, in fact, in serious difficulties, for it was hardly possible for English ships of war to maintain the upper hand over the pirates unless they could count upon the protection of the new governmental authorities in the coast states. In the previous March, President Monroe had, in the name of the North American union, formally recognised several of the new republics, and Henry Clay had declared in a grand oration that this was America's answer to the sinister conspiracy of the despots. At this very moment British warships found it necessary to break the Spanish blockade before Puerto Cabello in order to safeguard the entry of merchantmen. England, who had endured so many forcible changes of regime, and whose criminal law expressly permitted obedience to any *de facto* government, could not possibly carry legitimist respect for the Spanish court to such a point as to run the risk of losing the profitable markets

of Venezuela and Peru, which might in the interim be secured by her North American rival.

In the dry tone of a mercantile report, Wellington therefore made the following communication to the powers. England was obliged to come to an agreement with the governmental authorities of the colonies for common action against piracy, and this co-operation would inevitably lead to the recognition of the *de facto* existence of these revolutionary governments. All the other powers raised vigorous objections. Emperor Francis bluntly declared that he would never recognise the independence of the colonies until their rightful king had done so. Bernstorff likewise expressed his king's strong opposition, and considered that at any rate the moment was ill chosen, for the outcome of the congress of Verona would perhaps be the restoration of order in Spain, and this might facilitate an understanding between the colonies and the motherland. The czar desired to await the effect of a great plan of reconciliation which he had discussed with King Ferdinand France, finally, announced a desire that the alliance should "some day" come to a common understanding about the matter, lest by premature action any one power might arouse the commercial jealousy of the others. This legitimist caution, which recoiled so timidly from the acknowledgment of accomplished facts, was ill suited to the pressing needs of British commerce. Wellington, after his cool manner, did not hesitate to give definite expression to such an opinion; and at the close of the congress Bernstorff considered it certain that before long, and without consultation of the allies, England would come to a complete understanding with the rebel states of South America.[1]

With equal unconcern as to the opinion of the other powers, Wellington dealt with another important interest of English commercial policy, the suppression of the slave trade. With what delight had the civilised world once hailed this philanthropic idea when it was first advocated by the noble minded and sincerely religious Wilberforce. Since then, pious zeal had long cooled upon the continent, because at every congress the statesmen of England had advocated this reform with an ardour that was altogether too conspicuous, while the British commercial world used language of almost fanatical vehemence

[1] Austrian Declaration regarding the Spanish Colonies, November 24; Prussian Declaration, November 28; Russian ditto, November 24; French ditto, undated; Bernstorff's Report, November 30, 1822.

against the slave traders. Ill-natured people could not but ponder the question why the merchants of London and Liverpool, who in other respects were far from tender-hearted, had such delicate sensibilities about the negroes. The answer was to be found in trade returns. Of the total coffee imports of those days, barely one-twentieth came from the English colonies, and of the total sugar imports about one-fourth. The gigantic British colonial empire possessed very few plantations suitable for negro labour, and all of these had long been overstocked with blacks. Consequently the abolition of the slave trade could do little harm to England, whilst it would inevitably give rise to severe economic disturbances in the colonies of the other naval powers. Thus behind all the fine talk of Christian brotherly love there lurked the unchristian design of doing serious harm to England's commercial rivals. Not even Canning could deny that suspicion as to England's motives existed, especially in France, though he naturally declared it to be groundless. The great powers, and even Prussia (which had no direct concern in the matter), judged otherwise. When Wellington went on to demand that France should alter her laws, that the punishment of confiscation which had been abolished by the *charte* should be reinforced against the slave traders, and that French merchantmen should be subjected to the right of search by foreign warships, the French plenipotentiary made an extremely tart rejoinder, and the congress contented itself with reaffirming in general terms the principle of the abolition of the slave trade.[1] There were better grounds for England's complaints about the Rhine dues imposed by the Netherlanders in contravention of the treaties. The powers resolved to make common complaint in Brussels, and Bernstorff joined in this protest for form's sake, although the Prussian ministry of finance had already determined upon the employment of more forcible measures to remind these unteachable neighbours of their treaty obligations.

It was indisputable that the Grand Alliance was breaking up. England went her own way, not conspicuously hostile, but in absolute independence; and Metternich no longer ventured to propose the summoning of a new congress, although

[1] Wellington, Memorial concerning the Slave Trade, November 28; French Reply, undated; Prussian Reply, November 28, 1822.

the struggle against the Spanish revolution had been merely initiated, and not fought to a conclusion He can hardly have been in earnest when he attempted to console his friends by saying that Wellington's cold negative signified nothing more than the mild protests which Castlereagh had sent to Troppau and Laibach.

Better consolation, even though it was but for a day or two, was afforded by the Greek question, which now, as Gentz jubilantly declared, seemed quietly buried. By giving way to the czar in the Spanish affair, Metternich imagined that he had purchased peace in the east. A Russian declaration communicated to the congress (under date of September 26th) was beyond measure conciliatory, so that all the powers rivalled one another in assurances that they would vigorously support the reasonable demands which the czar made of Turkey. It was only Wellington, as a conscientious representative of Canning's commercial policy, and full of suspicion, who had previously secured information regarding the commercial advantages which Russia was claiming for herself in the Black Sea. Tatishcheff thanked the powers courteously and declared that his imperial master would confidently leave to the allies the further negotiations with the Porte.[1] Peace and confidence were in the ascendant, and yet Lord Strangford, who had just reached Verona from Constantinople, had regretfully to admit that the Porte had not hitherto displayed the slightest disposition to make any concessions. It was hoped that the eastern question was done with. Consequently a despatch from the national assembly of Argos, which begged for Europe's recognition of the new Hellenic state, was rejected; and when Metaxas, the Greek plenipotentiary, writing from Ancona, announced his impending arrival, Metternich sent him an answer through Cardinal Spina that he would be detained at the Austrian frontier. In moving terms, Metaxas had written to the king of Prussia: "The Greek nation loudly demands its fatherland, a throne, a right to existence and to property."[2] All his letters to the monarch were disregarded, and Gentz said scornfully that this was the right way to deal with the "ridiculous chatter" of the rebels. But Niebuhr was indignant when he

[1] Nesselrode, Note to Bernstorff, Vienna, September 26, submitted to the congress November 9; Minutes of the conference, November 27; Tatishcheff's Reply, November 27; Bernstorff's Report, November 17, 1822.

[2] Metternich to Spina, November 30; Metaxas to King Frederick William, November 2, 1822.

perceived how heartlessly this Christian nation was being treated by the Christian powers, and said: "It will assuredly be proposed to the congress to have Homer's poems burned by the public executioner, to have all copies surrendered under severe penalties and sent to Constantinople for the Turk to dispose of as he pleases."

It was easy to come to an agreement about Italian affairs. There was no longer any murmur of opposition in the enslaved land, and King Charles Felix could with satisfaction declare to the powers: "The rebirth of Piedmont is accomplished." The congress therefore approved the evacuation of Piedmont, and decided to reduce the strength of the Austrian army of occupation in Naples. For a time Metternich continued to entertain the design of instituting a common police station for the whole of Italy, but he soon let the plan drop, for Consalvi, ably represented by Cardinal Spina, resolutely defended the unrestricted sovereignty of the Pontifical State. To pacify the alarmed minor princes, on December 11th the three eastern powers issued a circular to the Italian courts, exhorting them once more to govern strictly, but also giving a solemn assurance that the Grand Alliance made absolutely no claim to suzerainty over the Italian peninsula.[1]

While this was going on, the fate of Charles Albert of Carignan was decided. A year before, immediately after the failure of his ill-advised rising, the unfortunate prince had given assurances to the Prussian envoy of his good sentiments.[2] The anger of Charles Felix was however undiminished, and the king asked the great powers whether they would recognise a pragmatic sanction which should exclude the rebel from succession to the throne. Instead of Charles Albert, the latter's son Victor Emanuel, at a later date King of Italy, who had been born in March, 1820, amid the stormy days of the Piedmontese revolution, was to become heir to the throne of Piedmont. This would render a prolonged regency probable, and it was suggested that the regent should be the duke of Modena, the chief of the Italian reactionary party, who would then have time to regulate the kingdom of Sardinia in accordance with the Austrian model. The powers gave serious consideration to this proposal. Bernstorff took a very severe view of "this prince who lacks intelligence and character, and who has grown up under the influence of evil

[1] Declaration from Austria, Prussia, and Russia to the Italian courts, December 11, 1822.

[2] Truchsess' Report, Turin, April 2, 1821.

example and bad principles"; but so gross an infringement of legitimacy and of the prescriptions of the Vienna congress act seemed to him undesirable. Since Russia and France also intervened vigorously on behalf of the threatened man, Metternich as well took a conciliatory line,[1] and the odious plan was rejected. The prince did not fail to manifest his amelioration. Soon afterwards he entered a French regiment and fought against the army of the Spanish Cortes—to the horror of the liberal world, which raged against "the traitor Carignano," and to the secret vexation of Emperor Francis, who now learned that this ambitious nephew had turned a hopeful eye towards France.

The Italian patriots, however, could not be persuaded out of the belief that Austria herself had cherished aspirations towards the throne of Piedmont; and what must their feelings be when something leaked out about the memorial which Duke Francis of Modena had sent to the eastern powers as a reply to their circular. Herein the tyrannical sentiments of a petty despot who regarded his people as his natural enemy found crude and impudent expression. Six means, in especial, were recommended by him to the Italian courts, "for the formation of quiet subjects": favouring the priesthood; re-elevation of the nobility; strengthening the paternal authority of the sovereign; severer laws against lese-majesty; reform of education by dissolution of the universities; and, finally, strict supervision of the press. It was not to be supposed that the statesmen in Verona had formally agreed to these principles; but all, not excepting Bernstorff, regarded the author of the memorial as the best of the Italian princes, and not one of them thought of asking whether it was possible that a noble nation could permanently submit to the yoke of such despots.

Considering everything, Metternich had little reason to congratulate himself upon this diet of princes, and Gentz had need of all his mastery as a stylist, in the circular which at the close of the congress (December 14th) the eastern powers issued to their embassies, to conceal the poor results of the deliberations. He overwhelmed the Madrid government with abuse; he spoke of Spain in its present state of decay as being the enemy of the principles of the European alliance; and he announced that the envoys of the three powers would be withdrawn from the peninsula. But he had nothing to relate about

[1] Metternich, Memorial concerning the prince of Carignan, October 25, 1822.

the further resolutions of the cabinets, and was forced to content himself with the mysterious intimation that the monarchs would not yield a jot, whatever might be the consequences of their action. At the close of the empty declaration, came an urgent, almost threatening exhortation, mainly directed, it was obvious, against the minor German courts. The authority of the state, they were told, was a sacred pledge entrusted to sovereign powers, and every government incurred grave responsibilities whenever it followed false counsels; but the three monarchs hoped that they would find allies in all the governments, faithful allies who would respect the letter and the spirit of the European treaties. The only inference the press could draw from these obscure words was that a fresh intervention was in prospect. Görres had ironically greeted the opening of the new diet of princes with an angry and confused writing, entitled, *The Holy Alliance and the Peoples at the Congress of Verona.* Now, at the close of the congress, universal wrath was voiced at the dictatorial language employed by the European triarchy.

The evil fruits of the congress ripened all too quickly. On January 6, 1823, the envoys of the eastern powers in Madrid handed in their threatening notes; received from Minister San Miguel, as might have been foreseen, a proud and stiff answer; and left the country a few days later. Meanwhile, at the court of the Tuileries, the war party of Montmorency was engaged in a prolonged and indecisive struggle with the more cautious Villèle. A proposal at mediation on the part of England, handed in by Wellington on his way home from Verona, was refused; but at Christmas Montmorency had to leave the cabinet, and for a moment the peace party was inspired with renewed hopes. Chateaubriand, however, replaced the fallen minister, and now that he had attained the goal of his desires, now that he had at length got his hand upon the tiller, the romantically minded statesman steered a straight course for war. The French envoy, too, had to submit a note to the Spanish minister, in respect of form somewhat more moderate than the despatches of the eastern powers, but scarcely less hostile than these in tenour; receiving likewise a trenchant answer (January 9th), he was recalled after a brief interval On January 28th, King Louis opened parliament with an address from the throne which verged upon a declaration of war. A hundred thousand Frenchmen, he said threateningly, were stationed close to the Pyrenees in order to preserve the Spanish throne for a descendant of Henry IV. The great majority

of the new Chamber consisted of passionate ultras. They gave such free rein to their partisan rage that the deputy Manuel was excluded from the house on account of a speech which, owing to the general disorder, he was unable even to finish, and a portion of the opposition, infuriated by this, quitted the Chamber. The ultras, thus left to their own devices, joyfully voted the sinews of war, whilst in Madrid the orators of the Cortes were boasting the invincibility of the Spanish liberators.

By March it was clear that war was inevitable, and Canning considered that the time had now come to reiterate publicly the antagonism which he had announced at Verona. On March 31st he declared to the Tuileries that England purposed to remain neutral, but under three conditions only: first, provided the independence of the Spanish crown were left intact; secondly, if the old established alliance between Great Britain and Portugal were not disturbed; and thirdly, if France did not raise a claim to any portion of the Spanish colonies, whose separation from the motherland seemed already decided. This was an unambiguous announcement that the British court was about to recognise the independence of South America. King George, indeed, expressed his ill-humour at the minister who had been forced upon him. To the Austrian envoy he lamented the death of the irreplaceable Castlereagh. His Hanoverian confidant, Count Münster, sent the federal envoy Hammerstein instructions which flatly contradicted the intentions of the English cabinet. Very alluring, too, to the Guelph ruler were the suggestions of his friend Metternich, who on several occasions advised that Canning should be dismissed.[1] But what in this country could the will of the monarch effect against a great statesman whose resolute action on behalf of national commerce had immediately opened all British hearts, who day by day rose higher in popular favour, and who in vigorous speeches was making threatening references to the furled pinions of the warships of Old England? The German powers had no longer any choice. However honestly at first they also had desired peace, they were jointly responsible for the threats of France, and must now share responsibility before the world for the legitimist crusade. The more hostile England's attitude, wrote Bernstorff to Vienna, the more firmly must the eastern powers hold together, so that France shall not be isolated.[2]

[1] Hatzfeldt's Reports, March 22 and 26 and May 10; Blittersdorff's Report, Frankfort, January 18, 1823.

[2] Bernstorff, Instruction to Hatzfeldt, March 1, 1823.

Such were the fruits of the czar's war fever, of the ultras' partisan fury, of the inept pliancy of Austria and Prussia. England had severed herself from the Grand Alliance, while in Spain began a war in which not even good luck could save the protectors of the perjured Bourbon from endless embarrassments.

§ 2. WANGENHEIM AND THE TRIAS POLICY. THE CUSTOMS CONFERENCES OF DARMSTADT.

The Spanish question had so completely monopolised the energies of the congress that Metternich had been forced to defer the proposed discussion of German affairs. He arranged with Bernstorff that in January a new German conference of ministers should be summoned at Vienna, restricted this time to a small circle of initiates. The two great powers wished to arrange for a unanimous federal policy, coming to terms regarding certain necessary federal laws and regarding the removal of the hostile federal envoys. This "epuration of the Bundestag," as Metternich termed it, had been under consideration by the great powers since the previous summer, but they still kept their intention a profound secret.[1] The plan was, above all, directed against the court of Stuttgart and its unruly federal envoy, Wangenheim. "Würtemberg," declared Bernstorff, in words almost identical with those used by Metternich, "is to-day to be regarded as the principal focus of all the revolutionary activities of Germany, while the king of Würtemberg is in fact and in intention a definite enemy to the Federation." To prepare for the campaign, Metternich returned by way of Munich, where, at the new year, he met with a most friendly reception. How delighted was the good Max Joseph to see "his Clemens" once more. On this occasion, as three years earlier, Rechberg considered that it would be safer for Bavaria to be represented at the Vienna conferences by Zentner, while he himself remained in Munich. In this way he would be able to send instructions to the plenipotentiary in Vienna, keeping his own eye the while upon the inconstant king. The Austrian chancellor agreed. With mind completely at rest as to the sentiments of the Bavarian court, he now returned to Vienna, and there described his successes in Munich with so much gratification that Hatzfeldt, reporting with customary exaggeration, wrote: "Metternich's arrival in

[1] Hatzfeldt's Report, July 18; Instruction to Hatzfeldt, July 26, 1822.

Munich made so great an impression, that the king, had he but been that which unfortunately he is not, might have freed himself from this fatal constitution by an edict of six lines."[1]

Meanwhile the king of Würtemberg had gleaned some information regarding the intentions of the great powers. In accordance with his usual custom he sought the help of his Russian brother-in-law, and begged for a confidential meeting. On several occasions during recent years he had made the same request, but always in vain. This time his wish was gratified. At Christmas the brothers-in-law met at Mittenwald in the Bavarian mountains, and King William did not refrain from allowing it to be known through the instrumentality of his envoy in Munich in how friendly a manner the czar had promised him protection.[2] In reality, Alexander, as soon as the conversation turned to the political situation, was extremely severe, assuring the king that it would be most dangerous for him to turn his back upon the Grand Alliance.[3] The czar subsequently remarked to Metternich: "I did not spare my dear brother-in-law. But the man is utterly corrupt, and is permeated by the worst possible principles."[4] The two separated in ill-humour and inspired by mutual mistrust.

It was not without good cause that the German great powers wished to secure a clear understanding about federal policy, for during the last three years there had prevailed at the Bundestag a state of anarchy whose continuance was impossible. That federation within the federation which the *Manuscript from South Germany* had advocated, seemed to have been realised, for an active party among the federal envoys was assembled beneath the banner of the German trias. A secure and instinctive understanding of the real forces of political life had from of old been rarer among the Germans than among the English or the Italians, and how morbidly during the last few centuries, under the influence of utterly false constitutions, had this national defect of political visionariness developed. In the Holy Empire, just as in the Germanic Federation, the constitution had not been the legal form

[1] Zastrow's Reports, December 31, 1822, January 5, 1823; Hatzfeldt's Report, January 8; Blittersdorff's Report, January 15, 1823.

[2] Zastrow to the king, January 19; to Bernstorff, February 9, 1823.

[3] A few weeks later Czar Alexander instructed his envoy von Benckendorff, who had been present at the Mittenwald meeting, to give King William an express reminder of this conversation. (Nesselrode, Instruction to Benckendorff, St. Petersburg, February 6/18, 1823.)

[4] Hatzfeldt's Report, January 8, 1823.

representative of existing relationships of power, for between law and power there yawned so wide an abyss that none but those of exceptionally sober intelligence could distinguish appearance from reality in statecraft, and even leading minds conceived political crotchets which in any other nation would have been regarded as positively childish. Johann Christian von Boyneburg, a statesman of first-class ability, had seriously believed that the elector John Philip, simply because he bore the title of the first prince of Germany, would be competent to mediate between France and Austria on behalf of the peace of the world, while so great a man as Leibnitz extolled these follies of pacifist policy, and glorified the elector of Mainz as the Atlas who bore the destiny of Europe upon his strong shoulders. So now, many well-meaning and able men were befooled by Wangenheim's particularist dreams of extended power.

The middle-sized and small states possessed an overwhelming majority at the Bundestag, having fifteen out of the seventeen votes of the inner council; and if regard were had to the imaginary federal frontier which the Vienna congress had drawn across Austrian and Prussian territory, in population also they outnumbered either of the two great powers. How obvious, therefore, was the temptation to unite this chaos of "la troisième Allemagne" into a single power; and even more obvious was the idea of misusing the letter of the federal law in a contest with the great powers, which had contented themselves with so modest a voting strength solely because they had presupposed that the Federation would follow their lead. The mood which prevailed at this moment in the Eschenheimer Gasse provided a grateful soil for such endeavours, for all the envoys had been profoundly mortified by the insulting treatment to which the Bundestag had been subjected during the Carlsbad days, but at the same time they had been encouraged to a desperate venture, since at the Vienna ministerial conferences the great powers had proved so cautious and pliable.

With all the impetuosity of his ardent spirit, Wangenheim threw himself into the devious paths of a policy which to him seemed sacred. According to his conviction as a natural philosopher, unity in trinity was the law of life. Whoever contested the application of this world-embracing law to German policy, could do so for no other reason than because he was animated by love of power and by avarice; and he assumed without further investigation that both the great powers, and Prussia in especial,

were influenced by these passions. He "glowed with shame" when he thought of the Carlsbad decrees, and as an honest liberal was resolved to resist with the utmost vigour every new attack upon constitutional life. He considered the foundations of the federal constitution altogether admirable, for they gave the minor states the preponderance; and even in the year 1849, when the Bundestag perished amid the execrations of the nation, he passionately defended the honourable assembly against the reproach of barrenness. It was true that in this happy Federation a genuine federative life would be first awakened by a firmer economic, ecclesiastical, and political union of the minor states, and the indefatigable man was continually weaving new plans for the furtherance of this sonderbund policy. Day by day he blew his soap bubbles, watched them rise in the air, and rejoiced like a child when they glittered for a time in the sunlight; but he remained just as happy when his bubbles burst. For the passionate delight in success which is the surest characteristic of practical genius, was in him completely lacking, and notwithstanding the honesty of his convictions he never got beyond a busy dilettantism. Among all the principles of the federal law there was none which he reverenced so highly as the formal legal equality of the sovereign federal states. He grudged the great powers even the appearance of preponderance, and was never disturbed by a doubt as to whether the power and unity of Germany, which, in his own fashion, he sincerely desired, could be reconciled with the equality of these eight-and-thirty sovereigns. On one occasion, when in a lengthy Opinion he had proved that Coethen was a state just as much as Prussia, and that the smuggling trade of Coethen was therefore as fully justified as the commercial policy of Prussia, he was overwhelmed by the consciousness of a completed great action, and wrote proudly to a friend: "The Prusso-Anhalt dispute, which is synonymous with the question whether we are to have a federation or a *societatem leoninam*, has been worthily and fruitfully answered, and—Würtemberg has given the answer which now re-echoes through Germany!"[1]

The tall, handsome cavalier, with eyes of a dreamer and good-humoured smile, was welcome everywhere. He was pardoned readily enough if, when the wine was coursing through his veins, he gave his indiscriminate high spirits free play, and when on one occasion in the presence of the Prussian envoy he actually proposed a toast to the republic. In wit and culture he

[1] Wangenheim to Hartmann, July 12, 1821.

excelled most of his official colleagues, while in dialectical skill he excelled them all, and he relentlessly permitted them to feel his superiority; he defended every one of his interventions in the Bundestag in replies and in rejoinders, and soon it became the rule for Würtemberg to give separate opinions upon every question, however trifling. Although the federal envoys were strictly bound to instructions, Buol's pompous opening addresses and Gagern's cordial outpourings of imperial patriotism, had accustomed the Bundestag to the misuse of parliamentary oratory; now Wangenheim's inexhaustible eloquence would sometimes occupy entire sittings. In Stuttgart the conservative minded Wintzingerode was not infrequently terrified at the bold plunges taken by his federal envoy, but the king and his private adviser Trott usually took the side of Wangenheim, and he was therefore able undisturbed to assemble a party of opposition. The Hessian envoys, Lepel and Harnier, skilful men of business, followed him almost unreservedly. Even Aretin, the Bavarian representative, a man of fine culture, who was far from sharing the wild pro-Bavarian fanaticism of his brother on the *Alemannia*, was not altogether unaffected when Wangenheim spoke to him of Bavaria's great future and of the leadership of "pure" Germany, and the Bavarian envoy therefore circumspectly participated in the little war against the great powers. Grünne, the Netherlander, being frankly ignorant of German affairs, was utterly defenceless against the oratorical arts of the Würtemberger. Even Carlowitz, a kindly man belonging to the cumbrous and formal school of the old-time Electoral Saxon officials, allowed himself to be bewitched; while to Hammerstein, the Hanoverian, who was in the habit of passing his nights at the gaming table, it seemed an excellent joke to disturb the peace of the Bundestag from time to time by some impudent contradiction.

Wangenheim's honest zeal for constitutional liberty would also on occasions induce the prudent Smidt of Bremen, who was extremely disinclined to oppose the house of Austria, to make his way into the opposition camp. This motley society was at first joined by a somewhat dubious ally, the youngest member of the Bundestag, Blittersdorff of Baden, who, next to Smidt, unquestionably possessed the keenest political intelligence in the assembly, but a man of quite ignoble character, who corrupted the fruits of his rich endowments by his base sentiments and immeasurable ambition. Born in 1792, he was now but thirty years of age, yet how many mutations had his career already

undergone by the close of the year 1822. When chargé d'affaires in St. Petersburg he had ably advocated the dynastic claims of the princely house of Baden, and as a supplementary activity had sharply opposed the Russians when they spoke too disdainfully of Germany. Subsequently, at the time of the Vienna conferences, he had been the most zealous of those ultras who had desired that the new territorial constitutions should be annulled by federal decrees. Next he made another change of front, and for about a year and a half luxuriated in trias dreams. At length, in the autumn of 1822, he was sent to Vienna, and now, this time for good, went over to the reactionary Austrian camp. Being a scion of the Catholic nobility of Breisgau, it was his hope that with Austria's help he would secure a Badenese ministerial post, or else, and this he would have preferred, that he would be granted high office in the Austrian service. Metternich's timid policy, however, could find no place for this restless schemer, who rarely complied with instructions, and was not afraid when it suited him to adopt revolutionary designs.

He was free from all trace of petty particularism. He looked down contemptuously upon the storms in a teacup at the Carlsruhe diet, and this contempt was resented by the Badenese liberals far more than were his reactionary sentiments. If from time to time he declared that the federal constitution was a continuous protest against the oppression of the lesser powers, or that nationality was the highest good of the minor states and one they must never sacrifice to foreign influences, these were no more than paradoxical expressions which were not seriously meant. His hopes were fixed upon a strong federal authority, one which would master the individual states. It was only the restless impulse towards activity, only the desire to let his light shine before men, which drove him for a time to follow the standard of Wangenheim. "I do not purpose that the money the state pays me shall be wasted," he wrote on one occasion. With bold and reckless humour he described in the following terms the dialectical, swashbuckler arts of the opposition to which he had attached himself: "Instructed by the example of the great courts that it is possible in politics by means of propositions, counter-propositions, dilemmas, syllogisms, sorites, and the entire battery of logical formulas, to undermine every serious political resolve, or at least to secure the postponement of its execution, we have laboured not to be surpassed in this matter, and indeed have endeavoured to outbid the masters in this art at least by

the thoroughness of our proceedings, so that it is almost impossible to excel us in the trick of proving whatever it suits us to prove." From this brazen front the reproach of faithlessness glanced off as water runs off a duck's back. In youth a careless spendthrift, and in later days an adroit speculator, he judged the world by the light of his own character, and openly adhered to the Machiavellian proposition that men must be ruled by fear and hope.[1] Notwithstanding his extreme ugliness, the tall, lean young man was a favourite in society, although few trusted him. He was a keen observer, so that his reports continue to offer valuable material to the expert. He charmed everyone by his self-reliance, by his gossipy small-talk, by his brilliant sallies, and by a knowledge which, though by no means profound, greatly exceeded the endowments in this respect of most of the federal envoys. In the school of an honourable political life, Blittersdorff's talents might possibly have developed into a lofty ambition, but in the Bundestag he was nothing but a wrangler and a pettifogger.

The worst of it was that this wonderful opposition party floated as insecurely in the air as did the trias dreams of Wangenheim. It was not rooted in the sentiments and interests of the cabinets, but in the transitory moods of envoys who might at any moment be called to account by instructions from their courts; and it was with perfect justice that the Badenese government wrote to Blittersdorff, "At the Bundestag there can very well exist a Bavarian or a Würtemberg party, but there can never be an Aretin party or a Wangenheim party."[2] Yet the opposition contained almost all the ability in the assembly, and neither Buol's tactless effervescence nor Goltz's honest good-humour was of any avail in debate. The presidential envoy had but two trustworthy allies: Marschall of Nassau, whose blustering arrogance was a nuisance to his friends; and Leonhardi, the envoy of the sixteenth curia. This dismal pedant had acquired for himself the honour of representing eight German sovereigns, from Hohenzollern to Waldeck, the reason being that as a well-to-do houseowner of Frankfort he could get along with a ludicrously small salary—and the work he did was in accordance with the price paid. On one occasion when an urgent sitting, instead of being fixed for the customary Thursday, was to be held

[1] Blittersdorff's Reports, Frankfort, June 10 and November 29, 1821, May 27, 1822, and subsequent dates.

[2] Privy Councillor Jolly, Opinion upon Blittersdorff's Memorial concerning German Policy, February 18, 1822.

on Saturday, and actually to be resumed on the following Monday, he protested vigorously, for how could a Frankforter be expected to renounce his human right of spending Sunday over his cider in the Stadtwald or at Bockenheim ?

The envoys of the two great powers not only lacked support in the assembly but also pursued discordant aims. The natural opposition of interests, which in European politics was again and again concealed, was nakedly displayed at the Bundestag. How intolerable to Prussian pride was the position of influence which the presidential envoy had by degrees arrogated to himself. He alone prescribed the agenda, without consulting the Bundestag, and did not hesitate on occasions to provide a disagreeable surprise even for the Prussian envoy. He preserved the archives in his own safe-keeping, for in this assembly everything was provisional. It had neither a chancellery nor a definitive order of business, and the envoys had to make the best of it when, with the utmost politeness and under various excuses, the officials of the Austrian chancellery refused to permit them access to documents they desired to examine. What difficulties, too, had General Wolzogen to encounter in the ordering of the federal military system, which was a matter of indifference to the Hofburg as long as Austria could depend upon Prussia's military aid ; day after day he had to counteract the secret intrigues of his Austrian colleague, Langenau. Since his Saxon experiences, the latter had cherished an irreconcilable hatred of Prussia, but understood so well how to hide his sentiments behind the mask of martial candour that he was able to lead the federal military committee by the nose. Very few had realised that this open-hearted soldier was Metternich's most trusty counsellor in all questions of federal policy, and that through the instrumentality of the secret Austrian police in Frankfort he had every letter of the federal envoys examined and all their conversations reported. Since, owing to the eternal dispute between Würtemberg and Baden, the fourth federal fortress of Ulm was not likely to be built within any period that could be foreseen, Austria endeavoured, in defiance of the treaties, to retain the fortress of Mainz exclusively in her own hands, and with lying excuses refused to admit Prussia to the promised rotation in command. Again and again did Goltz ask that the twenty millions of French money paid for the construction of fortresses, which Metternich had upon his own instance entrusted to the house of Rothschild in return for a simple note-of-hand, should be divided into equal parts and temporarily lent to Prussia and

Austria, a double interest being paid, and utilised for the upkeep of the existing federal fortresses.[1] Austria's finances were entirely dependent upon the goodwill of the great banking house, and since the minor states were afraid to give vigorous support to the Prussian envoy, the net result was that the Germanic Federation made the firm of Rothschild an annual present of about half a million francs.

In the course of these negotiations, even the peace-loving Goltz made the experience which was subsequently that of every Prussian federal envoy, namely, that a true-hearted Prussian was forced to oppose Austria as soon as he became intimately acquainted with Austrian federal policy. Before long he was completely estranged from his Austrian colleague, while the sentiments of his subordinates may be judged from a secret memorial by Küpfer, secretary to legation, concerning Prussia's German policy, which was sent to Berlin by Goltz in the year 1822. In this document, the Berlin court is advised to maintain the Austrian alliance for the time being, but secretly to resume the Frederician policy, and by resolute defence of "the Protestant principle" to attract to its side the minor courts both of the south and of the north, so that when the day of the inevitable separation should arrive, the whole or almost the whole of Lower Austrian Germany would be prepared to accept Prussia's leadership. The memorial was nothing more than the private composition of an ambitious and untrustworthy young official who was compelled shortly afterwards to quit the state service, and it was remarkable solely as an indication of the sentiments that animated Prussian federal diplomacy. But it subsequently acquired undeserved celebrity, for it was stolen by an official of the embassy, the dreaded demagogue Gustav Kombst, and was universally regarded by the liberal press as the sinister work of Eichhorn—a foolish suspicion which, unfortunately, owing to the bureaucratic formalism of those days was allowed to circulate without contradiction.[2]

To add to the confusion, the foreign diplomats also intervened in this war of all against all. Anstett, the Russian envoy, an incorrigible intriguer, pursued his subterranean activities, at

[1] Goltz, Justification of my Conduct in Frankfort, September 9, 1824.

[2] Küpfer, Unauthoritative Ideas concerning the political system of Prussia in Relation to Germany. In essentials the document is accurately reprinted in the work (by Kombst) Authentic Documents from the Archives of the Germanic Federation (Strasburg, 1835), p. 1; in Welcker's Important Documents, p. 356; and elsewhere. The memorial was subsequently elaborated by Küpfer, and was despatched to Bernstorff a second time on December 18, 1824.

first, doubtless, with the knowledge of Capodistrias, but, after the Greek's fall, upon his own account and in opposition to Nesselrode's wishes. He busied himself everywhere among the lesser envoys in order to incite them against the two great powers, and week after week Blittersdorff had to report what "someone" or what "my fat friend, the friend who is not my colleague," had found renewed occasion to suggest. Faber and Strinkevitch, the universally known secret agents, worked under Anstett's orders; but their eavesdropping became such a scandal that after Capodistrias' dismissal it was considered advisable to recall them from Frankfort. Less conspicuous than that of Anstett, and yet extremely powerful, was the influence of the French envoy Reinhard, who probably continued to entertain secret relationships with the dissentients on the left bank of the Rhine. A Swabian by birth, a man of learning, a moderate liberal, and a natural patron of "la troisième Allemagne," he was a kindred spirit to the Würtemberg envoy; and although Wangenheim, in his straightforward patriotism, remained completely inaccessible to all Rhenish Confederate ideas, the impetuous and visionary German could not fail at times to be influenced unconsciously by the clever semi-Frenchman. What a delight it was to him when his friend Reinhard gave a brilliant banquet to celebrate at one and the same time the recovery of Goethe from a severe illness and the birth of an heir to the throne of Würtemberg.[1]

Under such conditions the negotiations concerning the federal military system could not fail to exhibit a repulsive picture of German disintegration, which effectively recalled the deplorable memories of the Ratisbon Reichstag. On April 9, 1821, the Bundestag at length came to an agreement as to the "general principles of German military organisation," and on July 11, 1822, as to the "more intimate details of the matter," so that nearly six years after the opening of the federal assembly the principles of the military system were completed on paper. Since Austria would not employ her influence, the upshot was a thorough defeat for Prussia and a complete victory for the petty kingdoms. The federal army was to have a strength of about 300,000 men, Austria supplying three army corps, numbering 95,000 men. Prussia, three-fourths of whose population belonged to the Federation, was allowed to contribute no more than one-third of her army, three corps, numbering 80,000 men. Thus

[1] Wangenheim to Hartmann, March 14, 1823.

the petty states enjoyed the satisfaction of having more troops upon the federal rolls than either of the two great powers, for they supplied four corps, numbering more than 120,000 men. The seventh corps was Bavarian, the eighth comprised the remaining South German states, the tenth represented Hanover and the minor states of North Germany; upon the map, at least, these corps could be regarded as unities. But in order that the king of Saxony might also rejoice in the possession of a general commanding an army corps, a wonderful ninth corps was devised, comprising the troops of Saxony, Thuringia, Electoral Hesse, Nassau, and Luxemburg, a war force which, it need hardly be said, never once assembled even for manœuvres.

In their zeal for federalist equality, Wangenheim and his friends had deliberately disregarded all the prerequisites of military order and readiness for war. The two leading stipulations of the military constitution, articles 5 and 8, declared that no federal state which contributed an entire army corps could combine other troops with its own; and that even the appearance of the supremacy of one federal state over the others must be avoided. Thus was discarded all possibility of combining the unsupported contingents of the smallest states to form parts of a reasonably useful army. The strength of the federal army, amounting to one per cent. of the population, was altogether inadequate when compared with the fighting forces of Russia and France; and would necessarily prove wholly insufficient in the course of a prolonged war, for the reserve forces were not to exceed more than one-sixth per cent., or in an extreme case one-half per cent., of the population. The whole system rested upon the expectation that Prussia would voluntarily furnish three times as much as her federal allies. In case of war, the federal commander was to be chosen by the Federation, *i.e.* by the middle-sized states; he would lack the power of independent action, for he was to be assisted by representatives who would be appointed by various war-lords to safeguard the interests of their respective contingents; and in order to paralyse his activities completely, Würtemberg and Bavaria went so far as to propose (but this time in vain) that he should at the outset submit his plan of campaign to the federal assembly. It was further discussed whether, in addition to the commander-in-chief, his lieutenant-general and quartermaster-general should also have to take an oath of fealty to the Federation. When contentious matter threatened to run short, Wangenheim raised his favourite question whether in the

subject under discussion unanimity was requisite, or whether a simple majority would suffice—or brought up a still more effective point, by asking who was really responsible for the procrastination of the affair. When this string was touched, the disputants instantly joined forces in a chorus of indignation, every man of them exclaiming: "It is impossible to accuse me of responsibility for the delay!"

Interwoven with these disputes, the struggle about the federal fortresses still continued. Although the conditions under which Mainz and Luxemburg were to be garrisoned had long before been specified by European treaties, Wangenheim raised the consideration that the Federation had not participated in drawing up these treaties, and therefore did not require to take over the two federal fortresses. At any rate, the nomination of the military governor in time of peace should be left in the hands of the territorial suzerain of the fortified town, for the presence "of a foreign military commander would be vexatious for a German sovereign." The consequence was that in Mainz and Luxemburg provisional arrangements still persisted, and the fortifications were manifestly falling into disrepair. In the year 1822, the acquirement of land for the federal fortress of Rastatt was completed, and two years later the finished plan for the fortifications was submitted to the military committee; but nothing more was done, for it was still uncertain whether Rastatt or Ulm was to be fortified, or whether both fortresses were to be constructed simultaneously. For Landau, during the years 1816 to 1830, Bavaria provided no more than one million gulden, and for Germersheim, which was also to be a federal fortress, no more than 167,000 gulden, a sum not even equal to the interest on the French money which had been paid over to Bavaria. The Prussians, who in this witches' sabbath of particularist futilities alone continued to think of the fatherland, did not attempt to conceal their disgust (as even Blittersdorff was forced to admit to his court); and Goltz wrote in despair to Berlin that he would not raise any further objections, for if he did so nothing at all would be done.[1]

When an agreement was at length secured about military organisation, fresh differences arose. The law allotted troops of all arms to each sovereign proportionally to population, but it soon appeared that many of the German princes were not in a

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, November 18; Goltz's Report, March 13, 1821, etc.

position to provide a cavalry regiment or a battery, but had perforce to content themselves with military fragments which, in the courtly official language of the Bundestag, were described by the high-sounding name of "body of cavalry or artillery." The body of cavalry of the prince of Liechtenstein consisted of a force of eight horse. Even to the strategists of the Bundestag such army columns appeared somewhat remarkable. Since any compulsion of the sovereigns must be avoided on principle, it was suggested that the smallest states might freely arrange with their more powerful neighbours for the supply of these special arms. Thereupon the duke of Oldenburg interposed strenuously with an objection. In a lengthy memorial he expounded the view that for larger states the maintenance of a strong military force was "a matter of self-indulgence," a means for securing political prestige, but for smaller ones it was no more than a passive duty; nor would anyone deny that in war a small contingent might be "the sacrifice of a moment," whereas this could not be contended regarding the Prussian army. Since, therefore, for the lesser powers, the gratification was slighter and the danger more extensive, he demanded as a right that in his case the burden should be lightened, and that he should be permitted to provide an unmixed force of infantry. The landgrave of Homburg took the opposite view. He desired to supply the federal army with 29 cavalry-men, 2 sappers, and 14 artillerymen (3 mounted and 11 on foot), and insisted upon the privilege of furnishing this force of troops "in their pristine Homburg purity," for representation by a foreign sovereign would be more costly, and would moreover involve an outflow of Homburg money "into a foreign country." Nassau, on the other hand, claimed the privilege of providing nothing but infantry and artillery, and since Metternich privately supported his friend Marschall's desire, Wangenheim considered it his duty to offer passionate opposition. Was it proposed, he asked, to compel the federal states which contributed the other army corps to strengthen the ninth corps with cavalry, all for the sake of Nassau? "Would these foreign troops be always handled with the same attention, care, and affection" as the soldiers properly belonging to the ninth corps? Thus it went on; an interminable dispute, which so fully occupied the energies of the military committee that during the years 1822 to 1830 not a single additional noteworthy decision was secured concerning the organisation of the federal army. Not until the July revolution in Paris had made the danger of war with France

seem imminent, did the Bundestag pluck up courage, on December 9, 1830, for the reasonable resolve that the smallest contingents, from that of Weimar downwards, should be compacted to form a reserve infantry division destined for fortress duty. Even then it remained extremely doubtful whether the men of Bückeburg and of Reuss would in case of war reach the Rhenish fortresses in good time.

Of joint manœuvres in time of peace, or of any kind of close association between the contingents of the army corps, there was absolutely no talk. Only the states of the eighth army corps made quite inadequate arrangements for a uniform arming of their respective contingents, and also regarding the appointment of the general in command—not, of course, without much quarrelling, for it was long before Würtemberg and Baden would agree that Darmstadt, " the weakest power," possessed equal rights with themselves.[1] A cartel for the mutual handing over of deserters was promised, but the discussion of the arrangements continued for five years, from 1820 to 1825 ; then the matter was shelved for a time, until at length a decision was arrived at, in the year 1831, but the arrangements were so defective that misunderstandings and grievances were endless. For an entire generation no agreement could be secured regarding the provisioning of the federal army. The German princes now possessed a military supremacy more unrestricted than had ever before been conceded them, and, supported by their thrifty diets, they misused this right in order to grant excessive furloughs, whereby the efficiency of many of the contingents was reduced below that of a simple militia. In the military organisation of the Germanic Federation, almost every conceivable system was represented, from the recruited mercenaries of the Hansa towns to those of Prussia provided by universal compulsory service.

In view of the enormous changes which the art of war had undergone in Napoleonic times, the lesser contingents of the federal army were well-nigh as useless as had been the imperial army during the eighteenth century, and in outward appearance were scarcely less ridiculous. The simple military principle that comrades-in-arms should be dressed as far as possible alike was utterly disregarded. Each petty war-lord endeavoured to safeguard the " nationality " of his forces by distinguishing them in the most striking way from the troops of neighbouring states, so that the enemy might always know with certainty whom he had to face.

[1] Blittersdorff's Reports, November 29, 1821, and subsequent dates.

The discovery of new uniforms soon became a sport providing agreeable occupation for the numerous idle hours of the minor German princes. Very few of the sovereigns followed the reasonable example of the grand duke of Baden, who clad his troops after the Prussian model. The Hanoverians continued to wear the red coats of the English soldiery, while the Black Brunswickers were still seen in their familiar sable trappings; the men of Darmstadt sported trefoil epaulettes; a Würtemberg cavalry squadron, doubtless in honour of the Russian relationships of the royal house, carried lances and wore fur caps like those of the Cossacks; the Bückeburg uniform was a bold combination of Bavarian padded helmets with Black Brunswick tunics; the Saxons hit upon a conjunction of colours whose hideousness was a guarantee against the possibility of imitation, for the unfortunate infantry were clad in green tunics and bright blue trousers, whilst there was subsequently added a sort of peaked nightcap. It seemed as if particularist vanity were intentionally exposing to ridicule these valiant German warriors who under the leadership of Prussian generals could become the best soldiers in the world; it was always a day of rejoicing for the Frankfort gamins when the members of the federal military committee appeared on parade in their extraordinary complexity of uniforms. Taking it all in all, this outcome of kinglet arrogance and Austrian sloth was so deplorable that henceforward when war threatened the question immediately came up for discussion how the federal military constitution could best be thrown on the dust-heap, for whenever there was need of soldiers it forthwith became overwhelmingly clear that Austria was paralysed by her Italian possessions while the middle-sized states were utterly impotent, and that Prussia alone was competent to defend the frontiers of Germany.

In the miserable Coethen negotiations, Wangenheim's attitude towards the Prussian envoy was even more hostile than in military affairs. He had no eye for the impropriety of the Anhalt smuggling traffic; it sufficed him that the letter of the federal law, and the letter alone, was against Prussia. He desired to use against the disturber of the peace all the means provided by the federal executive organisation, and in case of need to have recourse to arms. In his eyes this was a holy war, and a generation later, when everyone else had forgotten the affair, he published all his ancient opinions upon the Coethen question, in order to show the Germans how noble a spirit had dwelt in their defunct

Bundestag. No one, however, is free from bias where questions of political power are involved, nor could even this inspired defender of the federal law rise superior to the generalisation. It was his wish to establish a separate customs union of the minor states, and it seemed to him that Prussia's commercial policy constituted the most dangerous obstacle to his own plans. The maladroitness of Count Goltz, who defended Prussia's cause, politically incontestable, with dubious legal contentions, gave the Würtemberger many small and transient successes; but Wangenheim was soon forced to recognise that his friends, and especially Aretin, were becoming restive. Who could seriously believe that Prussia would sacrifice her customs system to a federal decree? Moreover, as Blittersdorff said in his frivolous way, "Happily the federal legislative system provides means enough for shelving any question indefinitely." Even Count Buol, who had at first regarded the dispute with cynical delight, drew back in alarm when it became more and more evident that Wangenheim aimed at founding a third power in Germany. Amid the rejoicings of the liberal press, the committee appointed to discuss these matters overwhelmed the Prussian state with bitter reproaches, but no decisive action was taken; the harassing affair dragged on until, after many years, Anhalt voluntarily gave way to the Prussian demands.

A valuable contrast to these particularist follies was afforded by Wangenheim's attitude in the disputed questions of federal constitutional law. Herein were displayed all this remarkable man's virtues: his candour, his sense of justice, his wide knowledge, and his industry. He was the soul of the committee for grievances and petitions, a body which was regarded by the Hofburg as the focus of demagogy in the Bundestag. It is true that this restless activity remained as sterile as the Bundestag itself, but Wangenheim understood how to turn it to advantage on behalf of the idea of the federation of lesser powers. He maintained lively intercourse with the liberal press, and before long the papers reported almost every week how boldly Würtemberg had once again come forward in Frankfort as champion of the oppressed. The belief in the liberal sentiments of the South German courts was already becoming a general prejudice. In foreign lands this view was also being adopted, if only for the reason that the French press, which set the tone in these matters, had an affection for the states of the trias as the allies of France.

The American publicist Everett, who in the year 1822 considered that the state of German affairs was worse than that which prevailed in Central Asia, could discern in this vast desert of slavery but one oasis, Würtemberg and the neighbouring lands.

Wangenheim's reports upon the Detmold constitutional dispute, and upon the complaints of the old estates of Schleswig-Holstein against the Danish government, secured grateful recognition from the newspapers. whilst in the Hofburg they aroused increasing hostility; but a perfect storm of anger raged in the Austrian camp when the Würtemberg statesman valiantly espoused the cause of the purchasers of the Westphalian domains, who upon the elector's orders had been dismissed unheard by the Hessian courts. A few years earlier the Bundestag had indeed interceded on behalf of these unfortunates, but now courage had waned among the diplomats of the Eschenheimer Gasse; they had no wish to be embroiled with the despot of Cassel, whose only answer when called to order by the Federation was a flood of invective, and who, moreover, was assured of Metternich's favour.[1] In Berlin the view had long prevailed that the Federation was incompetent to remedy the evils of arbitrary government in Hesse. Consequently Prussia had with great difficulty at length (1821) secured from the courts of Hanover, Brunswick, and Cassel, that the four heirs of the kingdom of Westphalia should meet to deliberate upon an agreement as to common legal principles. Count Goltz also wished that the Bundestag, instead of passing another resolution which it would be impossible to carry into effect, should first await the result of these negotiations. On the other hand, Hanover, Oldenburg, Electoral Hesse, and several of the other minor states, considered that legitimist rights and the monarchical principle would be shaken to their foundations if any governmental proceedings of the usurper Jerome were recognised as legally binding. They tacitly ignored that Electoral Hesse and the two Guelph states had beyond question ceased to exist during the years 1807 to 1813, and that therefore a *debellatio* which was perfectly valid from the point of view of international law had taken place; nor did they choose to recall that in their own territories were to be found mediatised princes who had by no means all agreed in recognising the new *de facto* state authority as legitimate. It was obvious that this legitimist zeal was the mask for secret anxiety. The sovereigns did not feel securely seated upon their thrones; they were thinking about their long-

[1] See vol. II, pp. 408 et seq.

suffering Prussian neighbour, and dreading a new dethronement. What an uproar, therefore, when Wangenheim, in a detailed report, showed that the elector of Hesse was manifestly guilty of an infringement of the law, and that it was necessary for the Federation to admonish him to allow justice a free course. He went on to advance, though in somewhat ill-chosen terms, the incontestable proposition that in every state there must always exist some kind of government, saying: "The everlasting state speaks through the voice of all its rulers; the state authority empowers the *de facto* ruler only in so far as the wielding of that authority imposes upon him certain obligations." He repeatedly appealed to the meritorious Electoral Hessian judge, Pfeiffer, and to Ludwig Klüber's book, *The International Law of the Germanic Federation and of the Federal States.*

The result of this last appeal was that the impression produced by Wangenheim's honest words was rendered worse. Recently the editor of *The Acts of the Vienna Congress during the years* 1814 *and* 1815 had been regarded as the leading German authority on the doctrine of the state, and his reputation in this respect had been uncontested by the cabinets. But now suspicion was everywhere rife, and attached even to the distinguished name of Klüber. When the second edition of his *International Law* was published, and when shortly afterwards his devoted patron Hardenberg died, Marschall of Nassau brought an accusation against him in Berlin on account of demagogic sentiments. Despite his colossal learning, Klüber's was by no means a poietic intelligence. Undisturbed by the new ideas of the historical school of law, he continued to cling to the traditional doctrines of natural law, accepting even Rousseau's theory of the primitive contract as introduced by Kant into German jurisprudence. But he followed up these antiquated general principles by a strictly objective and extremely substantial demonstration of positive law, which never transcended the limits of moderate constitutionalist views, and which, herein sharply contrasting with the enmity to history characteristic of Rotteck's law of reason, endeavoured throughout to trace the connection between existing institutions and the old imperial law. Marschall's accusation had wide repercussions. Metternich made Gentz examine the suspicious work, and then declared that this was the most revolutionary book that had been published in Germany for many years.[1] Schmalz, ever on the alert, considered it his duty to provide studious youth with an antidote, and wrote

[1] Hatzfeldt's Report, January 8 and 16, 1823.

a treatise on *German Constitutional Law*, a book which, though less fanatical than other writings by the same author, remained, owing to its poverty in ideas, almost unnoticed. In Frankfort, Klüber, although attached to the Prussian embassy as legal councillor, was sedulously shunned by the Austrians. To the Hofburg it seemed incredible audacity that at the council table of the Bundestag Wangenheim should cite such an authority, and Metternich exclaimed in a fury, "This wretched fellow has by this report put the seal upon his damnation." [1] To crown all, this was the moment chosen by Wangenheim's attaché, Robert Mohl, for the publication of his first book *Federal Justice*. Mohl was a young scholar whose honest candour and scientific impartiality made him seem strangely out of place in Frankfort society, and in his book he ventured to criticise the votes of some of the federal envoys. Metternich and Hatzfeldt could no longer doubt that an entire band of literary assassins was now assembled round the Würtemberg envoy. Wangenheim, meanwhile, had embarked upon a determined and thoroughly justified attack on Metternich's favourite creation, the central committee of enquiry in Mainz. With the exception of the seven governments which participated in the Black Committee, the German courts had no knowledge of the activities of the Mainz demagogue-hunters—although it was the legal duty of the committee to report to the Bundestag. In September, 1820, when this remarkable state of affairs had persisted for nearly a year, Wangenheim demanded that the report should be presented without delay; he renewed the demand upon several occasions, but the men of Mainz preserved a profound silence. Losing patience, on March 14, 1822, he proposed the immediate abolition of this authority, which had not hitherto arrested a single person of note, and had therefore obviously failed to discover anything of importance. It was time, he said, that repose should at length be restored to perturbed spirits, and besides, every one of the federal states possessed ample means of its own for the punishment of demagogic intrigues. He wisely refrained from any allusion to Würtemberg's original assent to the appointment of the committee. Strangely enough, his bold declaration of war against Carlsbad policy was supported by a majority in the Bundestag. Eight votes of the inner council, all the minor states from Baden downwards, supported Würtemberg's proposal, thus outvoting the two great powers and the three largest kingdoms. No doubt several of the minor princes

[1] Metternich to Berstett, June 24, 1823.

were animated solely by mortified pride; and as far as the miserly elector of Hesse was concerned, his only objection to the Mainz committee was that it cost money. It is possible, too, that some of the envoys were carried away by Wangenheim's eloquence, and acted without instructions. Finally, Blittersdorff's sole reason for voting with the majority was that to the reactionary zeal of the Carlsruhe court it seemed that the Mainz committee was not vigorous enough.[1] But let the motives have been what they may, the action was worthy of all honour, and it was the best deed of this strangely compounded opposition that it endeavoured to clear out the evil nest of political suspicion and persecution.

Count Buol, who carried on a private correspondence with the president of the committee of enquiry, was all the more painfully surprised because Baden and Darmstadt, two of the courts represented in Mainz, had voted with the majority. Lest worse befall he gave the committee a hint, and at length, on May 30th, the report, with three-and-thirty appendixes, and well provided with seals, was laid upon the table of the federal assembly. In a covering letter, the Mainz committee declared that information was withheld regarding enquiries that were still in progress, lest a premature publication should do harm—a malicious dig at Wangenheim, who had on several occasions carelessly told tales out of school. The Würtemberger and his associates hoped that they were at length to gain precise information about these obscure doings; but Austrian ingenuity was equal to the difficulty. Buol proposed that the sealed papers should in the first instance be entrusted to a committee which was to consist of the seven states already represented in Mainz. This was done, and Wangenheim and his friends learned nothing of what had been taking place in Mainz beyond what the committee of the seven initiates thought fit to divulge to the Bundestag. There could no longer be any question of abolishing this sinister authority, for its report was not carried beyond 1821. Years passed before the supplementary report was ready, and thus the demagogue-hunters of Mainz were assured of a further long period of congenial activities.

Outside the Bundestag, Wangenheim's activities were likewise unceasing. The Frankfort conference of the states of the Upper Rhenish ecclesiastical province continued from time to time to meet under his presidency; and although the proceedings were

[1] Berstett to Marschall, July 20, 1822.

now concerned with the innocent question of instituting a small archbishopric, Wangenheim still confidently hoped that from these conferences there would issue a new and enlightened national system of ecclesiastical law, and first of all a general synod for the whole of Germany. In fervid speeches he extolled the successes of these pure German courts, which had "established the episcopal system in all its fullness and dignity." He rapturously exclaimed, "It is thus that a light has become established which can hardly be obscured by the spiritual vapours which here and there take shape in ghostly fashion to form gigantic phantoms."

In reality the Upper Rhenish states had as yet effected nothing beyond the determination of their new diocesan boundaries, having not even drawn up a federal prescription regarding the choice of bishops; and when they now endeavoured, after the Napoleonic manner, to impose upon their future territorial bishops strictly bureaucratic rules of ecclesiastical duty, they encountered the decisive opposition of the Vatican. Moreover, the candidates they recommended to the curia as first holders of the new episcopal sees, basing these recommendations upon proposals made by the territorial clergy, were utterly displeasing to the pope. He rejoined with an opposing list of fourteen names (which included that of young Räss, editor of the *Mainzer Katholik*); but these "fourteen holy saviours," as they were termed in Carlsruhe, were utterly unacceptable to the cabinets. In Baden, all the chapters of the country had designated their acting bishop Wessenberg as the most suitable person for the archiepiscopal office, but the government was afraid of this appointment, and vainly endeavoured to secure the candidate's voluntary withdrawal. Blittersdorff went so far as to declare to his patron Berstett that it might be well to cast suspicion in Vienna upon the inconvenient man as an ultra-liberal, lest he might be appointed bishop of Rottenburg, for which see his name had also been suggested.[1] The establishment of the new ecclesiastical province was at a standstill for some years, and no further progress was made until after Wangenheim's fall, when Berstett (1824) supported by Metternich, began secret negotiations in Rome. Then at length, after prolonged and laborious deliberations, on April 11th the pope issued the bull *Ad dominici gregis custodiam* to supplement the Upper Rhenish episcopal areas' bull. The new bull was published by the governments with reservations, for in addition

[1] Blittersdorff to Berstett, April 27, 1822.

to prescriptions regarding seminaries and episcopal jurisdiction it contained some that were impossible to accept. But at least the question of episcopal appointments was now brought to a head, and the Upper Rhenish chapters, like those of Prussia, were instructed by the pope to select those candidates only who would be agreeable to the territorial suzerain.

There was now no difficulty in coming to an understanding about the personalities of the first bishops. The allied governments started from the consideration that preference should be given to persons of gentle disposition, who would be objectionable to no one. The dangerous principle was good enough for the moment, but those who had been guided by it had to learn later that in times of stress persons of weakly character are apt, under the influence of their anxieties, to become priestly zealots. The first archbishop of Freiburg was Bernhard Boll, a conciliatory and well-meaning prince of the church. As soon as this appointment had been decided (1827), Wessenberg resigned the acting episcopate which he had held for ten years in defiance of the pope, and took leave of his flock in a strikingly beautiful and apostolically mild pastoral. He exhorted them not to misunderstand the signs of the times, and warned them against the old sins of those who "after that the light has come into the world continue to love the darkness more than the light." The curia had left him unmolested all this time only because it foresaw that his fall would inevitably occur when the reconstitution of his diocese took place. He succumbed to the tragic fate of all those well-intentioned men of half measures who cannot grasp the fact that evangelical freedom is impossible upon the soil of the Roman church, and that a heretic alone can gain a victory over the pope. For years after this, Wessenberg continued to live a private life by the lake of Constance and in Breisgau, profoundly loved and venerated, a benefactor to the poor, an indefatigable author and collector, and in the Badenese chamber a vigorous advocate of moderate liberalism. As far as the Catholic church was concerned he was a dead man. He was the last representative of that old episcopal system which cannot strike roots elsewhere than in the firm soil of the national state, but for which there was no place in the loose rubble of the Germanic Federation.

Meanwhile the five courts were engaged in fresh deliberations regarding the common defence of the right of ecclesiastical supremacy. Just as Napoleon had followed up his concordat by the organic articles, and Bavaria hers by the edict of religions,

so the five courts proposed to supplement the two Upper Rhenish bulls by independent rules of ecclesiastical discipline. After tedious negotiations, in which the Badenese ecclesiastical councillor Burg, a man ever ready for service, acted as intermediary, on January 30, 1830, was published the ordinance dealing with the suzerain rights of protection and supervision. For the most part it gave expression to the earlier proposals, preserving the *placet* for the crown, subjecting the education of the clergy to strict supervision, and manifesting such open mistrust of the church that the pope immediately entered a protest. Nevertheless, during these first years the relationships between state and church were almost untroubled. The flourishing condition of the theological faculties in Tübingen and Freiburg showed how uprightly these minor crowns, despite their bureaucratic timidities, were promoting the weal of the church; their officials, like those of Bavaria and better than those of Prussia, understood how to get on with the clergy, and in this latter body men belonging to the tolerant older generation still constituted the majority.

Far more important than these ecclesiastico-political attempts at a sonderbund was the great commercial conference of the South German and some of the Central German minor states which, as arranged in the Vienna conversations, assembled in Darmstadt on September 13, 1820. Here also Wangenheim was the disturbing factor. He had ridden over from Frankfort, and was, as ever, ready to mediate; on equally good terms with List, the protectionist, and Nebenius, the free-trader, for in his view from this commercial diet would inevitably issue the political league of pure Germany. The Darmstadt negotiations were not, in fact, altogether fruitless, although plans and counter-plans continued to rise restlessly to the surface like the bubbles in a simmering pot. This served as a process of purification, eliminating from German commercial policy all unpractical and visionary ideas. The conferences gave an opportunity to the participators, and also to the attentive observers in the court of Berlin, to become acquainted with the economic interests of the federal states, and to give serious consideration to the preconditions of a commercial union. But repeated failures to secure any definite results showed that a customs union was impossible without Prussia. Just as Wangenheim's dreams of a national church ended in the establishment of a small archbishopric, so it was

impossible that a viable national commercial policy should ever issue from a purely inland economic area.

It is not surprising that the misused nation hailed with delight the first attempt at the abolition of internal tolls. Numerous addresses of gratitude rewarded the magnanimous determination of the courts. Badenese agriculturists testified in advance to Minister Berstett that by the Darmstadt conferences "the foundation has been laid for a glorious and genuinely national institution." Even E. W. Arnoldi of Gotha, the first among German men of business to recognise the national importance of the Prussian customs law, was now swept away by the current of the time, and begged the duke to cast in his lot with the South German states, on the ground that Gotha could not make headway against the competition of the better equipped Prussian factories. It is true that, after the traditional fashion, the wishes and expectations of the general public turned in all directions under heaven. The commercial classes of Baden demanded unconditional free trade, saying that it was simply impossible for the hundredweight of colonial produce to pay more than fifteen kreutzers duty. Others broke forth into the customary abuse of "the proud foreigners." In the Bavarian chamber, Köster proposed that there should be a German national dress made exclusively of German materials, and that in the elementary schools a patriotic detestation of foreign wares should be instilled into children's minds. The merchants of Mannheim, on the other hand, based their hopes mainly upon severe duties directed against Frankfort commerce; the union was to secure for other places the advantages which the town on the Main owed to its control of excessive capital, and it must refuse any concessions to the Rhenish Prussians until the Prussian state was willing to make common cause, and to submit to the will of the majority.[1]

The writings of List and his associates, who gradually lost themselves among the errors of the rigid prohibitive system, served only to increase the general obscurity. In a memorial intended for the Darmstadt conferences, and published in July, 1821, Miller of Immenstadt, formulated the following demands: the prohibition of the import of all foreign wares which could be produced in Germany or for which substitutes could be provided; an attempt to secure a commercial union with Switzerland,

[1] Petition from E. W. Arnoldi and others to the duke of Gotha (1820); from the agricultural union of Ettenheim to Berstett, September 1, 1820; from Ludwig Bassermann Frohn of Mannheim, October, 1820; etc.

Piedmont, Holland, Hanover, the Hansa towns, and Holstein; the king of Denmark as a loyal German federal prince, would certainly be disposed to give the ships of the union the protection of the Danish flag. And all this was proposed in the name of German honour and was advocated with the inevitable patriotic emotion! The urgent exhortations of List's union, which was also represented in Darmstadt, soon became extremely annoying to the governments. Nebenius, the Badenese plenipotentiary, forbade his secretary to hold any converse with List, and openly told the agitator that his presence was superfluous and aroused evil rumours. List had no influence upon the course of the deliberations, and Berstett considered it necessary to assure Metternich that nothing but the need of self-preservation had given rise to the Darmstadt undertaking, and that it had "not issued from the declamations of a small body of self-seeking manufacturers."[1]

Among the cabinets, views were no less divergent than among the general public, for it was only in outward aspect that the allied states constituted a geographical unit. When serious business came to be discussed, the utter vanity of the scandalous doctrine expounded in the *Manuscript from South Germany* was speedily displayed. There was once more manifested that peculiarity in the position of Rhineland which has so frequently in our history enabled this region to mediate between north and south. The small Upper Rhenish states were connected with the Rhenish lowlands by stronger interests than those which they shared with the Bavario-Swabian lands. Electoral Hesse and Thuringia had been driven into this South German association by nothing else than a political whimsy—hatred for Prussia. Consequently the court of Cassel was from the first aloof and reluctant. Already in 1822 the Thuringian states began separate deliberations in Arnstadt; but they participated simultaneously in the Darmstadt conferences, and worried the Berlin cabinet with unmeaning general enquiries, inspired by the hopeless perplexity of ineptitude and enfeeblement of the will.

How great, too, were the contrasts between the various states in respect of economic views and legislation! In Baden, high duties were obviously impossible, for the entire country consisted of frontier districts, while the Swiss neighbours still lacked any orderly customs system. The government knew how to make an adroit use of the state's favourable commercial situation,

[1] Nebenius' Report. Darmstadt, September 22; Berstett to Metternich September 8, 1820.

and contented itself with the imposition of extremely low duties which attracted a vigorous transit trade to Baden and furnished a rich yield to the treasury. Under such a system, large scale manufacture could not, indeed, be initiated, but the ministry of finance looked upon this as superfluous. Nor did the people suffer from the absence of local manufactures, for, owing to free trade, cheap manufactured articles were freely imported from other lands. But all Baden's German neighbours uttered loud complaints, for a widespread smuggling traffic was centred here, flourishing especially in the Black Forest, and being treated by the government with unseemly indulgence. Many deplorable scandals, as for instance the great trial of the firm of Renner for fraud, recalled the state of affairs in Coethen. In Darmstadt, an obsolete physiocratic system still prevailed, which knew nothing of frontier dues, and derived almost the entire income of the state from direct taxation and from the yield of the domains; the commercial classes of Mainz, which could not forget the Napoleonic *douane*, adjured the government to save them from this plague. In Nassau the ducal "domanium" with its magnificent vineyards and mineral waters took the lead of all other economic interests. For this reason, Marschall considered that factories would be dangerous to the state, and that frontier customs dues were certainly open to serious objection, and he introduced an excise system which he often commended to his neighbours as a masterwork of political finance. The members of the extensive official class were extremely well off in consequence of the unnatural cheapness of commodities in the narrow market, and no one considered the interests of the producer. Bavaria, on the other hand, already possessed in Franconia and Swabia the first beginnings of a system of manufacturing industry. On the average, the Bavarian customs dues were only a little lower than those of Prussia, but their yield was trifling owing to the disproportionately heavy cost of supervising the frontiers. In Würtemberg, the development of manufacturing industry still lagged behind that of Bavaria, and for this reason the commercial policy of Stuttgart was intermediate between the free-trading spirit of the Rhenish riverine states and the protectionist views of the Bavarian manufacturers.

Within the narrow limits of a South German union it was impossible to reconcile tendencies so divergent. Nothing but a large free market could suffice to compensate the states for the unavoidable sacrifices and vexations which every customs

union must at first of necessity impose upon its members. This sole adequate compensation could be secured in no other way than by adhesion to Prussia, a step to which all the participators were averse on principle. As du Thil himself admitted in later years, "We unanimously endeavoured to make head against Prussia."[1] However loudly the liberals might extol the natural alliance of the constitutional states, even the political harmony of the allies was established upon an extremely insecure foundation. It was only Wangenheim and the small circle of his Frankfort associates who gave vigorous support to the trias plans of the court of Stuttgart, and it was a misfortune for the conference that several of the federal envoys were accredited as plenipotentiaries, so that the bickering and scandal-mongering of the Eschenheimer Gasse were interwoven into the arid play of the deliberations. Du Thil, on the other hand, like his elderly master the grand duke, played his part in the proceedings with the sober sense of the man of business, and would not hear a word of hidden political motives. Marschall, and Berstett too, after some vacillations, continued to move in the political wake of the Hofburg. The Munich cabinet, finally, did not adopt a consistent attitude. Whilst Aretin, the first plenipotentiary, continued in Darmstadt as he had done in Frankfort to walk cautiously in Wangenheim's footsteps, and Lerchenfeld, despite disapproval of his Swabian friend's trias dreams, honestly desired the formation of a South German commercial union, Count Rechberg regarded the Darmstadt conference with mistrust, and Jörres, the second plenipotentiary, who was wholly dependent upon Rechberg, did everything he could by secret means to impose obstacles in the way of negotiations. Each one of the courts stubbornly maintained its own demands, although none of them as yet had any well-grounded commercio-political convictions;[2] they all alike regarded any suggestion of yielding as a treasonable attack upon their sovereignty. In these circumstances the prerequisites for an understanding were utterly lacking.

A pretentious motto for the union was not difficult to find. The commercial policy of the allies was to be based upon "the economico-financial principle"—a fine phrase which, unfortunately, received a different interpretation from each of the cabinets. At the suggestion of du Thil, Nebenius, the ablest economist in the assembly, was commissioned to elaborate a draft scheme for the deliberations. He set to work full of confidence. Nebenius

[1] Du Thil's Memoirs. [2] Ibid.

shared the view generally held by the South German bureaucracy that the abolition of internal tolls would strengthen particularism, and he wrote to his court in sanguine mood: "Our union will victoriously deprive the apostles of unity of their principal and most formidable argument." But the plan which he brought forward on November 27th, being conceived in the sole interest of Baden, was unacceptable to all the other states. He advocated a system of very low duties, ranging from thirty kreutzers to two florins upon the hundredweight of colonial produce, and from five to fifteen florins upon the hundredweight of manufactured articles, a tariff which in Aretin's view was far too low. There was no issue to the dispute, for both parties took their stand upon incontrovertible grounds. A small customs area needs free trade, because it cannot bear the costs of strict frontier supervision; but it was certain that the dues proposed by Baden would be insufficient to protect the nascent industries of Bavaria.

Further, Nebenius wished to have all dues levied at the frontiers, not to tolerate the existence of bonded warehouses, and to have the Rhenish ports alone outside the cutoms barrier. Behind this was concealed the hope of the Carlsruhe bureaucracy to elevate Kehl and Mannheim to the position of principal entrepôts of the union. Bavaria, with good reason, offered lively opposition; it was only when the customs dues were extremely low that storehouses were indispensable; moreover, the allies should continue to hope for Frankfort's accession to the union and should not impose disadvantages upon the natural centre of the Upper Rhenish transit trade in favour of places of minor importance. Animated by the like spirit of Badenese narrow-mindedness was the further suggestion that in the case of all wares which the union admitted duty-free, the frontier states should be allowed to levy duties on their own account. All the states lying remote from the frontier immediately raised objections. Nor, in the matter of the apportionment of the customs revenue, did Nebenius forget to consider the advantage of Baden, whose customs revenue was in any case higher than that of the other states. He demanded that the decisive factors in the allotment should be population and the length of the frontiers over which each state had to exercise supervision. No less arrogantly did Bavaria defend her private interest, demanding that an average should be struck between population and extent of territory—for Bavaria was more thinly populated than the neighbouring lands.

Nebenius wished that the legislative authority should be

entrusted to a conference of plenipotentiaries, to meet annually, and to decide by a majority vote. But the court of Munich was not inclined to subordinate itself in this way to its lesser allies. Aretin displayed the egotism of power, and, regardless of consequences, demanded one vote for every half million of population. This would have given a majority of all votes to Bavaria, and du Thil and the other representatives of the smaller states rejected the proposal as "far too naive." Finally the customs administration was to be conducted by officials common to all the powers, and to be supervised by a permanent committee. Strangely enough, the idea of this central administration aroused at first little hostility. In fact, the Swabian bureaucracy was strongly in favour of it. The all-powerful class of Würtemberg scriveners looked askance at this union, which threatened to do away with so many scriveners' posts. But if the union were inevitable, the central administration seemed the lesser evil, for each state would have to appoint a numerous corps of officials. On the other hand, should the states retain their independent customs administration Würtemberg would merely have to supervise two miles [German] of frontier on the lake of Constance, and all the glories of the royal customs would collapse.

The discussion of these vexed questions soon became acrimonious. Nebenius, in his reports, spoke with unjust bitterness of his opponents, although many of their objections were based upon excellent grounds. Moreover, every state continued to advocate its own peculiar wishes. Neither Reuss nor Weimar would abandon without compensation the fees they were accustomed to exact for the supply of imaginary armed convoys. The elector of Hesse refused to hand his transit dues over to the union, demanding a *præcipuum* or extraordinary payment on account of the high consumption of French wines, a demand which was answered by the bold falsehood that a larger quantity of such wines was drunk in the highlands than in Electoral Hesse. Baden was unwilling to join the union unless a commercial treaty were immediately concluded with Switzerland. While opinions were clashing in this aimless manner, several of the cabinets, and for a time even the Bavarian court, continued to hope that Prussia would join the union! Again and again in Darmstadt the admission of Rhenish Prussia was advocated; for the sake of the parturient mountain of this sonderbund, Prussia was to sever the laboriously acquired commercio-political unity of her domain! It was the same incurable dynastic arrogance which had induced

the states of the Upper Rhenish ecclesiastical province to suggest to Prussia the acceptance of their draft concordat.

When the Bavarian instructions had been awaited for six months, at length, in July, 1821, Aretin announced the demand of his court that the existing Bavarian customs law should constitute the foundation of the union. Thereupon the hopeless dispute recommenced. A year and a half later, an opportunity occurred for testing the vitality of the union. On April 23, 1822, France promulgated a new customs law, which was plainly hostile to the interests of the Upper Rhenish states, for it imposed prohibitive duties upon beeves and wool, the principal commodities imported from South Germany. Since the blow hit almost all the South German lands alike, was it not possible to adopt common measures of defence against this onslaught? Prolonged negotiations ensued. On May 17th, Baden prohibited the import of wine across her western frontier; Würtemberg adopted the same measure of retaliation; but no understanding could be secured with Bavaria. In this extremity, Berstett applied to Metternich, begging the Hofburg's good offices with the Tuileries. After nearly two months, the Austrian replied as follows, on August 12th: "It is hardly necessary to say how ready we are to show all possible complaisance towards the German federal states; but the French law is the outcome of the national opinion, and of a politico-economical system which has, for practical purposes, become the favourite system of our day." This was all the help that Germany's economic system could expect from Austria![1] In the end, the unstable and isolated attempts at retaliation undertaken by the South German courts led only to a new and deplorable quarrel between Bavaria and Baden, for, since the Bavarian Palatinate levied no dues, Baden, in order to strike an effective blow against the French wine trade, was forced to prohibit the import of wine from trans-Rhenish Bavaria; this gave rise to complaints from the aggrieved Bavarians; and so on, ad infinitum.

In the autumn of 1822 it seemed as if the negotiations were at length making headway. Bavaria, encouraged by an urgent resolution of the diet, set vigorously to work; the unresting Wangenheim brought forward a proposal for mediation, favouring the Bavarian suggestions. But still no agreement could be secured, the negotiators pulling one another, now in this direction,

[1] Berstett's Instruction to Tettenborn in Vienna, June 18; Metternich to Hruby in Carlsruhe, August 12, 1822.

now in that. The Darmstadt government had recently promised its diet that the customs question should be speedily settled, and in February, 1823, losing patience, declared that, if no understanding could be secured, Darmstadt would deal with her own affairs quite independently.

The Prussian government looked on indifferently at these well-intentioned but hopeless negotiations. Year by year Prussia became more firmly convinced of the vitality of her own customs law, and her cool disregard remained undisturbed when the usual abuse of Prussia's customs system found expression at the Darmstadt conference. At a later date, a memorial issued by the foreign office contained the dry observation: "In Darmstadt, Prussia was made the general target, all hoping in this way to win the favour of public opinion and to be enabled to prosecute their own plans more securely." [1] Metternich, on the other hand, who had no fruitful ideas to oppose to the Darmstadt plans, was not free from care. Before the conferences opened, he exhorted Berstett that he should at least avoid yielding to the influence of subordinates, and of the diets. At the same time Marschall was impelled to express his suspicion of the court of Carlsruhe, and to ask whether Nebenius was not himself one of the disguised demagogues. The Badenese minister endeavoured to appease his patron, and gave Nebenius definite instructions to guard against any political arrières pensées. "Poison can be extracted even from the simplest things. Considerations which it is easier to feel than to describe forbid us to allow the diets to cooperate in any way." Nevertheless Metternich remained suspicious, and since Marschall dolorously admitted that the merchant, with his mobile capital, unfortunately belonged, not to one, but to all German states, it was quite possible that the commercial question might be utilised by the revolutionaries for the furtherance of their dreams of unity.[2] Not even the unmistakable failure of the conferences served to tranquillise the leaders of the German high police: Wangenheim, the conspirator, was everywhere, and it was reported that he had even ridden all over Baden in order to converse with the liberal deputies.

For some years Stuttgart had been the centre of the German liberal press, although the censorship here was by no means

[1] H. von Bülow, Memorial concerning the South German Commercial Union April 9, 1828.

[2] Metternich to Berstett, September 1; Berstett to Nebenius, September 13; Marschall to Metternich, September 10, 1820.

indulgent. In this city, Friedrich Murhard, at one time editor of the royal Westphalian *Moniteur*, was publishing a continuation of Posselt's *Annalen*, a periodical which, in addition to the verbose outpourings of its editor, contained many solid contributions from Wangenheim, Rotteck, and other liberal party leaders. Friedrich Murhard lived in Frankfort with his brother, the political economist Carl Murhard, and associated freely with Klüber and the members of the opposition in the Bundestag. Consequently every article in the *Annalen* was open to suspicion, and an insignificant essay by Lindner, court publicist of Stuttgart, entitled *The Diplomats*, aroused an uproar, although it contained nothing beyond a few unmeaning pinpricks, directed against aristocratic arrogance and the empty drawing-room chatter of vulgar diplomacy. Count Buol and the Austrian party regarded it as a malicious slander upon the Bundestag. To counteract this dangerous newspaper, Pfeilschifter founded in Frankfort, probably with the aid of Austrian money, a pugnacious ultra-conservative periodical, *Der Staatsmann*. Haller, the restorer, honoured its columns with two contributions, but it secured little support, for in ultimate analysis its legitimism led to nothing more than a glorification of the Roman church and the Society of Jesus. Among the other Stuttgart journals, the *Neckarzeitung* had long enjoyed the peculiar disfavour of the Hofburg, and its reputation in this quarter had become still worse since Wangenheim had taken to supplying it with extremely indiscreet reports from the Eschenheimer Gasse.[1] Yet more open to suspicion was Liesching's *Deutscher Beobachter*, a definitely radical paper, which numbered barely three hundred subscribers, and which so cleverly concealed its revolutionary threats behind vague turns of phrase that the censorship could find no point of attack. What could be done when the *Beobachter*, in quite general terms, and without naming the Carlsbad decrees, stigmatised the press censorship as "the spiritual club law of the new century"; or when, apropos of the Greek revolt, the journal said: "The churchyard is already ripe for a festival of resurrection. You have destroyed the peace of the peoples; how, then, can you establish the peace of the thrones?"

The leading idea of the Stuttgart press was war against the policy of the congresses, or against the Holy Alliance, as the fashionable phrase ran. Metternich, in his alarm, could

[1] Goltz's Report, April 27, 1822.

not be persuaded out of the belief that Lindner and his friend Le Bret, in conjunction with Trott and the old Bonapartist Malchus, constituted a Würtemberg comité directeur, which was connected also with the brothers Murhard and with Lafayette's French carbonari lodge. In truth this new liberalism contrasted sharply with the Teutonist enthusiasm of the former Burschenschaft. It could not conceal its Rhenish Confederate origin, and it luxuriated in French ideas. The curse of our distorted political relationships was that in this primevally Teutonic land of Swabia, the Napoleonic cult of vanished days found so many fresh adherents. Lindner and Le Bret openly declared themselves Bonapartists, and in their garden erected a memorial to the Imperator, with the legend: "Au grand homme. L'Europe le déplore, l'Asie l'adore, l'Afrique le regrette." So strong was the current that even Wilhelm Hauff, an amiable poet with no strong political views, was carried away by it. His charming novel, *Das Bild des Kaisers*, which appeared at this epoch, pushed veneration for the Imperator to the point of idolatry, and treated the Prussian conquerors with mockery and contempt.

In the interim *The Manuscript from South Germany* had been succeeded by another and equally mysterious Stuttgart manifesto, a diplomatic report *Concerning the present State of Europe* (1822), ostensibly issued by Kollmanner, but unmistakably the work of Lindner. After the old manner, the writing attacked the "stability system" of the great powers, but, it also formally discarded "the representative system under whose protection the artists in oratory earn their bread," and spoke with the utmost contempt of "the tame, well-nigh soulless estates" of Würtemberg, and of the sterility of the other South German diets. When the two opposing systems had run their course, continued the report, there would once more come into operation the natural law "which summons the higher type of genius to become regenerator of society. Men will once more appear upon the stage, and will be understood: they will inspire federal policy with new ardours, will awaken lesser spirits to a comprehension of their own powers"—and so on, with a string of oracular utterances. Bignon, the ready-writing advocate of the Rhenish Confederate princes, in a book entitled *The Cabinets and the Peoples*, hastened to draw the world's attention to the immeasurable importance of this Stuttgart manifesto.

It was not easy to believe that King William had had no prior knowledge of his literary confidant's new work; and it was beyond question that every sentence of the report, whose whole tenour would necessarily make it completely unintelligible to the masses, was written with an eye to the personal passions of the ambitious prince. The diplomatic world was to be prepared for some saving deed on the part of the court of Stuttgart. Precisely what this great deed was to be, was unknown even to the dilettantist intriguers who had conceived the trias policy. Gentz promptly fell upon the remarkable artifact with annihilating scorn, and in a memorial which Metternich sent to all the Austrian embassies described the subterranean activities of the court of Stuttgart in such plain terms that everyone could fit the caps. It was impossible, he wrote, that this report could have originated in the head of one single author. Rather was it plain that some modest confidant had blurted out the unripe proposals of a party which desired, with the help "of a restless adventurer as counsellor" [Wangenheim], to destroy the Germanic Federation, "the centre of the life and energy of the European league," and to impose upon a certain prince the role "of the German Bonaparte." But the German Bonaparte soon became alarmed, and to demonstrate his innocence he had Gentz's memorial reprinted in the Stuttgart *Hofzeitung*.

Thus the court of Stuttgart had completely broken with Prussia and Austria. Vainly did Wintzingerode represent to the king how purposeless was this petty war against overwhelming forces, and insisted that such a state as Würtemberg could not exist without the goodwill of the great powers, so that it was at least necessary to repudiate Lindner's literary intrigues in unmistakable terms. King William proudly rejoined: "My character and the circumstances of my country forbid me to play the 'chien couchant.' In a far more dangerous time I did not play this part against Napoleon, nor will I now, when I might have good ground for doing so, against a man whom I despise so thoroughly as I do Metternich. Strong in my own conscience, in the love of my subjects, in the respect of Germany, I confidently await the serried ranks of the Machiavellianism of the feeble Metternich. This is my last word." The circumspect minister frequently had occasion to sigh over the provocative demeanour of his royal

master, who could not refrain from angering the great courts by affronts, and who even went so far as to appoint Colonel Bangold, "the Würtemberg Riego," one of the originators of the demagogic officers' address issued at Ulm, as royal aide-de-camp.[1] Again and again the minister was involved in difficulties by the high spirits of his devil-may-care federal envoy. When, in the wretched Coethen dispute, Wangenheim had expressed his views too freely about Prussia, Wintzingerode gave a solemn assurance through the Würtemberg envoy in Berlin that his court was entirely free from ulterior motives, and was animated solely by a straightforward desire for the development of the federal system.[2]

Wangenheim, meanwhile, had already become aware that the ground was quaking beneath his feet. He learned that General Langenau had sent to Vienna a memorial about the Bundestag, wherein was given an extremely unflattering picture of the Würtemberger's party.[3] At once he replied to his powerful opponent with malicious scorn, preparing a spurious "Memorial à la Langenau," which, after being privately circulated at the Bundestag, made its way into the press, and, although it was unmistakably satirical, was for two decades regarded by the liberal world as a sample of Austrian spite. The roguish Würtemberger put the plan for the epuration of the Bundestag into the mouth of the Austrian general, who was made to say that if the opposition in Frankfort were to continue its activities "the petty peoples would at length come to believe in the possibility of combining to form a nation." If the recall of a single one of the refractory envoys were to be insisted on, the others, "desiring to remain firmly seated in their lucrative and tranquil posts, would combine to exhibit a loyal subserviency to the old imperial house, and to induce their courts to cooperate with Austria's views and intentions, and thus therefore with those of Prussia." So plainly did this extraordinary hothead foresee his own fall, and yet he could not refrain from talking of the devil.

Every consideration of prudence now dictated to the king that he should avoid giving further stimulus to the revengeful

[1] Küster's Report, April 10, 1821.

[2] Wintzingerode, Instruction to the envoy Count Wintzingerode, senior, in Berlin, January 3, 1822.

[3] Blittersdorff's Report, June 28; Memorial concerning German Policy February 18, 1822.

spirit of the court of Vienna. Since the Mittenwald meeting he could not but know how little he was able to count upon the help of his Russian brother-in-law. But his failure here served only to inflame his arrogance. Europe should learn that Würtemberg was strong enough to engage single-handed in a struggle against the great powers. While the other lesser courts accepted the Verona circular of the three eastern powers with their customary humility, King William instructed his minister to make a formal protest. It was useless for Wintzingerode to assure him that such an undertaking was extremely unwise. Doubtless the dictatorial tone of the circular was mortifying to the self-respect of the minor states, but the document involved no infringements of the law, and least of all any injustice to Würtemberg. For in Verona, contrary to Metternich's original design, there had been no discussion of German affairs; and Austria and Prussia had just issued to the great German governments, including that of Würtemberg, a friendly invitation to visit Vienna in order to secure an understanding regarding federal policy. It was not the fault of Austria that the court of Stuttgart rudely declined the invitation. If, at a moment when not one of his country's interests was directly threatened, King William chose to throw down the gauntlet to the great powers, he did so for no other reason than mortified vanity, and as the outcome of that peculiar and aimless urge to activity which again and again impelled the middle-sized states to show that the pygmies were still alive in the world.

Wintzingerode, as usual, reluctantly gave way, and on January 2, 1823, sent a circular to the Würtemberg envoys which vividly recalled the fable of the eagle and the wren. Under the protection of its minuteness the tiny bird imagined it could, unchastised, defy the kings of the air. All the reproaches which, in ironical circumlocution, the court of Stuttgart had formerly levelled against the Troppau congress,[1] were now repeated as a public accusation. This king by Napoleon's grace spoke of the powers which had overthrown the Imperator as "inheritors of the influence which Napoleon had arrogated to himself in Europe"—a phrase which could not fail to rankle the more since the reproach was not entirely devoid of truth. The despatch continued as follows: "To conclude treaties, to summon congresses, in the interest of the European

[1] Vide supra, vol. III, p. 507.

family of nations, without permitting the states of the second rank to make their views heard, or to protect their peculiar interests; the very forms under which they are admitted to the treaties and in which they are notified of the decrees of the preponderant powers; the expectation of the great powers that none of their allies will differ from them in opinion —these diverse innovations in diplomacy justify at least an express reservation in favour of the rights which inalienably attach to every independent state." In conclusion, Wintzingerode complained of the exclusion of Würtemberg from the congress, and, more particularly, of the exclusion of the Germanic Federation, although this body must be numbered among the powers of the first rank, and, considered as a whole, could not be regarded as inferior to its parts, the two German great powers! It was hardly possible for the campaign against the tutelage of the pentarchy to be initiated more unskillfully, for what had Würtemberg to do with the affairs of Spain, Italy, and Greece, which alone were discussed at Verona? What a visionary pride of power must blind the political intelligences of the advocates of the trias policy, if they could not grasp that Austria and Prussia were not simply parts of the Germanic Federation, and that without them the Federation, thanks to its exemplary military organisation, could not be regarded as anything beyond a power of the second rank.

Since this despatch opposed a formal legal protest to the public declaration of the eastern powers, it was necessary that it should itself be published, or at least communicated to the great courts. To Wagner, chargé d'affaires in Berlin, this seemed self-evident, and in all innocence he read the remarkable document to Ancillon, Bernstorff's locum tenens. How great was his alarm when the meek German statesman was infuriated, and refused to listen to such language. The Stuttgart court, at any rate, he exclaimed to the Würtemberg envoy, owes its crown to Napoleon's favour, but the great powers, far from inheriting their forces from Napoleon, used them to fight against the Cæsar! Austria and Russia were at once asked to unite with Prussia in a joint demand for satisfaction, and to undertake "a great blow" against the chief of the German opposition.[1]

[1] Ancillon to Schöler in St. Petersburg, January 26, 1823.

§ 3. HUMILIATION OF WURTEMBERG. EPURATION OF THE BUNDESTAG.

Thus sharp was the opposition between the parties when in the middle of January the new Vienna conference assembled around Metternich, consisting merely of Bernstorff, Zentner, Blittersdorff, Plessen, and a few other confidants. Not even Marschall had received an invitation, and the duke of Nassau complained bitterly, asking what the well-disposed among the German princes could now do, since they knew nothing about the Vienna conversations.[1] Metternich considered that within this circumscribed society he would be able to express his heartfelt wishes more openly than had been possible in the great ministerial conference of three years earlier. He had made Gentz elaborate a memorial upon the maintenance of tranquillity and order. The work opened with the traditional blood-curdling description of German affairs, saying that in the hands of the South German governments the very shadow of the monarchical form would speedily cease to exist. Then followed proposals directed against the Bundestag, which was to be purged of all hostile elements, and which was in future to sit for four months only in each year. The publication of the minutes was to be discontinued, for it had hitherto served only to gratify the vanity of individual envoys, or else " owing to the unavoidable triviality of the matter, to give occasion for needless mockery." The centre of gravity of the Austrian proposals lay in the second section, dealing with the territorial constitutions. Henceforward the Bundestag was to interpret the federal laws in such a manner " as is demanded by the highest of all state laws, the preservation of the whole and of its members." The Bundestag was to be empowered, upon the motion of individual governments, to alter the territorial constitutions of these governments, and in especial to restrict the publicity of parliamentary proceedings, in order to prevent " the most subversive maxims being preached daily without punishment to the disciplined and law-abiding inhabitants of other federal states."

Such was Metternich's new plan for a coup d'état, the natural outcome of the repeated appeals from Bavaria and Baden. Here in Vienna, too, Blittersdorff did all he could to secure an interpretation of the final act in the sense of absolutism (which he termed " order "), for at home in Carlsruhe the ministers had just been

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, April 2, 1823.

engaged in another severe parliamentary struggle. Liebenstein, the leader of the Badenese opposition, had in the interim entered the service of the ministry. As government commissaries he and Ludwig Winter displayed that youthful and spontaneous eloquence which has always distinguished the oratory of the High Germans from the less ornate and colder speeches of the North. Liebenstein aroused enthusiasm by his forceful emotionalism, whilst Winter's influence depended upon intrinsic mother-wit and popular bluntness. In the liberal camp, a new man of talent now appeared, Adam von Itzstein of Mainz, an ardent and facile speaker, characterised neither by statesmanlike insight nor by notable knowledge of affairs, but lively and adroit. He knew how to hold his followers together, how to keep them in a good mood, especially the younger ones, and his winning amiability soon secured for him the position of intermediary between the opposition parties of the South German diets. The southern liberals were in the habit of meeting at his estate of Hallgarten in Rheingau, immediately beneath the Johannisberg, and how often did it happen that while the diplomats in Metternich's castle upon the hill were holding session, in order, as Gentz phrased it, to administer to the Bundestag a new dose of Carlsbad water, down in the valley the full glasses were clinking to a toast of "Down with the Bundestag!" Itzstein was even spoken of as "the liberal Metternich." At this diet, his first, he did not indeed give any proof of diplomatic ability; he stirred up strife and pressed forward at a time when nothing but caution and moderation could save youthful constitutional life from a destructive blow.

After Metternich and Berstett had met at Innsbruck, the new "Innsbruck system" of the Badenese court was manifested more and more plainly. So little was the longing for a coup de main concealed, that the Prussian government considered it advisable to warn the reactionary hotspurs in Carlsruhe of the need for discretion. Constitutional changes, wrote Ancillon, could only be the work of time: "Until the proper time arrives, the government must make up its mind to bear the self-imposed yoke with the dignity of resignation and with apparent goodwill"; for this reason it was inadmissible "to encounter in a spirit of bitterness an opposition whose existence was based upon the very nature of the political forms." [1] The liberals, on the other

[1] Ancillon, Instruction to Küster, December 9, 1822.

hand, pushed to an extreme the mistrust demanded by the constitutional doctrine of salvation, especially where the discussion of the new conscription law was concerned. From fear of arbitrary power they even contested the right of the military authorities to discharge at the latters' own discretion soldiers unfit for service. A further trouble arose out of the anomalous position of the state servants. Itzstein and several others of the opposition leaders were officials, and even the governmental commissaries would not be denied the right of speaking occasionally against the ministry. An abundance of inflammatory material had long been heaped up in various quarters, and when the flames broke out in January, 1823, unfortunately, as in the year 1819, the question was again one touching the foundations of the federal law.

It was the unhappy destiny of the Carlsruhe diet that it must always be at loggerheads with the Federation. The government had brought forward a military budget, which was finally reduced to 1,600,000 gulden, and the ministers declared that with a smaller sum than this it would be impossible to meet the demands of the new federal military organisation. Everyone knew that Grand Duke Louis was in personal charge of the army administration, and that he had repeatedly and threateningly declared that he would not allow the diet to interfere in this domain. But the fashionable hatred of standing armies demanded a victim, and the chambers wished to reduce the budget by the further pitiable sum of 50,000 gulden. Thereupon the grand duke rejoined that according to arcticle 58 of the federal act the estates had no power to hinder him in the fulfilment of his federal duties, and that he would consequently disburse the necessary sums in default of parliamentary approval. This was to dispute the budgetary rights of the chambers, and as soon as a question of constitutional principle was mooted, young German liberalism invariably lost its senses. Just as had happened three years earlier, there now resounded the war cry of particularism, "Territorial rights take precedence of federal rights." Liebenstein's discreet warnings were unheeded, for Itzstein, in a violent speech, reminded the deputies of their duty as "men of honour." The chambers maintained their decision by a majority of one vote, and the representatives of the government immediately quitted the hall. On the very next day parliament was dissolved. A fierce manifesto announced to the people the grand duke's anger against his undutiful estates. Not one of the laws which the diet had passed was promulgated,

and as, since the establishment of this constitution, not a single budget had as yet been adopted, the government satisfied its needs contentedly enough with the unapproved revenue. A period of reaction, harsh and revengeful, ensued, and the land of Baden was to pay dearly for this unfortunate 50,000 gulden.

At the Vienna conference the dissolution of the Carlsruhe diet was hailed with unanimous approval. Emperor Francis said to Blittersdorff that the grand duke's action was a wholesome example for home and foreign world alike, and the Badenese statesman wrote with delight that the members of the opposition party had now "hardly anything left beyond lies, clamour, and shamelessness." [1] But the bold interpretation of the federal law which had been discussed between Blittersdorff and the Austrian, encountered an insuperable obstacle in the uprightness of Bernstorff. The Prussian minister took an extremely strong line. He had been "genuinely disgusted" at Gentz's memorial, and expressed sharp censure because Hatzfeldt, with customary assiduity, had immediately sent "so immature and vague a work" to Berlin. He would never consent to abandon the legal foundation afforded by the final act, for such a course "would in a sense justify" the groundless mistrust of the great powers felt by the petty states.[2] Just as three years before, so now, he found a powerful ally in Zentner, who had been very little moved by Rechberg's appeals for help. Strange were the contradictions of this divided policy of Munich: the Viennese negotiations had been initiated from Bavaria, and now Bavaria helped to deprive them of force. Since Bernstorff and Zentner won over Plessen to their side, Metternich let his proposal drop for the time being, and Blittersdorff was compelled dejectedly to report that the Prussian and the Bavarian had saved the publicity of the diet and had frustrated the designed onslaught upon the territorial constitutions.[3] In Berlin, Bernstorff's straightforward behaviour secured full approval, for although the Prussian court now confidently hoped that the South German constitutions would soon prove altogether unworkable, it was felt essential to avoid any infringement of law. Even Schuckmann, a rigid bureaucrat, declared: "An attack by the Bundestag upon the territorial constitutions could not be effected

[1] Blittersdorff's Reports, February 5 and March 5, 1823.

[2] Bernstorff's Report to the king, January 21; Bernstorff to Ancillon, January 21, 1823.

[3] Blittersdorff's Report, February 3, 1823.

in due legal form unless the governments had first been induced to place their fundamental laws under the guarantee of the Federation."[1]

Gentz had also elaborated a proposal concerning the press, opening with the exhortation that the rulers must not be content to encounter with nothing more than silent contempt those who were engaged in leading public opinion astray. For his part, Gentz had no need to fear the reproach of undue taciturnity, for in eight-and-twenty closely written pages he vented his long-standing grudges against the newspaper writers. When the great publicist had to encounter these dear enemies he was never able to maintain his statesmanlike poise. All possible evils were attributed to this gagged press. It was said to have proved "that in its hypocritical panegyrics upon constitutional monarchy it had never desired anything other than a democratic abortion"; and since a common criminal code against press offences was, unfortunately, unattainable, it would soon be permissible to enquire whether, "in view of the manifest impossibility of a compromise, the newspaper writers or the governments should evacuate the field.[2] Not even this energetic performance of the Hofburg availed to satisfy the Prussian statesman. He disapproved of "the polemic tendency, the passionate colour" of the memorial, and in the end all that the conference decided was that the press committee of the Bundestag ("the dead-alive," as Gentz termed it) should resume its activities, and should first of all inflict a wholesome and alarming chastisement upon some of the Stuttgart journals.[3]

Bernstorff was in full agreement, however, with the proposal to purge the Bundestag. The Frankfort congress of envoys had wandered away from its modest task. The contentious opposition which there, upon its own initiative, pursued its barren activities, served only to confuse public opinion, and it was not without reason that Gentz wrote in his memorial: "Deliberate and artificial demonstrations of individual views, debates in which selfishness and rancour alone find gratification, divagations into the realm of abstract theory, popular lectures, platform oratory—all these must be cast out from the federal assembly." The king of Würtemberg, by his incautious circular, had afforded the court of Vienna so convenient an opportunity for the annihilation of

[1] Schuckmann to Bernstorff, April 28, 1823.

[2] Gentz, Draft for a Presidential Address upon the Maintenance of the Press Law.

[3] Bernstorff's Report to the king, February 10, 1823.

the Frankfort opposition and its loquacious leader, that Hatzfeldt rejoiced, saying: "The crowned revolutionary has done excellent service to those of the right way of thinking!" [1] The Stuttgart statesmen had absolutely no idea how gravely they had affronted the eastern powers, for in an impotent cabinet the sense of responsibility evaporates just as readily as it does in a many-headed parliament. For so long the great courts had with impunity been irritated by petty affronts, uttered sometimes in earnest, and sometimes in sport, until people had almost ceased to realise that strong words have a meaning, and may lead to consequences. Wangenheim triumphantly showed the momentous circular to his Frankfort colleagues, and had to listen in consequence to a rebuke from the Bavarian federal envoy, who said that the court of Munich would never lend a hand to the overthrow of the existing federal system.[2] Shortly afterwards, the despatch was published in the French newspapers, and far and wide through the liberal world resounded the praises of the Swabian king, the champion of European freedom. William, meanwhile, under pressure from the great powers, had strengthened his press law. Yet he availed himself even of this opportunity to let the light of his liberalism shine before men. In a new despatch, Wintzingerode informed the embassies that his master had adopted such a measure with reluctance. In absolutist states it might do little harm, but in a land where constitutional freedom prevailed it was likely to arouse serious discontent.[3]

On February 6th the Verona declaration of the eastern powers was read to the federal assembly, with an accompanying letter from Anstett, the Russian envoy, which culminated in the assertion: "The peoples are quiet only so long as they are happy, and never yet has happiness been found in disturbance." Bavaria proposed, on this occasion in a more appropriate form than after the Laibach manifesto, that the Bundestag should express its thanks to the three powers, and its recognition of their sagacious and conservative principles. Wangenheim mischievously desired that a simple approval should be expressed of the intentions of the great powers, and reserved himself for more thorough deliberation. His faithful friends, Lepel and Harnier of the two Hesses, supported him. But a fortnight later, when the vote was taken, they had both received countermanding instructions,

[1] Hatzfeldt's Reports, January 27 and February 24, 1823.
[2] Report of the Bavarian federal envoy, von Pfeffel, January 15, 1823.
[3] Wintzingerode, Circular to the embassies, January 29, 1823.

and Wangenheim alone abstained from joining in the general vote of thanks, under the strange pretext that the Federation had to take into account all the European powers, by which he meant England. So little seriousness and dignity was to be found in this German opposition, that instead of honestly showing its colours, or prudently making common cause with the majority, it hid behind Canning.

The court of Stuttgart was now becoming anxious. Tidings had been received of Ancillon's furious harangue, and of the general indignation of the Prussian statesmen. Even the gentle Bernstorff was much incensed, and informed all the embassies "how the king of Würtemberg has thought fit in a circular of rejoinder to give vent openly and unashamedly to the hostile sentiments towards the allied powers by which he has long been known to be animated." [1] A grave letter from Metternich soon came to hand. The Würtemberg envoy had been afraid to read the circular to the Austrian chancellor, but the latter entered a protest in advance on behalf of his emperor against the reproach of Napoleonic tyranny. There was a reek of fire in the air, and King William travelled again to Weimar to visit Würtemberg's guardian angel, the archduchess Maria Pavlovna. Wintzingerode spoke soft words to the representatives of the eastern powers, and pledged his honour that the circular had become known only through a criminal breach of official secrecy. The Frankfort postal service must bear the blame. But why had the chargé d'affaires in Berlin read the profoundly secret document out loud in the Prussian foreign office? This simple question remained unanswered. It was enveloped in the twilight characteristic of Stuttgart politics.[2]

Now the Stuttgart *Hofzeitung* published an obsequious article which assured the great powers of Würtemberg's complete agreement. Metternich was quick to seize his advantage, and had the suggestion made in Stuttgart that if the king were really in agreement with the powers he would do well to prove it by recalling Wangenheim, who had just refused to recognise the Verona manifesto. Prussia immediately followed this lead. Wintzingerode, however, was inexhaustible in the provision of excuses and counter-considerations. What were they to find

[1] Bernstorff to Schöler, January 27; to the embassies, January 28, 1823.

[2] Report of the Russian envoy, von Benckendorff, February 11; Wintzingerode to Beroldingen in St. Petersburg, March 18; Küster's Report, March 4, 1823.

for this ambitious and able man to do in the land of Würtemberg? Wangenheim had not committed any serious offence. He had already been exhorted to caution in the future. Numerous other subterfuges followed.[1] The genuine reason for the refusal was the king's pride. He loudly boasted that the eastern powers would never receive any other satisfaction than the article in the *Hofzeitung*. He imagined that he could allow himself any liberty because the court of St. Petersburg, the only one whose opinion had weight with him, took an extremely lenient view. Alexander, although personally aggrieved, wished to spare his brother-in-law, and instructed his envoy to adopt a conciliatory attitude.[2]

But neither Bernstorff nor Metternich was disposed to rest content with so derisory a satisfaction. It was not magnanimous, but in view of all that had happened it was readily explicable that they should at length decide to show the overbearing little sovereign the limits of his power. The czar was talked over, and on April 27th King Frederick William sent the following laconic despatch to the king of Würtemberg: "I find it necessary to recall my envoy." Küster left Stuttgart, and the Austrian and Russian envoys were likewise recalled. The forms of the federal law were strictly observed. Russian diplomacy did not utter a word about Wangenheim's dismissal, for the czar did not wish to intervene in German affairs.[3] The French envoy had also departed on leave for an indefinite period, for the court of the Tuileries had taken much amiss the attacks of the Stuttgart press. Thus at one blow the diplomatic corps, that indispensable ornament of every minor court, had almost completely disappeared from the Nesenbach.

King William had not expected this. As if nothing had happened, he commanded his diplomats to remain equably in the capitals of the eastern powers, but the icy silence of the three affronted courts disquieted him so greatly that by July he had determined to recall Wangenheim. To a man of his character it was impossible to proceed openly, to admit frankly that he had acted in undue haste. He took for his excuse Wangenheim's notorious memorial concerning the purchasers of

[1] Wintzingerode to Gremp. in Vienna, March 23; Küster's Reports, March 15 and 29, 1823.

[2] Nesselrode, Secret Instruction to Benckendorff, February 6/18; Bernstorff to Hatzfeldt, March 23, 1823.

[3] Metternich to Lebzeltern in St. Petersburg, April 7; Bernstorff's Report to the king, April 17; King Frederick William to the king of Würtemberg, April 27; Nesselrode to Alopeus, April 25/May 7, 1823.

the Westphalian domains, declaring everywhere that it was for this reason alone, and not in the least in order to give satisfaction to the great powers, that the federal envoy was recalled. The consequence was that diplomatic relations were not resumed. Wangenheim, who had long anticipated his fall, showed now, when the inevitable occurred, all the passionate violence of his disposition. He accused Wintzingerode of foul play, and although the minister had protected him as long as possible and even longer than had been judicious, Wangenheim broke completely with his old friend, and to an epistolary enquiry made by Wintzingerode replied that he was ready "at any moment to give an answer with his hand." [1] In the summer the king went to Italy, and had on the journey to learn from a thousand mortifications that in these days even a reigning monarch who had incurred the displeasure of the Hofburg was everywhere treated with contumely. The eastern powers had warned all the courts against the liberal king of Swabia, and with the zeal of legitimist virtue young Bunsen wrote from Rome, after he had conveyed his message to Cardinal Consalvi: "It is hardly necessary to say that the lying spirit of jacobinism has been at work, spreading with characteristic impudence the most absurd and mendacious reports regarding the motives which have induced their majesties' courts to undertake this punitive measure." [2]

When the king returned home, his pride deeply wounded, he found that Wintzingerode was about to tender his resignation. Too faithfully had this inconstant statesman followed every turn of a policy of which he disapproved, and now he had fallen out with everyone. Despite his conservative inclinations, since it was he who had signed the momentous circular, he was an object of suspicion to the great powers; while the liberals would not forgive him the overthrow of Wangenheim. "What sort of a course is it for a government," he exclaimed in despair, "to rush forward, to inflict unnecessary injury, and to be forced to recoil when an obstacle is encountered!" Backbiting, which flourished even more luxuriantly in Stuttgart than in the other minor courts, contributed to increase the king's anger against him, [3] and on October 2nd the minister, who after all had never done anything but fulfil his royal master's behests, was dismissed in disgrace.

[1] Wangenheim to Hartmann, December 19, 1823.

[2] Bunsen's Report, July 12, 1823.

[3] Wintzingerode to Count Mülinen, November 28; Mülinen's Reply, December 4, 1823.

Infuriated by this ingratitude, Wintzingerode stooped to revenge. In the *Constitutionnel* of Paris he wrote an article overflowing with malice, in which he described the liberal plans of Kessler, the deputy, "the last of the Romans," and referred above all to the glorious intentions of the king. King William was prepared to reduce his army, magnanimously to renounce one-third of the civil list (which swallowed up half the national revenue), and above all to abolish the useless ministry for foreign affairs; "then there would be no more of those circulars which make so much noise for nothing and against nothing, which expose the government to attack and endanger the state." Such was the self-criticism with which the statesman who for four years had directed the policy of a middle-sized state desirous of playing the part of a great power, took leave of his own works! The authorship of the article did not long remain a secret, and the writer had made himself forever impossible in the world of diplomacy. Thus two victims had already been sacrificed to the wrath of Austria and Prussia. Upon both the dismissed men the king enjoined inviolable silence, for if they had given tongue they might readily have shown that in the petty warfare against the great powers the monarch had always been even more ready for the fray than his councillors.[1]

But with all this, the diplomatic dispute remained unsettled, for King William could not bring himself to write a conciliatory word to the affronted monarchs. Through his envoy Beroldingen in St. Petersburg, and then through Tatishcheff in Vienna, he vainly endeavoured to invoke the good offices of his imperial brother-in-law. The czar considered it would be better to leave the sullen man to his own reflections for a while, for if no more than a finger were extended towards him he would immediately be encouraged to a fresh dispute, and would be greatly strengthened in his sense of self-importance.[2] For more than a year the court of Würtemberg obstinately endured its isolation. In the capitals of the east its envoys enjoyed an unenviable existence, while in Stuttgart the eastern powers were represented only by three young chargés d'affaires who contented themselves with the viséing of passports and were never seen at court. The court balls were heartbreaking affairs without any diplomats there. At times, indeed, the king was consoled by popular favour,

[1] Privy Councillor Vellnagel to Wangenheim, December 28, 1823; Wangenheim's Reply, January 3; Küster's Report, February 7, 1824.

[2] Tatishcheff to Nesselrode, July 17/29; Nesselrode's Reply August 2, 1823.

for the fable of Swabian freedom had not as yet been completely forgotten. When on one occasion he was passing through Heidelberg the students assembled to acclaim "the defender of the national liberty." In December he opened the diet with an oration swelling with the pride of freedom, although the members of the upper house again failed to put in an appearance, and the spectacle of this unintentional unicameral system was by no means consolatory. The king was also annoyed once more by the liberal speeches of Kessler, "the last of the Romans," and he was on the verge of deciding to dissolve the diet. One of the ministers, however, represented to him that this would seem as if he were yielding to the great powers, and the king bitterly exclaimed, "I am not in the humour to pay court to these powers!" [1]

Nevertheless he gradually began to feel that defiance was hopeless. Trott, his new federal envoy, who was at first received with universal mistrust, had to be conciliatory in everything; and when in the summer of 1824 the renewal of the Carlsbad decrees came up for discussion, King William unreservedly expressed his agreement to the proposal. Thereupon he received a hint from St. Petersburg that now was the moment to offer conciliation.[2] For a while he continued to wrestle with his pride, for it was but two years since he had loudly boasted that he would never play the part of "chien couchant." At length he gave way, and after making his peace with Alexander, on September 23rd he wrote to the king of Prussia saying that by assenting to "the important conservative measure" of renewing the Carlsbad decrees he had proved how fervent was his desire to favour the maintenance of order in the Germanic Federation. "Your majesty, one of the strongest pillars of order, will, I flatter myself, do justice to the principles which have guided me on this occasion. Your majesty can have no doubt as to these, and the value, sire, which I attach to your friendship permits me to hope that even if misunderstandings, which I sincerely regret, have occurred in the past, these will henceforward cease to exist." Similar was the wording of the letter to Emperor Francis. The two monarchs had been so greatly incensed at King William's prolonged silence that they were in doubt at first whether they should be contented with this apology. At length they decided

[1] Küster's Report, December 26, 1823.

[2] Reports of Count Lusi, chargé d'affaires, Stuttgart, July 22 and August 12, 1824.

to temper justice with mercy, although defiance was still playing round the penitent's lips. King Frederick William, however, could not refrain from remarking to the Würtemberger: "I am especially delighted to learn that your majesty does justice to the principles which guided the allies in the proceedings at Laibach and Verona, principles which for a moment your majesty seemed to misunderstand."[1] Such was the lamentable end of the attempt to assemble pure Germany around the banner of Würtemberg. The role of liberal party leader, which had never really suited the despotic king, had been played out for ever. Lindner had to leave Würtemberg, and the world was to hear no more of mysterious Stuttgart manifestoes.

While this Swabian tragicomedy was running its tedious course, the epuration of the Bundestag, the sole outcome of the barren Vienna conference, had been completed. In April, 1823, Baron von Münch-Bellinghausen, the new federal presidential envoy, came to Frankfort. Still a young man, he had displayed diplomatic skill in connection with the negotiations about the Elbe navigation, and had soon acquired Metternich's full confidence. He was domineering, conceited, harsh, universally disliked, but a far abler man than his predecessor. He understood admirably how to handle the diplomatic subtleties of the lesser states, now by flattery and now by threats. Metternich said of him: "This is the very man I want." His instructions were to make the Bundestag attend strictly to business, and to carry through some of the proposals which Metternich had been unable to deal with to his satisfaction at the Vienna conference, and in especial to secure the privacy of federal proceedings. It is not surprising that Berstett read these instructions with ecstasy. When Münch assumed the reins of office he was still fresh enough to believe that the Bundestag must have some function in life, and to the assiduous Blittersdorff, who immediately attached himself to the new presidential envoy, the latter complained: "A hundred times, in Vienna, I have asked Prince Metternich what it was really wished to make of the Federation, but could never secure a definite answer."[2] No long time elapsed before he had completely discarded these youthful errors. He soon

[1] King William to the king of Prussia, September 23; Reply October 14; Bernstorff's Report to the king, September 30; Instructions to Hatzfeldt, September 28 and October 4, 1824.

[2] General and Special Instruction to Baron von Münch-Bellinghausen; Berstett to Metternich, April 30; Blittersdorff's Report, April 18, 1823.

became quite at home in the busy idleness of the Eschenheimer Gasse, and found it perfectly in order that, in addition to the punishment of demagogues and the suppression of newspapers, nothing further should be done than to receive instructions, and to issue declarations that certain matters were not within the competence of the Federation. After he had continued these activities for a quarter of a century, he seemed to the nation the very embodiment of the high federal police.

Even before Münch's arrival, and before Austria had sent an urgent warning to Darmstadt, Harnier had been recalled from his post. Next ensued the fall of Wangenheim. Of the three leaders of the opposition, Lepel of Electoral Hesse maintained his ground longest, although Metternich repeatedly demanded his recall, and at length restricted diplomatic intercourse with the court of Cassel to a minimum. The elector insisted that he would take orders from no one. But the Cassel glass house was not a good place from which to throw stones. In September, when the elector wished to secure an estate in Bohemia for his mistress, Metternich dryly assured him that a prince whose federal envoy was a man of such dubious sentiments could not expect any favour from the emperor. Sentence was now passed upon Lepel. It was through such considerations of petty princely political wisdom that the last pillar of the federal opposition was overthrown.[1] Meanwhile the deceased Aretin had been replaced by von Pfeffel, a Franco-German who, little acquainted with the German tongue or German politics, confined himself to following Rechberg's instructions. Hammerstein was sharply called to order by Count Münster, while Blittersdorff had ere this made his peace with the Hofburg.[2]

Wangenheim's economic sonderbund, the Darmstadt conference, was already in its death agony On July 3, 1823, du Thil announced the withdrawal of the grand duke of Hesse, on the ground that Hesse could no longer postpone the reorganisation of her customs system. Nassau followed this example Thereupon Bavaria refused to continue the negotiations in the absence of Hesse-Darmstadt. Amid acrimonious mutual accusations, the congress broke up, after three years passed in unedifying disputes. Its failure resulted from the impossibility of harmonising divergent interests upon so narrow a field, but the collapse was accelerated

[1] Metternich to Zichy, April 10; to Count Spiegel in Cassel, May 31; Blittersdorff's Report, March 21; Hatzfeldt's Report, September 15, 1823.

[2] Rechberg to Pfeffel, January 19; Blittersdorff's Report, April 8, 1823.

by the intrigues of Viennese diplomacy and by those of Otterstedt, the Prussian envoy. This restless schemer was an enthusiast for Prussia's "preponderance on the Rhine," strongly desiring the formation of a customs union between Rhenish Prussia and the South German states, and would on no account tolerate a league of the constitutional middle-sized states without Prussia. He was never weary of pressing upon his chief these crude ideas. Since Eichhorn persisted in instructing him to let matters take their course, he at length acted upon his own initiative. He warned Marschall (a step that was hardly necessary), and wrote to the Prussian envoy in Vienna to inform him what "stratagems on the part of an opposition scheming against their majesties" were concealed behind the customs union. Hatzfeldt instantly sounded the alarm in the ears of the Hofburg, and thereupon such urgent representations were issued from Vienna to Munich, Carlsruhe, and Biebrich, that the existence of the sonderbund, which from internal causes had long been tending towards disruption, became impossible, and Berstett admitted that the Darmstadt conferences must necessarily remain fruitless, "if only on account of the participators, and on account of the accessory schemes which these had been endeavouring to promote."[1] It was not until some time afterwards that the Berlin cabinet was informed of its envoy's disobedience. The vain diplomat had loudly boasted that it was he who had broken up the Darmstadt league, and this led the king to command an enquiry. Otterstedt received a sharp reproof, and was again given instructions to refrain from all intervention in these negotiations. It was enough, he was told, to declare to the minor courts that Prussia was prepared to treat for the extension of her customs system.[2] For the present all this was a profound secret, and for years everyone continued to believe that the king of Prussia had dug the grave for the well-intentioned attempt to secure the customs unity of South Germany. In a word, of all the fantasies of the trias policy, nothing remained beyond the Upper Rhenish ecclesiastical province.

In November, when the federal assembly met after the recess, not the remotest trace remained of the spectre of a federal opposition. In order to complete the epuration of the Bundestag,

[1] Berstett to Blittersdorff, October 25, 1824.

[2] Report to the king from the minister for foreign affairs, July 13, 1824; Instructions to Otterstedt, February 20 and May 5, 1825.

in July, 1824, Goltz was also recalled. The Austrians witnessed his departure with delight, and had great hopes of his successor, Postmaster General von Nagler, who alike in his merits and in his defects seemed the precise opposite of the good-natured count. Like his brother-in-law Altenstein, Nagler had come to the front in Hardenberg's Franconian school of officials. Before long, however, he was so thoroughly permeated with the rigidly conservative views of the feudalist bureaucracy that he became an enemy of his old patron and, having been dismissed from the service by the chancellor, spent the next eleven years for the most part in travelling. Not until 1821, when Hardenberg's star was declining, had Nagler been recalled to office, and shortly afterwards appointed postmaster general. In this capacity he manifested an extraordinary talent for administration, displaying also an excess of that autocratic spirit which is, indeed, no less indispensable in the postal service than in the army. A man of restless energy, harsh and rough, the terror of his subordinates, within a few years he made the Prussian postal service a model for all Germany. It is true that, in accordance with the old tradition, he regarded the post office merely as a source of revenue for the state, and would rarely agree to any reduction in the high charges; but if the institution were to be lucrative, it must be carried on by well-trained and adequately paid officials, and must serve the public quickly, conveniently, and punctually. In Prussia, as elsewhere, privacy of correspondence was strictly limited. In Nagler's eyes, it was an inalienable right of the crown to open letters, a right which none but the malevolent could deny. He plumed himself upon the lenity of the Prussian service, which was satisfied with the mere perusal of correspondence, whereas the Austrian post-office did not hesitate to intercept letters. Careful in all things, he devoted great attention to this branch of the service, sending a clever agent, Opfermann, to Saarbrücken, to supervise correspondence with France. A faithful ally of Wittgenstein, he soon came to take a cordial delight in these underhand activities, and when he was appointed envoy to Frankfort, he considered it his official duty to undertake the police supervision of public feeling on the Rhine and in the south, being assisted therein by the unselfish official zeal of his able secretary, Kelchner.

With astonishing industry, he combined for many years the activities of postmaster general, of diplomatist, and of honorary minister of police, always on the move up and down the great

Berlin-Frankfort road, where every postmaster must be ready to supply his four best horses to draw the special post-chaise of the much dreaded man. He was ever at work, ever overburdened with activities, so that he could scarcely spare a week now and again to attend to his beautiful art collections. He grudged every syllable, every minute, wrote his despatches with the smallest conceivable expenditure of words, but wrote them efficiently and to the point, while in private correspondence he contented himself with a few disconnected phrases whose dry brevity was apt to seem brutal and cynical. When the faithful Kelchner once suggested to his chief that the desperate demagogue Kombst might perhaps kill himself when arrested, Nagler answered simply: "His suicide is his own affair."

To the easy-going little folk of the Bundestag, the beribboned and bestarred dignitary seemed insufferable, with his repellent curtness and his ceremonious official manners, which would soften only for brief intervals to a calculated affability. In this Franconian, the Frankforters saw the embodiment of everything which they disliked in the North Germans, and beyond question his prolonged stay on the Main contributed greatly to foster South German prejudices against the Prussian officialdom. Nagler enjoyed the peculiar favour of Metternich, and joyfully co-operated in all the measures proposed by the Hofburg for the maintenance of public tranquillity. And yet, after his manner, he was a proud Prussian patriot. It was not for the sake of Austria, but in accordance with his own rigid absolutist principles, that he supported the measures of the Austrian federal police, and never did he forget that his king, whom he idolised, had instructed him when leaving for Frankfort, that while he must not neglect the alliance with Austria, he was to do nothing that might prejudice the Prussian state. Being a man of strict Protestant views, one who scented jesuitry everywhere, he distrusted the Hofburg, and as soon as he came to recognise that in all military and economic questions Austria secretly worked against the Prussian federal envoy, he at once armed for defence. Münch speedily learned that there was still less to be done with this severe reactionary than with his gentler predecessor. The two men, both full of claims and both uncongenial, could never get on. Soon after Nagler's arrival private dissensions began, and continually recurred, to be settled always by Metternich's mediation, usually in favour of the Prussian. But when it was a question of discipling the minor envoys, Münch and Nagler acted like one man.

Thus was effected the purging of the Bundestag, and step by step, almost without discussion, under Münch's leadership there was now adopted a series of resolutions which filled the court of Vienna with well-grounded satisfaction. The petitions of the purchasers of the Westphalian domains were simply refused a hearing, on the ground that the matter was beyond the competence of the assembly. In order to manifest even more unambiguously its detestation of Klüber's and Wangenheim's doctrine of the "undying state," the Bundestag adopted a resolution unparalleled in the history of civilised nations to the effect that, in the course of its proceedings, no appeal should be tolerated to "new federal doctrines and theories" (December 11, 1823). In this way science was formally forbidden to undertake a clarifying and moderating co-operation in the development of the federal law, whose exiguous and inchoate condition rendered the assistance of intellectual forces indispensable. Never before in this educated nation had the hatred of culture been so unashamedly displayed.

Noteworthy was the manner in which, in these proceedings, the two souls of Prussian policy were once again manifested. Where the phobia of the demagogues was not operative, Prussia invariably displayed herself as the most just among all the German states. To the last, Goltz vigorously advocated the cause of the purchasers of the Westphalian domains. It was his wish that the elector should be compelled by the federal authority to render account to the Bundestag in respect of all the cases that were still in dispute, and he expressed his indignation in strong language when the great majority of the assembly, led by Münch, in opposition to their own earlier resolutions, curtly refused redress to the Hessian despot's innocent victims. Yet this very government, whose actions were here so honourable, did not merely give a willing assent to the resolution which conflicted with the theories of the federal law, but even outbade this resolution by a preposterous act of injustice which gravely and permanently injured Prussia's good repute. Bernstorff, alarmed by Marschall's and Metternich's private complaints, had had Klüber's writings examined, presumably by Kamptz, without even giving the accused and unsuspecting man a hearing, and took him by surprise with the announcement that the use of his works would be discontinued in the Prussian universities and that Klüber

himself could no longer be employed in the foreign office.[1] The chief reasons alleged were: first, the disquisitions on natural law contained in Klüber's *Federal Law*; and secondly, the writer's preference for the new mixed constitutions whose democratic principles were known to be antagonistic to monarchical government. The estimable professor would not put up with this treatment. He immediately threw up this post with its income of 5,000 thalers, and for long continued to live in Frankfort as a private individual, the recognised chief of the dissatisfied "diplomatie volante," and a living example to the South Germans of the arbitrary conduct of the Prussian government.

Even before this, in May, the press committee had resumed its activities, and had promptly suppressed the *Deutscher Beobachter* of Stuttgart. How greatly honoured did Blittersdorff, the referendary, feel when he was instructed "to take the bull by the horns." In his zeal he went so far as to overcome his vanity, and agreed to issue as his own a gigantic memorial sent him by the Hofburg. This stigmatised the revolutionary "delirium" of the sinister Würtemberg journal, and referred with especial venom to Lindner's article *The Diplomats*. "Although it might seem as if the members of the committee were speaking here on their own behalf," thus ran the document, "if this highly respected class of officials were to be treated with contumely," such was the illuminating conclusion, "the safety of the Federation would be endangered." Shortly afterwards F. Murhard was expelled from Frankfort, and Nassau and the two Hesses had to undertake to give him no harbourage in their territories, so near the federal capital. In a collection of *Private Papers*, Lindner ventured upon a very tame defence against Blittersdorff, this serving merely to hasten his banishment from Würtemberg.

While the federal assembly was thus disposing of the liberal writers, Hornthal, the Bavarian parliamentary orator, was, with Jewish self-assurance, preparing a painful surprise. He respectfully dedicated to the Bundestag his latest writing, *Will the German Federated Princes take part in the War against Spain?*—a booklet in which the free Spaniards were overwhelmed with verbose commendation. In order to put an end to all possibility of such embarrassments, the assembly decided that henceforward no one should dedicate a book to

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, December 3, 1823.

it without express permission, and even the gift of a book could not be accepted unless the author had previously submitted his work to his sovereign's federal envoy, and this dignitary had given it his sanction. Thus was any risk of the access of demagogic ideas into the library of the Taxis palace safely averted; while in order that the documents of the Bundestag might also be preserved from contamination the assembly resolved on January 15, 1822, that petitions to the Federation, in so far as printed, must first be submitted to the censorship. Thus the most modest of all civic rights, the right of petition, maintained undiminished by the Russians and the Chinese, was restricted for our nation; the veiled foreign dominion which oppressed Germany constructed for itself an unprecedented monument. It was the gentry of Holstein who had given occasion for this incredible decree by their petition for the restoration of the old territorial constitution, a petition which, it need hardly be said, was bluntly rejected.

After all this, it was but logical that the Bundestag should continue to keep its proceedings private, as Metternich had proposed at the Vienna conference. On July 1, 1824, the assembly decided that it would allow the publication of a mere summary from its minutes. Of the unabridged minutes very few examples were printed, all sedulously numbered, and transmitted with the utmost privacy to the federal courts, where they were preserved with such care that down to the year 1848 not a single German historian could gain access to them. The brief summary secured no readers, and four years later its issue was entirely discontinued "owing to lack of material." Unquestionably the proceedings of a congress of envoys was ill suited for the general public, the publication of a detailed account of what went on would frequently have increased the dissensions among the courts, while still more often it would have seduced the envoys into the display of superfluous oratory. But the secrecy of the proceedings was far more disastrous than could have been any effect of publicity. To the embittered nation it seemed henceforward that the German central government was nothing more than a secret police authority, while the science of the German federal law, so suspect to the Bundestag, never emerged from swaddling-clothes, for no precise information could be secured regarding the origin, significance, and purpose of the federal laws. Once

only during these long years did anyone venture upon an act of blackest treachery in respect of the minutes of the Bundestag. The secretary to legation at one of the federal embassies discovered one day with horror, after purchasing his supper at the butcher's, that his wurst had been wrapped in a secret minute of the Bundestag. The Frankfort police immediately set to work. They had long been accustomed to render faithful service to the Austrian federal envoy, and not merely did they succeed in unearthing a considerable number of greasy minute-sheets, but were able to prove that the Ernestine federal envoy's cook had sold the sausage man the old papers which her master had never read. Germany's highest authority investigated this delicate matter with customary thoroughness; then the errant documents, together with the miraculously recovered sheet, were reassembled into a special bundle and deposited in the federal archives, where even the name of the undutiful federal cook is still preserved for the benefit of posterity.

The still life of the Eschenheimer Gasse had now become so deplorably tedious, that the days of Wangenheim, with their futile and noisy quarrels, seemed enviable in comparison. After Münch assumed the sceptre, the entire activity of the Bundestag was devoted to the suppression of national life. The Prussian government alone continued, even in these days of dull tyranny, to preserve its old zeal for the maintenance of the national military efficiency. The king insisted that at least the defence of the middle Rhine should at length be safeguarded, since the South Germans were still unable to come to terms about their federal fortresses. After several fruitless exhortations to Frankfort, in the spring of 1824 he sent General Krauseneck to Vienna. Hatzfeldt was terrified by this inconvenient mission, fearing it might lead to a breach with his Austrian friend. But the general was imperturbable, and took so definite a line that Metternich modestly gave the most earnest assurances that nothing but unfortunate misunderstandings had been responsible for the delay. He went so far as to declare to the general, "every Austrian has a Prussian heart," and this produced a painful impression in Berlin, for his aim was obvious.[1] In very truth, on this occasion also he failed to keep his word. It was not until the following winter, when Nagler went to Vienna, that

[1] Meyern's Report, September 25, 1824.

Austria's opposition was completely overcome;[1] and in April, 1825, nearly ten years after the European treaties had been signed, the two great powers at length demanded in real earnest that the Federation should take over Mainz, Landau, and Luxemburg as federal fortresses.

Once more the shamelessness of particularism was displayed in the old dissensions. Although the middle-sized states by no means desired to assume, in Prussia's place, the right of garrisoning the federal fortresses, the view they took was that this burden, which Prussia was shouldering for the whole of Germany, was a favour granted to the Prussian state; and they considered it extremely unfair that the Federation should have to pay various accessory costs of the garrisoning. Würtemburg was unwilling to pay anything at all for Luxemburg, for in the eyes of the court of Stuttgart Mainz alone was a genuine federal fortress, whereas Luxemburg "must be regarded as a federal fortress solely from the military point of view," and it therefore devolved on Prussia to bear all the costs of the garrisoning. Hammerstein, the Hanoverian, likewise proved so refractory that the English envoy found it necessary to remind him of his patriotic duty, asking whether Hammerstein did not realise that it was in the British interest to strengthen the Rhenish frontier. Loudest of all were the complaints of the Luxemburg envoy: the taking over of the fortress was premature; its radius had not yet been determined; moreover, his king must demand that upon their native soil the Netherland troops should take precedence of those of Prussia.

Nevertheless Prussia remained firm, and Münch, who hitherto through the instrumentality of Langenau had encouraged the Luxemburger in all his hole-and-corner tricks and breaches of treaty, was compelled in the end to make up his mind to utilise the power of the majority, although Bavaria stood out for a unanimous vote. On July 28th, a majority vote decided that the three fortresses should be taken over. Nagler, however, wrote mournfully: "This affair has shown that it is difficult, if not impossible, to induce the federal assembly to unite for any great end if the interest of one of the federal states be affected, or if expenditure is demanded from them all."[2] Such was the view of his master's

[1] Nagler's Report, Vienna, February 10, 1825.

[2] Blittersdorff's Report, May 25; Nagler's Reports, July 24, August 3 and 11, September 24, 1825.

pet creation taken by Metternich's favourite a year after he had made acquaintance with the activities of the Frankfort assembly, for the seriousness of the Prussian official was after all stronger in him than Austrian reactionary party sentiment. Since Bavaria would not agree, the taking over of Landau was further postponed, and was not effected until the year 1831, after repeated negotiations. Regarding the ultimate motives of the opposition, the court of Stuttgart spoke with a cynical straightforwardness which was most unusual. King William considered it advisable to excuse himself to Emperor Francis for his relapse into the old policy of opposition, and wrote therefore to Vienna saying: "The important matter for us is the question of money, scarce everywhere to-day, and especially scarce in an agricultural country such as ours." Further, he said, Würtemberg was willing, out of deference to the great powers, that Luxemburg and Landau should become federal fortresses, "but it would be extremely unjust to make this a reason for disadvantageous demands upon our finances"; to Prussia and Austria these costs were trifling, but to Würtemberg they were "of serious importance." At the last he expressed himself still more simply: "His majesty of Würtemberg does not need to justify himself for objecting to the taking over of a fortress when this measure would have as its consequence the imposing of serious burdens upon his majesty's country." [1]

The good Wolzogen, who for so many years had had to endure malice and misunderstanding, could now enjoy the satisfaction of being sent to Mainz, in December, 1825, in the company of the Hanoverian general, von Hinüber, in order to take over the fortress on behalf of the Federation. It was assuredly time, for the works were crumbling away. When the two federal commissaries wished to proceed to Luxemburg a few months later, the Luxemburg envoy refused to give them passports. They went without his visé, completed the taking over of the fortress, and, on March 13, 1826, handed back without reading it a protest from the Netherland general Gödeke, which had been delivered to them after the formal parade. When they returned home they found that the Netherland government had sent a despatch to the Bundestag

[1] Despatch from Minister von Beroldingen to von Gremp, envoy in Vienna, Stuttgart, May 22, 1825, with Supplement entitled Memorial Concerning the Federal Fortresses.

declaring in the rudest terms that "the almost unqualifiable act" of March 13th was null and void. The old hatred of the Orange ruler for the neighbour state to which he owed his throne was thus once more displayed. He threatened that as a last resource he would "employ other means to maintain the integrity of the grand duchy." Not even the federal assembly could endure such affronts. It rejected the king's statement of grievances as untenable, and expressed its regret that he should have thought fit to use such language.[1] In the end, the Netherlander gave way, for he knew full well that the law was against him

§ 4. RENEWAL OF THE CARLSBAD DECREES. REACTION IN SOUTH GERMANY. THE EASTERN QUESTION.

The court of Vienna took part in these tedious negotiations with reluctance, and only because it felt that Prussian patience was nearly exhausted. Far more important than the safeguarding of the Rhenish frontier seemed to Austria the renewal of the Carlsbad decrees, for the validity of the press law would expire during the year 1824. This saving act was prepared long in advance, and as early as January 6, 1824, Münch communicated his plan of campaign to Metternich: He showed in a memorandum that it was the press law alone which required renewal, for in the case of the other Carlsbad laws no definite period had been specified; he audaciously maintained that a resolution of renewal could be adequately carried by a simple majority at the Bundestag, but at the same time he urgently advised the chancellor to undertake preliminary confidential negotiations with the greater courts, and above all with that of Munich. It was in Bavaria that there still existed a solitary and modest exception to the rule of the Carlsbad press law. Newspapers alone and not books were subjected to the censorship, and although the Munich police knew well enough how to deal with books by suppression after publication, the Austrian presidential envoy regarded as dangerous any deviation from the great principle of the censorship. Metternich followed his advice, first endeavouring to secure the support of Prussia, sending the essential portions of

[1] Nagler's Reports, March 4 and 6, April 15, May 15, 1826.

Münch's memorial to Berlin through the instrumentality of Hatzfeldt (May 12th). Bernstorff gave his assent, for he agreed with his Viennese friend about newspapers and students. But on one point he raised a serious consideration of form. The memory of the falsified vote by which the Carlsbad decrees had been introduced was painful to the Prussian minister. He insisted that on this occasion the forms of the federal law must be conscientiously observed. He demanded a unanimous resolution, on the ground that legally the renewal of a law of exception was tantamount to the issue of a new law, and he ultimately secured his point, although the court of Vienna, fearing a mishap, resisted long and strenuously.[1]

Meanwhile Metternich went to Bavaria, and here found the king's mood favourable beyond all expectation. It is true that recently, when celebrating the silver jubilee of his accession, Max Joseph had received abundant proofs of love from his subjects, and that he greatly prized Bavarian loyalty; but the aging king could not adapt himself to constitutional methods, and he looked forward with anxiety towards the next diet, when a considerable deficit would have to be met. Moreover the persecution of the demagogues was now in full blast. In Munich, Dr. Eisenmann and some other fine young fellows had been arrested upon a hint from Berlin. In Erlangen, it was believed that among some soldiers placed under arrest a conspiracy had been discovered to abolish the king and all his ministers, or even to hang them, as timid spirits maintained; it was only the liberal-minded Lerchenfeld who had a word to say in favour of the young rascals. This childish folly made a profound impression at court, and the liberal minister did not derive any advantage from the respect paid him by the demagogues. On several occasions his fall seemed imminent, and he had had to endure seeing his talented friend Ignaz Rudhard banished from Munich on account of a candid book upon the federal law. The ultramontane party which surrounded the nuncio became bolder day by day; in the Frauenkirche, Father Hock, protected by his archbishop, preached invectives against the Protestants. A writing by Alexander Müller, *Prussia and Bavaria in Concordat with Rome*, was suppressed because it defended the old Frederician

[1] Eichhorn's Memorandum, June 5; Bernstorff's Instructions to Hatzfeldt, June 15; to Jordan and Küster, June 18; to Goltz, June 22; Nagler's Report, July 24, 1824.

ecclesiastical policy.[1] Sinister rumours of hierarchical intrigues ran through the country and rendered the Protestant population uneasy. When the king, desiring to give Protestant congregations more independence, commanded the election of presbyteries, he encountered obstinate resistance from his Franconian subjects. Anselm Feuerbach wrote passionate polemics against the attempt to restrict Lutheran freedom by Calvinist moral discipline; he contested the right of the Catholic sovereign to exercise the supreme episcopal authority; he demanded a special ministry of public worship and education for the Protestant church; and he would not be appeased when Schleiermacher and even Paulus, the deadly enemy of priestly dominion, defended the king's well-meant plan. The lack of confidence was insuperable, and the crown was forced to give way. In these days, profoundly shaken by the death of his beloved Eugene Beauharnais, Max Joseph was more yielding than of yore. Rechberg was in high favour, and knew how to make the most of his opportunities. He was never weary of assuring the Prussian envoy that the king would be delighted if the Federation would render a reform of the territorial constitution possible; but the proposal for such a reform must come from the great powers, not from Bavaria.[2]

In the end of May, Metternich came to Tegernsee in the train of the archduke Francis Charles, who was there to be betrothed to the king's daughter Sophia. For the sake of the Austrian alliance the affectionate father had made up his mind to bestow the hand of the beautiful and accomplished princess upon Emperor Francis' second son, to whom nature had been far from kind. While the princes were celebrating their brilliant family festival, Metternich was engaged in private negotiations with Rechberg, Wrede, and Zentner, and he first of all laid before them Münch's memorial. Next, the Austrian cautiously mooted the question whether the opportunity might not be seized of endeavouring to effect with federal aid the urgently necessary alterations in the new territorial constitutions. The pretext for raising this matter was supplied once again by the incurably reactionary court of Baden. During recent months the ultras in Carlsruhe had never ceased impressing

[1] Zastrow's Report, February 26; Küster's Reports, August 3 and 6, 1823, April 28, 1824.

[2] Küster's Reports, March 31, May 9 and 23, 1824.

on their Viennese protector the importance of establishing the monarchical principle, of closing the public galleries in the chambers, and of abolishing academic jurisdiction. In January, Berstett had hastened to Frankfort in order to discuss with Münch measures for the control of the Badenese diet.[1] Metternich was agreeably surprised to find that not Rechberg alone, but Zentner as well, received these advances in a friendly spirit. The very man who, barely five years earlier, had so zealously opposed the Carlsbad decrees, now regarded their renewal as urgently necessary. Thus irresistibly did the reactionary current of the times affect even reflective minds. With infinitesimal exceptions, all the leading statesmen of Germany now openly accepted Gentz's bold declaration: "The supreme law of the European alliance is the censorship." To everyone it seemed wicked, almost incredible, that the revolution which had been overthrown upon the battle-fields of southern Europe should continue to live; that the defeated party should still dare to raise its voice; and that the dead, as Gentz mockingly phrased it, should, like Banquo's ghost, drive the living from their seats. Zentner, indeed, would not agree to a comprehensive change in the territorial constitutions; but he too considered publicity of parliamentary proceedings disastrous ("this first and in its daily manifestations the greatest of all modern ills," as Metternich called it); and upon the Austrian's demand he at length, on May 28th, incorporated his proposals in a memorial which exceeded the Hofburg's most sanguine anticipations.[2]

The memorial demanded that Austria, in a presidential address to the Bundestag, should draw attention to the menacing activity of the revolutionary parties "during a period of ostensible repose," and should proceed to demand the renewal of the Carlsbad decrees, in so far as these were about to expire. In matters of detail, Zentner's chief demand was that the monarchical principle should be maintained by the carrying out of article 13 of the federal act. In the Germanic Federation, "no forms and principles which diverge utterly

[1] Berstett to Metternich, April 5, 1824, etc.; Küster's Reports, January 8 and 22, 1824.

[2] Zentner's Memorial is reprinted word for word in Ilse's History of the German Federal Assembly, vol. II, p. 341. The writing, on the other hand, which, in Metternich's Posthumous Papers, vol. IV, p. 120, is erroneously reproduced as the work of Zentner, is in reality the Münch-Bellinghausen Memorandum of January 6, 1824. Further details in Appendix XV.

from the primitive character of the estates can be tolerated," and therefore in all the federal states which had granted publicity to their assemblies, strict rules of procedure must be introduced, as far as possible by common agreement. The Bavarian minister expressed himself as in full accord with the continued enforcement of the laws against the universities and the press, but he added that in Bavaria the suppression of books after publication had been just as effective as the censorship of books elsewhere, and perhaps even more effective. There was no longer a word regarding any reservation of Bavarian sovereignty or the Bavarian constitution. Thus it seemed that the father of the Bavarian constitution had gone over with flying colours into the Austrian camp, and Metternich immediately resolved to make Zentner's memorial the basis of his own proposals at the Bundestag. It was his wish, as he declared to Emperor Francis, "to compromise Bavaria," so as to cut off the possibility of retreat from the untrustworthy court of Munich. In great satisfaction he left Tegernsee on June 2nd, to assemble his confidants at Johannisberg. They all hailed the Bavarian memorial as a grand success. The Prussian federal envoy declared maliciously: "Zentner seems to regard his own child as an abortion, and adopts an attitude very different from that which he formerly assumed as illuminate, professor, and constitution-builder." [1]

Yet matters were not quite so bad as this. The wary Bavarian statesman, far as he had gone to meet the wishes of Austria, still held firmly to the principles which, with Bernstorff's support, he had defended at the Vienna conference. He did not desire that the Federation should interfere in any way with the territorial constitutions. If we look more closely into the matter, we can see that Zentner's memorial did not even contain an unambiguous promise that Bavaria herself would henceforward literally enforce the Carlsbad press law, or would (contrary to the constitution) introduce a censorship of books. When he expressed the wish that the order of procedure in the diets should be made stricter, this was no new concession, but simply a paraphrase of the prescription already contained in article 59 of the final act. Moreover, Metternich was well aware that the pliancy of the court of Munich had its limits. When Berstett now appeared at Johannisberg, again imploring the help of the Federation, and

[1] Nagler's Report, July 19, 1824.

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describing the deplorable situation of Baden in a long memorial signed by Blittersdorff,[1] the Austrian answered with a shrug that anyone could learn from Carlsruhe how, with unaided forces, the rulers could manage their estates; that it was not possible for the present to secure more than had been demanded in Tegernsee; that Prussia and Bavaria would not go further than this. Still, Metternich could congratulate himself upon his successes. Shortly before, he had complained to his friends "Rechberg is not Bavaria"; [2] now he could enjoy the triumph of seeing the old opponent of the Carlsbad decrees demand their renewal.

Metternich stayed at his Rhenish castle for several weeks. Münch, Nagler, Hatzfeldt, Marschall, Berstett, Münster, and du Thil, almost all the leading statesmen of the Federation, were in attendance, and the duke of Oldenburg put in an appearance in person. Everyone advocated Zentner's proposals, and Berstett more zealously than all the others. The Badenese statesman had long had in mind the institution of common rules of procedure for the South German popular chambers, rules which were not to impinge in the least upon the existing constitutions; no more was necessary than "to make the exception the rule and the rule the exception," so that the chambers should in future hold public sittings on special occasions only, and with the approval of the government! The court of Dresden was also in favour of an understanding; the minor cabinets were enlightened by a circular from Metternich; and, to the general surprise, even Maucler, the Würtemberg minister, came to Johannisberg in order to make his peace with the great powers.[3] At the very end, Charles Augustus of Weimar also spent a few hours at the castle; he was little impressed by the diplomatic chatter, but what could he do to resist when the great ones were in accord?

On his way home, Metternich visited Wrede at the castle of Ellingen, to consult further with the Bavarian statesmen, and to cement the new friendship. In his customary boastful tone he then announced to Emperor Francis (July 29th) that the great coup at the Bundestag had now been safely prepared. It is hardly credible with what complacency he ventured to

[1] Blittersdorff, Memorial Concerning the Situation in Baden, Johannisberg, July, 1824.

[2] Metternich to Berstett, March 18 and May 8, 1824.

[3] Jordan's Report, Dresden, July 12; Lusi's Report, Stuttgart, June 16,

lie to his monarch, whose ideas concerning the German federal law were, indeed, utterly childish. Metternich declared that through the ministerial conferences of 1820 the Federation had acquired "some seventy new organic laws"—a statement which could be regarded as true only if each of the sixty-five paragraphs of the final act were to be deemed a separate organic law. Through this fabulous legislative fertility the organic legal system of the Federation had naturally been perfected, and the only thing that still remained necessary was the renewal of the exceptional laws. Emperor Francis gladly gave his approval, saying: "Truly your labours have been unceasing to maintain the tranquillity and order of the world. May God crown them with success."

On August 12th, in a confidential sitting, the Bundestag was informed regarding the plans of the Hofburg. Four days later the well-prepared drama was staged. Münch delivered a long presidential address, giving by Metternich's orders a literal reproduction of several passages from Zentner's memorial, so that in form as well as in substance the proposals should seem the joint work of Bavaria and Austria. Thereupon the Bundestag unanimously resolved to continue the provisional press law in force until a definitive law should be promulgated. The law dealing with the universities was also to remain in force, and a committee of the federal assembly was to study the defects of the German educational system. Finally, it was declared the duty of all the federated states to maintain the monarchical principle, and to avert the misuse of public parliamentary procedure by rigid rules for the conduct of business, which were to be drawn up as far as possible upon common agreement.

Most of the minor courts, as Berstett subsequently admitted, complied with reluctance; but the semblance of freedom was preserved, assent was given in all cases without reservation, and it was only the suspicious eye of Blittersdorff which could discern in the somewhat involved phrasing of the Ernestine representative's vote that "the Wartburg spirit" still haunted Weimar. Owing to dread of dissensions no attempt was made to secure the promised definitive press law, and for the same reason the new federal committee upon the universities never came into existence. The only state which exhibited a trifling hesitation regarding the Bavario-Austrian proposals was, strangely enough, Bavaria. The Bavarian envoy

when approving the renewal of the press law, did so in the ambiguous phrase, that the measures against the press agreed upon in the year 1819 were to be enforced in all German states "in the same manner as before." Bavaria thus tacitly maintained the distinctive methods she had previously practised. To the last, Metternich vainly endeavoured to secure the suppression of the obnoxious clause; but when this proved impossible he closed his eyes to it, for Bavaria was in any case attached to Austria by sufficiently close bonds. The adoption of the Carlsbad decrees five years earlier had been secured only by a coup de main, but their renewal was now effected in a manner legally incontestable. Although the prescribed formal discussion had not taken place, all the other prescriptions of the order of procedure had been followed, and the unanimity demanded by the constitution had been secured. The resolution concerning the diets signified very little, for every one of the federated states still remained essentially entitled to impose upon freedom of speech whatever limits it might desire. But the Hofburg had attained its principal aim; the sacred institution of the censorship was preserved for the Germans for an indefinite period. In a gracious letter, the king of Prussia expressed his thanks to the Austrian chancellor, and Metternich declared with satisfaction that now for the first time the Germanic Federation had been completely interwoven into the system of the great powers.[1] Gentz wrote, without foreseeing how terribly his prophecy was to be fulfilled, "Henceforward the revolutionary system cannot gain the upper hand in Germany without the destruction of the Germanic Federation. Thus far have we advanced since the year 1819."

After these resolutions had been passed, the court of Vienna exhibited towards the Bundestag the same dull indifference which it had displayed in the year 1817. A police-regulated order had been secured. What more was necessary? The house of Austria could not cherish positive plans for the increase of German power and well-being. Had not the unresting Prussia continued to agitate the question of the federal fortresses, the Bundestag would have had hardly anything to discuss. The restriction of the session to four months, as desired by the Hofburg, practically came into effect, for henceforward Münch regularly spent eight months of the year at the foreign

[1] Blittersdorff's Reports, August 12, 16, 22, and 27, 1824.

office in Vienna; during his absence he was represented by Bavaria or Saxony, never by Prussia. In a word, the activities of the Eschenheimer Gasse became purely spectral, and were no wise distinguished from those of Ratisbon days. The much derided question of the Cutin common lands, which to the day of its extinction the old Reichstag had proved unable to settle, found a worthy counterpart in the year 1827, when the Mainz fortification authority, "with undue precipitancy and reckless disregard of its relationship to the high federal assembly," built a few latrines for the garrison hospital. The Bundestag was justly outraged at this usurpation of authority. It need hardly be said that the evil-doers were Prussian officers. Since, however, "the necessity of this provision" was irrefutable, it was finally decided that the military committee should, "for this once, authorise the expenditure of the specified sum," whereupon, with strict exhortations, the money was paid over to the culpable authority. In the following year, such severe and groundless reproaches were again made on account of these same latrines that Nagler had to explain to the enraged envoys of the minor powers that the Prussian fortification authority ought to be heard before its conduct was disapproved.

In the art of confusing what was simple and of obscuring what was clear, the Bundestag had long ere this successfully rivalled its Ratisbon prototype. Princess Berkeley, the widow of the last margrave of Ansbach-Baireuth, had, among others, experience of this. The crown of Prussia had formerly assigned her an annual income drawn from the public funds of the Franconian provinces, and according to the clear wording of the treaties it was indisputable that the king of Bavaria, now suzerain of Ansbach-Baireuth, should pay the widow her jointure. Bavaria, however, found it possible to evade this obligation under empty excuses, and when, in the year 1825, the princess lodged a complaint with the Bundestag, the discussion was protracted in Frankfort for several years, and was then referred to the court of arbitration in Lübeck. In the year 1830, the court decided, as it was evidently forced to do, in favour of the plaintiff. But meanwhile the princess had died, and her son, Lord Craven, was informed by Bavaria that in accordance with the laws of that country his claim was extinct. He was never able to secure his rights, although the English government espoused his cause, and the London

press expatiated with well-grounded contempt upon this example of German fidelity. Gentz was right. Things had moved far since the year 1819. It is hardly surprising that on September 18, 1828, Gentz had the proposal made at the Bundestag that the assembly should for lack of business be adjourned for an indefinite period. For very shame, the motion was not entered in the private minutes, but was concealed in a secret register; it was adopted, however, and the adjournment lasted more than four months.

Disgraceful as was this state of affairs, one which exposed a great nation to the mockery of Europe, it had firm roots in the international field. As long as Austria, England, Denmark, and Holland belonged to the Germanic Federation, the central authority of that body must either, as in Wangenheim's days, pass its time in sterile quarrels, or else must succumb to a futile stagnation; and who among the thousands of true patriots that lamented the miseries of Germany had ever given a serious thought to the reasons for the national disgrace? As time passed, moreover, numerous social relationships became established between the Bundestag, the Frankfort bourse, and the leading families of the vicinity, and before long polite society in the south-west came to regard as indispensable this court of diplomats who never had anything to do and were always ready for amusements. Especially valuable services were performed for the assembly by its three powerful favourites, the business houses of Rothschild, of Taxis, and of Cotta. The firm of Rothschild displayed its gratitude for the gift of the interest on the money for the German fortifications, by supplying the court of Vienna with private information, and by utilising the wide subterranean ramifications of its social power on behalf of Austrian federal policy.

No less grateful was the princely house of Thurn and Taxis, which was confirmed by the federal act in its old postal rights, thus securing from Prussia and several other states abundant indemnification. In Würtemberg, the two Hesses, Nassau, and the Thuringian states, the house administered the posts with all the shamelessness of the monopolist spirit. How many people avoided travelling in Central Germany, for fear of being "turned and taxed" (as the popular phrase ran) in the wretched diligences of this postal service. The postal "snail" of Thurn and Taxis, as Börne called it, occupied forty-six hours traversing the hundred miles between Frankfort

and Stuttgart, spending fifteen of these hours at wayside inns. There was no question of the institution of branch lines of service, since these brought in so little profit. To the Austrian presidential embassy, the Taxis postal administration was more accommodating than to travellers, placing at the envoy's disposition not merely the *Frankfurter Oberpostamtszeitung*, a journal of unexampled dullness, but also the princely police services. The Napoleonic police had long before introduced into every European state the evil practice of opening private letters, and all the courts had adopted it. When a minister wished without fear of punishment to say an unpleasant truth to a foreign sovereign, he wrote to his envoy through the post, feeling confident that his words would reach their mark. But nowhere else, the Viennese Stallburg alone excepted, was this dirty traffic carried on so impudently as in the "lodges" of the Taxis post, and the renowned Taxis general post office of Eisenach sat like a spider at the centre of the web of German communications. When Nagler, in Frankfort, was asked on one occasion to send a private instruction to Küster in Munich without fear of its disclosure, the man of experience answered that this was quite impossible, The best way would be to write the instruction in Berlin upon fancy notepaper, and have it addressed in a woman's handwriting to Fräulein von Küster; the note must then be enclosed in a letter to an artist friend in Munich.[1] Conducted in this spirit, the Taxis postal service was a powerful prop of Austrian dominion in Germany. The Austrian envoy was gratuitously housed at the Taxis palace in the Eschenheimer Gasse, and the Bundestag saw nothing improper in enjoying for many decades the hospitality of the postal dynasts of Ratisbon.

Of a different character, but no less useful, were the amenities which the house of Cotta was able to render the Bundestag. In the year 1825, Goethe requested special protection against literary piracy. In a ceremonious and dignified petition the old man declared that "the supervision devoted by our illustrious authorities to the great whole need not exclude a benevolent regard for individual details," and he commended to the illustrious Bundestag, to the union of all the German sovereignties, "this affair which is of importance to German literature." Notwithstanding Prussia's endeavours, a federal law against literary piracy had not yet been enacted.

[1] Nagler to the minister for foreign affairs, April 7, 1828.

and the granting of special privileges was not within the competence of the Bundestag, yet the members of the assembly could not but feel what Germany owed to her greatest poet. Nagler pleaded urgency; considerations of form were ignored; matters were pressed on with unusual speed; and two months after the petition had been received a resolution was adopted by all the federated governments to advocate the granting of Goethe's request. The forty volumes of the new edition of Goethe's works were able to appear "protected by the privileges of the most illustrious Germanic Federation." Subsequently this privilege was renewed, and a similar privilege was extended to the works of Schiller. But the wealthy heirs of the excellent Johann Friedrich Cotta were as little able as was the house of Taxis to withstand the temptations of the monopolist spirit. Unaffected by the remonstrances of the learned world, they misused their privilege by gross neglect of the treasures entrusted to their care, and as long as the Bundestag continued to exist, the German nation was never given a suitable and accurate edition of the works of its greatest poets. This national scandal, inconceivable in England or in France, served only as additional proof of the impotence of public opinion in our distracted land.

The extraordinary favour was reciprocated by the house of Cotta by means of the *Allgemeine Zeitung* published in Augsburg, which since 1820 had been the most influential German paper, and practically the only one read in Austria. Its voluminous reports made it indispensable to diplomats, while the scientific essays its columns contained were invaluable to men of learning. It was a common platform for all parties, for it published contributions from men of the most various shades of opinion. Sometimes, when the liberal current was strong, distinctively radical articles appeared. Rarely were its own opinions voiced, and then always with diplomatic reserve. For many years the editorship was in the hands of Stegmann and Lindner's friend Le Bret, both of them liberal particularists of the Stuttgart school. Nevertheless this non-partisan newspaper was in such close relationships with the Austrian court that Cotta was inclined on several occasions to transfer his organ to Vienna, and was deterred from doing so only on account of the Austrian censorship! Gentz, annoyed a hundred times over by the liberal articles published in the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, had very good reasons none the less for continuing to exhibit

his favour. More effectively here than in the columns of the ill-reputed *Oesterreichische Beobachter* could the most intimate wishes of Viennese statesmanship find expression. The paper was conducted upon commercial principles, and, desiring to preserve a reputation for diplomatic profundity, never rejected a contribution "from an exalted source," the sole provisos being that the articles must be topical and must be suitable for the perusal of intelligent readers. So chameleon-like a newspaper could not fail to exercise a profoundly disastrous influence upon the political culture of the nation, which, in its nebulous embitterment and obscure yearning, above all needed relentlessly straightforward instruction. It nourished in its readers that erudite political impotence by which the cultured Germans were tragically distinguished from neighbouring nations. Those who looked through these spectacles attained to the view that the loathsome rout of the Eschenheimer Gasse would endure for ever. The paper claimed omniscience, being thoroughly well-informed about Peru, Sweden, and Further India, whilst remaining a stranger to its own fatherland—for concerning the most vigorous of the German states the readers received no more than rare, scanty, and, for the most part, malicious reports. Thus the *Allgemeine Zeitung* was a faithful ally of the house of Austria, and it was not by chance merely that its influence passed away for ever after the fall of Metternich.

It was through this newspaper that Germany first became acquainted with a power which had long been known to her western neighbours—the power of journalistic anonymity. Beyond question, the Augsburg journal owed part of its prestige to the impenetrable veil which concealed the identity of its political contributors, reactionary or liberal, competent or incompetent. In the innocence of the first years of peace, the valiant German nature had continued to strive vigorously against anonymous authorship, and indeed our honest tongue did not even possess a thoroughly apt word for anonymity. The parliamentary orators among the Badenese and Bavarian liberals were then practically unanimous in the opinion that freedom of the press would not be possible unless everyone were to advocate his opinions under his own name. Since then, however, the period of persecution and mistrust had ensued, and to all it now seemed that anonymity was an

indispensable bulwark of freedom of the press. No longer did anyone ask what breaches of official duty, what moral offences, might lurk behind anonymous articles. To the writers in the daily press was conceded the privilege of dragging all that was hidden into the light, while themselves remaining concealed in the profoundest obscurity, and this fragment of topsy-turvydom was accepted as an inalterable necessity. Thus was introduced into Germany one of the worst moral diseases of the nineteenth century, an unnatural state of affairs which subsequent ages will regard as we regard the "informer system" of the Holy Roman Empire, but which those of the present generation take as a matter of course, accepting it in the same easy-going way as that in which orientals accept the plague.

In this desolate epoch of federal history the sole gratifying occurrence was the dissolution of the Mainz central committee of enquiry, which was at length abolished very quietly in the year 1829, owing to the complete exhaustion of material for its labours. It had cost the Federation 90,000 gulden, and the participating governments some half million. What had been the outcome? An alarming disclosure of the sentiments, not of the demagogues, but of the German courts and of their police officials. From the first the authorities had been upon the wrong road. They left the most dangerous of the young malcontents, Carl Follen, at liberty, so that in the beginning of the year 1820 he was able to escape to France. The investigation against the other arrested persons was conducted so ineptly that the Mainz committee, in order to be able to prove that there had existed at least a trace of dangerous intrigues, was compelled to resort to the most unworthy calumnies. In the year 1820, Musset, the Nassau plenipotentiary, a fit tool of Marschall, acting behind the backs of his colleagues, sent his court a secret report which almost exceeded the bounds of possibility in its suspicions and distortions. When Arndt was assuming his professorial office at Bonn, Nicolovius had once wished his friend God's blessing and the gift of energy "so that our youth may faithfully cherish justice and truth, and may become God's chosen weapon." On the ground of this letter, the Nassau envoy gleefully wrote: "Not everyone regarded the activities of the students as insignificant, although many now wish to make

light of this matter; there were some who believed that by good instruction youth might become God's chosen weapon!" Concerning the gymnastic cult, he wrote with similar perspicacity: "The feeling of physical energy which gymnastic exercise furnishes and the more rapid circulation it induces naturally awaken the desire for an object to contend with, and thus gymnastics prepare the mind for the reception of those ideas whose realisation demands great effort of body and mind." [1] Vainly did the Prussian president, von Kaisenberg, more unconcerned than the government he represented, endeavour to restrain the Mainz septemvirate within the limits of what was reasonable. The only outcome of his moderate attitude was that the court of Carlsruhe persistently complained of "the liberalising tendency" of the Mainz committee, and Metternich made a diplomatic enquiry in Berlin (this time without result) whether "the lack of firmness of the present Prussian plenipotentiary might not perhaps render expedient a change in the personality of the holder of this office." [2]

Hörmann, the Bavarian, was entrusted with the preparation of the general report, and the bungle he produced was so atrocious that even Blittersdorff was disgusted. How delighted was the Badenese statesman when in 1826 the Bundestag gave him the honourable commission of extracting from Hörmann's work a brief and telling report for the use of the general public; the nation was to learn on the brink of what an abyss it had been standing, from what enemies had it been rescued by the wisdom of the Federation. But imagine Blittersdorff's feelings when he came to contemplate the performances of the septemvirate! "In other lands," he wrote in a fury, "people would point the finger of scorn at us if after these long years we were to regale the public once more with such ancient histories. Is there any way of drafting an imposing report out of these materials? How is it possible to do so if we are to remain at a proper level of observation?" Again, when he had entered more fully into the spirit of the Mainz work, he wrote, "In the entire report there is to be found but one comprehensive and leading idea, and this is that all subsequent intrigues and secret societies

[1] Musset, Report upon the Labours of the Central Committee of Enquiry, Mainz, September 2, 1820.

[2] Berstett and Blittersdorff, Memorial concerning the Central Committee of Enquiry, April 6; Blittersdorff's Reports, February 6 and March 21; Metternich to Hatzfeldt, June 24, 1825.

have proceeded from those which were directed against the French dominion and the Confederation of the Rhine!"[1]

Such was the fact. The former editor of the Munich *Alemannia* had had the effrontery to give expression in the reports of the committee to his unabated Rhenish-confederate sentiment, to his deadly hatred for Prussia and the War of Liberation, at once utilising and outdoing the denunciations of Schmalz. As Blittersdorff dolefully complained, his work was permeated by "the scarce-concealed tendency to indicate Prussia and the powers as those who had raised the evil spirit which subsequently they had proved unable to control." It is indisputable that the revolt against Napoleon was here imputed to the Prussian people as a crime, and was thus imputed by the federal authority. The first demagogic "intrigue," the one with which Hörmann's relation began, was a letter from Schleiermacher to Reimer, written after the battle of Jena, which concluded with the following words: "A universal regeneration is essential, and will develop out of these incidents. We cannot yet see how this will occur; but we want to be on hand and to participate in it as soon as the current of affairs summons us or carries us away with it." Next came Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation*, the Tugendbund, Arndt's *Catechism for the German Landwehrmann*, all the patriotic clubs which had been formed against the French in the days of bitter need. Stein and Gneisenau were several times referred to as suspects, whilst almost on every page was flaunted the name of Hardenberg, the great patron of conspirators. From these "intrigues" against the lawful regime of Napoleon had then arisen, by a natural process of reproduction, the Burschenschaft, the gymnastic grounds, the Unconditionals, the assassination and the attempted assassination in the year 1819. For the subsequent years, Hörmann could produce little more than a league of youth and a questionable association of grown men, regarding whose aims the committee had to content itself with such weakly phrases as "it is conceivable," etc.

The fundamental idea of the report being thus shameful, thus derogatory to the national honour, the detailed application of the idea displayed a capricious unconscientiousness which was, indeed, an almost necessary consequence of the peculiar

[1] Blittersdorff to Münch, November 25 and December 7; to Berstett, November 26, 1826.

bastard character of the Mainz authority. A formal governmental court of judicature, such as was vainly recommended in Carlsbad by Prussia, would have had to confine its attention strictly to demonstrated facts. But this committee of enquiry considered it its duty, "making use of several thousand documents whose true significance could not for the most part as yet be perceived, and of several hundred testimonies many of which were still incomplete, to compile a history of the political activities of a period covering more than ten years (activities which found expression not so much in definite actions as in endeavours, preparations, and introductions), and to measure the degree of certainty of the facts in accordance with the principles of historical belief, in accordance with its own subjective conviction." Guided by this subjective conviction, the committee had assembled a marvellous hotch-potch of truth and fiction, of facts, suppositions, and rumours, which justified no definite conclusion regarding the decisive questions at issue; the committee itself admitted that Lieutenant Schulz's *Question and Answer Booklet* was "almost the only positive item" among their documents, and they profoundly deplored the acquittal of this evil-doer—an acquittal which unquestionably was not justified.

Blittersdorff could not venture to appear before the nation with such a report. The disfavour of public opinion had no terrors for him, but he dreaded the wrath of the Prussian government. What would be said in Berlin if an official historiographer of the Bundestag were to compile the history of the years 1806 to 1815 in the spirit of the Napoleonic secret police! The Badenese statesman therefore postponed the dangerous editorial task, and the Black Committee was dissolved without furnishing the nation with the promised revelations. It was not until years afterwards, in 1831, that Blittersdorff discharged his commission, and the précis which he now gave of the Mainz documents was a biased and trivial performance. He deliberately maintained silence regarding numerous extenuating circumstances which had been adduced in favour of the demagogues, but also suppressed much which might have aroused anger in Berlin. By this time all the German governments, with the exception of the indefatigable Hofburg, had become weary of the sordid affair. Prussia had just decided that the names of high officials were not to be mentioned in the reports of the enquiry, and when instructions

were asked concerning the publication of Blittersdorff's work, no answer was vouchsafed. Most of the courts remained silent from shame, but some doubtless as the simple outcome of a praiseworthy federal habit. Thus terminated the commission which Metternich had once commended to his Carlsbad colleagues for the salvation of Germany. It was only the unfortunates who at a nod from Mainz had been thrown into prison, that were able to relate something in private regarding the efficiency of the sinister authority. The whole extent of its obscure activities did not become known to the German nation until the year 1860, when Ilse published his excerpts from its proceedings.

In this manner all semblance of active life had gradually disappeared from the Federation, and Metternich listened occasionally with well-grounded satisfaction to the deep breathing of the peacefully slumbering Bundestag. What better could the Hofburg expect from the non-Austrian Germans? The court of Vienna had never even thought it worth while to promulgate the federal acts in its own German crown-lands. But among Prussian officers and statesmen the enquiry was now frequently and angrily voiced, as it had been of old in the days of the Holy Empire, whether Prussia should not utterly shake off the paralysing fetter by which she was chained to the corpse of the German unified state. Even Nagler openly declared to his colleagues in Frankfort that in his view Prussia ought to abandon to its fate an institution from which no good was to be expected. Everything in Germany which was still vigorously alive suffered from the oppression lying upon the Federation. It was now that the most difficult days came for the young constitutions of the south. The danger was greater than it had been in the year 1819. The youthful enthusiasm which had then greeted the new principles had long since cooled, and discouragement was so general that even the anxious Gentz had perforce to admit that the mood of the dangerous middle classes had notably improved. The masses, finally, had as yet enjoyed little from the new freedom beyond an increase in the burden of taxation, and many an honest peasant lent an eager ear when the parish priest or the bailiff was abusing the "ducat men," as the deputies were nicknamed on account of their salary of five gulden a day.

Hornthal was not re-elected to the new Bavarian diet,

which met in March, 1825; Behr and several other liberal officials were unable to attend because the government made a pitiless use of its power to refuse leave of absence. In place of these, there appeared many new men of talent, and in the forefront Ignaz Rudhart, a Franconian from the chapter lands, who while still quite young had displayed his fine acquirements as professor and author, had next manifested even more remarkable practical gifts as a public official, and who now, a man of irreproachable character and high endowments, was generally recognised as the greatest orator in Bavaria. It was a delight to hear him, still in the vigour of youth, a man with an honest and winning countenance, speaking his thoughts with the utmost candour—a rarity at that time. His manner was somewhat more emotional than is agreeable in these days of reserve; but he spoke always with a thorough knowledge of his subject, straightforwardly and yet prudently, thoughtfully and yet in simple and popular language. Notwithstanding all its immaturity, the youthful constitutional life of the south possessed the great advantage that such natures as Rudhart's could here develop freely, whereas for them the Prussian official state had as yet no place. Like all liberals of the period, Rudhart at first cherished somewhat extravagant ideas regarding the power of the new diets, Yet sooner than the others did he learn to take a more modest view, and to recognise the limits imposed upon parliamentarism by Germany's monarchical history. For the very reason that his hopes were not directed towards the unattainable, in this epoch of general slackness he preserved that cheerful and virile confidence which imparts charm to his speeches even to-day. Next to Rudhart, and distinguished by his knowledge of economics, came Utzschneider, a great manufacturer, almost the first to awaken the modern spirit of enterprise in easy-going Old Bavaria. Another man to acquire considerable reputation was Count Bentzel-Sternau, an old Bonapartist, who had in earlier days been Dahlberg's trusted minister in the grand-duchy of Frankfort, but now, at his country house by the lake of Zurich, composed second-rate poems in the vein of Jean Paul, and gave hospitable shelter to German refugees. He worked zealously on behalf of Protestant enlightenment, and finally came over to the Evangelical church. His experiences at the diet were subsequently recorded in his *Bavarian Letters*. This work, which ran to several volumes, took the form of a

correspondence between Reykjavik and Hochwittelsbach, and its marvellously facetious verbosity served in the end to convey but a single truth, that the destiny of the globe revolved around the parliament house of Munich.

However modest the attitude of the majority at the diet, its members soon felt that a new wind was blowing at court. Since the conversation of Tegernsee, Zentner had drawn closer to his opponents Rechberg and Thürheim; and Lerchenfeld was now so isolated, that in the ministerial council, after some hesitation, he had ultimately voted for the renewal of the Carlsbad decrees.[1] Meanwhile, at the hall in the Pranners Gasse, the boxes for the court and the diplomats had been greatly enlarged, so that the space allotted to ordinary strangers was much curtailed. The like spirit of petty timidity and the like methods of police government were displayed also in the rules of procedure which the ministers, in fulfilment of the pledges made in Frankfort, now laid before the diet. The proposals went far beyond the federal decrees, containing not merely severe provisions against the misuse of the right of free speech, but also the prescription that henceforward no delegate was to introduce a formally elaborated counter-proposal. Thus the limited right of initiative accorded to the diet by the constitution was to be almost completely abolished in an underhand manner by a paragraph in the rules of procedure. These proposals were discussed in a number of secret sittings, amid natural excitement. Vain were Rudhart's warnings that without publicity of parliamentary proceedings the constitution would be brought to naught. The majority accepted the decrees of the Bundestag, for it was known that the reactionary party at court had resolved, in case of need, to impose the new rules of procedure upon the diet by royal decree.[2]

In other legislative results this session had very little to show; even the three laws of September 11, 1825, concerning domicile and occupation were the outcome merely of peplexity, and not of a statesmanlike plan. The government recognised very clearly the impracticability of the old guild system, but it did not venture to disregard the deep-rooted prejudices of the people, who still clung to tradition; and it contemplated with profound mistrust the unprecedented

[1] Küster's Report, August 11, 1824.
[2] Küster's Report, September 8, 1824.

phenomena of modern commerce, especially the appearance of the detested bagmen from Frankfort and other "foreign" towns of the neighbour states. With good intentions, therefore, a middle course was chosen, and it was decided to adopt a system of concessions: permission to marry, to settle, and to carry on an occupation, were as a rule to be granted at the discretion of the authorities, who had in this connection to take into account "the nutritive conditions" of the locality. In truth the proposal was displeasing to all parties. It went too far for the conservatives; while the liberals demanded more, and Rudhart boldly predicted that the day of complete freedom of occupation was coming. In the end the diet voted for the proposal, for the sole reason that no other course was open. Among the masses, however, there immediately began a conservative movement against the disturbance of ancient customs, a natural process of reaction to which the new laws were to succumb within a few years. In the discussions on the budget, much pent up discontent was displayed in the private sittings; the balance of accounts was extremely unfavourable, for the fall in the price of grain had reduced the yield from the domains, while extensive fires and other disasters had affected large areas. In addition, there had occurred one of those disagreeable little incidents which seemed almost inevitable in the reign of Max Joseph. At the marriage of Princess Sophia, the happy father had scattered money with so lavish a hand that subsequently it was difficult to conceal these disbursements under various items.[1]

At length the budget was approved and the diet graciously dismissed. Nevertheless a number of harsh expressions which had been employed during the debates had profoundly affronted the court. Once more the reactionary party raised its head. It had already succeeded in dislodging the highly respected Cajetan Weiller, one of the most liberal-minded among the clergy, from his influential position at the Munich lyceum, and in transferring him to the torpidity of the academy. Aretin's "genuine Bavarians" had recommenced their literary invectives against the northern interlopers. There came also into the account the influence of private admonitions from the Hofburg. In this quarter, even the new rules of procedure for the diet, which in truth left nothing to be desired from the reactionary point of

[1] Küster's Report, December 17, 1824.

view, were considered inadequate. Hatzfeldt, Metternich's faithful echo, stormed against the cowardice of the Munich court, which was unable to make up its mind to the simple reestablishment of the old Bavarian estates. In his address to the upper house, the crown prince Louis had given the sensible advice that a passage about "the monarchical principle" should be expunged, because its retention might lead to hostile remarks in the other chamber. What a storm of indignation arose in Vienna when tidings were received that the heir to the throne had demeaned himself in this manner, and Hatzfeldt wrote with disgust that the information was "barely credible." Then the new theatre in Munich opened with the representation of the revolutionary plays *Egmont* and *Wilhelm Tell,* and the "licentious" Bavarian press permitted itself on this occasion to make disrespectful remarks about King Philip II of old.[1] In a word, with encouragement from Vienna, Rechberg resumed the old game. Lerchenfeld believed that his fall was imminent; worse was dreaded; and in view of the increasing weakness of will displayed by the aging king the issue was hard to foresee. Then, on October 12, 1825, Max Joseph died, serenely as he had lived. In accordance with his usual custom he had come to the capital on his official birthday in order to receive the congratulations of his subjects, and in the evening, his good-natured heart filled with pleasant memories, he had driven back to Nymphenburg. He died there quietly the same night, honestly mourned by his people. With the accession of King Louis a new era began for Bavaria.

In Würtemberg fresh rules of procedure for the diet were needless, and Trott could with a good conscience give assurances to this effect in Frankfort. In this kingdom the obsolete institution of the diet committee had long ere this manifested its two-edged influence. Under the prudent guidance of Weishaar, the permanent committee was in the habit of coming to such a perfect understanding with the ministers about all matters of importance, that the diet had no other work beyond that of registering its subsequent approval; and since, in addition, the chambers dissipated their energies in interminable deliberations in committee, the proceedings of the plenum were calm and tedious. The Swabian scriveners'

[1] Hatzfeldt's Report, March 17, 1825.

regime still flourished amazingly, and the only corporation in the country which continued to maintain a certain degree of independence vis-à-vis the all-powerful officialdom, namely the university, had to suffer severely from the displeasure of the dominant caste. In Tübingen, the royal commissary Hofacker instituted a rough and tyrannical system which could not be paralleled at any other German university. After a while, the proposal was made to transfer the university to the capital. At this time Stuttgart possessed few of the cultural amenities of a great town. The idea was, however, that the cheerful unrestraint of academic life, ever repulsive to the martinet spirit of the king, would be mastered by the atmosphere of the court, by the influence of the garrison, and by the strong police of the capital. For the time being the petty notion was dropped, but in the year 1829 the university received a completely new and purely bureaucratic constitution. It was by a strange irony of fate that Metternich's scheme for the reform of the universities should encounter insuperable obstacles in all the other federated states, but should be realised in the dominions of the liberal king of Swabia. In Tübingen it was still remembered how often in old days Duke Eberhard im Bart, the founder of the university, had visited his former tutor Nauclerus in the chancellor's house adjoining the Stiftskirche, in order to carouse with his professors and to dispute with them in a friendly way; while now, by a descendant of the founder and by his adviser Maucler the venerable university was being mistrustfully deprived of the ancient right of electing its own rector and dean. The entire learned world of Germany smarted from the affront, and Schelling sent to his old home the bitter Latin couplet:

Vindice Nauclero quondam fundata Tubinga,
Judice Mauclero perdita tota jacet.

In Darmstadt, reaction took a less odious form. The peace-loving spirit which had brooded over the beginnings of Hessian constitutional life had not yet completely disappeared. During these weary years the diet carried through a few valuable reforms, effecting, in especial, the abolition of tithes. Even here, however, the undisturbed harmony of former days no longer prevailed. How different now was the language held by the ministerial bench! When, in the exercise of the

limited power which had been granted them to supervise the national finances, the deputies demanded certain explanations, they were confidentially informed that further demands of the kind might readily endanger the very existence of the constitution. Inconvenient members of the opposition were got rid of by purely arbitrary measures. Before the elections of 1826, Minister Grolmann peregrinated the country in order to prepare the electors. When E. E. Hoffmann, the most outspoken and zealous of the liberal partisans, armed for defence, and exhorted the Hessians to give their votes to none but men of independent views, proceedings were taken against him by the government for indirect lese-majesty, and it was not until three years had elapsed and he had been acquitted of this charge that he was able to enter the chamber. The well-meaning minister, who had been extolled shortly before as the father of the constitution, had himself to blame for the fact that he was now regarded with suspicion and hostility; he was worn out by the petty vexations of his disputes with the diet, and died while still comparatively young.

But how trifling did all this seem when contrasted with the saturnalia of reaction which was going on in Baden. It was not for nothing that in his Johannisberg memorial Blittersdorff had uttered a threat, saying that the governments had too long been content with defence, and that it was time for them to assume the offensive. Since the ungracious dismissal of the diet of 1823, the reactionary party had done everything in its power to subvert the constitution. Replying to a congratulatory letter from the court of St. Petersburg, Berstett gave expression to his overwhelming gratitude for the flattering recognition accorded by the czar to the grand duke's poor efforts, and went on to say: "All the disorderly activities which for years past have disturbed peoples and governments alike, seem to be concentrated in the word 'constitution,' and to be manifested in the misuse made of its significance." Secret manœuvres were already in progress against this evil word. Spurred on by a local official, the districts of Wolfenweiler and Schallstadt sent a petition to the grand duke, begging him "to resume complete sovereignty without any representative assembly, and to reestablish the ancient form of government." With high delight the Austrian envoy sent information to Vienna concerning this manifestation of the popular will, and Hatzfeldt wrote with satisfaction:

"The populace is good everywhere and is everywhere the same; its judgments are always reasonable when it is preserved from the influence of conspirators with their dangerous principles." [1] Great was the grand duke's temptation; he found it difficult to endure any longer the nuisance of his loyal estates, and did not trouble to conceal that he would be extremely happy if the Bundestag or any other supreme authority could relieve him of his troublesome constitution.[2] Berstett and other high officials began to entertain serious thoughts of forcibly effecting a change in the constitution, and asked the opinion of Carl Salomo Zachariä, professor at Heidelberg, who in the last diet had been conspicuous for his subserviency. Zachariä belonged to the old school of jurists who regarded a counsel's opinion as a profitable field for the display of legal profundity, and he forthwith produced a memorial which demonstrated that the proposed coup d'état would be not merely timely but thoroughly justified by law. On this occasion he excelled himself in the art for which he was famed of being able to prove anything.

Grand Duke Louis, however, could not make up his mind to an open breach of his oath. He knew the opinion held in Berlin regarding coups d'état, and the ex-officer of the Prussian guard was in the habit of saying "I am well aware what I owe to our king." Since no direct help could be expected from the Bundestag, the court ultimately decided to avail itself of those means only which were furnished by the constitution. In December, 1824, the old diet was dissolved, and an electoral campaign based upon the model of the neighbouring land of France now promptly ensued, with the only difference that the free Germans were far more resentful of the misuse of official authority than the French, accustomed as they were to the amenities of bureaucratic rule. Berstett and a number of his subordinates travelled up and down the country, and the whole official army, even to the members of the road patrol, was pressed into the service. In Freiburg, where Rotteck's defeat was to be secured, the prescriptions of the electoral law were utterly disregarded. By these means the entire opposition was disposed of at one blow.

[1] Humble Petition of the Communes of Wolfenweiler and Schallstadt, February 9; Hruby's Report to Metternich, March 26; Hatzfeldt's Report, April 5, 1823.

[2] Küster's Report, January 1, 1824.

In the new chamber there were but three liberals, excellent men of moderate views, whose names were long held in respectful memory by the ill-used land of Baden: Föhrenbach; Grimm; and Professor Duttlinger of Freiburg, a man with a thorough knowledge of constitutional law.

Simultaneously the variously gifted favourite of the grand duke, Major Hennenhofer, had been pulling the wires which he had attached in every corner of the little country. He did not rest upon the laurels of Wolfenweiler and Schallstadt. All at once there poured in addresses to the grand duke from numerous localities, voicing in every case a request for the repeal of the constitution. Metternich's faithful henchmen looked with expectant joy towards Carlsruhe, where they possessed an astute and influential assistant in the Austrian envoy Hruby. Hatzfeldt was already arrogantly declaring: "I will not believe in the repose and happiness of Germany until the last of these constitutions and everything that resembles them shall have vanished from its soil."[1] It seemed by no means impossible that a radical change in the fundamental law might be enforced upon the pliable new chamber. Berstett, however, was not the man for such bold resolves unless he could count upon the support of the Federation, and in the ministerial council, though Berckheim was of the same way of thinking as himself, Boeckh and Ludwig Winter were both faithful to the constitution. In accordance with Winter's proposal the humble petitions were rejected, and instead of a comprehensive revision of the constitution being carried out, all that was suggested was that henceforward the budget should be approved for three years and that the entire chamber should be re-elected every six years.

Little objection could be raised to the content of the proposal. The passing of the budget for three years might well spare the country many needless verbal disputes, and the new electoral arrangements would unquestionably be better than the method hitherto adopted of renewing one-fourth of the chamber year by year. Nevertheless the proposal aroused profound and well-grounded discontent among the loyal adherents of the constitution, and Winter himself had unwillingly agreed to make this proposal only to avert a more undesirable one. It was to trifle with the constitution to alter this constitutional law so soon after its enactment, and to cancel the prescriptions

[1] Hatzfeldt's Report, January 24, 1825.

about the budget before a single budget had come into existence in due form of law. But what did reasons matter in this subservient parliament? Rosshirt, the young Heidelberg professor, a shining light of the growing ultramontane party, made a commendatory report, and all the deputies except the valiant three voted in favour of the change. The upper house took the same line, although Wessenberg reminded it of the "virgin immaculacy" of the fundamental law of the state. By this pusillanimous decision the vital energy of the Carlsruhe diet was paralysed for a long time to come. Heavily and dejectedly did the proceedings draw to a close; and the short diet of 1828 was likewise so inconspicuous that the people hardly noticed its existence. It was fortunate that the finances of the state were at length set in order by Boeckh, the able minister of finance, brother of the philologian. When at about this time Varnhagen reappeared in Baden and (to the great indignation of the elderly ruler) went to pay his respects to the grand duke, he seemed to the slumberous capital like a figure from a vanished world.[1] Metternich did not fail to express to the court of Carlsruhe the satisfaction of Emperor Francis, who, "owing to his genuinely cosmopolitan sentiments," took a lively interest in these affairs. "In times wherein there exists a quite peculiar solidarity of the men of ill will and of the evils which result from their activities, good example will be found no less fruitful. It has been reserved for the grand duke to set this example to Germany, and he therefore will be the first ruler to reap the harvest of so excellent a seed time."[2] Wessenberg's outlook into the future was keener than that of his powerful cousin. He prophesied to the court that no extensive advance would be made along this road. He knew that the undismayed leaders of Badenese liberalism were quietly reassembling their defeated troops for a fresh campaign.

Just as in federal policy the interests of Austria and Prussia were invariably opposed, so also in European affairs the relationship between the two friendly courts was always disturbed by manifold differences of opinion. When the French army crossed the Spanish frontier in April, 1823, Metternich proposed that until the king should have been liberated, the

[1] Küster's Reports, July 18 and 24, 1825.
[2] Metternich to Hruby, Milan, May 21, 1825.

regency in Spain should be committed to the monarch's uncle, Ferdinand of Naples; he desired in this way to prevent the duke of Angoulême, the French commander-in-chief, from utilising his victory for the sole advantage of France and perhaps even from proclaiming the French *charte* in Spain. Bernstorff most definitely opposed the idea. It was impossible, he said, that advantage should be taken of this essentially French war in order to establish in Spain a regime absolutely opposed to the interests of France. In bitter terms he depicted the horrible state of affairs in Naples, and asked whether it was possible to entrust the government of another country to such a ruler as the king of Naples. "While it is the duty of sovereigns to crush the doctrines and the acts of revolutionaries, it is equally their duty to avert these, and to render them impossible or inexcusable by preserving the nations from despotism as well as from anarchy, and by securing for them the first goods of social life." King Frederick William made a cool rejoinder to the Neapolitan Bourbon when the latter begged for his support, promising merely to give the matter his "most serious attention." [1] Similarly, Metternich wished to make the French commander military representative of the great powers and to entrust the political leadership of the war to a conference of the Paris envoys. This suggestion also was vetoed by Bernstorff, on the grounds that France could not tolerate such tutelage and that the powers themselves were not united. Just as little would the Prussian minister lend himself to a campaign against Villèle (who in Metternich's eyes was unduly moderate), Bernstorff declaring that this would be an affront to France. The king expressly approved Bernstorff's conduct, but exhorted him to display a yielding disposition in subsidiary matters, saying, "At the present moment everything depends upon a good understanding with the imperial courts." [2]

The Spanish expedition was easy beyond all expectation. Mutinies had been dreaded in the French army, but these did not take place, for the uninterrupted good fortune of the campaign strengthened the discipline of the troops. By May, the duke of Angoulême was already in Madrid, and was greeted

[1] Bernstorff's Instructions to Hatzfeldt, May 27, June 3 and 16; King Frederick William to King Ferdinand of Naples, June 10, 1823.

[2] Bernstorff's Instructions to Hatzfeldt, July 15 and August 9; Report to the king, August 20; the king's Reply, August 24, 1823.

there with exultation by the fickle mob. After the storming of the Trocadero before Cadiz, the only serious deed of arms of this military excursion, the entire country submitted; in November, Alicante, the last stronghold of the revolution, fell, and Chateaubriand was able to announce in Paris with all the figurative glories of his rhetoric that in seven months the white banner of the Bourbons had succeeded where the Napoleonic tricolor had failed in seven years. The revolution in Spain collapsed even more shamefully than had the revolution in Naples. The Cortes had taken refuge in Cadiz; and here in the holy of holies of Spanish glory, this body decreed its own dissolution, and restored to the king his absolute authority. Riego, the originator of the movement, died upon the scaffold, repentantly admitting his revolutionary blood-guiltiness.

The benevolent intentions of the duke of Angoulême were speedily frustrated by the ruthlessness which is natural to every war, and above all to civil war. Immediately after the entry of the French the reactionary party arose in its fury. The very regency established by the duke committed cruelties which he vainly endeavoured to restrain, and as soon as Ferdinand resumed the reins of power, the solemn pledge of amnesty was promptly renounced after the Bourbon manner, and there ensued a reign of terror such as was possible in Spain alone. With inconceivable guilelessness, the envoys of the eastern powers, who must have been well acquainted with the character of the Bourbon ruler, did everything they could to secure the unconditional reestablishment of the royal authority. In accordance with the legitimist doctrine, no reforms but those initiated by the crown were to be considered legally valid. For as long as he could, Bernstorff endeavoured to shut his eyes to the glaring misdeeds of the restoration. Even Royer, the new envoy, Gneisenau's confidant, considered it his duty as a strict legitimist to excuse the Spanish monarch's relentlessness to the utmost of his powers, so that Hatzfeldt invariably hailed the reports from Madrid with a delighted "parfait, parfait!" But soon, further self-deception was impossible. It became necessary to recognise, what might indeed have been foreseen, that the liberated Bourbon was reestablishing precisely the same system as that whose sins had led to the revolution of 1820. Too late did the Prussian minister break out into fierce denunciations of "the incredible weakness and perfidy of King Ferdinand." His Viennese

friend could not accept so harsh a judgment. As late as November, he expressed the good natured opinion: "It may perhaps be considered that the king's severity, for the moment somewhat exaggerated, will prove rather to have been fortunate, should he subsequently recognise the necessity of following up such measures by lenity!" But at length even in Vienna anxiety began to be felt regarding the ultimate consequences of Spanish misrule.

The legitimist crusade brought no profit to the French conquerors. In Madrid, their advice counted for even less than the opinions of the other powers, and at home dissatisfaction grew, for the ultras, intoxicated by the easy successes in Spain, advanced arrogantly from one folly to another, and carried even the cautious Villèle a long way with them. Meanwhile the new world was lost to the legitimist system. On December 2, 1823, President Monroe announced to the United States the proud principle "America for the Americans." The North American union would never permit the great powers of Europe to interfere in the affairs of the independent states in the young American continent. A year later, after prolonged hesitation, Canning delivered his carefully prepared blow against the Grand Alliance. At the new year of 1825, he announced to the envoys of the three eastern powers that he proposed to accredit English chargés d'affaires to the republics of Columbia, Mexico, and Buenos Ayres. All three envoys immediately entered protests, the most forcible being that of the Prussian representative, for in the Berlin foreign office the recognition of the rebel states, unless these had been declared free by King Ferdinand himself, was regarded as a deadly sin against legitimist right. The interests of the home industries which might secure a lucrative market in South America was not taken into account. How different was the sagacious commercial policy of England! With astounding frankness, Canning declared the reasons for his great resolve, saying: "Spanish America is free; we must make a good use of our opportunities. That's the plain English of it, and *novus saeculorum nascitur ordo.*" In accordance with his well-conceived plan, the political dominion of Spain was to be replaced by the commercial dominion of England, and for England this certainly opened a vista of prosperous centuries. Nor did Canning leave the United States in doubt regarding his views, for he declared with the

utmost definiteness that he by no means recognised the Monroe doctrine of "America for the Americans." But for the moment, in actual fact, English commercial interests were in conformity with the great lineaments of history, with the vital conditions of the world of young nations in the west, and not less so with the aspirations of liberalism, which had long desired a counterpoise to the Grand Alliance. Ingenuously, therefore, the entire liberal world re-echoed the justified national cry of joy of the Britons, delightedly repeating Canning's saying: "I called the New World into existence as an equipoise to the Old." Hardly less loud was the approval when Canning shortly afterwards, by a bold naval expedition to Lisbon, at one and the same time secured for the Portuguese their new system of constitutional government and for English commercial policy its old bridgehead. Thus the Spanish restoration terminated in a severe defeat of the eastern powers; it served merely to secure fresh hatred for its originators; it made the American rebels a present of independence, and it provided for the British flag a trade area of immeasurable extent.

Nor could Metternich contemplate with the satisfaction of the conqueror the confusions in the east. No one has better interpreted the secret of his eastern policy than his docile pupil Captain Prokesch, a skilful writer and an industrious young diplomat, distinguished rather by boastful arrogance than by genuine talent, but regarded in Vienna as a genius, and engaged since the year 1824 in the study of the eastern question. By the Hofburg, Prokesch's reports were regarded as oracular utterances, for he had the happy gift of seeing whatever he desired to see and consequently represented the Greek insurgents as a mere disorderly rabble. His opinion upon Turkish affairs was summed up in the monumental proposition: "What is termed the eastern question, is merely a question between Russia and the rest of Europe; in Turkey there is no eastern question!" This gem of wisdom was thoroughly to the master's taste. What did the court of Vienna care about the defiling of the cross by the crescent, or about the miseries of the rayah nations (miseries which cried to heaven), if only Russia's intervention could be averted and the sultan, most faithful of allies, could be confirmed in the tenure of his lawful possessions! Metternich positively plumed himself upon this unthinking barrenness of view,

declaring: "The strongest diplomatic attitude is ever the defensive." In his opinion, the Greek question was "the easiest of all." The pity of it was that other statesmen were not as wise as himself, who, "inspired with an inveterate hatred of words and phrases, always felt impelled to deeds! My position," he said, "is a rock, upon which the waves will break in vain. The rock does not call up the sea, but the sea rages against the rock." This vain conceit, which in the struggles of national life could see only the little men and never the driving forces, had soon, in its helpless weakness, to encounter the elemental energy of the Greek revolution; and it was all the more helpless on this occasion because Metternich, though he wished to exploit the czar and to deceive him about Russia's natural interests, was unwilling on any account to break with Alexander—for it was an article of faith in the Hofburg that a European war would necessarily unchain a universal revolution.

Metternich's diplomatic adroitness was still competent to secure a few ephemeral successes. Tatishcheff, Russian envoy in Vienna, was utterly hoodwinked, and did not attain for years to the modest recognition that, after all, Austria's and Russia's aims were not perfectly harmonious. In October, 1823, at a meeting of the two emperors in Czernowitz, the czar once more expressed in vigorous terms his hostility to the Greek rebels; but at the same time he compelled the Austrian cabinet to engage in serious deliberations regarding the future of the Hellenes, and on January 9, 1824, he formulated the demand that the Greek territories should henceforward constitute three semi-sovereign principalities under Turkish suzerainty. For many months, at a conference in St. Petersburg, this Russian programme was discussed by the powers. In this connection, Metternich made another lucky move upon the diplomatic chessboard, declaring through the mouth of Lebzeltern that if the subjugation of the Greeks should prove impossible the court of Vienna would prefer to recognise their absolute independence, thus constraining the Russian diplomatists to reply that Russia could not concede this independence. Unquestionably the admission forced from Nesselrode was of great value. The world now knew that the court of St. Petersburg had not yet abandoned Catharine's plans of conquest, and the Greeks soon turned away from Russia, to seek henceforward aid from England. Not even yet,

however, was a decision secured, and the St. Petersburg conference remained fruitless. The Porte could count upon Austria's friendship, and knew that none of the other powers was prepared to enforce its wishes with the sword. The Turks were determined to suppress the revolt, and therefore replied to all the exhortations of those stupid Franks whom they utterly despised by "the honeyed words," the empty turns of phrase, in which the cunning effendis had always been past masters; or else they wrapped themselves in contemptuous silence.

Meanwhile the struggle continued to rage. Twice a civil war broke out among the rebels; Odysseus, one of the Greek leaders, became a traitor. All seemed lost when in the year 1824 Sultan Mahmud demanded the aid of his dangerous vassal Mehemet Ali, and when the Egyptian regiments of Ibrahim Pasha devastated the unhappy Peloponnesus with the combined terrors of western military skill and eastern cruelty. Notwithstanding all this, and despite the brutal conquest of the island of Psara, the heroic little nation held out. Magical was the impression upon western Europe when Byron appeared in Hellas, devoting his sword to the great cause which he had previously served as a poet.

> The sword, the banner, and the field,
> Glory and Greece around me see!
> The Spartan, borne upon his shield,
> Was not more free.

The stanza resounded through the world, and hardly had the poet given utterance to this last of his songs, when he fell at the height of his fame, in his very death the most powerful worker on behalf of the cause of the Hellenes. In how many thousands had he formerly aroused a passion for the cradle of western freedom, by the impressive lines "The mountains look on Marathon—and Marathon looks on the sea"; and now he himself, like a new antagonist of the Persians, sealed the genuineness of his faith by a glorious death. Before this image, philhellenism was aroused to fresh enthusiasms Chamisso sang:

> Byron has appeared. The pupil
> Of Mars and the Muses, he shines forth a hero—

and upon the spot where he went to his rest the heroic defence of Missolonghi showed that he had not sacrificed his

life to the aid of the unworthy, and that this people could never be subdued.

Czar Alexander had at length begun to recognise that Metternich's wordy attempts at appeasement aimed merely at leaving the sultan a free hand for the annihilation of the rebels. In August, 1825, he instructed his envoys that henceforward they were to leave the communications of the Hofburg unanswered and were privately to approach the English cabinet. Just as little as the czar did Canning desire the complete independence of the Hellenes, but with his keen insight he recognised the continuous advance of the movement, and resolved to give cautious support to the Greek cause in order to save the existence of the Turkish empire. Already in the spring of 1823, he had recognised the blockade proclaimed by the Greeks, and had seriously exhorted the Porte to safeguard the rights of its Christian subjects, so that Metternich was quite beside himself on account of the English minister's "revolutionary delirium." [1] Without the Hofburg having any inkling of the matter, negotiations now proceeded between the two old opponents, and the English government accepted Russia's advances in a friendly spirit, fearing otherwise to strengthen the war party in St. Petersburg. A new epoch in the oriental complication was approaching. The court of Berlin had hitherto supported its Austrian friend, as in all questions wherein Prussian interests were not directly concerned, but on this occasion, with manifest halfheartedness, for Bernstorff had long ceased to believe in the prospect of a Turkish victory, and it was not possible to run counter too plainly to the philhellenist inclinations of public opinion, inclinations shared by Frederick William. In the summer of 1825, the Prussian minister informed his monarch in the following terms of the increasing tension between the two imperial courts: "Austria will not have a war under any conditions or at any cost; Russia desires under any conditions and at any cost the salvation and liberation of Greece." Thereupon he was commanded to declare plainly to the Viennese court that the king was unable to share Austria's views, that he desired neither the disappearance of Turkey nor the annihilation of the Greeks.[2] The court of the Tuileries, too, had long ere

[1] Hatzfeldt's Report, April 30, 1823.

[2] Bernstorff, Memorial concerning the Situation in the East, June 5; Lottum's Reply in the king's name, June 24, 1825.

this manifested its discontent with the sterile hesitations of Vienna.

Now occurred the death of Czar Alexander, the one man who had hitherto averted the inevitable conflict in the east. Immediately after his death Russia returned to the paths of nationalist policy, and Prussia's policy speedily resumed complete independence. The Spanish troubles had alienated England from the Grand Alliance. As the outcome of the Greek revolution, a change of attitude was enforced upon all the great powers alike.

CHAPTER VI.

PRUSSIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DEATH OF HARDENBERG.

§ 1. THE COUNCIL OF STATE AND THE PROVINCIAL DIETS.

After the death of the chancellor, the feudalist party anticipated a long lease of power, since the conduct of affairs had, as was to be expected, been handed over to Minister von Voss-Buch, the representative of this party. But in a few weeks (January, 1823), the aged leader of the feudalists followed his opponent to the grave, and Witzleben made use of his most persuasive arts to induce the king to appoint Wilhelm Humboldt to the office. The crown prince likewise desired the return of the dismissed minister so that the government might once more be characterised by spirit and vigour; professorial circles in Berlin unanimously favoured Humboldt, and even among the feudalists there were some who would have welcomed Hardenberg's opponent.

Humboldt himself kept aloof from these plans. He had long since found the peace of the scholar in his retreat at Tegel, and this peace was far dearer to him than were the honours and struggles of public life. Once again the quiet happiness of the days he had spent in Rome would steal over him as he wandered among the masterpieces of antiquity, "among so many noble figures," in the simple and charming château which Schinkel had designed; or when in the evening, accompanied by his wife, he strolled along the borders of the blue lake, and glancing upwards would see the towers of the eight winds gleaming through the ancient trees. He lived, as if outside the world, wrapped in his own thoughts and for himself alone. "I am extremely happy here, my mind and my body are at my free disposal, for there is no desire whose fulfilment I cannot secure by my own exertions." From the heights of his philosophy of history, human affairs seemed to

shrink and dwindle, he perceived "the torrent which carried things along, rather than the things themselves," and he took a serene view of the barriers imposed upon individual energies:

> Life is subordinated to possibility
> Whose fences compass us about.

Since such was his mood, he could neither be astonished nor wounded when Witzleben's endeavours proved unavailing. The king had never completely withdrawn his favour from the fallen minister, and persisted in naming him the most able of his statesmen; but the obstacle which had, five years previously, stood in the way of Humboldt's appointment to the foreign office, still proved insuperable. Prussia's peace policy stood or fell with the alliance of the eastern powers, and Frederick William had not sufficient confidence in his own strength to retain at the head of the council of state a man who had made himself hated both in St. Petersburg and in Vienna. An unacknowledged suspicion, and his old dread of talented natures, may have influenced him; at any rate the king declared this appointment out of the question.

In his perplexity he called upon the old field-marshal Kleist von Nollendorf, who had hitherto shunned political life. As adjutant-general, many years before, Kleist had won the personal regard of the monarch by his probity and his discreet calm. But he, too, died suddenly, before entering upon his new duties, and since the king did not know where to find another nominee, an idea which had occurred to him after Voss's death was now revived. It was his desire henceforward to govern, without any single leading statesman, through the intermediation of ministers who should be no more than expert heads of departments. Count Lottum was appointed to make regular report to the king; the count was therefore to remain permanently in the ministry, but the administration of the state treasury was to be transferred to the minister of finance.[1] The wealthy count proved a diligent and conscientious reporter; his dignified composure and his inaccessibility to intrigue commended him to the sovereign, and he retained his post until Frederick William's death. He harboured no great political ambitions, he never even held the

[1] Witzleben's Diary, January 31, 1823. The account given by Dorow (Experiences, vol. III, p. 328) is derived from the same source.

title of "cabinet minister." In other respects the ministry remained unaltered, though Hardenberg, in a posthumous memorial, had pressingly urged the need for attracting fresh energies into the government.

Thus it was that Hardenberg's chancellorship was succeeded by a period of autocratic administration. The will of the monarch held the ministry together; every issue hung upon his verdict. His trusted friends, Wittgenstein, Witzleben, and Albrecht, were alone able at times to induce him to modify his decisions; yet more rarely did the aged court-chamberlain, Schilden, who every morning gave his report of the royal household, venture upon a word of political advice. Only during a period of profound peace could such a government suffice; power, unity, quick determination, were rarely displayed. Since the king did not care to enforce his will with a high hand, and moreover was incapable of supervising the administration in its entirety, the old sin of the officialdom, heterogeneity of aims in the departments of state, once more flourished luxuriantly. Each specialist minister performed his tasks according to his own bent: conspicuous contrasts existed side by side; the very state which possessed the best administration in Europe, and which had established the unity of German markets, was engaged in the hateful persecution of the demagogues. And yet this personal government by the king, despite all its weaknesses, saved Prussia from a dangerous reaction, which could hardly have been avoided under a ministry headed by Voss-Buch. Now it became apparent how far the legislation of recent years had outstripped the political culture of the nation; reaction set in, similar to that which affected Germany in 1878. Not alone the feudal nobility but many circles of the bourgeoisie and the peasantry felt that their interests, customs, and prejudices had been outraged, and uttered loud complaints against the right of free domicile, the agrarian laws, and freedom of occupation. Frederick William, however, held firmly to his fundamental idea of social reform, and although, with age creeping on apace, he found it increasingly difficult to accommodate himself to novelties, he nevertheless succeeded, after his quiet manner, in preserving a princely aloofness from party strife. In order to appease the hotspurs of reaction, he granted them a few concessions, especially where interests of individuals were solely concerned; but he would not permit them to gain any ascendancy over

him, and they never attained their highest aim, the repeal of Hardenberg's laws.

Once, in the summer of 1825, the Austrian party thought a signal victory had been won when Duke Charles of Mecklenburg, the leader of the party, was elected president of the council of state, an office which had hitherto been held by ministers of state alone. In the castle of Monbijou, where the duke dwelt, Kamptz and General Müffling were the leaders of opinion; here Haller's doctrines were preached more assiduously even than in the Wilhelmsstrasse palace, where the crown prince and his romanticist friends foregathered. The king, however, who had not a high opinion of his brother-in-law's statesmanlike endowments, gave him little scope; he was allowed to be no more than a silent participator in the sittings of the ministry of state, the king's aim being to keep himself fully informed regarding the proceedings of this body, and to be better able, in case of need, to submit to it a legislative proposal. Vainly did the duke assail the king with petitions and threaten to resign his post; the coveted seat and vote in the council were invariably refused. So circumscribed was the duke's office that it amounted to no more than a sinecure.[1]

This policy of mediation, which kept all parties in order, and which in the making of laws advanced cautiously step by step, was the outcome not only of Frederick William's personal character but also of the inextricable confusion of political contrasts revealed in the proceedings of the new provincial diets. On August 3, 1823, the king's birthday, the general law of June 5th relating to the provincial diets, and the special laws of July 1st relating to Brandenburg, Prussia, and Pomerania, were promulgated. On March 27, 1824, there followed the laws for the other five provinces. During the course of the years 1824 to 1827, the provincial diets gradually assembled; the first being that of Brandenburg, the last that of Posen. The king was now thoroughly satisfied regarding the soundness of the course which had been adopted, and he was strengthened in his conviction when he learned the results of the working of the new representative systems in South Germany, when

[1] Duke Charles to the king, August 26, 1825, June 9, 1826, and July 29, 1827; to Altenstein, May 19, 1826; to Lottum, July 30, and October 30, 1827; Cabinet Orders to Duke Charles, August 31, 1825, and June 28, 1826; to the Ministry of State, December 9, 1827.

he was informed of the vacillating conduct of the court of Stuttgart, and heard the continued cries of alarm proceeding from Bavaria and Baden. He despatched the new laws to all his embassies, explaining that the chaotic condition of the political ideas of the day and the manifold differences between the provinces had retarded the conclusion of the work. The courts and the diplomats vied with one another in their expressions of grateful astonishment. Berstett was as delighted as the old king of Saxony; Rechberg commended in especial the strong representation of the nobility. The Badenese envoy expressed the hope that the universal verdict regarding representative institutions would now be reversed, and Bunsen, in an unctuously worded despatch, described the joy of all well-disposed Romans; how easy to pass such laws in Germany how difficult in Italy; "confronted by such considerations who would not bless the spirit of the Reformation!" Alone the francophil German, Reinhard of Frankfort, could not refrain from expressing, in a maliciously phrased memorial, the discontent of the Rhinelanders.[1]

It was with a frosty silence that this work, which fell so far short of the constitutionalist ideal, was first received by public opinion in the minor states. The *Journal des Débats* was the first paper to comment exhaustively on the new laws, and when at length the German newspapers came to discuss the matter, they almost unanimously expressed the opinion that the expectations of the nation had been disappointed, and that in Prussia nothing had been changed. The Prussians themselves felt otherwise. Among the mass of the people the idea of a national diet had never taken deep root, and even those who had hoped for better things were so permeated with monarchical sentiments that they gratefully accepted the inevitable, and recognised that the provincial diets could at least constitute the basis of a future constitution. Such was the view of Stein, Humboldt, Vincke, and Schön. Even in the liberal circles in which General Pfuel and the father of Theodor Körner moved, these beginnings "of an organic formation of the nation"[2] were welcomed with sanguine anticipation.

[1] Reports from Küster, August 21; Jordan, August 18; Zastrow, August 17; Meyern in Berlin, August 9; Bunsen, August 30; Memorial from Reinhard presented to Küster, August, 1823.

[2] Pfuel to Körner, February 20, 1823.

Among the extreme conservatives there were a few far-sighted men who anxiously asked themselves what would happen should war break out, since it was only the Reichstag which was entitled to vote an increase of the national debt. General Müffling felt impelled to propose that, towards the year 1828 (as soon as the provincial diets had twice met), the king should convene a Reichstag composed of about 120 members, and consisting of two chambers, so that subsequently, should necessity arise, a national diet could promptly be summoned.[1] The king did not accede to the proposal; he looked forward to a long period of peace and desired that the provincial diets should be tested before any other form of government was tried.

The elections to the first provincial diets passed off quietly, but everywhere they awakened lively interest. Even the gentry of the old territories unreservedly accepted the new ordering of affairs; the feudal particularist opposition vanished into thin air; the Prussian constitution stood once more erect upon a generally recognised legal foundation. Individual feudalist nobles might regret a half-victory and bemoan the loss of the old licence, but all the diets unanimously expressed their gratitude to the sovereign, and no one troubled to say a word on behalf of the rights of the former provincial diets. Saxony, Prussia, and Pomerania, it is true, suggested that the crown should sanction the summoning of special communal diets in certain districts, but when the king rejected this proposal the notion was dropped. Though the new arrangement might not be successful in arousing a distinct sense of the state, it nevertheless brought the inhabitants of the separate provinces into closer contact. Old Marwitz, greatly to his regret, had to look on while an Altmarker who had settled in Magdeburg, and a "foreigner," a Lower Lusatian, were elected to the presidency of the first provincial diet of Brandenburg; he grumbled about the "rubbish" which the demagogues of the officialdom had introduced into the representative legislation. Nevertheless he bowed to the inevitable, since he perceived that his "Markish state" had been partly reestablished, and the obstinate old feudalist triumphantly handed over to the new diet the key which, fourteen years before, he had refused to surrender to Hardenberg's officials.

[1] Müffling, Memorial concerning the National Diet, December 1, 1825.

The sympathy with which the first diets were welcomed soon cooled, for the new institutions, blighted in the germ, were at best capable of no more than a starveling growth. The crown showed an accommodating spirit towards its loyal estates. Electoral Mark was allowed to retain its ancient house of assembly, and, with certain restrictions, was once again to supervise the administration of its local system of poor relief. In order to do honour to the diets, all the provincial marshals were made members of the council of state; thus it came about that Stein at length received the position which had long been his due, and simultaneously with Marwitz was called to the council of state, but not until the king had cautiously sounded Duke Charles in order to ascertain whether the proud baron would accept this proof of royal favour.[1] The last constituent committee, the one which had created the provincial diets, was to continue, under the name of "immediate committee" and in a somewhat modified form, to deal with the affairs of the diets, to draft the legislative proposals submitted to these bodies, to arrange for the recesses of the diets, and to supervise the elections. The crown prince received the post of president. Privy Councillor von Voss-Buch, the son of the old minister, a man of like views with his father, was appointed minute-secretary. Voss-Buch had won the confidence of the heir apparent, and usually lent his clever pen to the composition of the prince's political memorials.[2] For three and twenty years, until the summoning of the unified diet, this immediate committee remained the intermediary between the throne and the diets; nor was goodwill lacking, for the crown prince had taken to his heart his honest German estates.

But all this could not take the place of vigorous association with the provincial diets, and such association had been rendered impossible by the action of the government itself, partly owing to bureaucratic timidity, and partly because the unnatural disintegration of the representative institutions made the course imperative. It was impossible for the ministers to be present at eight diets, and it was equally impossible to entrust the advocacy of legislative proposals to the provincial authorities,

[1] Lottum to Duke Charles of Mecklenburg, April 29; Duke Charles to Lottum, April 29; to the King, April 30, 1827.

[2] Cabinet Orders to the crown prince, November 5, 1824, and February 9, 1828; Massow, Memorandum concerning the Immediate Committee, October 20, 1847.

for these proposals as a rule concerned the whole state, directly or indirectly. Consequently, at the opening of the diets by the royal commissioner, the proposals from the throne were laid before the assembly and then the body was left to act on its own devices. Direct exchange of views between the government and the estates, the best feature of the proceedings of the Old German diets, was here entirely lacking. Not until the closure of the session did the crown make its decision public; and the recess was unduly prolonged, extending sometimes to a year or more, because the king could not reply to the petitions of the Rhinelanders and the Brandenburgers until he had consulted the Westphalians or the Silesians. Thus was avenged that artificial doctrinairism, in accordance with which the living unity of the state was to be broken up into eight parts. Just as the diets lacked contact with those in high places, so also were they out of touch with the people. The short summaries which were published at the close of the session by the provincial marshals, furnished but an incomplete picture; strict secrecy was enjoined upon the deputies. Even the harmless right, indispensable to a general diet, of receiving and discussing petitions, was forbidden to these provincial assemblies, manifestly because it was feared that in Posen or on the Rhine a storm of addresses might readily subserve aims inimical to the state. Thus the nation was practically kept in ignorance of the activities of the representatives. The representative proceedings educated, it is true, a small stock of politically experienced men, but they had hardly any influence upon wider circles of the community, and for long in Prussia there was but one party with definite aims—that of the feudalists.

It was in Prussia and Westphalia that the deliberations were most successful. In the eastern march, proud memories of the diet of Königsberg were reawakened, together with reminiscences of the vivid feudal life of the days of the Teutonic Order. A fresh waft of youthful hope and of provincial self-satisfaction pervaded the speeches; with delight did men like Schön speak of " the kingdom of Prussia and His Majesty's other states." The estates rejoiced at the recovery of their Old Prussian freedom and would have preferred that parliament should sit in the refectory of the Marienburg, the sanctuary of the country, instead of meeting alternately in Danzig and in Königsberg. The patriotic disposition of the aristocracy and the equally strong

native pride of the other inhabitants kept the particularist spirit of the various classes in abeyance. On one occasion, when a representative of the towns threatened an *itio in partes* (i.e., to exercise the *jus eundi in partes*, the right of voting *par ordre* and not *par tête*), he was furiously assailed by his colleagues in the diet, and the estates declared to the king that the diet of the kingdom of Prussia would never make use of this ancient right of voting by sections, for the Prussians understood how to rise superior to the interests of individual estates and provinces. At the very first sitting, the diet had suggested (unfortunately without result) that the deliberations should be printed so that the nation might make the acquaintance of its estates. Schön himself, the royal commissioner, pledged his reputation that he would make the diet of his province the pattern for the whole monarchy. When the assembly was held in Danzig, the lord lieutenant took up his residence in a country house and drove daily to the town in order that, in personal conversation, now exhorting, now threatening, he might make headway against the discontented spirits. The remote province was like a great family. In the diet hall, Count Alexander Dohna was revered as a patriarch; the whole country mourned with him when, during the session of 1827, the tidings of the death of his daughter-in-law Julie Dohna, Scharnhorst's daughter, was brought; with tears in their eyes the brave Prussians crowded round him when, nevertheless making his customary farewell speech, he concluded with the words of Paul Gerhard, "May God give us all a cheerful heart!"

The dignified behaviour of the Westphalian diet was chiefly due to Stein's influence. The baron lived more happily on his Prussian property, the old residence of the provosts of the Premonstratensians at Cappenberg, than in his own beautiful Nassau, for in Nassau everything reminded him of his lost liberty, while the fussy activities of the Rhenish Confederate officialdom were a perpetual annoyance to him. In Cappenberg he felt at home. In the centre of the courtyard of his retired castle was the venerable church of the saintly Norbert, and when Stein ambled along the terraces on his brown stallion his gaze travelled over the ancient oaks of the forest, down the vale of the Lippe, across to the distant hills, and far away into the land of the red earth to which he had devoted the energies of his early manhood. At Vincke's suggestion he was, as the most notable man of the province, elected provincial marshal. Though

bowed by the infirmities of age and though he had lost the sight of one eye, he nevertheless willingly accepted the position and, in the magnificent Peace Hall of the Rathaus in Münster, he opened the first diet with an address wherein he laid stress anew on the moral purposes of political freedom. He welcomed the new constitution as a means for educating the people to independence: "It will bind, develop, raise; it will unite us all; it will lead us all to strive for the same goal—the glorification of the fatherland. The constitution will give each and every one the knowledge of his own worth, for it will demand the output of the noblest and best of our energies." It was not easy to sit under Stein's presidency, for his hasty temper had not become milder with advancing years. The instant he entered, the hum of conversation ceased, and woe to the man who rendered the deliberations more arduous by unmeaning chatter; sometimes he was unjust, when he scented the influence of a "Bauern-advokat" [agitator] stirring up the country folk against the well-tried laws of the old Saxons; he even came into conflict with Vincke, the commissioner of the diet, over the constitution of the cadaster, and the two obstinate old fellows were never fully reconciled. But the moral grandeur of his powerful personality raised the tone of the whole assembly; his every word bore witness to his love of his second home. He still displayed his former mastery in the conduct of affairs; he was familiar with every detail in the conditions of life in the province, and the peasants knew very well that they had not a better friend in the world than this proud man, although now in his old age he so often gave vent to his aristocratic sentiments with undue acrimony.

In the other diets there were likewise displayed much common sense and practical experience; the devotion to the king, which the addresses of the estates often voiced with childlike simplicity, by no means excluded the possibility of straightforward criticism. The provincial diets wholeheartedly entered into the administration of the communal institutions entrusted to their care; the Teutonic idea of freedom, though first awakened by Stein's towns' ordinance, struck deep roots in this soil. With what amazing rapidity had the state won this people's affection! Not a protest was made against universal compulsory military service, though ten years earlier this had aroused such passionate hostility; nay, the estates of Brandenburg and of Posen begged the king to allow the Jews, for their

own improvement, wherever possible to pass through the school of the army.

In Posen alone was harmony disturbed by racial ill-feeling, and on the Rhine the contrasts between the old and the new social forms, which existed, though to a slighter degree, in the other provinces, led to considerable struggles. The three-class system of representation which had been elaborated over the board room table seemed nowhere so unfair as in the thoroughly bourgeois and modern conditions of life in Rhineland. The Ritterschaft [squirearchy] possessed barely four per cent. of the land in the province; many of the greater landlords were excluded from the suffrage, or they had to vote as townsmen when, as was here so frequently the case, they lived in town and their dispersed country estates had been leased. The caste spirit of the Rhenish aristocracy strengthened the discontent. The members of this generation of church dignitaries once more exhibited royalist leanings now that the crown had gone so far to meet the wishes of their order; but their sentiments quickly changed when, subsequently, the state came into conflict with the church. At this time, however, they spoke boastingly of their vocation to protect the throne from the revolution, and vowed to one another that they would elect to the diet those noblemen only who were eligible for admission into a chapter. Nor is it difficult to understand that, laws to the contrary notwithstanding, many bourgeois landowners endeavoured to enter the Ritterschaft. Clever lawyers, such as Sandt the public prosecutor, man of multifarious activities, devoted their pens to the cause, and even while the elections were in progress a lively fight against the prerogative of the nobility broke forth. Subsequently in the diet the quarrel flamed up anew.

The spirit displayed in the Prussian provincial diets was entirely different from that of the South German chambers. The contrasts between north and south stood out more emphatically than ever, for the South German bicameral system imposed incomparably greater limits upon the influence of the nobility than did the three-class electoral system of Prussia. In the south, moreover, the aristocracy constituted by right a full half of the diet; but they deliberated in their own chamber and could rarely venture to oppose the decisions of the lower house, which had the wholehearted support of the popular will behind it. In Prussia, on the other hand, the nobility directly

controlled the diets by vote and influence. The Prussian system of representation had at its inception a great advantage over the parliaments of South Germany, for the estate of peasants though meagrely represented, was nevertheless represented by authentic peasants and not, as in the south, by officials and townsmen. The members of this class, upon whose efficiency the indestructible strength of the German system depends, were enabled in the diets elected on the three-class system to express their opinions with a freedom which was rarely possible under an electoral system where a general and undifferentiated suffrage was at work; consequently the Prussian peasant representatives, although their emancipation from serfdom was of such recent date, proved by no means timid, but encountered the members of the Ritterschaft, when these endeavoured to assume too high a tone, with characteristic peasant stubbornness. Again, the professional classes, officials, lawyers, professors, and men of letters, which took the lead in the South German chambers, were almost entirely absent from the Prussian provincial diets; and even the great and increasing power of personal property was but indirectly and quite inadequately represented. Herein was to be found the gravest fault of the new order, for among these sections was rooted that young liberalism whose power and right to existence could no longer be ignored, and whose opinions had long dominated the public press. Since young liberalism was denied entry into the diets, the deliberations gave a very incomplete idea of the veritable temper of the people, and little by little a dangerous opposition grew up outside parliament, an opposition which pressed ever forward, until, after years of growth, it burst forth, to astound everyone by the fact that already the majority of the cultured bourgeoisie had been won over to its cause.

In the provincial diets it was only the landowners who were able to voice their views, and a preponderant majority of the landowners had strong conservative leanings. Down to the year 1830, not a word was uttered in the eight diets concerning the promised central representative body. From time to time a voice was uplifted in the press of the petty states recalling the old promise; thus, young Heinrich von Gagern, who warmly greeted the first Westphalian diet in the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, expressed the hope that with the inauguration of a centralised representative system for Prussia a new era of Prusso-German greatness would begin. The provincial diets were as yet little

concerned about such hopes. The more intelligent, firm in their loyalty to the king, felt that it was not for them to anticipate the decisions of the crown, but to wait and see how provincial representation succeeded. The very great majority had as yet hardly any interests outside their own province. The liberals in the first South German parliaments brought forward a long list of crude proposals; in Prussia the crown had continuously to fight against the ingrained particularism of the diets, against their dread of all innovation. Here was accomplished that which Humboldt had predicted when he said that the estates would always be guided by the principle of conservation, the governments by that of reform.

The first of all the diets to assemble, that of Brandenburg, forthwith broke into loud complaints against the innovations which, they said, the so-called zeitgeist of a bloody and stormy epoch had evoked. The Markers declared: "Adverse to theory, whether old or new, the only truth we can admit is the truth of practical experience." Experience proved that thousands, "dazzled by the hoped-for independence," were led astray by the newly acquired freedom of occupation, and that the countryman, "suffering from the destructive effects of free trade across the frontiers," sought vainly for assistance.[1] Similar grievances were voiced, somewhat less loudly, in almost all the other diets. Meanwhile the king had placed an obstacle in the way of such wishes when he issued orders to the immediate committee that the fundamental principles of the legislation of 1810 were not to be infringed; any such infringement would entail "the destruction of relationships based upon more or less firmly rooted legal duties"; he would permit a few isolated modifications, should the estates give sufficient reasons for such a course, but never would he countenance a diminution of the newly acquired revenue from taxes so long as a substitute was not forthcoming.[2] It was due to the monarchy alone that Hardenberg's reforms were for the most part retained, and were cautiously introduced into the new provinces. In the petty states, the court of Berlin was decried as a reactionary power, for the Germans in their political dillettantism did not consider it worth while to devote serious attention to the study of the great German state; as a matter of fact King Frederick William thought and acted with more liberality than his trusty estates.

[1] Address of the Brandenburg estates, December, 1824.
[2] Cabinet Order to the crown prince, November 30, 1824.

Not in all respects, indeed, did the monarch show himself in advance of the estates. The circle ordinances which he laid before the diets were worthily suited to the low level of culture of the provincial delegates; they were the work of the immediate committee, and in this committee the crown prince had the decisive voice. The king left the elaboration of all the dietary institutions in the hands of his son. It pleased Frederick William to see his heir entering so earnestly into all the details of provincial administration, and to his intimates he often expressed regret that he himself lacked such knowledge, saying that Beyme and the other cabinet councillors had made his work too easy during the first years of his reign.[1] Despite application to business, the crown prince could gain no adequate conception of the needs of circle administration, for this could be acquired in no other way than by practical experience; and since, besides, no man of creative intelligence was to be found in the committee, the new circle ordinances were just as unsuccessful as had been the last of Hardenberg's proposals. They entirely misunderstood the nature of German self-government; the circle diet was to be purely a deliberative and advisory assembly; for all initiative was placed in the hands of the Landrat, the administrative head of the district. The composition of the circle diets was thought out very much on the lines of Haller's ideas. According to this conception of the state as private property, the powers at the disposal of the supreme authority were not conferred for the sake of the state, and were consequently not transferable *pari passu* with the transformations of public life, but they represented innate freedoms, well-acquired rights, which could not be filched away in opposition to the will of the owner. To this doctrine Marwitz gave drastic expression, inasmuch as he accused the liberals of coveting their neighbours' goods and thereby infringing the tenth commandment. For this reason the Ritterschaft's unrestricted right to sit in the circle diet was to be revived. Each lord of the manor was to have an integral vote in the circle diet, each town in the circle likewise one vote, and the entire peasantry was to be content with three votes in all; in the two western provinces alone was a vote conceded to each administrative district and each commune, and in the Rhenish circle diets, when the numbers of lords of the manor did not suffice, a few chosen representatives of the great landlords were to be elected.

Thus in the name of traditional right a grave injustice was

[1] Witzleben's Diary, 1822.

committed against the towns and the peasantry, and the power of the Ritterschaft became greater than ever before. Until 1806, the circle administration of the Landrats and the circle assembly composed of nobles were in the hands of the lords of the manor alone; it was only since that time that the towns (excepting a few of the largest, which constituted separate town circles) and the free peasant villages, had entered the circle union; and in the new law it was expected that the towns and the peasantry would quietly allow themselves to be outvoted in the circle diets by the integral votes of the Ritterschaft. To mitigate the injustice, they were granted the right of voting by sections should their class interests be menaced—a dangerous power, and one which could but rarely be utilised. At the head of the circle diet was the Landrat, combining the functions of state official and representative of the circle (which was regarded as an independent corporation), for he must be one of the resident gentry (in Rhineland one of the great landowners), and was chosen by the king from among three candidates who had been nominated for election. The right of nomination, in consequence of the misinterpreted historical doctrine of law, was everywhere assigned to the nobility who had formerly exercised it; that is to say, in the large majority of the old provinces, this right of nomination was the exclusive privilege of the Ritterschaft. Elsewhere the right of nomination was exercised by the circle diets.

When the proposals reached the diets a lively storm was immediately raised. Self-seeking, envy, arrogance, all the despicable passions of the class war, were unashamedly displayed. The kernel of the matter was never touched, for no party had as yet given serious thought to the difficult task of local self-government. No one was to be found who could declare to the Prussian noble that it was time he should exchange the dominance of the feudal magnate for that given by the leading influence in the work of local self-government, and thus replace the hateful privilege of the integral vote by an ungrudged and therefore well-secured influence. The quarrel concentrated around the question of the suffrage; order fought against order. To the Brandenburg nobility the proposal of the government did not appear to go far enough. In the Berlin diet the arrogance of the nobles was unmitigated. Though many of the proud junkers of the Mark ruled benevolently on their own lands, and Marwitz himself was loved as a father by his serfs in Friedersdorf, they nevertheless looked askance at all endeavours to extend the rights of the

peasantry, considering every such attempt as a revolutionary undertaking, and they even voted that the peasant members of the provincial diets should receive only half the daily stipend which was paid to the gentry—a decision which the king promptly vetoed. They demanded, moreover, that the peasants should have one, or at most two, votes in the circle diets.

What a difference between the meanness of these Markers and the energetic public spirit of the other Prussians! In Rhineland, the members of the Ritterschaft had long been accustomed to regard the landowners of Cologne as their equals; they even suggested that the Landrat should be nominated by the whole circle assembly, for otherwise he might forfeit the confidence of the circle, and the two lower classes might feel aggrieved. In the other provinces, the gentry obstinately held to their traditional rights, whilst the peasants (for the most part in a state of ferment) demanded participation in the nomination of the Landrat and a more equitable share in voting power. Everywhere the towns, and in Saxony even the estate of princes, sided with the peasants; in Westphalia their most enthusiastic supporter was the clericalist Sommer, "Westphalus Eremita." Meanwhile the king rejected all amendments. It could be seen that he, bourgeois in sentiment, in no way disapproved the wishes of the peasants. Nevertheless, owing to his lack of legal knowledge, he was unable to make head against the crown prince's historical doctrine of law, and he attempted to pacify the complainants with the assurance that the number of votes in the circle diets was of little importance seeing that each order was free to vote by sections.

During the years 1825-28 seven new circle ordinances came into being; a common one for Rhineland and Westphalia, and one each for the eastern provinces. The last six were practically identical, and were not comprised in a single ordinance for the sole reason that historical romanticist sentiment took especial delight in provincial laws. The new circle diets were to co-operate with and support the "circle administration of the Landrat," to voice wishes and to give advice, and to arrange for the assessment of certain taxes; but the first essential of genuine self-government, the independent disposal of their own revenues, was denied them. It was only on account of this impotence of the circle diets that the integral votes of the gentry were not wholly unbearable to the burghers and the peasants. In the circle diets of the entire monarchy there sat 10,000 lords

of the manor, as against 979 representatives of the towns and 975 of the peasantry; in the governmental district of Köslin, where the power of the gentry was stronger than elsewhere, the first order disposed of 729, the second of 36, and the third of 45 votes. Such injustices could not fail to render social contrasts more acute. Even though, with few exceptions, the gentry nominated capable men to the posts of Landrat, and the progressive remission of peasant burdens eliminated many of the motives for discontent, year by year, among the townsmen and the peasants, tacit anger against the nobility increased.

Thus once again the feudalists had borne off the palm of victory. The reordering of life in the rural communes was henceforth out of the question, for representation in the circle diets, and manorial rights, mutually conditioned one another, and the nobility in some of the provincial diets even proposed that the landowners' magisterial authority should be strengthened. Hardenberg's plans for reform were momentarily shelved. The council of state, however, continued to labour at the reorganisation of the towns' ordinance, but the work progressed slowly, and at first with no result, for at every turn the task of legislation was hindered by the contradictory proposals of the eight diets. The Rhinelanders hoped to save at least the fundamental peculiarities of their French municipal system; the Brandenburgers and Old Pomeranians demanded a restriction in the number of burghers; the Saxons wanted more extensive rights for their town authorities. The New Hither Pomeranians, finally, would not permit the smallest stone to be removed from the worthy edifice of their ancient and clumsy, but popular and efficient, municipal administration; every Stralsunder remembered with pride the renowned story of the "eight-and-forty" and "hundred men," and insisted on the carrying out of the Old Hanseatic custom in accordance with which every evening the royal governor handed over the key of the fortress to the burgomaster.

The struggle involved even wider circles. The reform of the towns' ordinance was the solitary subject which, during these quiet years, seriously occupied the Prussian press. Streckfuss and the Silesian burgomaster Perschke elaborately defended Stein's towns' ordinance—the political Bible of Prussia, as its admirers termed it. F. von Raumer criticised certain defects without attacking the law itself. Ulmenstein represented the Rhenish

point of view, while Wiese voiced the sentiments of the ultra-conservatives of Electoral Mark. It could not be denied that some of the town councils were boorish and stingy, especially concerning the inauguration of the communal schools. Contrary to Stein's intention, a gradual increase in the official class might be observed, a communal bureaucracy of salaried burgomasters and town councillors coming into existence, men willing to migrate from one town to another, almost as homeless as the state officials, and convinced (on their side) that it was their vocation to uphold the municipal spirit against the predominance of the state. Adverse criticism notwithstanding, Stein's work brilliantly stood the test of this literary war.

All unbiased judges, and among these the government itself, were agreed that it was merely necessary to remedy a few incidental defects. Raumer was of opinion that when Prussia's officialdom, army, and municipal system were compared with constitutional and prefectoral France, it was impossible to deny that the Prussians possessed liberty, the French no more than its semblance. How widely divergent were the political paths entered upon by the two nations! At the very time (1829) when Prussia, unobserved by foreign nations, was modestly endeavouring to coordinate the principles of local self-government, in France a new communal law was laid before the chambers. Europe lent admiring ears to the magnificent oratorical dispute, which ended in the rejection of the law and the resignation of the ministry. Yet there was less substance in these resounding speeches than in the unadorned, businesslike writings of the Prussians; for no one in France considered it worth while to scrutinise the vital conditions of communal freedom; not one of the parties could dispense with a jot of Napoleonic administrative despotism; all the passions of the parliamentary struggle were concentrated upon the secondary question, how many electors should participate in the elections to the communal councils. In France, stormy fights for ministerial office and unworthy submission to the omnipotence of the prefects were manifested, while in Prussia an almost childlike confidence in the absolute monarch, very little receptivity for constitutional doctrines, but a clear appreciation of the duties of local self-government, were displayed—the whole gamut of contrasts between the Romance and the Germanic conception of the state was glaringly revealed. The future was to show that the less ostentatious development was the healthier.

Slow indeed was this development. So powerful were the forces of conservatism that the crown had its energies fully employed in maintaining the ground already occupied. Now that a general licence-tax was in force, the king intended to introduce a trades' ordinance for the entire state; when, however, the opinion of the provincial diets was demanded, the proposal encountered grave opposition, not only in Saxony and New Hither Pomerania where the old system of guilds still persisted, but likewise in Prussia, Old Pomerania, Posen, and Westphalia—everywhere the estates raised lively complaints about the curse of freedom of occupation. In Westphalia, the ultra-conversative writer H. Schultz fomented the guild agitation. Loudest of all were the Markers; Marwitz and the feudalist nobility fought shoulder to shoulder with the town councillors of Berlin and their spokesman, the merchant Knoblauch. All these malcontents made confident appeals to personal experience, which, through the muddleheadedness of political dilettantism, they elevated to a universal rule, thinking that in this way they secured a triumph over the theoretical philosophy of the board-room. They complained about the unbearable glut of industrial workers, whereas in reality during the first ten years of peace the number of manual workers had augmented no more rapidly than the general population. It was not, indeed, until after 1825 that such a preponderant increase in industrial workers became manifest. The whole trend of the age was against freedom of occupation. Romanticist literature, the historical doctrine of law, and latterly Hegel's philosophy, reawakened in the Germans the delight in the multiform corporate trading system of olden times. To many it seemed that the abolition of the guilds was no more than a bureaucratic coup de main against German freedom.

Much to the joy of the great majority of resident burghers, as soon as the foreign dominion had been overthrown, the guild system was reestablished throughout the petty states of the north-west. Even the South German liberals had not yet espoused the economic theories of the French Revolution, for large-scale manufacture, the great pioneer of industrial freedom, had as yet hardly penetrated into the highlands. Rotteck drew special attention to the shoddy character of the produce of free industry; and even young C. H. Rau, who had been the first to introduce Adam Smith's theories into South Germany, held that the balance of advantage still lay with the guild system. Besides,

this generation was haunted by the spectre of over-population. The delightful idea of the infinite possibility of human progress, which had been so courageously and lightheartedly voiced during the eighteenth century, had long since been overwhelmed amid the storms of the Revolution. In earlier days, it had seemed to enlightened absolutism that there could never be too many recruits and taxpayers. Emerging from the thousand afflictions of a terrible epoch, those of the new times asked anxiously how the rising generation was to earn its daily bread. Malthus' theory of population, propagated in Germany by Hegewisch of Kiel, found many adherents, and was frequently misapplied by petty-bourgeois timorousness. For instance, instead of making room for an enterprising younger generation by the emanicipation of economic forces, the state, it was held, should protect home-industry, should impose obstacles in the way of marriage, and should endeavour to rid itself of those without means by encouraging emigration—desperate measures which to the cowardly appeared the best remedies for all social ills.

Even impartial critics had to admit that in the Prussian market the disadvantages of freedom were already manifest side by side with its advantages. Unrestricted competition spurred on activity and furthered improvements in technique. Large-scale undertakings flourished, but the small employers were squeezed out by the excessive power of capital; in the year 1831, only 640 out of the 1,088 master-joiners of Berlin were in a position to pay the licence-tax. How thoughtlessly had Hardenberg, when destroying the untenable privileges of the guilds, destroyed also all the moral bonds which held craftsmanship together. The guilds, which still persisted in certain regions as free societies, lacked prestige and vital energy; the hardy pride of the handicraftsman had decayed, his ancient and rigid discipline and his conformity to traditional usage had disappeared, the training of apprentices was left to chance. It was for this reason that Stein, the man so unjustly accused of a change of mind, had ever demanded the reform of the guild system, and had always combated the dissolution of the guilds as shallow, unjustified "neologism." What were technical advances to him when compared with the moral development of the nation? Was not the latter the true aim of the state? With ardent zeal he entered the arena to announce his views, and Gneisenau feared that in the council of state, with the aid of the crown prince, the baron would entirely frustrate all endeavours to put through the new industrial

legislation. "Such a convert as Stein," wrote Gneisenau, "will be joined by a numerous phalanx of enthusiastic disciples proud to assemble under the aegis of a person of importance; but I shall hold aloof."[1]

The danger of panicky reaction was imminent. The government, however, remained calm, and was firmly supported by the Rhinelanders, to whom industrial freedom was the very marrow of their being. Provisionally the existing order was maintained. By royal proclamation, those who had formerly enjoyed special privileges were guaranteed reasonable compensation; and the difficult task of formulating a trades' ordinance to apply to the entire state was undertaken. This ordinance was to satisfy legitimate grievances, but was not to sacrifice the fundamental ideas of Hardenberg's legislation. J. G. Hoffmann, who was entrusted with the elaboration of the plan, had in his youth combated the guild system with the whole revolutionary armamentarium of the new economic doctrines, and had declared the corporative spirit to be the unmitigated enemy of the spirit of the commonweal. Since then, however, he had made up his mind that the "laissez faire of the disciples of Mercury was disastrous," and had thoughtfully endeavoured to answer the question if it were possible once more to reawaken, in free corporations, the moral content and the honourable comradeship of the old guilds, without sacrificing the basic principle of economic freedom. Thus the aim of Germany's new industrial policy was recognised, the intricate problem was formulated, and to this problem our legislation has subsequently again and again returned. It is easy to understand that the first attempts at a solution demanded laborious spade-work and that the contradictory opinions of the provincial diets served only to darken counsel. Meanwhile, with the exception of Electoral Saxony and the Swedish provinces, industrial freedom remained undisturbed throughout the whole monarchy, the distinction between handicraft and manufacture becoming more and more obscured by the rapid growth of large-scale production, so that the return to the old conditions which was so greatly desired by the feudalists had now become impossible.

The conservative sentiment of the provincial diets found even harsher expression in the matter of the Jews. The edict of emancipation promulgated on March 11, 1812, had not yet come into operation in the new provinces, but as a matter of course its prescriptions concerning the civil service applied to the whole

[1] Gneisenau to Schön, February 24, 1827.

state and were everywhere strictly enforced—in Rhineland, as elsewhere, for in Rhineland a certain number of Jewish subordinate officials taken over from the French service were quietly pensioned.[1] After the war, Hardenberg had often endeavoured to gain official appointments or monetary compensation for the Jewish volunteers, especially for those who were knights of the iron cross; the entire ministry of state, however, Bülow alone excepted, refused to deviate from the strict letter of the law, on the ground that the Jews had already had "their former privileges so considerably extended without any sacrifice on their part in return," and unanimously came to the decision that Jewish soldiers could never be given a document recognising their right to an appointment in the civil service (*Zivilversorgungsschein*), and that in exceptional cases only they might receive support or a pension.[2] As was well-known to the ministry, the king, at the bottom of his heart, was animated by a dislike to the Jews no less keen than that which, in former days, had inspired Frederick the Great. He rarely granted to foreign Jews the right of citizenship and even then only after minute investigation.[3] He trusted that as the outcome of religious conversions the old antagonism might gradually disappear, and he looked with especial favour upon the new Society for the Diffusion of Christianity among the Jews. The leading spirit of this society was Witzleben; it was strongly favoured by people of distinction and by theologians of various ways of thinking; and it could testify to many hundred conversions (at least in the year 1824): but among Jews inclined to adhere strictly to the old practices it made no headway. Nevertheless Frederick William did not intend to annul what had previously been conceded, and once only, in the days when the Voss-Buch party dominated the court, did he allow himself to be persuaded to a retraction: in December, 1822, the Jews were again denied access to academic and scholastic posts, "on account of the inconveniences that arise when such access is permitted." Meanwhile, in the new provinces of the east, there still persisted the severe disabilities imposed upon the Jews by the laws of

[1] Hardenberg to the government of Cleves, February 7, 1817.

[2] Bülow's Proposal to the Ministry of State, December 16; Opinions of Kircheisen, Wittgenstein, Beyme, December 23, 26, and 29, 1815. Hardenberg to Boyen, December 1, 1817; Boyen's Reply, February 7, 1817. Hardenberg to the Ministry of State, July 20; Report of the Ministry of State to the Chancellor, November 18, 1818.

[3] Cabinet Order to Schuckmann, August 28, 1827; to Minister von Brenn, May 5, 1831, etc.

Electoral Saxony and of Sweden, while in the west the prescriptions of the *code Napoléon* were in force. Wishing to do away with these intolerable inequalities, the crown asked the advice of the provincial diets.

Great was the indignation to which the eight diets now gave vent. Their anger did not arise, as had formerly the hatred of the Jews, manifested by the Burschenschaft, from vague Christo-Germanic fanaticism, but from the economic distress of the countryfolk; for unspeakable misery had been inflicted by Jewish usurers and estate agents upon landlord and peasant alike during the terrible crisis which visited German agriculture in the mid-twenties. In view of such experiences, almost all the landlords were agreed in the view that the legislation of Napoleonic days had failed to work any beneficial change in the Jews, or to do anything to assimilate them to their Christian fellow-citizens. Not one of the eight diets recommended the general enforcement of the edict of 1812. They all demanded measures for the protection of landed proprietorship, but unfortunately the proposals once again diverged widely. Some desired that the Jews should not be permitted to purchase property in land, whilst others wished to forbid them to engage in hawking or money-lending. They were also to be forbidden to adopt the names of respected Christian families; this request came from almost all the diets, for the great Old German families of Lehmann and Meier were inconsolable on account of their new "oriental cousinships." The three eastern frontier-provinces demanded in addition that severe measures should be taken against the public nuisance caused by immigrant beggars and pedlars who year by year flocked westward from the Polish cradle of German Jewry, and who sometimes seriously threatened the public peace in East Prussia. The excitement was universal. The liberal Prussians were hardly less outspoken than the conservative Brandenburgers. Even the Rhinelanders entered the lists; they desired to tolerate the native Jews in the communes as denizens merely; non-Rhenish Jews were to be prohibited the country, and the king was begged to enforce the Napoleonic law of March 17, 1808, which had imposed harsh and to some extent offensive conditions upon Jewish creditors.

It was no easy matter to withstand all these requests, for they voiced the thoughts of the great majority of the

countryfolk, and were in accord with popular feeling outside Prussia. At this very time (1828), it was only after lively debate in the chamber, and after considerable curtailment of its proposals, that the Würtemberg government was able to enact a law for the alleviation of the painful position of the Jews. The Prussian king would not permit himself to be rushed; he promised merely that the advice of the diets should be carefully considered when the revision of the law concerning the Jews came up for discussion. But the promised revision was never undertaken, for the king felt that it would serve only to aggravate the position of the Jews. For long years to come Prussian Jews lived under different laws in the different provinces. Once again were the king's actions hampered by the confusion caused by the eightfold deliberations in his diets. This state, which took upon itself to criticise the unnatural centralisation advocated by the liberals of the petty states, suffered through lack of cohesion in its own structure; important fields of legislation remained untouched because the centrifugal forces continued to elude the control of the central authority.

More resolute was the action of the crown in the matter of agrarian legislation. In the old provinces, the difficult work of emancipation and regulation went on quietly, and the advantages were obvious to all. When old Thaer, the compiler of the regulation edict, celebrated his silver jubilee, delegates from the peasants of Mark journeyed to Möglin, in order to express their gratitude to the just king who had so paternally espoused the cause of the estate of peasants and to pay their respects to the man who had helped him in the work. In the new territories, there was no other way of introducing Hardenberg's agrarian legislation than by provincial laws which contained many alterations and provisoes. In Saxony and Posen, it was necessary to enfranchise peasant proprietorship; in Westphalia it was a question of recognising the enfranchisement which had been effected under the foreign regime, and further of giving those entitled to it the reasonable compensation which the French laws had refused. With the best will in the world, mistakes and precipitancy were inevitable. In Westphalia, the first law of 1821, too radical a measure, had four years later to be replaced by a second and more reasonable one. In Posen, on the other

hand, the first legislation (1823) was unduly timid. The powerful nobility, which had already imposed a tenure by lease upon almost all the peasantry, and which exacted manorial dues even in the great mediatised towns of Meseritz, Crotoschin, and Kempen, resisted emancipation to the utmost. Ten years later, a second law was more vigorous, and broke down the resistance. It was above all in this land of the Sarmatian nobles' regime that there was now afforded a most striking demonstration of the manner in which Prussian legislation excelled its French prototype. The night of the fourth of August had brought absolutely no alleviation to the tenant farmers in France; the German law started from the well-grounded assumption that the majority of the peasant leases had originated in arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the great landowners, and in most cases conceded free proprietorship to leaseholders. The advantages conferred by the German regime had valuable political consequences; it was mainly for this reason that the Polish peasants rarely participated in the treasonable intrigues of the nobles and the priests.

Savigny, in the council of state, was especially active in the preliminary work upon the agrarian laws. The apostles of the liberal law of reason decried the great jurist as a reactionary; in the council, many of his colleagues, and even Gneisenau, accused him of revolutionary sentiments, because, although his general outlook made him an opponent of Hardenberg, he nevertheless recognised the necessity of this social transformation, and proved by his actions that the historical view of the state did not prevent an understanding of the needs of the living present. His veneration for the vocation of kingship, the protection of the weak, assisted him to overcome many legal counter-considerations; his eloquence and the technical mastery of his proposals enforced admiration even from his opponents. But this reform, too, encountered many difficulties in the provincial diets. In several of these assemblies the question of emancipation led to heated disputes between the first and the third estate, so that it was shown all too plainly that the gentry were far from representing (as they frequently maintained) the interests of the peasantry as well as their own. The Westphalian peasants, clinging faithfully to the paternal acres, refused to secure redemption from the burdens on the land by handing over a portion of their

farms, whilst the landlords demanded monetary compensation because the price of the land and its produce were now so low.

The crown endeavoured to be just to both parties, conceding to the Westphalians, in accordance with Stein's recommendation, indemnification in land or in money, as those concerned might agree; but it did not always display sufficient courage to withstand the class interests of the landlords. The reactionary tendency now dominant exercised a certain influence in the agrarian legislation of the time. The most serious error was that the emancipation was to be confined to the larger farms. Upon the request of the Breslau diet the small holdings of the so-called "service families" of Upper Silesia were excluded from the regulation, until, after a time, the landlords became aware that the services of these petty folk were of little value now that methods had become more elaborate, and in many cases accorded emancipation as an act of grace. Such misunderstandings made the peasants restive. Everywhere they fancied they could scent attacks upon their newly acquired liberty, nor was their mistrust allayed even when the crown laid before the diets the proposal for a reform manifestly friendly to the peasants. In these years of a general decline in the value of land, the dangers of the unrestricted divisibility of landed property became threatening; in many regions people already began to fear that the vigorous old estate of peasants would ere long disappear, through the sale of peasant property. For this reason, the government demanded the opinion of the diets upon certain restrictive measures, proposing that henceforward peasant estates should be subdivided only within certain limits, and with the assent of the commune; moreover, in accordance with the principles of the old law of inheritance, the farm was to be accredited to the heir at a low valuation. Very few of the diets gave a favourable answer. Most inclined to the measure were the Westphalians, for in this region of great peasant farms everyone was convinced of the necessity of entail—Vincke no less than Stein, the nobles no less than the peasants. In the old provinces, on the other hand, the peasants were extremely hostile to the measure, contending that custom alone, and not the state, could restrict their right to dispose freely of their own property. Thus the

well-meant proposal for reform, well-meant but immature, was wrecked upon a resistance which seemed liberal but was in reality the fruit of peasant suspicion and obstinacy; and it was not destined to be revived until many years had elapsed, and then in a far more carefully considered form.

How alien from these ultra-conservative corporations was the thought of attempting to resemble the South German parliaments in a lively and invigorating contact with public opinion. Before long they found themselves well pleased by the privacy of their deliberations, maintaining that privacy even more sedulously than the government itself. In the year 1829, when the Silesian diet complained in extremely exaggerated terms of the overburdening of the province with taxation, the finance minister, von Motz, wrote a thoroughgoing refutation, which was published in conjunction with the closing address to the diet and secured deserved recognition from the press. The diet, however, felt profoundly affronted by the censure of itself implied in the praise. It lodged a complaint in Berlin, and this constrained the king to administer a humiliating reproof, to the effect that the crown permitted to the newspapers the publication of candid and reasonable criticisms upon its own decisions, and that the loyal diets must learn to accept the like with equanimity.

The same tenacious adherence to ancient territorial usage which dominated the provincial diets of the east, was also characteristic of the Düsseldorf assembly of estates, the sole difference being that in Düsseldorf particularism was tinged with liberalism because the Rhenish territorial law derived from the Revolution. The existence of Napoleonic legislation had just before been seriously endangered for the second time, for a horrible event by which the Rhinelanders had been painfully agitated for several years had put a new weapon into the hands of those who opposed the Rhenish law. As early as 1816, general report had accused Fonk, a Cologne merchant, of murdering a clerk, a man named Cönen, whose body had been found in the Rhine. Fonk had been twice arrested, and twice set at liberty after prolonged investigation; he scorned to seek refuge in flight across the neighbouring Belgian frontier. But the enraged populace would not let the matter rest. That restless desire for nervous

excitement which is so deeply inracinated in the modern generation, and which could not obtain satisfaction in the peaceful political life of the day, found vent in connection with the Fonk trial, and led people to toy with strange imaginings, just as happened later in connection with the mysterious case of Caspar Hauser. The countenance of the suspected man, of sinister aspect, marked as with the brand of Cain, seemed to confirm the truth of the charge; the suspicion which the poor are always ready to harbour against the rich, contributed; in the Protestant towns on the Lower Rhine, religious antipathy to the nephew of the clericalist Fonk, vicar general of Aix-la-Chapelle, doubtless played a part. In a word, in Rhenish Prussia almost everyone believed Fonk guilty; the school children sang street ballads about the unpunished murderer; the force of public opinion became so overwhelming that the authorities instituted fresh inquiries. Arrested for the third time, Fonk was at length brought to trial in Treves, six years after the discovery of the corpse.

It remains doubtful to this day whether the current belief was well founded, but this much is certain, that in the trial, all the faults of trial by jury and all the bureaucratic abuses of French legal procedure were most offensively displayed. After every sitting of the court, the jurors were exposed in the taverns to the suggestions of the excited populace; among the witnesses, the "moutons," the celebrated prison spies employed by the French police, played a repulsive part; von Sandt, public prosecutor, the man who had been active in the Rhenish electoral campaigns, pushed the case for the crown with unseemly venom, and published a writing upon the matter while it was still sub judice; even the presiding judge misused the limitless authority confided to him by the French code, browbeating those favourable to Fonk. When the jury, notwithstanding the extremely defective evidence, returned a verdict of guilty, this was received with a chorus of acclamation throughout Rhineland; in some of the towns popular celebrations of delight were actually held; the public conscience was appeased. But Benzenberg, who was not readily carried away by the moods of his fellow countrymen, wrote to the chancellor saying that this verdict would make an end of trial by jury on the Rhine.

Outside Rhineland, the sentence of death aroused almost universal indignation. Kobbe, the Göttingen lawyer, immediately sent a severe criticism to Hardenberg, and qualified and unqualified persons hastened to participate in the paper war.[1] Helmine von Chezy, granddaughter of Anna Luise Karsch, also rushed into the fray. She was one of those terrible literary women who are accustomed to try the patience of their contemporaries, now by the publication of verses and now by works of charity. In the camp of the reactionaries these struggles were contemplated with great satisfaction, for the parliamentary orators of the south had long ere this dragged the question of trial by jury into the party arena. Metternich exulted, thankfully hailing the dispensation of providence by which the momentous name of Sand was once again to give the impulse to a wholesome step backwards. Even Paulus, of Heidelberg, one of the recognised leaders of the South German liberals, advocated the cause of the condemned man, filling entire issues of his *Sophronizon* with accounts of the trial (accounts which secured the degree of doctor of law for the valiant theologian), and he sent a copy of his work to the king. Yet more influential was the opinion of the leading German criminologist. Anselm Feuerbach, in his recently published pioneer work, had brilliantly defended public and oral criminal procedure, and he was by no means an unconditional opponent of trial by jury, which seemed to him inevitable in constitutional states. But he expressed the utmost detestation of the Treves trial, saying that a judicial murder of this character would outdo the execution of Jean Calas; it had not, he said, even been proved that Cönen's death had been due to murder at all.

All these influences were now brought to bear upon Frederick William, and at the same time Fonk's innocent wife assailed the king with moving appeals. Greatly affected, he demanded a precise report from the ministry of justice, and since the opinion sent in by the ministry roundly condemned the verdict of the Rhenish jury, he refused to confirm the sentence, for the mere exercise of his prerogative of pardon seemed to him inadequate in view of the injustice that had been committed. In the old provinces, the monarch's decision

[1] Benzenberg to Hardenberg, July 12 and November 25; Hardenberg to Kircheisen, August 3; Kobbe to Hardenberg, July 18, 1822.

was almost universally approved. The Rhinelanders murmured, for they could not reconcile themselves to the idea that in Prussia every sentence of death required the royal approval, and they approached the king on the ground that, like his great uncle in old days, after the trial of Johann Arnold, the miller, he had infringed the law upon the plea of justice. From Napoleon, they had accepted worse things without demur, for Napoleon protected trial by jury, which he had himself instituted; but under the German regime they anticipated that the first blow would be succeeded by heavier ones.

Their alarm was justified. It was long before the king could shake off the impressions produced by this horrible trial. In view of the reports he received from Minister Kircheisen, he considered it his duty to prevent all possibility of the recurrence of such a case; and, upon the proposal of the entire ministry of state, he commanded on December 9, 1824, that the abolition of the Rhenish legal code was not to be postponed (as had been decided in 1819) until the revision of the Prussian civil code had been completed, but was to be undertaken forthwith. When, however, the ministry of justice came to discuss the carrying of this cabinet order into effect, the difficulties appeared almost insuperable, and even Kircheisen, the old opponent of the French law, declared a few days before his death (March, 1825) that his opinion was changed, and that the introduction of the provincial laws must be postponed until Old Prussian legislation had been radically revised.[1] It was only Kircheisen's successor Count Danckelmann, a distinguished lawyer completely dominated by the legal views of Old Prussia, who determined to carry the king's command into effect without delay.

The announcement was consequently made to the first Rhenish provincial diet, that "in the year after next," 1828, the king would introduce the Prussian civil code into Rhineland—all but a few sections. The gentry received the royal message with rejoicing, Baron von Mirbach expressing his satisfaction on the ground that he detested the foreign legal system as a "shameful sign of subjugation," [2] while most of

[1] Kamptz, Memorial concerning the Introduction of Prussian Legislation into the Rhenish Provinces, 1825.

[2] Baron von Mirbach zu Harff, Separate Opinion concerning the Rhenish Law, Düsseldorf, December 27, 1826.

the others were gratified because they knew that the rights of their order would be well secured under the protection of the Prussian code. Most of the members of the two lower estates, however, held firmly together. It was on this occasion that the Rhenish lawyers first displayed their political power. Two able orators among their number, Mylius and Haw, in association with a merchant named Kamp, became leaders of the opposition in the diet, whilst throughout the province a work published by Brewer, a Düsseldorf lawyer, entitled *A Vindication of Publicity in the Law Courts*, secured attentive readers. There was an effervescence of provincial pride. Addresses were sent in by sixteen towns, in some cases to the king and in others to the diet, the latter unhesitatingly receiving the petitions in defiance of the law. So great was the general excitement, that the privacy of the debates prescribed by the regulations was disregarded. The stormy discussions, which the prince von Wied, the president of the diet, was frequently unable to keep within bounds, were reported in the press; in many instances, the votes of the individual members became known, and quite a number voted with the majority for the simple reason that they dreaded to be abused as "Prussians." In the end, the diet petitioned the monarch not to introduce the Prussian code until the revision had been completed, and begged him that in any case trial by jury, public procedure, and commercial courts should be preserved for Rhenish Prussia. The particularists likewise demanded that there should be Rhenish denizenship, and that the native-born should receive legal preference in appointments to office, but the majority was sufficiently prudent to postpone the discussion of this matter so dear to the hearts of the Rhinelanders.

Stein and his aristocratic friend, Archbishop Spiegel, could see nothing in all this beyond Gallicism and insubordination. The king took a more reasonable view. It is true that he expressed his displeasure to the diet on account of the frequent infringements of the rules of procedure, but upon quiet reflection he found it easy to understand why the province should be unwilling to abandon its own legal system in favour of a partially obsolete code. He conceded the point, though commanding that the matter should be deferred until the revision of the code was completed, permitting the Rhinelanders (and subsequently the other provinces as well)

to participate, through a deputation from the diet, in the elaboration of the provincial laws. Danckelmann, meanwhile, had set vigorously to work upon the great task of revision, which had been completely arrested under the slack leadership of Beyme. He appointed a number of notable lawyers —Savigny, Sethe, Kamptz, Sack, Simon, and others—to form a committee; and the enormous amount of material was divided up among the members of this body in sixteen separate sections. It was also proposed to make a collective study of the nine-and-fifty provincial codes of the monarchy. The king exhorted haste. Before long, however, the committee was forced to recognise that large portions of Frederician legislation, and especially of the Frederician criminal law, required complete transformation to adapt them to the needs of the new time, and in its present state of fermentative change German jurisprudence was unequal to such an undertaking. For this reason, the completion of the work was indefinitely postponed.

The second attack of the Old Prussian jurists had been repulsed, and the French legal system had been preserved for the Rhinelanders for a long time to come. At the same period (1827) similar struggles were going on in the grand duchy of Hesse. Here Minister Grolmann, unquestionably with the best intentions, laid before the diet the draft of a new legal system, but the deputies from the left bank of the Rhine entered the lists like one man on behalf of the Rhenish law, and the minister was forced to withdraw his proposal, which was in any case a mere patchwork. These incautious attempts on the part of German legislators served only to render more difficult the return of the Rhinelanders to German life. Now that the reactionary party had thus openly manifested its hatred of publicity in criminal procedure, it was regarded as indisputable that the *code Napoléon* was the enshrinement of liberty, the peculiar treasure of the left bank of the Rhine. Once more, as in the days of the Cisrhenish republic, the beautiful lands from the Lauter to the Netherland frontier regarded themselves as a semi-French intermediate realm whose function it was to transmit the freedoms of the west to the enslaved regions of the east. German liberalism, losing its way more and more in the maze of Gallic ideals, busily fostered, in its blindness, the arrogance of this Rhenish particularist life.

Far more threatening was the antiprussian opposition which had already from time to time ventured to display itself at the Posen diet. The Polish nobles owed the rescue of their lands to the kindly labours of the Prussian officialdom, for without the assistance of the new agricultural credit institute, during these years of need their lands would inevitably have passed to other hands; but what did they care for the blessings of German rule in comparison with the phantasm of the reestablishment of Poland? The circumspect conduct of Prince Radziwill, the viceroy, and of Zerboni, the lord-lieutenant, served only to strengthen the junkers and their priestly associates in a spirit of defiance. Zerboni admitted that it was essential for the government to train in Posen a number of loyal teachers, for, he said, "the Polish gymnasia have hitherto been rather foci of prussophobia than places of instruction." He had some of the more dangerous disturbers of the peace quietly removed from the schools, but he did what was necessary hesitatingly and regretfully, feeling, as he expressed it, "we are in the deplorable position of having to combat sentiments which, when nourished in our own breasts, served to secure our independence."[1] Instead of placing the Polish peasantry under the strict and just discipline of German officials, in 1823 a share in the administration of the rural districts was confidingly allotted to the Polish nobles: the landowner was to exercise on his estates the police powers of a *wojt*, no longer in virtue of his own authority, but as a state commissioner. From time to time some small Polish society would be surprised in secret sitting, or a number of letters or a mutilated bust of the king would be seized; but neither Zerboni nor his successor von Baumann could make up his mind to adopt a system of thoroughgoing supervision. Undeterred by the fate of General Uminski, who had to atone for his plots by prolonged imprisonment in the fortress of Glogau, Count Titus Dzialynski was engaged for years in secret intercourse with the conspirators in Warsaw. For the most part the wealthy landlords of the older generation held cautiously aloof, but all the more zealously did the younger men participate in the intrigues, and anyone who hesitated to join was speedily over-persuaded by the ardent patriotic eloquence of the Polish noblewomen.

[1] Zerboni's Report to Altenstein, November 20, 1819.

The summoning of the provincial diet was extremely welcome to the nobles, for the belauded class-division ensured an overwhelming majority for the Poles. There was a full attendance at the diet, for the German minority, too, played a vigorous part. A humble address of gratitude, whose effusive terms offered no difficulties to the Sarmatian conscience, was immediately followed by a petty warfare against German officialdom. Since it was impossible to point to any notable act of injustice on the part of the considerate administration, the diet was forced to content itself with general complaints about the dangers involved for the "nationality of the grand duchy"—as if the German third of the province had had no existence. It was requested that the Landrats should be entirely excluded from the sittings of the circle estates, so that the deliberations of the circle diets might be perfectly free; the diet complained of the great number of German officials, but to this the king dryly replied that he would have been glad to appoint men of Polish nationality, but hitherto not a single Pole had presented himself at the great examination of candidates for official service. Most violent of all were the attacks directed against the educational system, which ought, it was asserted, to be placed under the supervision of a special board, so that the German language might not gain the upper hand; it was not right to demand a knowledge of Greek from Polish abiturients, since they already had to learn two living languages; and so on, and so on. When the diet reassembled in January, 1830, the atmosphere had already become more oppressive, and it was manifest that a storm was impending. The diet reminded the monarch of the pledges of the year 1815, although he had fulfilled all of these with meticulous conscientiousness; it raised a number of new indefinite complaints, demanding, among other things, the dismissal of a judge ignorant of the Polish language who had been appointed in Posen, an essentially German town. The king made a sharp rejoinder, to the effect that he would continue to regard the province of Posen, without prejudice to the rights of its various tribal constituents, as a portion of his own realm, while he prohibited any arbitrary interpretation of his royal word and any attempt at political separatist agitation.

In this manner the provincial diets exercised almost

universally a purely obstructive influence, and once only during these years did a new and productive thought issue from among them. The powerful interests of youthful manufacturing industry imperiously demanded their rights. Upon the petition of the two diets of the west, the king at length abandoned his legitimist hesitations and entered into diplomatic intercourse with the new republics of America, doing this in order to secure that the Rhenish manufacturers should not completely lose access to so important a market; but when Alexander Humboldt was recommended by the Rhenish diet for the post of envoy to Mexico, Frederick William did not accede to the suggestion, considering that he could make a better use of Humboldt's talents in Berlin.

The tacit struggle between the ultra-conservative views of the diets and the comparatively liberal conceptions of the crown, was all the more vexatious in that it ultimately endangered the harmony of the very highest authorities themselves. In the ministry, the bourgeois sentiment of Old Prussian officialdom predominated. In the council of state, on the other hand, the fresh appointments of recent years had gradually led to the formation of a new majority. Duke Charles of Mecklenburg, Ancillon, Kamptz, Generals Knesebeck and Müffling, Marwitz, and most of the presidents of the diets, made common cause with the crown prince. This strictly aristocratic party lent a very friendly ear to the wishes of the diets, and especially to the petitions of loyal Electoral Mark, being even more well-disposed towards them than was the immediate committee; and since the council was already able at times to exercise a decisive influence, there gradually ensued a state of tension between that body and the ministry of state.[1] The consequence was that the council of state was consulted even more rarely than heretofore. After numerous disputes, Duke Charles, as president of the council, at length submitted to the king a formal statement of grievances (March 8, 1827). He described the unfriendly relationships between the two supreme authorities, and demanded that neither of them should be allowed to exercise a preponderant influence; he went on to show that during the last few years, of thirty new laws, four only had been submitted to the council of state; and he concluded

[1] Müffling to Duke Charles of Mecklenburg, October 29, 1827.

by saying, "If no remedy be provided, the council of state will exist in name only, and it would be better to do away with it altogether."[1]

What a preposterous suggestion to make to the king! How could he guide the state firmly and securely if his government were to be restricted by the divergent counsels of eight diets, and in addition by the opposition of a council of state arrogating the right to examine all legislative proposals and to act as counterpoise to the ministry? For a long time Frederick William had contemplated with displeasure the dispute among his chief advisers, and he had decisively refused to grant his brother-in-law the seat in the ministerial council for which the latter had petitioned, for he wished to avoid the introduction of the conflict into the ministry as well. Making up his mind that the trouble should cease, he informed the duke, through the instrumentality of Count Lottum, that he reserved to himself as king the right of deciding what laws should be submitted to the council of state.[2] In this way the sphere of activity allotted to the council of state by the ordinance of 1817 was notably restricted. No longer had the council to consider all new legislative proposals, for it was to be ignored whenever the king thought fit. Incontestably the change was within the competence of the absolute crown, but unfortunately it was effected in a manner open to objection, by a simple verbal command. In a way quite unanticipated, and yet inevitable, the summoning of the provincial diets resulted in a further decline in the prestige of the council of state. The council did not, indeed, as Duke Charles had feared, continue to exist merely in name, for even during the thirties its proceedings remained momentous and fruitful; but it had passed the zenith of its power and had entered upon its decline, so that ultimately, when the constitutional epoch arrived, this authority, once so powerful, became almost completely ineffectual.

Of all these matters, the general public knew little. Those only with an intimate knowledge of affairs of state knew well enough that the Old German diets gave the

[1] Duke Charles of Mecklenburg, Memorial concerning the Council of State, March 8. Despatches to Duke Charles: from Friese, February 19; from Müffling, March 19; from Kamptz, October 7, 1827.

[2] Lottum to Duke Charles, October 28, 1827.

Prussian crown very little less trouble than the modern systems of popular representation gave the South German courts. The provincial diets brought the monarchy many of the disadvantages of the constitutional system and none of its advantages. They brought a considerable proportion of the discontents, frictions, and procrastinations which are inseparably associated with any form of representative government; but they were incompetent to awaken in the populace a genuine sense of personal participation in the national life, and they were unable to subject the administration to that continuous and unsparing public criticism which, in active and vigorous monarchies, constitutes the most important and valuable task of parliamentary life by compelling the state to make the fullest and most efficient use of all its energies. In default of such supervision, every unrestricted political authority, even that of the well-ordered Prussian official state, must inevitably, in the end, lapse into self-satisfied inertia.

§2. THE COURT. DISPUTES ABOUT THE LITURGY. MIXED MARRIAGES.

For the present it seemed that such dangers were still remote. Notwithstanding widespread economic distress, the masses were unmistakably content with the careful administration; they thought of nothing but their work, were still almost completely unaffected by political ideas, and were attached to the royal house with a childlike fidelity. In the year 1824, when the king remarried, entering into a morganatic alliance with Countess Auguste Harrach, raised to the rank of Princess von Liegnitz, the delight was well nigh universal. After his two youngest daughters had also left the paternal roof, the solitude of his widower's life had become a torment. "Now the censures will begin," said the king to Bishop Eylert when communicating his entirely unexpected determination; and unquestionably Varnhagen had rarely harvested so rich a crop for his diary as in these first days, for all the world made a mock of the Bohemian jewel in the Prussian crown. But the chatter of malicious tongues was silenced when the king issued a manifesto to

his people, giving a frank account of the simply human course of the affair. The young princess held aloof from politics; she had sufficient tact to conduct herself admirably in her difficult position among the proud Hohenzollerns; and when she devotedly nursed her husband for months after he had sustained a dangerous fracture of the leg, all were loud in her praise, for it was felt that she was cherishing the much-tried man in the evening of his days. It was at this time that Frederick William made his account with life, writing his testament upon the sick bed; each day of the thirteen years which were still vouchsafed to him was humbly accepted as a special grace of God. The discontent by which previously he had so often been affected had now passed away; in the serenity of his pious old age he seemed even more kindly than of yore, although, indeed, he was but little accessible to new ideas. Not long after the marriage the princess von Liegnitz came over to the Evangelical church, thus gratifying her husband's heartfelt desire, for he was a man who could not have found permanent happiness in a mixed marriage; he regarded himself as chief and protector of German Protestantism, and considered it his princely duty to furnish the Protestant majority of his people with the example of a Protestant household.

How difficult he had found it to permit the betrothal of the heir to the throne to a Catholic princess. Some years earlier the crown prince had conceived a passion for the princess Elisabeth, the amiable and much admired daughter of the king of Bavaria—a passion such as is rarely felt by a man in his prime. His love was returned, and the prince imagined that there were no further difficulties in his path. King Max Joseph, who had been the first to moot the idea of this family alliance, cordially favoured the Prussian suitor. A worldling from the century of enlightenment, he considered the difference of creeds a matter of no moment, and found it quite in order that the future queen of Prussia should become a Protestant in accordance with the old Hohenzollern tradition. His daughter took a more serious view. Brought up under the eyes of her pious Evangelical mother Queen Caroline, she was of a tolerant spirit, but was a good Catholic, and had hitherto found peace in the old church. A change of creed to secure a brilliant future seemed to her unworthy, and she would go no further than to give a promise that if

at a later date she should become convinced of its truth she would embrace the Protestant faith. Even the good Schmitt, her mother's Protestant chaplain, confirmed her in this resistance. But the king of Prussia remained inflexible. Having been weak enough to sanction the conversion of his eldest daughter to the Greek church, he now considered it his duty to cling all the more firmly to the custom of his house. Thus the lovers had to endure four distressful years; their misfortunes aroused general compassion at the courts, and several princes and princesses endeavoured to mediate. At the congress of Verona, the two emperors also besieged their royal friend with fruitless petitions. Soon afterwards, his spiritual confidant, Bishop Eylert, endowed with the style and title of a Brandenburg canon, visited Tegernsee for further private talk with the princess; the versatile theological diplomat was completely disarmed by Elisabeth's dignified attitude, and returned home to assure the king that the acceptance of such a daughter-in-law need involve no fears for the faith of his house.[1]

The king at length (1823) gave his consent, and the intense happiness of the young couple sufficed to allay his anxieties completely. The crown princess was a woman of exceptionally high culture, her tutor Thiersch having even introduced her to the study of classical antiquity. She entered with loving understanding into the multifarious labours and schemes of her talented husband, and the sensitive man sought consolation and refreshment in her gentleness, her imperturbable equanimity. Thus she gradually acquired an ascendancy over his unstable disposition, involuntarily confirming him (although she never concerned herself with affairs of state) in his romanticist and ultra-conservative outlook. The "Bourbon views" of the Bavarian princess were familiar to all the friendly courts. Elisabeth remained upon affectionate terms with her paternal house and with her sisters, who had married in Austria and in Saxony, and she was unable to conceive the possibility that any serious change could ever occur in German policy, that Prussia could possibly find itself in conflict with these allied courts. When, several years after her marriage, she too became a Protestant, she continued to preserve for her old faith a sentiment of

[1] In this account I follow Schmitt's Memoirs, which agree in all important respects with the relation of Thiersch (F. Thiersch's Life, I, p. 259).

feminine loyalty, and it resulted from the intimate spiritual community of this marriage that the crown prince, though he remained profoundly convinced of the verity of Evangelical Christianity, became, as the years passed, more and more friendly to the claims of the Roman church.

Since the crown prince's marriage remained childless, it was necessary to reckon with the possibility that the crown would one day devolve upon Prince William. In the person of this second son, the king was able to enjoy the greatest joy known to a father, that of discerning a more brilliant reproduction of his own nature. Just as straightforward, reasonable, and honourable as his father, but far more cheerful, resolute, and alert, the chivalrous young prince was already the hope of the army, a born commander, at once strict and kindly, as is most agreeable to the soldier's heart. Officers and men alike would for him go through fire. Since the crown prince's unwarlike disposition had soon become manifest, Frederick William had had his second son trained entirely as a soldier. Prince William devoted himself zealously to his military duties, holding simultaneously two important commands, that of the Brandenburg army corps and that of a division of the guards. As yet nothing more was known of his political sentiments than that he held in high esteem the vocation of the absolute Prussian monarchy, regarding himself as the second of his father's subjects. He lived amid the traditions of the War of Liberation, reverencing the heroes of that great time, not excepting old York, who was in bad odour at court, for the prince's free spirit was unaffected by the whispers of calumniators. Like his father, he regarded the league of the eastern powers as the guarantee of peace; and, like his father, he preferred the Russians to the Austrians. It was with the Russians that he had made his first campaign; and after he had attended the marriage of his favourite sister, the grand duchess Charlotte, he remained in confidential intercourse with the court of St. Petersburg.

Yet in the case of this son so near to his heart, the king found it necessary to disturb most cruelly the dearest dreams of youth. Prince William loved Princess Elise Radziwill, the most beautiful and fascinating of the young court ladies. She seemed made for him, but her fitness in rank for a royal marriage was contested. Although this

ancient Lithuanian dynasty excelled many of the German princely houses in wealth and historical renown, and although once before in the days of the Great Elector a Hohenzollern had married a Radziwill, of late at the Prussian as at all the German royal courts stricter ideas had in these matters come to prevail. Since the time of Frederick the Great, the principle had been established that none but the daughters of the ruling princely houses, or of those who had formerly been estates of the empire, were suitable for a royal alliance. The king had recognised this principle when, on the occasion of his second marriage, he had publicly declared that by the rule of his house his marriage with the daughter of a count of the empire could be morganatic merely. For five years all that was possible was done on both sides to overcome the obstacle, and to secure for the prince the happiness he desired. Carl Friedrich Eichhorn, commissioned by Prince Anton Radziwill, wrote a legal opinion in favour of the equality in rank of the house of Radziwill, but the view of the great teacher of constitutional law conflicted with the well-grounded opinion of other notable jurists. Then it was proposed that Prince Augustus of Prussia should adopt the princess, but five of the ministers declared, in accordance with their official duty, that adoption was incompetent to overcome a defect in hereditary rank. Meanwhile the king's third son, Prince Charles, became betrothed to a princess of Weimar, and the grand-ducal court expressly declared that the right of succession would be claimed for the children of this marriage should the eldest son die without issue.

The question had now become extremely serious, for a dispute about the succession was threatened, one which might endanger the very existence of the dynasty. Upon the repeated representations of his advisers, the king, profoundly distressed, determined to use his personal influence (1826). In a letter overflowing with tenderness, he assured his son that everything that was possible had been attempted in vain, and that nothing was left open beyond the harsh duty of sacrificing a noble passion to the welfare of the state and to that of the royal house. When the prince received this communication from the hands of General Witzleben, he was at first utterly crushed; but, recovering his self-command, he wrote to the king the very same evening, promising obedience. In that simple, artless, and yet profoundly-felt language

characteristic of him, he poured his heart out to his father. He promised to justify the king's confidence by fighting down his intense sorrow, by steadfast acceptance of the inevitable, and he begged for the assistance of God, who would not abandon him in this severe trial. Yet more intimately than before would his heart now go out to his beloved father, for the paternal affection had never been more tenderly displayed than in the manner of the grievous decision. Witzleben upon this occasion wrote in his diary, "What a son, and what a father!" Three years later the prince concluded with Princess Augusta of Weimar the marriage which secured the issue of the royal house. Thus it was that an inscrutable destiny moulded the hero of the nation, and trained to obedience and renunciation the man who was one day to rule Germany.[1]

Outside court circles, little was known of these struggles of the heart. All the more excitement, therefore, was caused by the intelligence that in Paris the king's half-sister, the duchess Julia of Anhalt-Coethen had, with her husband, gone over to Rome (1825). Emperor Francis had been initiated into the secret, and had only demanded, in order to save himself annoyance, that the formal conversion should not take place in Austria. In accordance with the old custom of Roman Catholic honour, and following the example of the esteemed Haller, the converts had intended to conceal the change of faith from the inhabitants of their Protestant land, a course to which the pope willingly gave his approval. But the matter leaked out, and the duchess found it necessary to give her royal brother an official intimation of what had occurred. She did this in a fulsome letter, whose empty phrases displayed only the fantastical intoxication of these romanticist days, and gave no trace of the earnestness of a conviction secured through serious spiritual struggles. In conclusion, she gave the man whose most sacred sentiments were wounded the consolatory assurance that in accordance with Catholic custom she would never cease to mention him in her prayers.

Krug and Paulus, the old and jealous watchdogs of

[1] Wittgenstein to Bernstorff, March 28, 1826; Legal Opinions by C. F. Eichhorn, Schmelzer, and others; Witzleben's Diary, January 10 and April 4, 1825 June 23 and 24, 1826; Prince William to King Frederick William, June 23, 1862. For further details see Appendix XVII.

Protestantism, instantly raised the alarm in the press. The populace of Anhalt was greatly disturbed, for who could tell whether some of the duke's advisers, following the example of their sovereign, might not have been secretly converted to the Roman faith, so that the Protestant territorial church might be under Catholic guidance? A crowd of fanatical ultramontanes assembled round the duchess and her protégé, Adam Müller. Most dangerous of all was Haza, the Pole, a skilful agent of Roman propaganda, whose secret activities in this field were continued for many years, and even in the first German Reichstag. Before long it became known that another child of Frederick William II, Count Ingenheim, had been received into the Roman communion in the palace church of Coethen. Next a Jesuit mission became established in this old centre of Saxon Lutheranism, and for three decades the notorious alsatia of the German smuggling trade was also the acropolis of clericalist intrigues in the north-east. King Frederick William answered his sister with unsparing frankness, writing: "I feel it necessary to declare that in my view you could not have taken a more unfortunate step." He then exposed the grounds for his own fixed Evangelical convictions, and concluded by saying: "I had to write this to you. If I have erred, God forgive me!" Shortly afterwards this reply was published in the newspapers, with the king's approval. It troubled him little that the Catholic journals complained of his harshness, as did Councillor von Schütz of Anhalt, in a published response. He desired to bear testimony before the world to the unalterable sentiments of his house, which had hitherto been free from such conversions; moreover, it was essential that he should refute the odious reports regarding his own inclinations towards Catholicism. He deliberately introduced into his letter an assurance that the renovated Evangelical liturgy of the unified national church was based upon the pure word of the scriptures; for through this very liturgy and through the Catholic marriages in the royal house many anxious Protestants had been inspired with doubts regarding the pious monarch's firmness in the faith.

Inextinguishable in the mind of Frederick William were the religious impressions he had acquired in England after the first taking of Paris. With deep feeling did he recall

the profound repose of the Sabbath, the crowds of church-goers in the London streets, the dignified ceremonial of the Anglican service. From the prince, a stranger in the land, acquainted only with the superficialities of British life, the seamy side of English ecclesiasticism remained hidden. He failed to note how much heartless sanctimoniousness was concealed behind this decorous exterior, and how many secret sins were provoked by the unnatural strictness of the English Sabbath. When he returned home, with uplifted heart, and filled with gratitude for God's favour, which had been so signally displayed towards him and his people, he was horrified when he observed how scanty was the attendance at church, while he was repelled by the extreme sobriety of the German ritual, which in the epoch of the enlightenment had gradually discarded all nobility of form, getting rid so thoroughly of every devotional and elevating influence that a sermon dealing with a few moral commonplaces frequently comprised the entire service. The old rationalism, as one of the leaders of the movement declared with much self complacency, desired "to subserve the interests of mankind and of the state with due respect for the Christian faith, still cherished by the populace." During the long predominance of this morally respectable but thoroughly irreligious tendency, ritual as well as dogma had been left to the personal discretion of individual pastors, almost all of whom constructed a liturgy as they pleased. How great was the suffering of the pious Carl von Raumer when in Halle he stood beside the bier of a loved son, and the preacher, instead of the scriptural words for which the father's heart was yearning, read an insipid poem about mutability from Witschel's *Meditations*. In the marriage service, illuminate pastors would in many cases omit the exhortation "and he shall be your master," for the phrase seemed to them ungallant.

The contemplation of this anarchy was equally painful to the king's religious earnestness and to his military sense of order, and he declared to Eylert that of all evil things in the world arbitrary caprice was the worst. Just as he had not long before issued instructions to pastors to resume the dignified Lutheran cassock in place of the tasteless frock-coat and tall hat which had recently come into fashion, so also he considered it his duty in virtue of his episcopal supremacy to restore to the national church that unity of

ritual which is essential to every well-ordered religious community. By renovating the liturgy of Martin Luther, whom he venerated as the faithful man of God, the greatest of all reformers, he desired to safeguard the work of union, to lead back the Evangelical church to its primitive doctrines, to give to edifying prayers and hymns a place side by side with doctrine, and " to safeguard his Evangelical subjects against the abuses of anarchical caprice, creating doubt and indifference."

Since he felt inspired with a stronger religious sentiment than that which characterised the majority of pastors, he acted with unusual resolution, giving first of all to the garrison churches of his two palaces a liturgy, which subsequently (1821), in an expanded form, he commended to all the congregations of the national church. This new liturgy was a fine work of Evangelical piety. It faithfully followed the liturgical labours of the Reformation period, and harmonised perfectly with the Protestant confessions of faith. With scrupulous care Frederick William had endeavoured to do justice, in the elaboration of this work, to all the considerations and counsels he had received from ecclesiastical circles. His best hours were devoted to the task, the one dearest to his heart among his duties as a ruler. He was never weary of renewed and thorough discussions of this topic, not only with the theologians of his court, but also with Witzleben, and with Bunsen in Rome, who first acquired the monarch's confidence through his extensive liturgical knowledge. Every old liturgy which was discoverable in disintegrated Evangelical Germany was to be found in the king's library. Reading them all, and subjecting all to a detailed examination, he at length secured a completer command over the extensive material than was possessed by any of his theologians, and he innocently expected that his national church, which in response to his appeal had just effected a union, would now gratefully accept this product of his untiring industry as a new bond of unity.

Painful was to be his disillusionment. The weakness of absolute monarchy depends far more upon the timidities that prevail at a court than upon the ill will of a monarch. Even to this benevolent prince, who invariably subjected candid contradiction to thoughtful examination, people rarely ventured to utter the whole truth, for at the first moment he

would sometimes receive unpalatable communications with a certain roughness. The members of his entourage knew well enough how many objections had been voiced in ecclesiastical circles against even the first draft of the liturgy; but the king had not heard a word of this, and was therefore extremely surprised when, in response to the first demand, no more than a very small minority of the pastors proved willing to adopt the liturgy, while vehement opposition was manifested on all hands. To the rigid adherents of the Reformed church, it seemed a papistical abomination that, in accordance with the Lutheran custom, the pastor should at the benediction make the sign of the cross. The rationalists made similar reproaches, for they had long been naively accustomed to regard themselves as the true heirs of the Reformation, and to look upon everyone who differed from them as a Jesuit in disguise. Even the pious Lutherans took exception to the Reformed practice of breaking bread, and to the uniform rule which threatened to put an end to so many cherished local customs. A number of old practices which were now to be reintroduced had in course of time been forgotten, and to the zealots seemed a vexatious innovation—as for example the formula "Our Father," although the words are used in this order in the Lutheran Bible.

The ultimate ground of this multiform opposition was to be found in the reawakening of those republican ideas which lie in the nature of Protestantism, and which demand their rights whenever Protestantism feels strong. The archiepiscopal authority of the sovereign had had its ever memorable period, for it was through this that German Protestantism had been saved from breaking up into numerous mutually conflicting sects. But the old race of illuminate pastors who looked upon themselves as mere servants of the state was now dying out. The new time demanded, however obscurely at first, an independent religious life. The desire was to see the great idea of the priesthood of laymen, which Martin Luther had conceived in a strictly subjective sense, realised outwardly in the constitution of the church. Men of the most divergent views were united in these hopes; they all felt that such a reform of the liturgy, which so deeply affected the inner life of the church, ought not to be undertaken without the church's own cooperation.

Unmistakable was the reciprocal action between these

new religious views and the political idealism of the time. Their most notable spokesman, Schleiermacher, recognised just as plainly as did his friend Gass that the constitution of the state and the constitution of the church mutually conditioned one another. Nor did the king at first unreservedly oppose these ideas. In the year 1819 he permitted provincial synods to assemble, and even three years later he announced to the minister of public worship and education his intention to summon a general synod of elected clergymen and laymen, a body which, like that of Baden, was to draft a charter of union for the entire national church. Yet he was by no means inclined to break with the past or to renounce his position as head of the national church. All that he was willing to concede was cooperation between the synods and the existing sovereign consistories. For this reason he began to become alarmed when several of the provincial synods of 1819, in their inexperience, adopted revolutionary resolutions, and went so far as to demand the abolition of the consistorial constitution. The Brandenburg synod, in which Schleiermacher's influence was predominant, even desired to do away with the ministry of public worship and education and to replace it by a committee of the general synod, a proposal which, in view of the distracted state of religious parties, could not fail at this juncture to be disastrous, and to lead to a most unfortunate multiplication of sects. When the struggle against the liturgy now commenced, and a flood of contradictory complaints and criticisms surged up to the steps of the throne, Frederick William feared that if a general synod were now summoned, this would serve only to increase the confusion, and that it might endanger the existence of the young union. Political cares were also influential in guiding him to a decision. Altenstein was even more suspicious when he contemplated the first uneasy stirrings of religious independence. Despite his tolerance, the minister was still completely under the influence of the doctrine of state supremacy over the church, and did nothing to further the synodal reform, but followed his invariable practice in matters which seemed to him inconvenient, quietly shelving the monarch's plans after a few sterile preliminary labours. The provincial synods were not summoned again, and it was only the small circle synods of the clergy which continued to lead an inconspicuous existence.

Since the church still lacked a statutory organ for the expression of its general will, the king, in virtue of his supreme episcopal authority, determined to exercise what he spoke of as his "liturgical rights," and, while avoiding direct coercion, to utilise the entire prestige of the crown in order to put the liturgy into operation.

It was his sacred conviction that without a uniform rule for divine service the church would become a prey to hopeless dismemberment, and he considered that it rested with him to avert this disaster. Upon the margin of a petition of protest he wrote the holograph note: "Freedom of belief and freedom of conscience must be clearly distinguished from religious freedom." He was strengthened in his views by the writings of certain inept champions. Augusti, the Bonn theologian, went so far as to advocate the terrible proposition, *cujus regio ejus religio*, although this principle had ceased to be valid in Prussia as long ago as the days of John Sigismund. Augusti was valiantly supported by Ammon of Dresden. The first chaplain in ordinary of the largest and most distinguished Lutheran national church of Germany had recently exhibited lively opposition to the union, but he now regarded it as his official duty to advocate with rationalistic unction the rigid principles of state supremacy in religious matters which had prevailed in Electoral Saxony of old. The state and the church were to be as inseparable as were man and wife in the domestic economy, under the protection of the "father of light, who, through Jesus, and by the guidance of art and science, prepares us for the right faith, and leads us by the ways of law and order to the high benefits of his grace and truth. But the best defence of the liturgy was the work of the king's own pen. To sustain his most cherished creation he overcame his diffidence and published a little book entitled *Luther in Relation to the Prussian Liturgy*, bearing the motto, "God is not a god of disorder, but a god of peace." Straightforwardly and affectionately, writing as a Christian to Christians, he addressed the congregation with the natural eloquence of a pious heart, showing that the liturgy merely restored the old and pure Evangelical service in its primitive form. He had, however, absolutely no conception of the pangs of conscience which the work he had undertaken "solely to the greater glory of God" was bringing to countless

upright souls, and he could explain the antagonism of "unfair opponents" in no other way than as the outcome of blindness and prejudice.

Among these opponents, to the king's especial concern, was to be found the leading theologian of the country. How singular was the transposition of parties! Whilst Ammon, the opponent of the union, was now defending the king, Schleiermacher, who had been the most efficient worker on behalf of the union, was campaigning against the liturgy. It did not escape his acute vision that every change in religious service necessarily affects belief; and to him, since he sought the roots of religion in the sentiments of the believer's heart, even the semblance of constraint of conscience was intolerable. He knew, moreover, that many of the ancient liturgical forms which the king regarded as inalterable rules, seemed strange to the modern mind, and as a member of the Reformed church he had a personal objection to some of the prescriptions of the Lutheran liturgy. Writing under the pen-name of Pacificus Sincerus he gave candid expression to his views *Concerning the Liturgical Rights of German Sovereign Princes*, and demanded that the exercise of these rights should be postponed until the Evangelical church should have secured a permanent constitution.

Schleiermacher furnished no more than indefinite indications as to the synodal forms of this future constitution. Herein lay the weakness of the great theologian. Throughout life he suffered from his original association with the Moravian brethren, a small community of revivalists, who could feel at home only in the hole and corner position of an oppressed sect, and who never displayed any understanding for the organisation of a comprehensive national church. Officially, too, he entered the lists on behalf of his conviction, joining with eleven other respected pastors of Berlin to formulate a definite protest against the liturgy. Then he turned to answer the king's own pamphlet on the question, criticising it sharply in *Conversations between Two Christians*, and he did not shrink from showing that the personality of the unnamed author of the king's pamphlet was well known to him. The *Conversations* secured few readers, for to the modern taste the involved dialectic of platonic dialogues seemed alien and artificial. Great, however, was the indignation in the official world. Privy Councillor Kamptz, who, it need

hardly be said, was a wholehearted supporter of the monarch's liturgical rights, fiercely demanded the punishment of this unprecedented impudence. Schleiermacher, who had for years past been pestered by numerous pinpricks, the issue of bureaucratic dissatisfaction, daily expected his dismissal, and, according to credible reports, Altenstein was on the point of dismissing him. But the king had too great an esteem for his opponent to permit this. He urgently desired to win over Schleiermacher, and allowed the great theologian to do as he pleased.

More enduring than these struggles upon the altitudes of theological science, was the influence of the stubborn resistance which the liturgy encountered from the pious throughout the country, for religious sentiment has ever manifested its greatest energy among the masses of the people, among those that labour and are heavy laden. Dispersed in all the provinces there had continued to exist small conventicles of the faithful who held timidly aloof from the dominant rationalism of the national church. Their numbers had been increased by the afflictions of the years of war, and in these circles it was the custom to speak of the new century as "the age of revival." They were for the most part members of the common people, under the leadership of isolated nobles or men of learning. Like the pietists of old, they were submissive to authority, but were extremely restive in face of any disturbance of their religious traditions. Such a circle of revivalists existed in Further Pomerania under the leadership of the brothers von Below and of Senfft-Pilsach, an intimate friend of the crown prince. In Berlin and in the poverty-stricken weaving villages of the Riesengebirge, there worked in a similar spirit von Kottwitz, "the pious baron" as he was named by the populace, a venerable patriarch, never weary of well doing, a precursor of the Home Mission. During the war, in the old barrack in the Alexanderplatz, hundreds of starving Berlin workers had secured at his hands shelter, support, and edification. Stimulated by his example, Count A. von der Recke now instituted a home of refuge on the Lower Rhine. Less harmless was the ecstatic enthusiasm of a revivalist sect in Königsberg, which advocated the mystical doctrines of the pious eccentric Schönherr. Most defiant of all was the conduct of the Old Lutherans of Breslau. Their teacher was Scheibel, a pastor with

a hard head and a believing heart, who, completely unaffected by the ideas of the new theological science, continued, quite in the style of Flacius and Heshusius, to condemn the Reformed ritual as the "service of Isis," and to speak of the ordinances of the "pagan church-government" with the intractable cantankerousness of the appointed guardian of Zion. Associated with him were Huschke, the lawyer, a fantastical dreamer, and the unresting Steffens, who in a work upon *The True Faith* defended the infallibility of his rigid Scandinavian Lutheranism.

This motley opposition could not be dangerous to the existence of the national church, provided the ecclesiastical government were sufficiently tolerant to leave the exit open for those who were not able voluntarily to accept the liturgy. But Altenstein, like his master, adhered immutably to the old territorialist legal position, according to which every Prussian Protestant must belong to the national church. The illuminate minister was utterly devoid of understanding for the energies of the strictly religious sentiment, and at his hospitable table the question was at times coolly discussed whether Christianity would continue to exist for another twenty or fifty years. It sufficed him if religious feeling did not exceed a certain reasonable measure, and he considered that he was maintaining the public peace when, in the year 1825, he issued a severe ordinance against the "perverted and antisocial" tendencies of pietism, mysticism, and separatism. How gratefully, during the opening years of Frederick William's reign, had public opinion accepted similar manifestations of the monarch's enlightened sentiments. But now the minister's well-intentioned warning aroused justified hostility even among men who shared his views. This age would no longer endure such dictatorial intervention in the internal life of the church. It remained an insoluble contradiction that a state which ruled a population two-fifths of which had at one time been Catholic, a state desiring to be just to all the creeds, should nevertheless prescribe to its Protestants the sense in which they had to understand the saving truths of their faith.

The same weapons of an obsolete ecclesiastical policy were also used by Altenstein in order to carry the liturgy into effect. Beyond question the philosophical minister wished just as little as the pious monarch to oppress conscience in

any way, but since the church did not as yet possess any regular representation of the congregations, the fate of the liturgy lay first of all in the hands of the clergy, and these —Altenstein could conceive it in no other way—were his subordinates. The king, too, considered that severe reprimands were permissible, for he had been profoundly mortified by the malicious suspicions concerning his fidelity to the Evangelical faith. He did not recognise how hot were the tears that were flowing on account of this liturgy; his worldly-wise court bishops, Eylert and Neander, did not think it expedient to enlighten him. The consequence was that, for the good end, means were occasionally employed which closely resembled simony. In the middle of the nineteenth century, proud of its culture, there recurred, less drastically but little less detestably, the oppression of conscience of that tragic epoch of the Formulas of Concord to which the parsons' wives of Electoral Saxony had besought their husbands to subscribe in order to retain their cures. In a cabinet order, the monarch's heartfelt desire was laid before the pastors, and the promise was made that the king would not forget "those of the clergy to take a right view of their duty." Many who gave way received the order of the red eagle, *non propter acta, sed propter agenda,* as Schleiermacher mockingly remarked, while in the case of those who proved refractory a point was made of withholding the distinctions it was customary to distribute in connection with official celebrations. The director of the Brandenburg consistory, Kessler by name, an excellent official, and by no means a man of extremely strict religious views, asked to be transferred to the ministry of finance because he could not endure witnessing the petty afflictions of this liturgical dispute. An affliction it certainly was when Eylert, as royal commissary, found it necessary to visit the Home of the Holy Sepulchre in order to reassure the pious old ladies, or when the lord-lieutenant of Saxony was compelled to exhort the Lutheran peasants in the village of Bergwitz not to withdraw their acceptance of the dreaded "black book."

The crown prince observed with concern how much meanness was brought to light in this struggle, cowardly servility on the one hand, and unamiable obstinacy on the other. In the petty states, where all Prussian errors were noted with malicious delight, the name of the union was henceforward

in ill repute, and any further advance of religious unity beyond Prussia's frontiers was rendered impossible.[1] In the year 1827, nearly six-sevenths of the Protestant congregations of the monarchy had declared in favour of accepting the liturgy. Meanwhile, Schleiermacher's opposition had drawn the king's attention to the essential defects of the work; and the monarch was perhaps even more affected by the objections of the Königsberg superintendent Kähler, who, in a courageous writing, strongly criticised the abuse of political power, without attacking the liturgy itself. Frederick William now made an honest attempt to mitigate the rigid uniformity of the regulations. He had repeated consultations with notable theologians, and then had supplements to the liturgy elaborated by the able hand of Bishop Neander, permitting local practices to be valid in addition to the general ordinance, and conceding in each district the use of old-established liturgical forms. After this concession, Schleiermacher and his friends withdrew their opposition, for everyone who accepted the union could now unhesitatingly comply with the new ordinance. At the tercentenary festival of the Augsburg Confession in the year 1830, the king could congratulate himself that the liturgy had been accepted throughout the greater part of the monarchy, and that thereby, as he said, the union had been brought nearer to completion.

It was in the west that resistance continued longest. In Cleves-Berg and Mark, Protestantism had spontaneously struck its first roots, independently of the sovereign power, constructing for itself a free constitution after the prototype of the neighbouring Netherlands. This constitution had fallen into decay under the foreign regime, but even in its ruins was dear to the Evangelical populace. Altenstein was forced to recognise that these Protestants accustomed to independence would never agree to accept the liturgy unless their presbyteries and synods were reestablished. Here alone, therefore, was the opinion of the church asked in accordance with the Spirit of the Reformation. Upon the advice of Bishop Ross, who valiantly espoused the cause of his fellow countrymen, in the year 1835 the king determined that in Rhineland and Westphalia a reordering of the church constitution should be

[1] Wangemann's book, The Religious Cabinet Policy of Frederick William III (Berlin, 1884), furnishes a number of valuable new data, but I do not think the author succeeds in justifying the actions of the government.

effected simultaneously with the introduction of the amended liturgy, and the sequel showed that in this way the right path had at length been entered.

For many years this religious community of the west remained the soundest member of the Prussian national church, a centre of serious and liberal Protestantism, ever vigorously on guard amid its powerful Catholic neighbours. In the brotherly work of ecclesiastical self-government, there was here harmonious cooperation between men of sharply divergent religious views, Reformed Protestants of the Palatinate and Cleves, Lutherans of Ravensberg, and the Devout of Wuppertal. From the experiences of these Rhenish synods, Carl Immanuel Nitzsch constructed his designs for the reform of the constitution of the Evangelical national church. As teacher and preacher at the Rhenish university, the pious Wittenberg Lutheran learned to know and love the free congregational life of the Reformed church. While still quite young his was an impressive personality; he was a man of great learning and childlike modesty; and he speedily acquired undisputed prestige among the Rhenish Protestants, overcoming the last representatives of the old rationalism (which had never made itself really at home upon the Rhine) by the quiet power of his gentle and thoughtful eloquence. Nitzsch took a more favourable view of the liturgy than did Schleiermacher, for he recognised that an orderly ritual was essential, but he wished to exorcise from the national church "the devil of political hierarchy." More clearly than any of his contemporaries, he recognised that the only way in which the union could be safeguarded was by a reconstruction of the ecclesiastical constitution. To the vital conditions of an independent united church no one had given such thorough and careful consideration as this master of practical theology, whose talents for organisation were unfortunately neglected by the government of the church.

When the principal opponents of the liturgy had been reconciled to it more quickly than anyone had anticipated, Altenstein once more felt perfectly sure of his ground, and looked forward to a long period of undisturbed religious peace. All too soon, however, were his hopes frustrated. As soon as the liturgy had been almost universally introduced throughout the national church, the Old Lutherans of Silesia collected

their forces for a desperate resistance, and for nearly a decade to come the minister had to struggle with these irreconcilables. Meanwhile within the bosom of the united church a party movement became manifest, threatening, as time went on, the existence of the union and the broad-mindedly tolerant spirit of the Prussian national church. In the year 1827, Wilhelm Hengstenberg, Westphalian by birth, a man of twenty-five, founded in Berlin the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*. He was an advocate of unconditional authority in state and church. He was of little note as professor, but the very man to be indefatigable leader of a priestly party, obdurate, domineering, worldly wise, of like stuff with the celebrated persecutors Hogstraten and Torquemada. Brought up in the Reformed church, and as a student inclined to the things of this world, he had in Basle suddenly become a strict Bible Christian, and henceforward was prepared to damn with the anathema "he does not possess Christian truth" anyone who departed even by a hair's breadth from his formulas of faith. What he termed "Christian truth" was no more than a modernised form of the old orthodoxy which in the seventeenth century had brought Lutheranism so low, infused with a few pietistic ideas, although the genuine spirit of pietism which had originated amid the struggles for the letter of the faith was alien to the arid nature of Hengstenberg. He had recently defended Altenstein's ordinance against the separatists and mystics, doing so in a remarkable booklet in which the phrase was constantly reiterated that the rationalists were even more unchristian than those abandoned sectaries; subsequently he had attacked the Old Lutherans because they contested the supreme episcopal authority of the sovereign. Yet sooner or later it was inevitable that a party which could not tolerate any other tendency than its own should become hostile to the union.

The first task was to destroy rationalism, and this doctrine had in truth been long ripe for destruction. It was only in Halle that it remained predominant, for in Berlin and in Bonn, where the young men of talent all adhered to the doctrines of Schleiermacher and Nitzsch, it no longer found supporters. Its opponents had been assembling on all sides for the attack since Hahn, the Leipzig theologian, had first ventured to declare that in the church there was no place for rationalists. Everything in the way of good works

proper to an active Christian sentiment was effected in the Evangelical church without the cooperation of rationalism, and often despite the mockery of the rationalists—as, for instance, the foundation of the Königsberg mission to the heathen by Bishop Borowski. The new *Kirchenzeitung* accelerated the decline of the old school by unsparing personal attacks and suspicions. Hengstenberg had his reporters everywhere, who chose in especial as their targets such rationalist elementary school teachers as Dinter; and in the year 1830 an attack in force was made upon the rationalist acropolis in Halle.

It seemed as if old Goethe had good reason when at this period, sickened by the increasing acerbity of religious struggles, he wrote:

> Here we have the whole history of the church,
> A hotch-potch of error and of the abuse of power.

Ludwig von Gerlach, the crown prince's friend, published in the *Kirchenzeitung* a selection of trivial jests and disconnected passages from the lectures of the two Halle rationalists, Wegscheider and Gesenius, just as long before Joseph Schwartz and the orthodox of Lund had reported the lectures of Puffendorf. The malicious coup aroused general indignation, for the illegal publication of academic addresses has always, and with reason, been regarded as a dishonourable method of warfare, seeing that it undermines discipline and the confidence of the students. Johannes Neander, the pious and contemplative ecclesiastical historian, greatly incensed, separated himself from the denunciators, and the evil impression that had been created was by no means diminished when the *Kirchenzeitung* boldly declared that for a student to have confidence in a rationalist professor was not a duty but a sin. In Halle the foundations of rationalism had already become so weak that the doctrine was unable to withstand even such an attack. Gesenius and Wegscheider never regained their former prestige, and the support given to their Bible Christian rival, the able young Tholuck, increased year by year. In face of these struggles, the church government was in a position of painful embarrassment, for while Altenstein wished to maintain Old Protestant ideas, and in his appointments always gave the preference to the Bible Christian "neologists" over the rationalists, he also desired to avoid

any breach of the ecclesiastical peace. In the end, the Halle scandal was brought to a conclusion by the issue of a cabinet order which declared that there was no ground for taking action against the two professors, while a second cabinet order issued the same day instructed the minister that in his clerical appointments he was in future to select those only who adhered faithfully to the Augsburg Confession. The small Lutheran national churches of the neighbouring countries could still continue to live inconspicuously for a time under the regime of the sovereign consistories; but this great united church, which comprised within itself all the contrasts of German Protestantism, could not endure in perpetuity without an independent organ of its general will. For the present, however, its destiny remained in the hands of the king and of the minister of public worship and education, and the fiercer the conflict of parties within the church, the more intolerable did this bureaucratic arrangement become.

During these years the situation of the Catholic church was somewhat more peaceful, in outward appearance at least, especially after the reestablished episcopal see of Cologne had been filled (1825) by Count Ferdinand August von Spiegel, a prelate of the old aristocratic school, who throughout the confusions of the Napoleonic epoch had remained on good terms with every government. Years before, in Münster, he had as a canon struggled with the Prussian conquerors on behalf of the independence of his chapter, but immediately after the annexation he had made his peace with Prussia, shortly afterwards adapting himself no less adroitly to the regime of Napoleon, from whose hands he received the episcopal dignity. In the year 1813, his name acquired evil repute among patriots because in a pastoral letter he had, in inflated language, instructed the faithful to thank God for the victory of Dresden, and had also announced "the most affectionate sentiments which animated the mind of every subject of the great emperor." All these transformations were forgiven when at the time of the Vienna congress he once again, and now for good, espoused the cause of Prussia. Even Stein, who found it so difficult to forget the aberrations of Napoleonic days, was his sincere friend, because the worldly wise prelate recognised the new order of affairs unreservedly, and soon attained to the view that

Prussia alone was competent to exorcise from the Rhine "that Gallicism which is ill-disposed towards all knowledge and spirituality." A learned theologian, a man of many-sided culture and distinguished personality, Spiegel had had personal experience of service under the state, for during the careful regime of Fürstenberg he had once participated in the administration of Münsterland. Although he soon dropped Wessenberg's ideas of a national church, to which he had for a time adhered (for he came to regard them as impracticable), he held firmly to the essential views of the old episcopal system. He desired that there should be powerful and highly respected territorial bishops, who, in loyal understanding with the crown, could resist any attempt at arbitrary abuse of power on the part of the Roman curia, but who would not concede to the temporal authority the right of treating the church as a mere state institution; and it was extremely painful to his episcopal pride that the Prussian prelates were quite unrepresented in the provincial diets and that in the council of state they were represented by himself alone. In his palace of St. Gereon he established a stately clerical household, with an extensive library and a well-furnished cellar; the archiepiscopal cook was always grateful when Stein sent some pheasants or venison from the Cappenberg preserves. He speedily entered into cordial relations with the state authorities. His official despatches, couched in a cumbrous forensic style characteristic of Old Münster, were always perfectly unambiguous; and, except for a few ebullitions of that irritable class sensitiveness which the Catholic clergy shares with the officer caste, there were never any unfriendly passages. He voluntarily came to terms with the minister about the number of Catholic feast days, and commanded the clergy of his archiepiscopate to recognise the festival of fasting and prayer, which was regarded with disfavour by clericalist prelates because it had been established by Protestant princes. With the passage of the years, Count Spiegel had become more religious, and he took an extremely serious view of the duties of his office, but his warmest interest was devoted to the training of young men for the priesthood. The "stupidity" of many of the older clergy aroused his compassion, and before he accepted his position he had secured a pledge from Altenstein that a theological residential college should be established at the

Rhenish university, for it was, he said, impossible to leave the scientific training of the theologians of the coming generation "to the misconduct and routinism" of the seminary in Cologne. The tedious course of business in Altenstein's ministry often reduced the eager man to despair, and at times he went so far as to suspect that Privy Councillor Schmedding, whose views became increasingly clericalist, was secretly working against him. After he had urged and exhorted for two years, his most cherished desire was at length gratified, and the new residential college worked for good during this opening period, for the pupils, while subjected to a strict domestic discipline, were able to associate freely with their secular fellow-students, and could choose their philosophical courses of study as they pleased. On principle, the archbishop wished to prevent a conventual mode of life, for this conflicted with the customs of the modern world; nor did he offer any objection to the engagement of Evangelical servants in the residential college if no suitable Catholics were forthcoming.[1]

Unfortunately he made a partisan use of the right of veto he possessed in the matter of the appointment of theological teachers. If the parity university was to overcome the suspicion felt towards it in the old land of the crozier, all shades of theological science must be represented in its theological faculty, and Altenstein proposed to summon Möhler to Bonn, for Möhler was the ablest member of the young Tübingen school. The archbishop refused to sanction the appointment.[2] Since the days of his struggles in Münster he had been a declared enemy of the "passionate devotees," as he termed the rigid ultramontanes, and in scientific matters he unreservedly followed the advice of his "highly esteemed" old friend Hermes, who had been made a canon, and who set the tone both at Bonn and in Cologne. Not for some years would he agree to a nomination of this character; but he at length accepted Klee, a strict clericalist, as a member of the theological faculty. Achterfeldt, a Hermesian, was appointed dean of the residential college; moreover, Droste-Hülshoff professor of ecclesiastical law, and Braun and

[1] Spiegel to Rehfues, February 5 and March 21; to A. W. von Schlegel, July 13, 1825; to Professor Hüllmann, December 4 and 13, 1826, September 26 1827; to Bunsen, December 12, 1828, July 6, 1829.

[2] The fact is recorded by Rehfues in a Report to Altenstein dated March 20, 1837.

Vogelsang, the tutors, as well as all the older theologians, were more or less akin in opinions to the school of Hermes. They were excellent professors, at once dutiful to the state and loyal to the church. Droste-Hülshoff, in his work on ecclesiastical law, took almost as severe a view of clerical marriages as did his opponent Walter; while Braun went so far as to issue a vigorous polemic writing against a party formed among the Silesian clergy which ventured to contest the blessings of celibacy. To the ultramontanes, however a school which appealed to Kant could not fail to seem a party suspect of rationalism, and a tolerable appearance of peace within the Rhenish church was possible only so long as the life of the sagacious old archbishop continued.

The new bishop of Treves, Hommer, was a loyal assistant to Archbishop Spiegel. He was a priest of the old Electoral Treves type, learned and benevolent, open-hearted, and fond of the good things of life. In youth he had attended the Ems assembly of the German archbishops, and subsequently, as syndic of the estates of Electoral Treves, had had experience of political life. As a good patriot, he hailed the Prussian regime with delight, and when he paid homage to "the best of monarchs" he was animated by the honourable intention of never disturbing the peace of the creeds. When Stein, heir of the barons of Landscron, provided an endowment for the Landscron pastorate, the bishop unhesitatingly decreed that a mass should be said and a sermon preached on every anniversary of the Protestant founder's birthday. How great was the pleasure of these two friendly prelates when Capaccini, the nuncio, a man of like views with themselves, visited Rhineland, and gave expression to his admiration at the flourishing condition of the spiritual institutes in this region.[1]

Meanwhile Cardinal della Genga, chief of the clericalist zealots, passionately inimical to the prudent Consalvi, had become pope under the title of Leo XII. It was a sign of the times that a work by Abbate Fea, *The Suzerainty of the Pope over the Temporal Princes*, to which the censors of the gentle Pius VII had raised an objection, was now permitted to appear. As nuncio in Munich, the new pope had become acquainted with the difficulties of the German situation, and he was careful to avoid any rash intervention,

[1] Hommer to Bunsen, October 3; Spiegel to Bunsen, October 24, 1828.

but the increasing arrogance of the ultramontane press showed that a stronger wind was blowing from Rome. In the *Katholik*, Görres was the chief spokesman. Of late, since he had worn the martyr's crown of the exile, he had been more venerated by the Rhinelanders than in the days when he had lived among them, and he lost his way ever more completely in the fantastical and devious paths of clerical demagogy. He could find no word strong enough to describe the miseries of German affairs: in Germany truth was ravished by the spirit of falsehood, and the whole of life seemed to be nothing more than a spongey and incomplete nagelfluh! He now discerned the highest degree of human liberty in the Swiss primary cantons, for there Catholic and republican freedom were wedded. The regime of the crozier, which he had himself at one time mocked so bitterly, could not now be praised too highly. In an essay entitled *Rome as it is* he declared that in the exceptionally favoured town of God's supreme vicegerent even the dogs had better manners than elsewhere, whilst the blameless morality of the human inhabitants of Rome surpassed the possibility of description, for every Roman went Sunday after Sunday to communion, which would have been quite impossible had the pious souls felt burdened with any mortal sin!

The majority of the Rhenish clergy were happy under Spiegel's peaceful rule. In almost all the larger towns, however, there existed a circumscribed clericalist party of opposition, which worked in secret against the archbishop, and above all calumniated his residential college in Bonn as a nursery of anti-religious sentiment. In Düsseldorf, there was the Jesuit Wüst, confessor of the contemplative poetess Luise Hensel, beloved of Clemens Brentano, who before the altar solemnly pledged herself to Christ as her bridegroom; and similarly there were small circles of initiates, open or hidden opponents of the heretic government. The irritable particularism of Rhineland greedily seized every opportunity of accusing the Evangelical sovereign of oppressing Catholicism. The financial pledges of the understanding with the Roman see were fulfilled so punctiliously that Consalvi several times expressed his warmest thanks for the king's conscientiousness and magnanimity. Unfortunately, however, Hardenberg and Niebuhr had made one serious blunder in Rome, the solitary great defect in their negotiation, but one which

gave the ultramontanes a welcome chance for vexatious suspicions. The episcopal areas bull contained a promise that the supplementary payments granted by the state to the church should be furnished as ground rents upon the state forests if by the year 1833 a sufficient portion of the domains should become freed from acting as security for the national debt; should this prove impossible, then the crown would purchase estates for the church, and the yield of these would represent the church contributions. The chancellor had given this ill-considered pledge in opposition to the counsel of the majority of the ministers, and all too soon did it become apparent that the paying off of the national debt could not be effected with anything like the speed which Hardenberg had anticipated. It remained extremely doubtful whether by 1833 the crown would have at its disposal a sufficient area of the national forests, while the purchase of landed property was legally impracticable, for no addition could be made to the national debt without the approval of the national assembly. In such circumstances the serious political and economic objections to land ownership on the part of the church made themselves felt with unanswerable force, and the government quietly determined that this portion of the episcopal areas bull should not be carried into effect. No detriment was done to the church, for the promised grants were punctually paid by the provincial treasuries, and all that was sacrificed was the extremely indefinite prospect of acquiring landed property. But the formal injustice sufficed the ultramontane party, which was able to accuse the state of a breach of treaty, and of spoliation of the church.

Better grounded was the complaint of the Catholics about the church parades. In accordance with ancient tradition, thoughtlessly maintained, upon one Sunday in each month the troops had to attend service at the Evangelical garrison church, although in many regiments of the western provinces the men were, almost without exception, Catholics. The king had commanded that in such cases there should merely be a short sermon, equally suited to the adherents of either creed, asking why, if his soldiers could pray together before battle, they could not do so on Sundays as well. He was so thoroughly permeated with the ideas of a universal Evangelical Christianity that he was quite unable to conceive the views of a church which strictly forbade its members to participate

in the divine service of other Christians. But the Catholic populace felt that its holiest sentiments were outraged. On the Rhine, discontent became so loud that the generals of the province agreed among themselves to let the undesirable rule fall into desuetude, although they did not venture to communicate this determination to the monarch. In Westphalia, however, the evil practice continued, and the justified complaints that were made in this region secured an eager audience in Rhineland.

These misunderstandings were of trifling importance in comparison with the dispute concerning mixed marriages, which became more grievous year by year. Since the Roman church regards marriage as a sacrament, it looks upon every marriage which has not been effected in conformity with canonical prescriptions as concubinage, and can never concede to the state the right of regulating marriage law in accordance with the discretion of the civil authorities. In the old days of state omnipotence, the church had indeed complied with the temporal laws, but invariably with the tacit reservation that when a more favourable hour came the old and never abandoned principles were to be reenforced. Now that the ship of the prince of the apostles was once more under full sail, this hour seemed to have come, and Rome was resolved that at least no further concessions should be made to the temporal authority. An entirely unambiguous understanding between these dictatorial claims and the inaliénable rights of the sovereign state authority was impossible. There was for the state only one way by which at once its suzerain rights might be preserved, the parity of the creeds might be safeguarded, and due allowance might be made for the conscientious difficulties of Catholic priests. This was that the state should solemnise marriage through the instrumentality of its own officials, leaving it open to the church to give or to withhold its blessing after the legal marriage had been effected. In Prussia this method, the only satisfactory one, was obvious, for in the lands where the Rhenish law prevailed, civil marriage was already legal, although neither the crown nor the clergy desired to make a serious use of the institution. The church condemned civil marriage as the issue of jacobin paganism; it would have been glad that the state should lend its aid to enforce the universal practice of ecclesiastical marriage, but desired also that the full legality of papistical

marriages should be recognised. At the court of Berlin a view hardly less severe was taken of this heritage of the revolution, to which the king was especially averse, venerating Luther as he did—Luther, through whose work, the Reformation, the ecclesiastical hallowing of marriage had first become a general Christian custom. In the ministry of justice the intention had long prevailed of abolishing civil marriage on the Rhine, at latest through the revision of the Prussian code. To the legal consciousness of the people this French invention still seemed quite alien; it was hardly felt that there could be any need for it in Germany, for since the days of the peace of Westphalia there had been no serious dispute about mixed marriages.

It was not until much later, and in consequence of the painful experiences of the Prussian ecclesiastical dispute, that public opinion came over to the view that where parity of creeds prevailed, civil marriage was indispensable to religious peace. At this period the great majority of Germans regarded marriage as fully legal only when it had been solemnised by the church. Such was the view even in Rhineland, and the Prussian crown therefore considered itself competent to prescribe the conditions of ecclesiastical marriage by national laws in Rhineland as well as elsewhere. Since the year 1803, in the eastern provinces the legal rule had been accepted without dispute that the children of mixed marriages should be brought up in the father's creed, but in the western territories there still existed a number of different ecclesiastical prescriptions imposing obstacles in the way of the consecration of mixed marriages, or permitting them only when a pledge was given that all the children should be brought up as Catholics. After repeated and fruitless prohibitions and exhortations, in a cabinet order dated August 17, 1825, the king commanded that the declaration of the year 1803 should henceforward be enforced throughout the realm. In their naive ignorance of Catholic affairs, his ministers believed that in this way a firmly established and equitable legal condition would be at length secured for the entire state domain; for in accordance with Protestant logic it seemed inconceivable that the Roman church, having unhesitatingly complied with a law for twenty years in Silesia, would now resist the same law upon the Rhine. But the Prussian state was soon to learn that Rome never voluntarily abandons a

point of vantage. The Rhenish priests evaded the new law, ignoring the excellent example of their Silesian colleagues. They refused to consecrate mixed marriages, but gave no reason for their refusal, since they no longer ventured to demand a formal pledge that all children of such marriages should be brought up as Catholics. Not even Spiegel and Hommer, well disposed as they were, could give any help here, for in the Rhenish lands of the crozier old-established ecclesiastical prescriptions were still in force, and the bishops had no power to abrogate these without a papal dispensation.

Then came a helper in time of trouble, C. C. Josias Bunsen, the new representative of Prussia at the Roman court. What did he not believe himself capable of, this darling of fortune, during the first years of his much envied successes! Brought up in a petty environment, introduced by Niebuhr into the diplomatic career and in a few years succeeding his master, he soon acquired a favourable position in Roman society through the strongest and most effective of his manifold talents, his peculiar faculty for animated and stimulating conversation. In the Caffarelli palace on the summit of the Capitoline Hill, where the Prussian embassy was now established, there assembled all the men of genius, native and foreign, whom the world capital contained; and after long years the old "Capitoliners," whenever they encountered one another again, recalled with joy and thankfulness the social pleasures, at once so simple and so attractive, which they had enjoyed in the society of Bunsen and his distinguished English wife. Bunsen, a handsome man with the flashing eyes of the prophet, was able from the fulness of his mind and from his many-sided culture to offer something to every guest. The younger men of talent, among the artists and professors crowded round him with enthusiasm; he furthered their development with tactful understanding, and none of them took it amiss when, quite unhesitatingly, in his speech and writings he used his protégés' ideas as if they had been his own. The indubitable self-confidence which every gesture displayed demanded and compelled admiration, and it was but rarely that some candid man of the world ventured to remark under his breath that in the long run this eternal flow of eloquence proved somewhat tedious.

The European reputation of his predecessors Humboldt and Niebuhr was to some extent reflected upon the youthful

head of Bunsen; the notable strangers who enjoyed his hospitality, and especially the Englishmen, told stories everywhere of the witchery of his manner and the unfathomable depth of his knowledge. Thus he acquired renown even before he had done anything noteworthy, and he knew how to turn his reputation to account in the service of science. Through his instrumentality and that of Gerhard, the young philologist of Posen, in the year 1829 the Institute for Archeological Correspondence was founded, at the favourable moment when the excavations in the Roman Forum were begun, and when the vases of Vulci and the Etruscan frescoes were discovered in the catacombs of Corneto. This grandly conceived and circumspectly conducted undertaking was pursued under the patronage of the crown of Prussia, was supported by men of learning in every land, and most zealously by the Germans and Italians, laying a fine foundation for the study of Italian antiquities; and subsequently, when R. Lepsius entered the house on the Tarpeian rock, furthering also the young science of Egyptology. Very different now was Prussia's situation in the world of culture from what it had been twenty years earlier; foreign lands began gradually to recognise how extensive were the intellectual energies available in our land. The learned German visitors to Rome restored to honour the name of the *Tedeschi*; there was not a single country town in Central Italy which did not know Gerhard, "the good Signor Odoardo," not one which failed to provide him with learned communications.

Bunsen's university career had begun with the study of theology. Amid all the distractions of the great world, his pious disposition could never dispense with daily direct communion with God. Like his friend the crown prince, he based his hopes upon the independence of a free Evangelical church. For half his lifetime he cherished the design of combining the widely extended historical, linguistic, theological, and juristic researches which he pursued with unflagging energy in all his leisure hours, to form a philosophy of history, which was "to follow up the steady path of God through the stream of the ages," to demonstrate the working of Providence amid all the phases of national development. He believed that it was only the strange sport of destiny, pushing him almost against his will into a diplomatic career, which had prevented this life-work from attaining maturity.

In reality, however, the creative force of his spirit was inadequate to such a design; moreover, like his royal friend, it was his misfortune that his endowments were too scintillating and many sided, so that though he seemed predestined to all that was great, and though he cherished lofty resolves, he was never able to provide the world with a completed work. Just as his style, despite its liveliness, remained diffuse, and never appealed directly to the heart of the reader with the primitive force of native eloquence, so also the scientific content of his writings rarely excelled the measure of a thoughtful and comprehensive dilettantism.

Still less did his talents suffice for the tasks of practical statecraft. The boundless receptivity of his sensitive mind was the very antithesis of that collected energy of will, ever firmly directed towards some definite goal, which marks the statesman; never did he give himself up wholly to his diplomatic vocation—he complained of its aridity, and was incapable of recognising its fine possibilities. In politics, indeed, he was not devoid of good ideas and fresh outlooks; he knew how to grow with the growing time, and though at first he had blindly accepted the anti-revolutionary opinions of Niebuhr, he learned to take a juster view of the constitutional notions of the nineteenth century; he loved the fatherland of his adoption with ardent enthusiasm, and even in this spiritless time would not abandon the hope that Prussia would one day rule the Germans. Yet he knew little of Prussia. He completely lacked that knowledge of practical life and its finite requirements which is no less essential to the statesman than a mastery of technique is essential to the artist; he lacked the faculty for the sober contemplation of reality, the first and most indispensable talent for any diplomat who was to cope with the hard realism of the Vatican. His self-complacency was unceasingly cradled in fine illusions. Since his hospitable home was gladly visited, he imagined himself to be already a power. When from the windows of his palace, from the most celebrated site in Rome where the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus had once been established, he looked down upon the eternal city, he was sometimes overwhelmed by the vapours of megalomania, and he would write in his letters as if he had been a Protestant anti-pope in the centre of this Catholic Babel. Whenever the pope or a cardinal uttered to him one

of those polite commonplaces which cost southerners nothing at all, he plumed himself upon a great diplomatic achievement. Though he did not fail to note how reactionary was the mood of the church, he considered that the position of Prussia was absolutely secure, for in its admirable educational institutions the state possessed an infallible means of counteracting all ultramontane influences, and, he declared, the Roman see could exercise no more than an extremely restricted authority over the Catholics of Prussia. The easy assurance of his reports inspired high confidence in Berlin. Bunsen's powers were generally overestimated, and many considered him a far greater diplomatist than Niebuhr.

In the autumn of 1827, when the negotiations concerning mixed marriages were becoming acrimonious, Bunsen was summoned to Berlin to give expert advice. He took all hearts by storm, bewitching Eichhorn, Bernstorff, the crown prince, and, above all, the king. No other man had ever received so much fatherly kindness at the hands of the aging monarch, and envious courtiers declared that there was only one thing more the king could do for the young man, and that was to adopt him as a son. Bunsen might follow his gracious master into the rural retirement at Paretz, where no minister had ever been admitted; he sat by like an old family friend when the king played chess with his wife. Not only did he receive pardon for his Capitoline liturgy, which upon his own initiative he had introduced into the embassy, but the king even commanded that the work should be printed, and himself wrote a preface. It is not surprising, when he was thus overwhelmed with favours and honours, that his outlook on life should be more self-complacent than ever. He believed himself competent to solve with ease the problem of mixed marriages; the pope had given him a solemn promise that a term should soon be put to the confusions on the Rhine. Trusting in this pledge his advice was that Count Spiegel should ask the holy see for a dispensation; he himself would in the king's name support the demand, and would move the pope to a decision which should ensure the obedience of the clergy to the national laws. The bishops of the west gladly agreed to the proposal, for they found the opposition between temporal and spiritual legislation extremely harassing, and would have been delighted if the pope could have been persuaded to a compromise which, from

the outlook of the church, must proceed voluntarily from Rome.[1]

Thus upon Bunsen's advice there was entered for the first time a dangerous path which under Hardenberg's regime had been sedulously avoided. The crown was now to treat with the holy see in regard to the limits of its suzerainty, for at bottom the dispute concerned the question whether the national law was or was not valid. No honest compromise was possible here, although the curia was at this time still mindful of recent favours, and was by no means ill-disposed towards the Prussian crown. The negotiations were protracted, Pope Leo XII died while they were in progress, and when the king threatened severe measures against the contumacious Rhenish priests, on March 25, 1830, Leo's successor, Pius VIII, issued to the bishops of the archdiocese of Cologne a brief which was hailed by Bunsen as a great victory of Prussian statecraft and secured warm praise for the sanguine negotiator. In reality, in this remarkable document, the curia had employed all the verbiage of its monotonous rhetoric to say practically nothing about its own standpoint. It is true that the pope sanctioned the mixed marriages which had already taken place, and conceded that such forbidden marriages should be regarded as valid; but at the same time he unconditionally forbade the priests to consecrate these unions detested by the church unless adequate guarantees were given that the children were to be brought up as Catholics. By way of comment, he added that in certain regions of Rhineland, Jülich-Cleves-Berg for instance, in the celebration of mixed marriages priests had been permitted to render so-called passive assistance. But as to whether this milder custom was to be permitted to continue, and whether it was to be introduced into the other crosier lands of the archdiocese, the brief vouchsafed not a single word. The thorny question remained unsolved, and since a solution was absolutely indispensable, a momentous ecclesiastico-political dispute seemed almost inevitable.

None the less Altenstein continued to treat the Catholic church with extreme consideration. Never before had the

[1] Despatches to Bunsen: from Hommer, December 16, 1827; from Spiegel, August 8, 1828, July 8, 1829; from Caspar Max Droste, Bishop of Münster, December 27, 1827.

crown of Prussia utilised the right of the placet so circumspectly. The older officials, still accustomed to the strict ecclesiastical policy of Frederician days, were quite unable to adapt themselves to this lenity. When Beckendorff, one of Altenstein's chief advisers, went over to Rome, a report was immediately circulated that the minister himself was in the hands of the papists, nor was the rumour silenced even when the convert was promptly dismissed. Schön, who scented clericalist intrigues everywhere, ventured to accuse his old friend Nicolovius, a faithful Protestant, of having turned Catholic in secret, and this gave rise to a prolonged and odious controversy, which the king brought to a close by administering a sharp reproof to the vehement lord-lieutenant.[1]

It is true that the minister's benevolence was displayed chiefly towards the bishops. In his territorialist view, it was the duty of the state to rule each church in accordance with the spirit of its own constitution, and consequently to maintain the obedience of the Catholic priests to their bishops no less effectually than it subjected the Evangelical pastors to the supreme episcopal authority of the king. Just as the Protestant clergy had during the days of the liturgical dispute to submit to the stringent exhortations of the sovereign church government, so also in Silesia the minor Catholic clergy were forced to endure the zealous tutelage of the minister. In Silesia, the ultramontane party had begun to gather strength since the prince-bishop, Schimonski, a rigid clericalist of the old school, had been appointed to the episcopal office. What abuse was showered upon Regenbrecht, the Breslau lawyer, because in a *Dissertation upon the Origin of Church Government* he proved that Christ had never prescribed any formal constitution for the church—a truth with which the Protestant world had been familiar for fully three hundred years. The *Katholik* of Mainz and the entire clericalist press raised the alarm; and Gentz expressed his horror at the way in which the Prussian government permitted all liberties to its professors. Even the venerable Canon Dereser, an old champion of moderate Catholicism, was regarded with suspicion, and his widely diffused *German Breviary* was considered a textbook of unbelief. Yet in Strasburg during the days of

[1] Altenstein's Report to the King, May 18; Cabinet Order to Altenstein, June 11; Altenstein to Lottum, July 16; Lottum to Albrecht, July 23, 1827. See also Schön's Papers, vol. V, pp. 156 et seq.

the Revolution Dereser had furnished proof of priestly loyalty at the peril of his life.

What an uproar finally occurred when the youthful theologian Anton Theiner, one of Dereser's pupils, ventured to give public expression to all the nebulous ideas of reform which had long been fermenting among the Silesian clergy. In *The Catholic Church of Silesia,* published in 1826, Theiner declared open war against the ultramontanes,—"who from Mainz are swinging over Germany the leaden sceptre of superstition"; he demanded the abolition of celibacy, the introduction of the German mass, and the singing of hymns by the congregation, and innocently opined that all these changes could be effected without endangering the unity of the Catholic church. This book, glibly worded, but distinguished neither by new ideas nor by religious earnestness, evoked a vast number of polemic writings, all of which were cautiously published in regions beyond the control of the Prussian censorship. At this same time several petitions were sent in to the diets of Würtemberg and of Baden, recommending the abolition of celibacy, but neither the estates nor the government would take up the matter, for the mass of the Catholic populace held aloof. The Silesians endeavoured to win over the Prussian government to their ideas; eleven priests and a few landowners petitioned the king on behalf of an improvement in church discipline and public worship, demanding in especial the use of the vernacular.

The prince-bishop at once intervened with admonitions and punitive measures. Altenstein, too, called the petitioners to order, for he desired to maintain the discipline of the church, and also dreaded demagogic intrigues. It was not until Lord-Lieutenant Merckel espoused the cause of the persecuted priests, and Bunsen, this time with success, appeared as mediator, that the government determined to adopt milder measures. The king forbade the prince-bishop to carry his sentences into effect; but the minister imposed silence upon the opposition, for the introduction of a German service would touch the church's holy of holies, the mass, and was therefore inadmissible without the approval of the supreme ecclesiastical authorities. In this way, and with considerable difficulty, peace was restored, but the fires continued to glow beneath the ashes. This trivial ecclesiastical dispute in Silesia left ill feelings behind which found vent

twenty years later in the far more revolutionary German Catholic movement. Both parties were incensed against the well-meaning minister, and with good reason, for the increasing sense of religious independence made it impossible to tolerate any longer that this minister of public worship and education should be empowered to give instruction, now to Evangelical pastors concerning the spirit of the Lutheran liturgy, and now to Catholic priests concerning the sacrifice of the mass. The old system of territorial suzerainty in religious matters was out of date, and irresistibly was the day approaching when both the churches would throw off state tutelage.

§ 3. ADMINISTRATION AND ARMY. BERLIN LIFE.

In educational affairs, Altenstein was far more successful than in matters of ecclesiastical policy. He was, indeed, unable to prevent his old opponent Kamptz from being appointed as director in the ministry of public worship and education in the year 1824. But the dreaded persecutor of the demagogues behaved in a very different way from that which the alarmed teachers had anticipated; he could not shake off the characteristics of the learned jurist, and treated the experts in knowledge so amiably that the Berliners jestingly declared that he had better sentence himself to a term of imprisonment at Köpenick with the rest of the incarcerated demagogues. Overwhelmed with judicial affairs, he had but little time to spare for the work of his new office, while Nicolovius, who was suspect as a friend of Arndt, was henceforward to concern himself chiefly with ecclesiastical affairs, and was to leave educational matters alone. Metternich and his supporters spoke of Kamptz as "a moral Hercules" and hoped that the power of the phildemagogue minister had already been broken. But Kamptz's appointment had no serious consequences. Altenstein and Johannes Schulze retained a free hand, and continued to conduct educational administration in the old spirit, rather slowly, and with some timidity, but with insight and good feeling. A severe cabinet order of the year 1822, aiming at the speedy dismissal of suspect teachers and pastors, was put in force with great mildness. The lord-lieutenants had more than

once to report concerning political intrigues in the gymnasia, and they all agreed in declaring that there was no occasion for anxiety.[1] It is true that the prosecutions initiated in 1819 were carried through, and that from time to time a teacher would fall a victim to the movement against the demagogues, but on the whole, even during these years of gloom and mistrust, Altenstein succeeded in maintaining the liberty of the teaching profession and the healthy development of the educational system.

Meanwhile the new administrative organisation had at length been established on a firm foundation. Soon after Hardenberg's death, the king had appointed yet another committee to elaborate a plan for the simplification of the administration, in so far as this might prove possible, and it need hardly be said that Ladenberg, the inexorable economiser, was a member of this body.[2] Once again a confused mass of proposals for reform were submitted to the king. The feudalist party and several of the lord-lieutenants returned to their favourite design of the appointment of provincial ministers, although, or perhaps because, the old chancellor, shortly before his death, had issued urgent warnings against any such strengthening of particularism.[3] The Rhinelanders and a few rigid bureaucrats recommended the introduction of the prefectoral system, and for a brief period the unhappy suggestion actually secured a majority in the ministerial council, where the one dominant thought was thrift. The problem how to combine the unity of the national will with the free mobility of the parts, seemed so difficult in Prussia's complicated situation that the views even of experienced and far sighted statesmen were vacillating. Motz, the new lord-lieutenant of Saxony, wished to transfer the centre of gravity of the administration into the provinces, recommending the establishment of a great governmental college at the head of every province, the subordinate authorities being purely executive in function.[4] But he soon recognised

[1] Reports of the lord-lieutenants to Altenstein, November to December, 1819, and April to June, 1824 (excerpts from the documents, communicated to me by C. Varrentrapp).

[2] Cabinet Order of June 3, 1823.

[3] Hardenberg, Memorandum concerning the Reform of the existing Organisation of the Ministries and Provincial Authorities, September, 1822.

[4] (Daniels) F. C. A. von Motz. A Biography. Erfurt, 1833, p. 187.

that the size of the Prussian provinces made this excellent idea impracticable, and he then proposed that the lord-lieutenants should spend three months of every year in Berlin in order to keep the district governments in touch with the central administration; in this way the advantages of specialist ministries and those of provincial ministries would be combined.[1]

All these proposals were rejected. Now that the provincial diets had come into being, the reestablishment of the provincial ministries appeared directly dangerous to the national unity. The prefectoral system was repulsive to the king owing to its rigidity, and the populace of the old provinces took the same view. Here the customary collegial administration had struck deep roots, and no isolated officials except the Landrats could count upon public confidence. In accordance with the committee's suggestion, on August 31, 1824, the king commanded that the new administrative order should in essentials remain unchanged;[2] the only change was that, through a new instruction (December 31st), the lord-lieutenants received additional powers. In matters of detail, however, certain sweeping changes were made. Henceforward the lord-lieutenants, in addition to their other duties, were to act as presidents in the governmental colleges of the provincial capital; the positions of vice-presidents and directors in the governments were done away with, and a number of minor offices were likewise abolished. Frederick Schöll and some other of Hardenberg's questionable friends, had still to be compensated, for good or for ill, in fulfilment of various pledges made by their old patron.[3] But after this final legacy of the frivolous chancellor had been paid, in all branches of the national service there prevailed a Spartan simplicity, hardly less strict than that of the days of Frederic William I. The salaries were exiguous, the offices were bald and poverty stricken; many of the new official buildings, as for instance the Arnsberg court of appeal, were more like barns than palaces; it was only in the case of the public offices of the capital that Schinkel was at times able to secure some unpretentious artistic adornment. It was the glory of

[1] Motz, Memorial concerning the Simplification of the Administration, Magdeburg, October 9, 1823 (sent to the Immediate Committee).

[2] Principal Report of the committee, July 4; Cabinet Order of August 31; the king's Instructions to Klewitz, Schuckmann, and Altenstein, August 31, 1824.

[3] Schöll to Albrecht, December 30, 1823; Cabinet Order to Lottum March 31, 1824.

the Prussian officialdom that no other great power was so thrifty in its dealings with the economic energies of the nation, and it became a matter of caste pride to spare the crown expense in every possible way. When Eichhorn had saved the state many millions through the tedious negotiations with France about the settlement of the war indemnity, he definitely refused to accept the extremely modest gratification which the king assigned to him, and only gave way upon the point after several years because the monarch insisted upon his doing so.[1]

Thus after prolonged struggles the new administrative order proved victorious, and remained for years to come almost free from attack, for its advantages and its efficiency were unmistakable. It is true that there were certain complaints concerning its cumbrous and complicated formalities. It would occasionally happen that some administrative question would have to pass through the hands of five authorities; from the commune to the Landrat, to the provincial government, to the lord-lieutenant, and finally to the minister. But even this inconvenience was endurable, for the superimposition of authorities gave a definite guarantee against arbitrariness and partisanship. Thus on this occasion, as so often before, in opposition to the demands of the provincial estates, the king, faithful to his monarchical duty, had maintained the continuity of the administrative system, and had saved the great achievements of the epochs of Stein and Hardenberg. No one was more delighted on this account than Stägemann, the veteran of Stein's days, who, as Lottum's immediate subordinate, had now to draft all important cabinet orders.

After the decision had been made, Schön endeavoured once again to induce the king to nominate eight provincial ministers in addition to six specialist ministers. The suggestion was disregarded, but W. Humboldt was thereby induced, in a masterly monograph dated February, 1, 1825, to justify the unity of the administration with a force as overwhelming as that with which in his memorial concerning the provincial diets he had formerly defended the unity of the constitution. "The highest sense of responsibility," he wrote in answer to the advocates of the provincial system, "is paralysed by this

[1] Bernstorff to Hardenberg, July 13, 1822; Eichhorn to the king, December 11, 1826.

system. The political unity of the state is something entirely different from the complex of all its parts. The deduction from this is a principle which I regard as the first of all administrative principles, namely, that from its highest point to its lowest the administration must constitute an uninterrupted series, so that the hand of the supreme authority may make its influence felt even in the lowest strata. Where this does not exist, there can be no guarantee for the excellence of the rules nor yet for the efficiency of their enforcement. The political expression of unity is subordination; if in any series coordination occurs, there is duality and no longer unity."[1]

The army law was no less successful than the new administration in resisting every attack. After the military revolutions in southern Europe, the foreign courts regarded the Prussian national army with even more suspicion than before, and the king had to listen to friendly warnings whenever he met foreign sovereigns. When foreign officers attended the Prussian manœuvres, they rarely showed any understanding of the warlike spirit of this nation in arms, and many of them on their return home told alarming stories of the democratic lack of discipline of the Landwehr. But in Prussia itself all objections were gradually silenced, and the idea of universal obligation to military service became thoroughly incorporated into our people. About the year 1824, the king abandoned his last objections, after having on several occasions been convinced by personal examination how excellent was the work of the Landwehr; and his generals, without exception, came in time to agree that in no other way than by the Landwehr system could Prussia maintain her position among the great military powers. Hardly less vigorously than Gneisenau did his old opponent Müffling now defend the ideas of Scharnhorst. "If you ask England, France, Austria, or Russia whether there is any desire to exercise compulsion over us," wrote Müffling to Prince Augustus, "you will be informed that a war with Prussia would be a desperate venture, because such a war could be nothing else than

[1] I drew attention to this memorial in the *Preussische Jahrbücher* for the year 1877 (XXXVIII, p. 406). Subsequently it was published in full in the further Contributions and Supplements to the Papers of Minister von Schön (Berlin, 1881 p. 187). See Appendix XVIII.

a national one. The sovereigns may find it disagreeable to be compelled to admit that insignificant little Prussia can arm herself so readily. From the day on which our Landwehr system should be transformed into a furlough system, the Prussian state would decline into the category of all other states with an income not exceeding 50,000,000 thalers, whereas Prussia now stands upon a quite incalculable eminence, for not one of the surrounding nations is competent to introduce the Landwehr system in its entire moral extent." [1]

Yet how incomplete was still the development of the system, how far did the reality lag behind the ideal of universal military service. The narrow cadres of the standing army were barely able to incorporate one-half of those competent for service. Moreover, the expedient of Landwehr recruits worked badly; these imperfectly trained men did not fuse well with the soldiers who had had full military training. Since a limitation of expenditure was absolutely indispensable, and since any increase in the troops of the line was consequently impossible, there seemed to be only one means available by which the majority of those liable for service might be passed through the school of the standing army, namely, the reduction of the term of service to two years. This was recommended by Müffling and several other generals, but the king considered it would be a mistake for the army of the line, already too weak, to suffer further from inadequate technical training. The false economy of Hake, the minister of war, who never ventured to disregard the urgent exhortations of the department of finance, had become equivalent to extravagance, for the money spent upon the army no longer served its purpose. The war efficiency of the Landwehr had declined, now that the second levy was left entirely untrained, while the first was summoned but once a year for a fortnight's drill. The provision for the rapid mobilisation of the army was defective; the general staff, which in war time required one hundred officers, had to content itself in time of peace with forty-four, twenty-six of whom were assigned to the army corps. It was with concern that the generals recognised that, should war suddenly threaten, whilst Prussia might perhaps complete her pre-

[1] Müffling, Memorial concerning the Landwehr (addressed to Prince Augustus). Handed to the Chancellor on June 12, 1821.

parations somewhat more rapidly than her neighbours, she would not be able to do so quickly enough to undertake with safety that offensive which accorded with the character and traditions of the Prussian army.

Moreover, the army was not unaffected by the spirit of inertia from which, during this long period of peace, all the great armies of Europe suffered, and in especial that of Austria. Promotion was at a standstill. Lieutenants with twenty years of service were by no means rare. There was not a regiment without supernumerary officers on the rolls. The forms of the service, which during the war had been somewhat relaxed, were reorganised with Old Prussian punctilio, for the king recognised that now that the time of service was so short the troops could receive an adequate military training only if inexorable strictness were observed; but the sterile arts of the parade ground regained an immoderate vogue. In many of the infantry regiments, formal drills were regarded as of more importance than field service and training in marksmanship. A number of the cavalry generals considered they had fulfilled their highest duties when they had trained their squadrons to defile in a brief gallop or trot with an absolutely regular front, the horses tightly bitted, in close files, and with finely arched necks, whereas but little attention was paid to the most important function of cavalry, the rapid covering of long distances. During these weary years, the performances even of the national war school in Berlin were no more than moderate, despite the fact that the brilliant Clausewitz stood at the head of this institution. In addition, that unfortunate caste arrogance which had caused so much discontent during the years before 1806, was from time to time again manifested. When Lieutenant Blücher, grandson of the field-marshal, in the course of a nocturnal love adventure had cut down an actor named Stich, the king thought it necessary to warn his officers. "I do not wish," he wrote to the minister for war, "that the officers of my army should endeavour to maintain the dignity of their order by bloodily avenging affronts for which they have themselves to blame. On the contrary, I demand from them that they should maintain this honour by reasonable and moral conduct, and by avoiding behaviour which is equally reprehensible by the laws of morality and those of honour."[1]

[1] Cabinet Order to Hake, October 9, 1823.

Nevertheless, the nucleus of the army remained healthy, and the supply of military talent was inexhaustible. Pipeclay notwithstanding, active and efficient cavalry leaders like General Wrangel kept alive the dashing cavalry spirit, and in the event of war the army confidently relied on two men to act as supreme commanders in the field: Gneisenau, recently appointed field-marshal; and Grolman, who six years after his dismissal had reentered the line, when Prince Augustus and Witzleben had at length succeeded in allaying the king's displeasure. In the interim, the lively activity which Grolman had awakened in the general staff had continued under his successor General Müffling. The new chief undertook annual journeys of inspection with his officers, and instituted comprehensive researches into military history. As the fruit of these last there was published the *History of the Seven Years' War*, a work which, in so far as the scanty sources permitted, was thorough and unbiased, the precursor of maturer studies. In the year 1821, the general staff was detached from the ministry of war, and placed under the king's immediate orders as an independent authority. This reform was instituted on technical grounds, and no one foresaw what a profound influence it was destined to exercise upon the constitution of the state. It now became possible for the king of Prussia, even as a constitutional ruler, to remain an independent war lord, and to preserve his monarchical army from the mutations of the parliamentary struggle.

Despite universal military service, the towns' ordinance, and the provincial diets, Prussia remained in essentials the state of the officialdom. Enormous was the power of this political caste. With the inclusion of the officers, the teachers, and the clergy, who were still accounted officials by civil law, it comprised almost everything the nation possessed in the way of higher culture, and continually enlarged its ranks by the accession of fresh energies from all strata of society. It was through the officials that the crown learned what was going on among the populace and that the people acquired an understanding of their rights—for of the public law of the country, even of those laws which directly affected every individual, the masses had as yet no knowledge. They blindly did what the authorities ordered, possessing a childlike confidence (which was rarely deceived) that in the royal service whatever was done was

right. It was with good reason that in official circles the saying was current, "In Prussia the civil service is tantamount to the constitution." In the state service alone could political ambition find a field for its exercise, and in the higher circles there were very few men of ability who had not passed a longer or a shorter period in official service. During this classical epoch of the officialdom, the Prussian official caste excelled every other ruling class in Europe in uprightness, fidelity to duty, and wide culture. Devoid of economic class egoism, it was competent, like the monarchy which it served, to take a just and unprejudiced view of the struggles of interest in bourgeois society. But the officialdom was too remote from practical life, and in the quietude of their offices its members rarely attained to a complete understanding of the wishes and needs of the working nation; they wasted much of their energies in formal clerical activities, and were afflicted by a self-conceit which was extremely offensive to the Germans outside Prussia. When the stiff and thrifty privy councillors of Berlin spent a summer holiday in Carlsbad or Ems to recuperate after the labours of the winter, the easy-going visitors from South Germany were annoyed by the forbidding manners of these martinets, all the more because the Prussians' intellectual superiority was seldom open to dispute. Never was official pride higher than in these days when the Prussian state was playing so modest a role in the great world of politics, and this pride comported very well with the Old Prussian hereditary failing of fault-finding.

Quite intolerable was the self-praise of the bureaucracy as reflected in Councillor Wehnert's work, *The Spirit of Prussian National Organisation.* This able and well intentioned official, inspired with the infallible arrogance of a caste "characterised by a combination of scientific culture and experience of practical life," looked down with contempt upon "the arid pedantry and rash speculation of biased men of learning." Wehnert declared that the officialdom was "the sole ideal energy of the national spirit, and condescendingly announced that "the dispute about constitutional forms which is to-day shaking the world leaves Prussia unaffected." It was not until the provincial estates should have acquired the necessary maturity within their modest sphere of activity that he desired the summoning of a national

assembly. So little understanding was there in official circles of the revolutionary energy of constitutional ideas.

Bureaucratic self-sufficiency found a powerful ally in the political doctrines of the dominant school of philosophy. Hegel extolled the "state of the intelligence" in terms almost more extravagant than those used by the officials. He considered that the old ideal of the philosophers, the rule of the wise, was realised in the Prussian officialdom; and Sietze, the jurist, with the customary exaggeration of the disciple, in his *History of the Prussian State -and Prussian Law* (1829), proved in mad dithyrambs the conceptual perfection of the Prussian constitution. Prussia was compared to "a gigantic harp, strung in God's garden to lead the world chorus." Prussian law was the fruit of European self-consciousness, the incarnation of the divine logos. He ended with the prophecy: "Prussia will rule all other nations, not by chains, but by her spirit." Thus extraordinary were the fantasies which emanated from the reposeful activities of this literary epoch: the vigorous nation, the terror of whose victorious arms had disturbed the quiet of the old society of states, was to end its days peacefully as a cosmopolitan schoolmaster! This ingenuous view of Prussia's historic mission was now beginning to secure acceptance abroad. The liberal orators of the French chambers were accustomed to speak of Prussia, in other respects hardly worthy of notice, as the model land of serious scientific culture. Royer-Collard declared: "You have freedom of education while we have freedom of the press." Victor Cousin, who had been detained for a time in Berlin through the folly of the demagogue-hunters, magnanimously forgetting the affront after his return home, delivered enthusiastic lectures upon the wonders of the Hegelian philosophy and of the Prussian school system.

The Prussians regarded their state with pride, and joined in with full hearts when Spontini's powerful hymn *Borussia* was first heard at the Halle musical festival in 1829. Yet this nation had long before attained a degree of maturity wherein the struggles of a free public life were indispensable to the healthy development of its civilisation. The renowned culture of the state of the intelligence displayed more than a sufficiency of morbid characteristics. What a strange spectacle was presented by the life of the capital, with its

abundance of fine intellectual energies and its insipid, childishly crude philistinism. Even Germans still considered Berlin a poor town, although its commercial importance continually increased. The plate glass window of the royal palace, a gift from the czar, was a solitary specimen of its kind, and was as reverently admired as was the new room is Fuchs's pastrycook shop with its mussel-shell mural decoration, or the extremely modest gaslamps which had been installed in the main streets in the year 1826. The hard-working population of Berlin was still quite free from the social discontents characteristic of the modern great town, for universal military service had made a clean sweep of the rude military mob of old days, while the proletariat of manufacturing industry was only now beginning to come into existence.

It was no more than a small number of officials and professors who were concerned about the struggles of national life. The genuine Berliner considered his political hebetude to be one of the special merits of his "intellectual culture," and with that self-complacent irony which on the Spree is mistaken for wit he mocked at the political passions of other nations. The censors had an easy time, for the three political journals that then existed, rivalled one another in the endeavour to carry off the palm for aridity and dulness. It was only the *Staatszeitung* which would occasionally publish a well-informed article concerning the Elbe navigation or the graduated poll tax, from the pen of one of the privy councillors. The *Vossische*, the favourite newspaper of the bourgeoisie, avoided the discussion of Prussian affairs no less sedulously than did the somewhat more select *Spenersche Zeitung*. When on the occasion of the entry of the crown prince's affianced twenty persons succumbed in the crowd, not a single Berlin paper ventured to make any allusion to the occurrence, for it was felt that the police authorities might resent comment. The only things to interest the newspaper readers of the capital were the local satire which flourished everywhere in quiet German life, and theatrical gossip; yet even this belletristic small-talk made extremely little show in the Berlin press. Neither F. W. Gubitz, editor of the *Gesellschafter*, a thoroughly honest fellow who in the course of a long life as a writer never succeeded in penning a single correct and simple German

sentence, nor yet Ludwig Rellstab, the dreaded but perfectly harmless feuilleton-writer of the *Vossische Zeitung*, could be compared for an instant with the critics of the *Morgenblatt* of Stuttgart.

For several years Saphir was actively at work in Berlin. A Hungarian Jew, equally devoid of wit and taste, and lacking even the ordinary elements of education, he was a man of inexhaustible impudence, a master in the manufacture of those wretched puns known in Germany by the name of *Kalauer*—and not by chance thus termed, for, of all the Germans, the Marker alone finds them amusing. It was with Saphir that professional journalism, such as had long been acclimatised in England and in France, the journalism which thinks only of monetary gain, was first introduced into Berlin. Working simultaneously for two newspapers, the *Kurier*, and the *Schnellpost*, he wrote funny articles about life in the capital, "the theatre, fashion, the polite world, and local news," in a vein which, if possible, was more stupid than that of our modern comic papers, and he competed for the favour of his "dear, golden subscribers" with all the arts of the cheap-jack. Since he was prepared to lick the floor in order to ingratiate himself with the royal house and with the authorities, the censorship permitted him to practise his swash-buckling arts as he pleased against poets and painters, singers and actors. The great public would swallow anything that he offered, even the following couplet:

> Die Dichtkunst weibisch ist, das wisst ihr.
> Drum Poe-sie sie heisst, nicht Poe-er.

He was the hero of the day; the picture of the hideous man with curly golden periwig hung in every shop window; a rich literature of pamphlets attacked him or idolised him until he had at length made himself impossible by his excessive disputatiousness. The love of noisy disputes which is ingrained in the populace of every large town could find satisfaction in no other way than in such idle controversies.

In the theatre the police looked on indulgently when unpopular actors were compelled to make formal apologies to the sovereign people; and such men as Callot Hoffmann did not object to lead these popular assizes in person. When the Königstadt theatre was opened, the Berliners took

sides as passionately as if the struggle had been one for political power. Enthusiastic romanticists were already hoping that Berlin would at length acquire a popular stage, and that German art would create fresh energy out of the vagabondage of the erstwhile actors' booth. In Carl von Holtei, "the improviser upon paper," as Goethe termed him, the new stage possessed an amiable, happy-go-lucky poet, whose cheerful Silesian naturalness could exercise beneficial influence upon the artificialised culture of Berlin. But the bureaucratic authorities who controlled the royal theatre could not make up their minds to leave the small change of farces and vaudevilles to the popular theatre. Thus it was that a deplorable rivalry began, degrading both stages. The scandal reached its climax when the finest of all German singers, Henriette Sontag, first appeared at the Königstadt. The whole town was in commotion; the detractors and the admirers of the beautiful Henriette vied with one another in newspaper articles and pamphlets, in legal proceedings and counter-proceedings; even Hegel descended from the pure ether of the idea, in order to give expression to his philosophic dislike of the farces at the Königstadt, and the street arabs whistled a new popular song, *Lott' ist tot,* which ended with a joke about the lace garments of the Demoiselle Sontag and about her despairing suitor, the English envoy Lord Clanwilliam.

Simultaneously upon the stage of the royal theatre itself there was going on an interminable dispute between the board of management and Spontini, the musical director. Ultimately Count Brühl succumbed to the unending vexation; but his successor, the artistic young Count Redern, notwithstanding his courtly refinement, proved unable to settle the quarrel with the autocratic Italian. For more than twenty years this Napoleon of the musical world maintained his position amid a legion of enemies in the capital of the nation which had delivered the decisive blow against Bonapartism, sustained only by the king's favour and by his own indisputable talent. When the tall lean man, decked out with jewels and lace frills, turned the fiery glance of his black eyes towards the orchestra, everyone felt that there were elements of Napoleonic dominance in the savagery of this passionate sallow face, and the musicians followed with absolute accuracy every sign of his baton. He was proud of his position as the last classical representative of those master works of

Italian opera, whose great day was now drawing to a close. If some youthful beginner brought him a weakly composition, he would lead the unhappy young man to the window, and, pointing to the majestic cupola of the French church, would say sublimely: "Mon ami, il vous faut des idées grandes comme cette coupole!" But it was impossible that the proud foreigner should suffice for a nation which had long ere this created its own ideals in music. The press attacked him with patriotic indignation, although he unhesitatingly appealed for aid to the police and the censorship, and at times even invoked the personal assistance of the king. The younger generation demanded national art, desiring to see the favourite C. M. von Weber in the conductor's place. When young Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy conducted Bach's *Matthew Passion* in the fine new hall which the king had presented to the singing academy, the maestro might well have learned that these solemn strains appealed to the German heart far more effectively than the roll of drums in his *Fernand-Cortez*; but what did he care for the opinion of these northern barbarians, whose speech he never mastered?

How petty did these trifling skirmishes appear in comparison with the serious struggles which were agitating the scientific life of Berlin. The young university was now in reality what W. Humboldt had once hoped it might become, the leading intellectual centre of Germany. It had lost Fichte, Niebuhr, and C. F. Eichhorn, but had gained Bopp, Ritter, Ranke, and many other brilliant young men. The creative ideas by means of which new ground was being broken in theology, jurisprudence, and the wide domains of historico-philological research, emanated for the most part from Berlin. Now the Hegelian philosophy, the last of the great philosophical systems which have really permeated and dominated the nation, had established its camp beside the Spree. Animated with the consciousness of his world-historical vocation, Hegel had in 1818 entered upon his Prussian appointment, declaring, "At the university of the centre must philosophy, the centre of science, also establish her seat." In Berlin he devoted himself exclusively to his professorial work, and the influence of his living words was stupendous. Among the students at the feet of the master there sat also numerous notable men from the officialdom

and the army, admiring the grandly conceived architectonic of an edifice of thought at once completely self-dependent and embracing the entire universe, an edifice which, so long as the essential fallacies upon which it was based remained undetected, furnished the highest possible satisfaction for the self-complacency of the reflective mind. Philosophy was no longer the love of wisdom, for it now imagined that it was wisdom itself, and with immeasurable arrogance it waged war against the purely reasonable thinking of common mortals; in Schleiermacher's religious sentiment it could recognise merely the caprice of the finite subject, and in the researches of the historical jurists it could discern no more than the barren overvaluation of sordid reality. In the *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, the Hegelians founded a militant partisan organ at the very time when Hengstenberg was assembling the orthodox under the banner of his *Kirchenzeitung*; nor was there any lack of the deplorable personal quarrels which in Germany never fail to accompany every dispute between men of learning. Through the favour of the minister, Hegel procured a chair in the juristic faculty for E. Gans, the most eloquent of his disciples, and the deadly enemy of Savigny; but to himself his opponents, pettily enough, refused the appropriate place in the academy of the sciences. In addition to all these widely divergent contending parties of Protestant science, there existed a vigorous little Catholic congregation, as the liberals termed it, containing within its fold the amiable convert Henriette Mendelssohn, with Jarcke, Phillips, and other strict ultramontanes, whose influence with the crown prince and his entourage was already at times perceptible.

Meanwhile the king continued to work for the adornment of his capital to the extent that the scanty financial resources permitted. Not a year passed without some inconspicuous addition to its collections or its architectural features—in the form of a palace, a memorial column, or a piece of statuary. During this period, Berlin gradually became a fine city, attractive to foreigners as well as to Germans. The library, which under Humboldt's administration had for the first time received a fixed annual income of 3,500 thalers, was at length more abundantly equipped, and by extraordinary gifts from the king was given a position among the great collections of books, although it could not

as yet compare even remotely with its elder sisters in Munich and Dresden. Schinkel was now enjoying the most fortunate time of his career. After the success of his great venture of the theatre he was given a somewhat freer hand for his bold plans, building the beautiful Palace Bridge, and having the marshy river-bed so transformed as to secure a free outlook over the waters, thus restoring to its rights the sole æsthetic charm which niggard nature has vouchsafed to the Berliners; while now from the morass behind the Lustgarten there arose the Ionic portico of the Old Museum, no less striking in its simple beauty than the ponderous mass of the palace on the other side of the garden.

The internal installation of the museum was directed by W. Humboldt, of late frequently distinguished by the king, who sometimes paid a visit to Tegel. When Humboldt's wife died, Frederick William endeavoured to provide consolation by the offer of this dignified occupation. Humboldt gratefully accepted the task. After this last stroke of destiny, all his mockery and all his acerbity had been discarded. Illuminated by the gentle wisdom of antiquity, he now lived only in the realm of ideas; and it suited him admirably, after he had in earlier days opened new paths for the scientific life of his state, that he should now cooperate in the æsthetic education of the Prussians. For in this matter he was at one with Schinkel in considering that the art treasures of the museum should not serve as the objects of learned research, but should be employed primarily to awaken among the hypercritical inhabitants of the capital an innocent delight in the beautiful. What Prussia had been forced to renounce during the urgent needs of her war-ridden history was now, indeed, largely irrecoverable. Most of the master works of the painters had long ere this passed into safe keeping, and Bunsen was looked upon as the darling of fortune when with his own hands he brought to Berlin Raphael's Madonna Colonna which he had purchased in Rome at the enormous cost of a thousand louis d'or. Nevertheless, this latest of the great European museums was an invaluable focus of culture for our prosaic north-east, and even the sciolism of Berlin was mute before the spiritual grandeur which found expression in Schinkel's mighty rotunda. Rauch, too, was making vigorous progress in his work, ungrudgingly admired by his old teacher, Gottfried

Schadow. How much freer, simpler, and grander than Schadow's first essay in Rostock was Rauch's new monument to Blucher in Berlin. When early one spring morning the statue was unostentatiously unveiled, there were but three spectators in the wide square, Gneisenau, Hegel, and the sculptor himself. The Prussian army, Prussian science, and Prussian art were associated in veneration of the hero of our sacred national wrath.

Notwithstanding this abundance of notable personalities, the capital still lacked the chief charm of urban life, that broad-minded sociability which harmoniously embraces all contrasts. Frederick William knew very well how to utilise at the appropriate place the available talents of art and science, but his unpretentious habits unfitted him for the endeavour to assemble the men of talent around his person in lively social intercourse. It is true that the court and the experiences of the royal house were still the only topics of conversation common to all classes; the Berliners lived with their monarch, speaking affectionately of "our son-in-law" in St. Petersburg, of "our Alexandra" in Schwerin, and they loudly exulted when, after his recovery, their sovereign reappeared for the first time in the theatre. From time to time too the king made up his mind to provide Berlin society with a spectacle of royal magnificence, in which Schinkel, Spontini, and W. Hensel, the painter, had to display their abilities to the utmost. Two of these festivals, at which the romantic opera of *Lalla Rookh* and the mask the *White Rose* were produced, acquired a European reputation, and the festival of the White Rose genuinely deserved commemoration by the brush of young Adolf Menzel, for this was the last grand courtly display of modern history to be illuminated by the magic of art, the last triumph of the old romanticism and of the aristocratic society of the restoration. In Potsdam, amid the admiration of thousands of reverential spectators, the royal princes, wearing golden helms and shining armour, drove in chariots to pay knightly homage to their sister Charlotte, the White Rose. During these very days, *The Dumb Girl of Portici*, the stormy petrel of revolution, was already hovering over the theatre of Europe, heralding the approach of a democratic epoch, whose popular

festivals and political struggles were utterly to obscure the glories of the courts.

But such days as these, when the court emerged from its retirement, were rare; and outside the court, Berlin possessed few centres of urban sociability. Hardly anywhere else than in the wealthy homes of Mendelssohn and Meyerbeer, in the modest salon of Stägemann and his amiable wife, and in the "Lawless Society" where Schleiermacher and the genial despot Buttmann competed in the display of their sparkling wit, could talented persons of divergent views still discover neutral ground for unconstrained intercourse. Elsewhere there were to be found nothing but restricted petty parties and coteries, and even the intellectualist circle of Rahel Varnhagen was already assuming an aspect of literary and political sectarianism. During the long century of German impotence, the ancient Teutonic defiance had been overgrown by a petty and envious spirit of separatism, and the nature of the Germans had been transformed. The students were impelled by this spirit into the trivial disputes of corps life; urban society was corrupted by an intolerable tendency to form cliques; and even the greatest town of Germany was not yet exempt from these defects. Professors and actors, writers and artists, assembled in their separate narrow factions and schools, arrogant, intolerant of all but their colleagues, illimitably unjust towards their opponents. In this disintegrated and distracted world, there was neither to be found the urbanity of the society of the larger Italian towns, nor yet that thoroughgoing national pride of the French which esteems every great manifestation of talent as a fragment of patriotic glory. Before strangers, the Berliners were fond of boasting of their town's intellectual brilliancy; among themselves everyone, fearing that otherwise he himself would be regarded as a dullard, endeavoured to discredit all that seemed superexcellent, to take the gloss off everything, as Rahel put it. Hence the chasm between the cultured and the uncultured remained unnaturally wide. The honest burgher, drinking his beer in the evening, knew nothing of the great ones of the academy and of the university; and indeed the dominant philosophical school did its utmost, by the use of an incomprehensible argot, to close the doors of its wisdom in the face of all non-adepts.

Prussian Affairs after the Death of Hardenberg

In the year 1827, Alexander Humboldt returned to Berlin, henceforward in accordance with the king's desire leading a leisured life at the court of his native land. This was a turning point in the history of our culture. It was impossible that a more wholesome influence could be exercised upon the distracted life of Germany than that of this universal spirit, the man who was apt for all the vanities of court life, but who at the same time supported every efficient manifestation of energy with magnanimous good feeling and penetrating understanding. After having experienced the lighter grace of the Parisian drawing-rooms, it was long before he could accommodate himself to the roughness and narrowness of German life, and years after his return he exclaimed with a sigh that Berlin, while providing in abundance for all the lusts of the flesh, was and would remain a bearish city. But he was a social force from the day of his advent. He turned the king's attention towards everything new and vital that manifested itself in art and science. It was he who restored natural science to honour, natural science which had been almost overwhelmed by the excess of speculative thought. As soon as he had begun his studies in magnetism, which he pursued in Mendelssohn's garden, in a little laboratory, in the construction of which copper had been used instead of iron, a number of brilliant young investigators, Encke, Dirichlet, Dove, assembled round the master; Carl Ritter, young Baeyer, and the other members of the recently founded Geographical Society, collaborated with him; and a lively rivalry was awakened in all branches of exact research. Memorable was the impression when, during his first winter in Berlin, he delivered in the singing academy a course of lectures upon physical geography, from which his *Cosmos* subsequently issued. With the secure touch of genius, brilliantly refuting the fantasies of the armchair natural philosophers, he established the programme of that purely empirical study of nature which was soon to effect a fundamental transformation in all the habits of the new century. Never before had the guild of the learned made so bold a stand in Germany, and only a man of Humboldt's world-wide reputation could have succeeded in such a venture. He it was who first showed the Germans that the technical expert is able to make himself fully intelligible to the best of the nation, doing

this at the very time when Leopold Ranke was pursuing a similar course in his first historical treatise.

Moreover, the position of men of learning in society was improved by Humboldt, a matter of no small importance in this land of courtly and bureaucratic divisions of caste. As early as 1822, Oken, who in his proper domain of science was far more successful than in politics, had summoned at Leipzig a congress of German men of science. This first congress was attended by no more than thirteen persons, but it was followed by several others, and when in the autumn of 1828 a new congress was to be held at Berlin, Humboldt lent the support of his great name. It can hardly be said that such assemblies brought much advantage to science, for in research as in art all creative work issues from individual brilliant intelligences; but in a time when travel was still so difficult they afforded many efficient investigators whose minds were tending to stagnate in the remote isolation of some petty university, the sole available opportunity of escaping out of parochialism, and of engaging in a stimulating exchange of ideas with others who were at work in the same field of enquiry. When, following the example set by the Swiss, Oken initiated these congresses, he had a national end in view. While some of the participators might console themselves for the political miseries of Germany in the contemplation of the ideal grandeur of the fatherland, in the case of the majority, the result was an increase in national pride and an enhanced yearning for closer union with fellow countrymen. Similar sentiments were awakened by the Schiller festival, then held for the first time in Stuttgart, and repeated on many subsequent occasions; and also by the centennial celebration in honour of Albrecht Dürer, held in numerous German towns, to the accompaniment of song and fiery patriotic speeches.

The Berlin natural science congress was a brilliant success, being attended by six hundred persons. Humboldt played the host, and declared in his inaugural oration that the intellectual unity of Germany was here finding expression. His example compelled the court and the official world to pay a respect to men of learning which in Paris and London had long been unquestioningly accorded. How astounded were the Berliners when at the great banquet the royal princes mixed freely with the professors, while Kamptz, the

demagogue-hunter, came to table arm-in-arm with Oken, the terrible conspirator—though the king, indeed, remained apart, looking down shyly from his box upon the unwonted activities. Everyone paid homage to the prince of natural science, and although there was much fashionable vanity associated with all the addresses and congratulatory gifts which were heaped upon the much honoured man, there was at least one permanent gain, namely, that science secured its footing in polite society, that the censorious capital now at length possessed one figure whose greatness was universally admitted. It was through Humboldt and the propitiatory force of his genius, that the good tone of metropolitan tolerance was first introduced into the disintegrated life of Germany.

§ 4. PERSECUTION OF THE DEMAGOGUES.

Elsewhere in Germany, less was heard of the brilliancy of intellectual life in Berlin, and of the services of the Prussian administration, than of the grievous sins of the demagogue hunt which tarnished the glory of the Hohenzollern crown. Nowhere outside Prussia was political persecution so pitiless. It was in the very nature of this vigorous state that, while all the German virtues flourished abundantly, all the German sins should also appear in full force. For five long years it was possible for a rabble of profligates and misguided persons to take advantage for their own sinister purposes of the petty suspicions which are universally associated with bureaucratic absolutism; and whilst in other respects the administration of justice was irreproachable, these men could maltreat with tyrannical caprice the objects of their suspicions. Privy Councillor Kamptz, the fanatic of timidity, was the soul of these obscure activities. As director of police he instituted the arrests, and in the summer of 1819 it was he who communicated to the chancellor the first intimations of the great conspiracy he had discovered.[1] Beyond question he was no deliberate calumniator; but he was no more unbiased now than he had been when he entered the lists against the Wartburg festival. Between the lines of Jahn's foolish *Golden Sayings*, which his spies brought to him, he believed he could read evidence that a plot was

[1] Kamptz's Reports to Hardenberg, July 11, 1819, and subsequent dates.

on foot for his own assassination, and he attacked his enemies with all the unrestraint of personal animosity. A police committee of enquiry worked under his orders, and on this body, in addition to the wretched Grano, there sat one of Hardenberg's questionable confidants, Tzschoppe, the Lusatian, a little man of boylike aspect, with blond hair, rosy cheeks, and soft blue eyes, smooth and supple as a weasel, with an ear at every keyhole, and ever ready, in fair, well-rounded characters, to introduce foul accusations into his reports.

By the letter of the existing law, the legality of the proceedings was hardly open to dispute, for unquestionably in times of peril the absolute monarch was empowered to adopt extraordinary measures, and the code demanded judicial investigation only when it was probable that a definite crime had been committed. Nevertheless, the ministry of state, in petitions submitted to the king and the chancellor, demanded the immediate appointment of a judicial committee. Writing to the monarch on September 8th, the ministers declared: "Public opinion, more particularly in our own days, is greatly influenced by respect for the law and for its protective forms. Now nothing endangers confidence so greatly as when the administration employs extraordinary measures which do not prove to have been justified by the result. So firmly established is confidence in the Prussian state that, as the newspaper reports sent in by the governments unanimously show, hardly anyone believes in the existence of dangerous intrigues, and certainly no one is in the least afraid of them. But who can tell what will happen if existing methods are fruitlessly continued much longer?" Kamptz came out to meet these attacks with the utmost violence. "'Existing methods'——" he asks, scornfully, "is it those of the intrigues or those of the investigations? There can be no doubt that the former might lead far!" Since the chancellor reposed absolute confidence in the assurances of the director of police, Hardenberg issued a cabinet order on his own responsibility expressing to the ministers the king's displeasure, recommending caution in all utterances, and declaring in set terms that there could be no doubt that the public safety was imperilled.[1]

[1] Petitions of the ministry of state to the king, July 16 and September 8; Kamptz's Reports, August 24 and September 14; Cabinet Orders to the ministry of state, July 23 and September 16, 1819.

Equally fruitless, at first, were the repeated demands of the Berlin high court of justice that judicial proceedings should be instituted. These opponents likewise were encountered with fierce invectives by Kamptz, who asked whether they wished to assume the role of the French parliament. They, too, received a reproof from the king, who informed them that the high court of justice was taking a wrong course in repeating its demand when the police authorities had given an official assurance that the enquiry was not yet ripe for the intervention of the law courts.[1] After such declarations on the part of the head of the state, the authorities could no longer maintain their objection. Even Kircheisen, friend and adherent of Suarez, gave way. Long before, when Frederick William was still crown prince, Kircheisen had in friendly conversation warned him of the evil consequences of cabinet justice; and throughout life the minister had valiantly defended the independence of the courts. But when he now came to examine the voluminous police reports, which were by royal command communicated to the ministry, he also succumbed to the belief that the state was in urgent danger, and that the monarch was justified in availing himself of the competence conferred by sovereign authority.

Nevertheless, the representations that had been so ungraciously received, had produced an impression on the king's mind. On October 1st, the committee was reconstituted, and was formally equipped with the powers of a judicial committee of enquiry, consisting henceforward of five members of the high court of justice and two administrative officials. In this new form, its constitution complied with the law, for the king still possessed the dangerous power of instituting extraordinary courts to deal with special cases. Among the judges on the committee, were the venerable President von Trützschler and Hoffmann, the moralist and humorist, who was so much tickled at the contemplation of the bogey of this demagogue hunt that he could not help caricaturing the activities in which he himself participated in an episode of his romance *Meister Floh*. The supreme conduct of the investigation was placed in the hands of a ministerial

[1] Petitions of the High Court of Justice to Minister Kircheisen, July 16 and 31; Kamptz's Reports, August 6 and 9; Cabinet Order to Kircheisen, August 21, 1819.

committee, consisting of Hardenberg, Kircheisen, Schuckmann, Wittgenstein, Kamptz, and Lord-Lieutenant Bülow. Thus protected by the chancellor, and by his old patrons, Schuckmann, and Wittgenstein, Kamptz, with his abettors, could do pretty much as he pleased. Since new denunciations were continually coming to hand from the federal committee at Mainz and from the Berlin police, he was able to prolong the proceedings at will by the unexpected introduction of side issues. As far as personal manners were concerned, the common-looking little man assumed a remarkably friendly tone towards many of the unfortunates whom he held in his talons, but this was a poor consolation for the torment of perpetual detention on suspicion. In the old castle of Köpenick on the Spree, close to the renowned hall of arms where in former days the courageous court-martial had defended the life of Crown Prince Frederick against his own father, the demagogues were now incarcerated behind screened windows, with no outlook except a rectangle of grey sky, and allowed out for but a few hours a day to walk under the trees of the park or to bathe in the river. The prisons of Berlin were likewise filled with the victims of political persecution, so that the students had a song which ran:

> Who knows the truth and freely speaks his mind,
> Seek in Berlin, in noisome jail confined.

After the first alarms had been dissipated, the great majority of the officials held aloof with disgust from the doings of the demagogue-hunters and regarded the little gang of police spies which surrounded Kamptz as a plague spot upon their honourable corporation. In order to withdraw the jurisdiction over political offences from the Rhenish juries, the king commanded on March 6, 1821, that all offences against the safety of the state were to be dealt with in accordance with the prescriptions of the code and of the old criminal ordinances. This cabinet order was made retrospective, the sole reservation being that in the case of offences committed prior to the issue of the decree, the judges were always to impose the mildest penalties permitted by the law. The minister of the interior and the police minister were instructed to report concerning the conduct of teachers, since the intrigues had their root in the misleading of youth.[1]

[1] Cabinet Order to Schuckmann and Wittgenstein, November 12, 1819.

In the appointment of teachers and pastors, the opinion of these two ministers was always to be consulted; when demagogic teachers were dismissed, the only appeal open was to the ministry of state; every secret association of students was to be dealt with straightway by the criminal courts.

In comparison with this mighty equipment, how ridiculous seemed the result of the enquiries. What must have been the feelings of Prussian patriots when they saw Carnot, the regicide, for whom there was no place in France, living freely in Magdeburg under the protection of the Prussian crown, while the loyal Jahn was persecuted for years. In vain did the Turnvater declare: "It is quite possible that my writings may have contained certain opinions, but no subversive opinions. I have not been privy to any secret intrigues, and still less have I participated in any."[1] In vain did Councillor Hoffmann, a few months later, recommend that the accused, who was manifestly guiltless, should be set at liberty. All that was conceded was that he should reside at the fortress of Colberg in lenient imprisonment, and there he had to remain until the year 1825, when he was at length set at liberty. He received a pension from the king, but was commanded not to live in any town where there was a university or a gymnasium. Forgotten by the world, he dwelt henceforward in his little house on the Weinberg at Freiburg-on-the-Unstrut. When, occasionally, the Burschen of the Saxon universities visited him during vacation, they were disappointed to find that the bearded old fellow continued immutably faithful to the Teutonism of happier days, and would hear not a word of "the French devil of the new radicalism."

A man named Pape, who as a judge was equally unconscientious and petty, was sent to Bonn as commissary to conduct the enquiry there, and he was supported by the referendary Dambach, a heartless routinist, who subsequently became governor of the Hausvogtei prison in Berlin, and who, in conjunction with Tzschoppe, remained for years one of the most pliable of Kamptz's tools. What extraordinary things did not these two men discover among the documents of C. T. Welcker! But notwithstanding the reckless violence of the accused, in the end nothing could

[1] Jahn to Schuckmann, September 5, 1819.

be proved against him; the proceedings, begun as a criminal charge and continued as a police investigation, were quietly dropped. When Welcker received a call to Freiburg, he was, in flattering terms, granted his discharge from royal service, but no legal acquittal was vouchsafed him, and consequently, in a *Public Documentary Reputation* which ran to nearly thirty sheets, he overwhelmed Prussian arbitrariness with a shower-bath of moral indignation.

Far more effectively could Arndt move the hearts of his readers by the straightforward language of his brief work of defence entitled, *A necessary Word about my own Affairs.* What had become of Prussian justice when this most loyal of men found it necessary to hide his letters in the cellar and under the flooring of his room? Even before the persecution of the demagogues, he had had to contend with the incredible suspicions of the authorities, and had been compelled to assure the board of curators that the title of his public lecture *Concerning Life and Study* had been chosen in all innocence.[1] How preposterous too were the examinations conducted by Pape and Dambach. The strange vagaries of terminology with which Arndt was accustomed to amuse himself were now objects of suspicion. What were the "paperish arts and plans" of which he spoke in one of his letters? What was the meaning of the enigmatic sentence, "That lies above my sphere——"? Was the song, *O Breaker of all Bonds* a demagogic poem or was it really to be found in the old Berlin song book? Especially grave was the suspicion aroused by a sheet of paper on which, together with other disconnected jottings, were found the words, "If a single preacher were to be shot, the whole thing would be over." This was an extract from the remarks which the king had written in 1811 upon the margin of Gneisenau's memorial concerning the national uprising.[2] Great was the labour until the judge could at length be convinced of his ludicrous error. Even five-and-twenty years later Kamptz boldly denied that Arndt had actually been exposed to hostile questioning on account of the monarch's own words.

Three years after the first domiciliary search, and a year and a half after the opening enquiry, the proceedings were suddenly discontinued. Just as little as Welcker was Arndt

[1] Arndt, Petition to the board of curators in Bonn, March 22, 1819.
[2] See vol. I. p. 456.

able to secure a legal acquittal. Not until 1827 was he informed that the examination had been without result. He was able to retain his office and his residence, because Stein, Niebuhr, and Eichhorn frankly espoused his cause, but he was not permitted to resume his lectures. In spite of all this, the valiant man displayed no bitterness. His childlike piety made it possible for him to accept even the scandalous injustice of these years as the decree of a just deity. If at times his anger overmastered him, he would reprove himself by exclaiming:

> How oft hast Heaven open seen,
> God's finger issuing forth!

He would not abandon Prussia, "for Prussia is my fatherland, and is still, as ever, my hope." Yet he admitted that the tedious suspension of his best energies had grieved him to the utmost. His activities as a publicist were practically forbidden. He felt little inclination for scientific work now that the stimulus of his teaching activities was lacking. The result was that he passed some of his best years "in a sort of nebulous and playful dream, among children, trees, and flowers." Through the follies of the demagogue hunt our German youth were deprived of the services of a teacher who better than any other could have checked the inrush of the errors of revolutionary cosmopolitanism.

It was chiefly in North Germany that Arndt's fate aroused resentment; on the Rhine, Görres was regarded as the martyr of freedom. From his exile Görres repeatedly, but ever in vain, voiced his old demand that he should be brought before a Rhenish jury, and he took his revenge by writing *Concerning the Rhenish Provinces and concerning my own Affairs*, a passionate pamphlet which seriously affected Prussia's prestige on the Rhine. With his profound mastery of demagogic arts, he here set in motion every wheel of Rhenish particularism, stimulating the hatred of the Catholics against Protestant arrogance, and the hostility of the bourgeoisie towards the army. "In free Switzerland," he said, with a turn of phrase which continually recurs in his subsequent writings, "we never encounter those crowds of loafers who in peace time devour the wellbeing of the nation so that

they may not have to defend it in war." Describing the injustice done to him personally, he gave it such a colouring as to produce the impression that he had suffered solely on behalf of the Franco-Rhenish law; and he concluded by saying threateningly that in any case he would secure justice as soon as the province should come into its own.

Few other men of note had to suffer in the persecution of the demagogues. Absolutely nothing could be found to incriminate Reimer, notwithstanding the meticulous scrutiny of all his papers. Of the Breslau gymnasts, Passow was discharged after a few weeks' arrest, for the only thing against him was the utterance of a few strong words in his *Gymnastic Aims*; Carl von Raumer removed to Halle in order to elude the proceedings in Silesia; his friend Harnisch, after receiving one or two unpleasant official admonitions, continued his work as teacher unmolested. All the students who had been arrested held firmly together. In the possession of the young philosopher von Henning was found a map of Germany which assigned to the Prussian state approximately the frontiers of 1866, and here also were discovered the revolutionary constitutional plans of the Unconditionals. Many of the intercepted letters reproduced the fanatical doctrines of Carl Follen: as that every state whose freedom is threatened is in a condition of justifiable revolution; that the war of individuals then begins; and that every burgher has a right to punish traitors if they are left unpunished by the state. Yet more frequently were discovered all sorts of threatening phrases about the day of action, the day of vengeance. But who could say at what point youthful boasting ended and serious designs began? Even the judges of the demagogues had to admit that in Germany it is a far cry from the pen to the dagger. Of the most intimate friends of the two assassins, some had sought asylum abroad, while the others maintained an inviolable silence. Finally, Mühlenfels also took to flight, a man who, beyond doubt unjustly, was regarded as especially dangerous, because his letters were full of incautious phrases. He escaped to Sweden upon a fishing boat, and it was years before he could secure pardon from the king.

The great enquiry seemed to be expiring for lack of matter, when in the year 1823, to Kamptz's satisfaction,

a new secret society was discovered, and one which had at least the semblance of a conspiracy. How was it possible to expect from German students unconditional obedience to the Carlsbad decrees? The Burschenschaft had everywhere been dissolved, ceremoniously in Breslau to the strains of *Our Union ends only with Death*; but everywhere it was promptly reconstituted, in some instances as an extensive association, and in others in the form of small clubs. In Jena and in Halle, it was soon stronger than all other associations. In many of the universities it gained its first success through the stimulus of the forbidden, and before long the prohibited colours were again worn in the streets of Leipzig. The constraint of conscience which, in their foolish anxiety, the governments had imposed upon the young people, had a demoralising effect. Since all the students had now to pledge themselves not to join any secret society, they appeased their consciences by saying to themselves that the Burschenschaft was not secret. Others decided that whenever a student was summoned before the courts he should, for the nonce, cease to be a member of the association. The most audacious, however, bluntly contended that by breaking their pledge they had already declared war against the authorities and that therefore they were justified in taking further illegal steps.

From the first the old Burschenschaft had been too large to confine itself to the representation of a single definite view, and now the various factions which had been comprised within the original association gradually drew apart. Those of Christian inclinations turned their backs upon politics, and contented themselves with cheerful social intercourse or with plans for university reform. Contrasted with these "Arminen," as they were subsequently termed, were the "Germanen," whose aims were political. Whoever, amid the general relaxation, still continued to cherish political ideals, readily succumbed to radicalism; and the heavy hand of police persecution, in conjunction with the exciting intelligence from southern Europe, could not fail to accentuate this tendency. Moreover, most of the members of the "Germania" were mere well-meaning enthusiasts, who, in one breath, would extol their own rightful princes and the emperor in the Kyffhäuser. The ancient German loyalty to the emperor was now revived by Rückert's *Lay of Barbarossa*,

and subsequently by Raumer's *History of the Hohenstaufen*. Hundreds of sanguine youths repeated the poet's prophecy:

> With him of old departed
> The empire's ancient fame.
> With him one day returning
> Shall yet revive its name!

But there was now coming into its own a modern generation, consisting of those who would no longer hear a word about Christian mediævalism, and who conceived of united Germany as but one member in the great league of nations which was to arise in united Europe. In the Burschenhaus at Jena, the chief influence was wielded by Arnold Ruge, a sturdy and good natured Pomeranian, full of dry humour and vigorous joy of life, far too kind-hearted to kill a fly needlessly, and none the less an apostle of the universal revolution in state and church. His ideal was "the anarchy or self-government" which he believed to have existed in ancient Athens; after the lapse of many centuries of despotism, the Dutch republic and the American republic had once again brought some saving grace into the world; at length had dawned the glorious day of the great Revolution, and new blossoms had flowered for humanity in the heroic struggles of the Convention. Such views, which in the days of the Wartburg festival would still have evoked a storm of opposition, now secured a number of faithful adherents. Incapable, as he remained throughout life, of distinguishing between dreams and reality, Ruge reposed full confidence in the revolutionary determination of his comrades, and never doubled the immeasurable superiority of "these tranquil republican statesmen," when compared with the corrupt monarchical world of philistines. "Upon the right understanding of this question depends the future of Europe, and in especial the picture of our own people, which has not yet become republican"—such were the words which resounded through the hall when the young reformers were discussing the question of the "free swordsman," and when, as pugnacious philosophers, they arrived at the typical Germanic conclusion that in view of the prejudices of their own day they would not for the present abandon the mediæval barbarism of the duel.

Wherever this revolutionary tendency was displayed, a

distinct change of tone soon became manifest. There was no longer any talk of Christianity. From the old mottoes, "fresh and joyful, godly, free," and "honour, freedom, country, God," "godly" and "God" were tacitly omitted, and sometimes formally expunged. How horrified was Wolfgang Menzel when, returning from Switzerland some years after the promulgation of the Carlsbad decrees, he found that no trace now remained of the Christo-Germanic enthusiasm of his student days. In Halle, Carl von Raumer, a true friend of the old Burschenschafts, vainly endeavoured to counteract the influence of those who were leading the students astray into revolutionary paths. No longer would the Burschen hearken to the voice of their pious teacher. How, indeed, was it possible to expect moderation from them when the stupidity of the authorities led these to attempt the complete destruction of the traditional corporation life of the students, and to forbid even the establishment of an academic committee? Ludicrously conspicuous was the contrast between the old generation and the new, when Arnold Ruge was imprisoned for a time beside Jahn in the fortress of Colberg, the pantheistic republican sharing the duress of the rigidly orthodox Prussian monarchist. Neither cared to conceal that he regarded the other as a perfect fool, but Kamptz considered both to be remorseless traitors. The revolutionary embitterment of the younger generation was disastrous to the future of party life in Germany, but for the moment there was absolutely no danger to the public peace. How keen was the insight of Arndt when he exclaimed to the German youth,

> Ill suited thou for ruse and craft,
> All trickery away dost waft.

In the arts of conspiracy, the ingenuous Teutons had never been able to compete with the Latin races. Now the incautious young fellows exposed their plans everywhere, and the profoundly secret German Burschentags which during these years were held in Dresden, in the Kyffhäuser, and elsewhere, all came sooner or later to the knowledge of the police

Even less circumspect was a secret society founded by Carl Follen, the old mischief-maker. In the interim, Follen

had in Paris entered into relationships with Lafayette and the conspirators of the Union, and had subsequently taken refuge in Switzerland. In Coire he encountered some of the most zealous of the Blacks, W. Snell, Völker, and Dittmar, and joined with them and an Italian carbonaro named de Prati to found a league of German men. The aim of the conspiracy was the overthrow of the existing order and the establishment of a unified Germany with a constitution based upon popular representation. The organisation of the league was modelled upon that of the Italian secret societies. There were small lodges which were to know nothing of one another; inviolable secrecy and no written communications; implicit obedience to superiors when these decreed the day of action; death for all traitors. Unfortunately, von Sprewitz, a Mecklenburger, visited Coire at this time. He was an excellent young fellow, somewhat emotional, who had fought against the French while still little more than a boy, and who now worked as a teacher at Dr. Gustav Bunsen's educational institute in Frankfort, which town was a favourite asylum of the malcontents. The conspirators persuaded him to visit the German universities during the summer of 1821, and to establish a league of youth in the ten circles of the old empire; in the Austrian circle, which had played no part in the institutions of the Holy Empire, it was not at present proposed to establish the revolutionary circle constitution.

Active recruiting was now undertaken at ten universities, and about one hundred and fifty young men joined the nebulous undertaking. Among them were many men of first-class intelligence; from Swabia, Kolb, and also Mebold, widely known in later days as editor of the *Allgemeine Zeitung*; from Baden, Baader, who subsequently did good service as historian of his homeland; from Thuringia and Mecklenburg, two able law students, Asverus and Kippe; from Bavaria, one of Anselm Feuerbach's talented sons, and Eisenmann, the student of medicine, a thoroughly honest man but a queer customer, at once political enthusiast and fervent Catholic; from Saxony, the theological student Carl Hase, most gifted of them all. Not one of them could possibly associate any definite scheme with the obscurely worded menaces of the nine rules of the organisation; and indeed Hase and Kippe joined only with reservations, for

their honourable natures revolted against the ungerman demand for blind obedience. Even Ruge, the loudest and most indefatigable among the advocates of the league, was ill suited for the role of conspirator. In order to stimulate the courage of the leaguers, childish fables were circulated. It was said that Gneisenau was ready to play the part of a German Riego, and that it was possible to count upon Prince von Wied and upon the generals Thielmann and Jagow. Through the intermediation of Robert Wesselhöft, two older men maintained secret intercourse with the Jena comrades. One of these agents was Salomon, an oil refiner of Erfurt, a religious fanatic, at one time teacher of gymnastics, widely renowned for the athletic powers of his fine physique; the other was Captain Fehrentheil, the sole Prussian officer of note to be misled into participation in the demagogic intrigues of this epoch. Fehrentheil had once been attached to the headquarters staff of the Silesian army, a fact which afforded a lever to Gneisenau's secret enemies. He had long ere this become estranged from his old comrades, having been obsessed by the fantasies of a vain political ambition, and he seriously designed with the help of the Landwehr to overpower the fortress of Erfurt. After a little while, no more was heard of the first originators of the design. Carl Follen probably recognised that after the defeat of the revolutions in the south a revolt in Germany was impossible; he withdrew his own head from the noose, and left the league of youth to its fate. The deluded young men now devoted themselves to tragicomical discussions, to decide whether the proposed league of men had actually come into existence (a question to which no definite answer can be given to this day); if so, whether it still existed; and whether they themselves should disregard it, and go ahead on their own account.

At this juncture (1823) the Mainz committee received intelligence of the designs, and now this distracted nation was first to experience the practical meaning of German unity. The prosecutions were jointly conducted by Kamptz in Berlin and the Black Committee in Mainz, and numerous arrests were made in all the larger federal states. Overcome by anxiety, the lesser courts forgot the most sacred of their sentiments, the arrogance of sovereignty, and did not hesitate to send their native demagogues to Köpenick

for a time, to enable Kamptz to conduct his enquiry more efficiently. Kamptz made use of this favourable opportunity to place again under lock and key some of the members of the old Burschenschaft who had for years been closely supervised. Such was the fate of Franz Lieber, who had meanwhile gained experience in a cruel school. As Jahn's disciple he had been kept in prison for a long time; then, still untaught, he had participated in the foundation of the league of youth; and finally he had left Germany to fight on behalf of the freedom of Hellas. But how painful was his disillusionment at the terrible savagery of these fighters for freedom. All his hopes in life frustrated, penniless and friendless, he endeavoured to make his way home by way of Italy, and in Rome, Niebuhr took pity on this man who had suffered "moral shipwreck." When the great genius displayed his paternal affection, a new world of pure and lofty ideas opened for the highly gifted youth. Upon Niebuhr's request, the king permitted Lieber to return home unmolested, and after his arrival in Germany he admitted in a candid letter to Kamptz that he had outgrown the follies of his youth. Yet not even the king's word was sacred to the demagogue-hunters. The unfortunate man was summoned to bear witness against his former associates, and as he refused to incriminate them he was again immured in Köpenick, until his final liberation upon the renewed plea of his loyal patron.

Heinrich Carl Hofmann, one of the founders of the Giessen Burschenschaft, had also to undergo examination in Köpenick. For some years he had been advocate in Darmstadt, and had already adopted the moderate liberal principles to which he remained faithful throughout life. Like Lieber, he steadfastly refused to betray the friends of earlier days. The unhappy Sprewitz endeavoured to kill himself in prison; surviving severely wounded, he lost heart, and disclosed all he knew. His testimony was largely identical with the denunciations of the miserable traitor Wit von Dörring, who, at one time the confidant of Follen and Sand, had since then led the futile existence of a secret conspirator in almost every country in Europe, and now, after having tasted prison in Piedmont and Austria, had become informer to Metternich, Hatzfeld, and Schuckmann. Difficult indeed was it to derive any clear ideas from the

utterances of the half crazy adventurer; his communications were a medley of true and false, as confused as the *Memoirs* which he published not long afterwards.

Nevertheless sufficient proofs had at length been secured. If the empty words of the oath of initiation were to be literally interpreted, it was indisputable that the league of youth had cherished treasonable designs. In passing judgment upon the young offenders, German particularism resumed full sway. Although the investigation had been jointly conducted, each federal state settled the issue through its own law courts and in accordance with its own laws, and the decisions served to display the greatly admired complexity of German political life. The severest sentences were those passed by the Prussian courts. In 1826 the Breslau court of appeal simultaneously condemned twenty-eight members of the league of youth to long terms of imprisonment, in some cases to as much as fifteen years in a fortress. One only of the accused, young von Viebahn, in later days a distinguished official and statistician, was provisionally acquitted of the graver charge, "but on account of strong suspicion that he had known of the existence of the league without denouncing it to the authorities," he was sentenced to two years' detention in a fortress. In Hesse, Würtemberg, and Mecklenburg, a far more lenient view was taken of the same offences. In Bavaria, the accused were all provisionally acquitted, but only after prolonged detention as suspects subject to rigorous examination. Carl Feuerbach's mind was temporarily unhinged by his troubles. Frederick William at first took the miserable affair much to heart. He sharply reproved an official who interceded on behalf of one of the prisoners, saying: "I am forced to believe that you share the disastrous opinion that criminal intrigues which worm their way along in obscurity are pardonable because they are based upon erroneous views." He was at first unwilling to grant any pardons until the condemned had in each case endured a third of the sentence.[1] Nevertheless kindliness ultimately triumphed over stern determination. The king felt that the young men had suffered enough through the prolonged enquiry, and extended his clemency to them all, in most cases after a year had elapsed.

[1] Cabinet Order to Landrat von Borries, March 12, 1824; to Schuckmann, October 13, 1827.

All these prosecutions were supervised by Metternich and Hatzfeldt with indefatigable zeal. Intense was the indignation in Vienna when the Zerbst court of appeal sentenced a member of the league of youth to no more than a brief term of lenient imprisonment, for it was impossible to know whether later, when he had arrived at greater maturity, the young man might not carry the spirit of his plans into more effectual execution. Metternich at once induced the Mainz committee to remonstrate, but upright President Kaisenberg refused to allow the course of justice to be disturbed, although Schuckmann approached him with a similar suggestion. There was again great excitement at the Hofburg when the mild sentences of the Hessian courts had furnished "a fresh scandal for the whole of Germany," and a severely worded admonition was sent on this account to the Darmstadt cabinet.[1]

While the great enquiry into the league of youth was still in progress, a thorough investigation was made concerning the other students' associations. Even after 1819 a complex and vigorous corporative life had continued to flourish at the Berlin university, but all this collapsed when the new governmental plenipotentiary Schulz roughly intervened. Here also was discovered a league of Arminen with the terrible motto, "unity, liberty, and equality"; but its members escaped with trifling disciplinary punishments, for Stägemann and Altenstein were able to convince the king of the harmlessness of the affair.[2] Wittgenstein and Schuckmann, on the other hand, were always on the side of severity. Hardly credible was the childishness with which these heroes of the police, notwithstanding their personal experience of university life, exaggerated the depravity of the times. Schuckmann was not ashamed to send to the Badenese government, with a special ministerial despatch, the letter of a young traitor of Bonn, in which the information was conveyed that friend X. was laid up in the Hirschgasse with a wound, while friend O. had had a terrible slash over the nose. Continual deliberations were in progress as to what further fetters could be imposed upon youth. Arens, the tyrant of the Giessen university, went so far as

[1] Hatzfeldt's Reports, May 26, 1825, and November 16, 1826.

[2] Stägemann's Report concerning the Arminia, May 6; Wittgenstein's Report to the king, May 8, 1823.

to recommend that a political certificate of good conduct written by a governmental plenipotentiary should be demanded from every student, whereupon Curator Fröhlich of Heidelberg bitterly rejoined, "The days when people paid with their heads for being suspect are, after all, not so very remote."[1]

Among the prosecuted associations, the Polonia occupied a peculiar position. In Berlin and in Breslau the young Poles were highly esteemed as loyal friends and chivalrous swordsmen. They were on good terms with the Burschenschafts, for whoever was in opposition to the existing government was regarded as a liberal, and the simple-minded youth of Germany had not yet begun to realise the intensity of national contrasts. In all probability the Polonia was far more deeply involved in political intrigues than were any of the German students' associations, for the entire domain of Old Poland was undermined by secret societies; but Sarmatian cunning was a match for the arts of the German police, and the enquiries yielded no noteworthy results. Towards the year 1824, the zeal of the authorities reached its climax; then it gradually declined, and in the summer of 1829 Schuckmann himself proposed that the investigation into the ramifications of the league of youth should be discontinued, for no information had been forthcoming to show that the secret league of German men had ever come into existence.[2]

Who at that time could have imagined that this first political persecution of modern German history would provide an enduring increase in strength to a distant offshoot of our people? In the course of the eighteenth century quite a number of Germans had emigrated to North America. These were mainly Palatiners and Swabians, to whom the plundering French, or religious coercion and economic stresses, made the old fatherland seem an undesirable residence. During the famine years of 1816 and 1817, another 20,000 Germans sought the foreign shore. Thenceforward the stream of emigration continued to flow, although in quieter times less strongly; and during the eleven years from 1820 to 1830 inclusive, the total number of German

[1] Schuckmann to Berstett, October 8, 1822; Arens to Otterstedt, October 2, 1824.

[2] Schuckmann and Danckelmann, Report to the king, June 12, 1829.

emigrants to America was reckoned at about 15,000. These were still for the most part South Germans, who were no longer able to make a living in their thickly populated homelands, subject to the oppression of a petty economic policy. When Duke Bernard of Weimar visited the North American Union in the year 1825, he found flourishing German communitties in New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore; while in almost all the other large towns were isolated German citizens in positions of respect. Astor, the Palatiner, already occupied a brilliant position among the millionaires of the young republic. But the great majority of the Germans in America were uncultured individuals of no particular account in state or society. The name of "Dutchmen" was, in fact, in ill-repute, for the Americans in this connection thought only of the mercenary soldiers from Hesse and Ansbach who had been employed by England in the revolutionary war, while they made a point of forgetting how valiantly their German fellow-citizens had fought for the stars and stripes, and how magnificently Generals Steuben and Kalb had in Washington's army upheld the glorious traditions of German arms.

But now a number of men active in the intellectual and political fields had been driven to the new world by the persecution of the demagogues. Among them were Lieber and Carl Follen, Fehrentheil and Salomon, Albert Lange and the Wesselhöfts, Carl Beck from Heidelberg, and Bardili from Swabia. Popular sentiment towards the Germans began to change. The immigrants' state of education and their prestige gradually improved. Marvellous was the rapidity with which the wildest of the German radicals were here transformed into good republican citizens. Some had been constrained by poverty; others found their political ideal realised on American soil, bringing to their new home an abundance of devotion and friendly consideration, a surplus of amiable feelings, which would have secured for them an equally fortunate life in Germany had they been able to regard their old fatherland with similar tolerance. It was but natural that these lost sons of the German nation should have no ear for the warning which was Niebuhr's parting word to his protégé Lieber—to avoid being deceived as to the nature of democracy by the ease with which economic success could be secured in the new home. Entangled in the views of the old

natural law, embittered by the attacks of the German police, they could discern at home nothing but the cruelty of crowned despots; and the immature community in which absolutely no restraints were imposed upon the arbitrariness of individuals, was unhesitatingly greeted by them as the land of liberty.

This change of mood was manifested in Carl Follen more crudely than in any of the others. When his skill as a conspirator had for the second time misled the German students and brought disaster upon them, he was compelled to leave Switzerland, for the German great powers were demanding his extradition for cogent reasons. Hardly had he arrived in America than, as a born republican, he spoke in very different tones. "In this country," he exclaimed with delight, "where law alone rules, there will be no subject more peaceable than myself. In this world of reason, the man who in Europe is a mere hothouse product can find a home. Here there are no taxes to pay, or hardly any, for the whole government of the United States does not cost as much as that of one German principality."[1] He never noted the obvious fact that the administrative duties which in Germany were undertaken by the state, were in America performed far less efficiently and far more expensively by the free activity of society. Vigorous and diligent as ever, he lived a life full of cares and deprivations, and, like so many of his companions in misfortune, gladly supported himself by subordinate occupations which he would have been too proud to turn his hand to at home. When Lafayette was making his triumphal progress through the United States, Follen greeted him as an old fellow-fighter; but he would have nothing more to do with German politics. "I hope the day will arrive," he wrote, "when the German governments will believe my assertion that I have no longer any wish to interfere in German affairs, with which I have no longer any concern."[2] He immersed himself in the interests of his new home, was one of the first to espouse the cause of the abolition of slavery, and joined the Unitarian congregation of his excellent friend W. E. Channing. In this church devoid of symbols, synods, and governing authorities, he found

[1] Carl Follen to his family, January 13, 1825; December 19, 1826; May 26, 1832.

[2] Carl Follen to his family, August 1, 1825; August 24, 1829.

the highest known to him in the sphere of the moral life, the unconditioned freedom of the personal will.

He held fast to the revolutionary ideas of his youth with that sinister obstinacy which the political fanatic shares with those of deranged understanding; a process of growth, of internal development, was impossible to the one-sidedness of his harsh nature. In his last work upon war and peace he defended his old favourite proposition culled from the French constitution of 1791, that the one purpose for which the state exists is the protection of the personal rights of the individual. Consequently war is a conspiracy to rob and murder, justified solely when elementary human rights are infringed, be it only the rights of a single individual—and he carried this reasoning once more to its ultimate extreme in the crass subjectivism of the Unconditionals, war between individuals. Adroitly as he adapted himself to the language and the customs of his second fatherland, he could not escape the curse which rests upon the man without a home. In Germany there had been no place for the radical; to the Americans, the idealist was incomprehensible. When he delivered lectures upon Schiller, whom he regarded upon the abstract plane as the poet of free morality, he speedily noted that his audience could not follow him, and that the sermonising from *Wallenstein's Lager* seemed actually repulsive to their rigid sectarianism. After many painful disillusionments Follen became a Unitarian minister and died prematurely in 1840, meeting a ghastly end on board a burning steamship.

Among the German refugees of this first generation, one only, Franz Lieber, acquired permanent political influence. He was a mediator between two nations, inasmuch as, writing in English but thinking in German, as teacher and man of learning he applied the ideas of Niebuhr's philosophy of history to the scientific formulation of American constitutional principles. Though he, also, tended to overestimate the republican freedom of his new home, his loyal disposition remained untouched by the deplorable bitterness of the refugee. Amid his fruitful labours, he frequently had heartfelt experience of the tragical truth that no one can have two fatherlands; and, in the thin atmosphere of this land of toil, he yearned for the abundant intellectual life of the old world of German civilisation.

For the inchoate national life of North America, the continued influx of German immigrants proved, as the Yankees phrased it, an invaluable fertiliser, for the new citizens were of inestimable value owing to their industry and loyalty, their courage and cordiality. Entering a nation which, though less intellectually cultured, was more active in the economic field, it was inevitable that the small German minority should be perpetually overwhelmed, just as in former days the French refugees had been absorbed into the German nation. In the third generation, at latest, all the German settlers had become Americans, even though in certain regions of Pennsylvania a corrupt German dialect was able to maintain itself beside the English tongue. For Germany, on the other hand, this outflow of healthy energies signified nothing but loss, for it was a gift made to the foreign world without any compensation in return. The venturesome cosmopolitanism of our people, now entering new paths, remained no less unfruitful for German political life than it had been in earlier days when German mercenaries were fighting the battles of all nations. While the Bundestag continued to rule Germany, it was hardly possible even to raise the suggestion whether the current of German emigration might be diverted towards countries where it would not be completely lost to the language, the customs, and the economy of the motherland.

At that time the emigrants took absolutely no direct share in the party struggles of the old home; but all the greater was the tacit influence of what they related in their letters concerning the free country without princes or taxes, where every man stood upon his own feet, where everyone could do and leave undone in accordance with his own preferences. Now that so many victims of the monarchical official state had secured a hospitable reception beneath the star-spangled banner, the doctrines of the law of reason, which declared the republic a sanctuary, acquired fresh energy, and Gottfried Duden found the soil well prepared when, in the beginning of the thirties, he sent to the old fatherland his overdrawn descriptions of the fortunate eldorado of the west. The ideal image of the great federal republic began to exercise potent influence upon German political life.

The watchfulness of the censors worked hand in hand with the zeal of the demagogue-hunters. Since Grano could

display his well-tried energies simultaneously in both these domains of police pressure, it was inevitable that Berlin should provide its special contribution to the wealth of puerile anecdotes about the censorship which constituted a favourite topic of conversation throughout Germany. No one was safe from the incredible caprices of the censor. When General Minutoli, writing in Gubitz's innocent *Gesellschafter*, declared that there was not much intelligence to be found in the *Intelligenzblatt* of Berlin, Grano blue-pencilled this impudent observation because the *Intelligenzblatt* bore its name with the approbation of the king's most excellent majesty. In Berlin, indeed, matters were not so bad as in Austria, where all the writings which had been censored by the German authorities were subjected to a fresh and even stricter censorship, and where even the encyclopædia (*Konversationslexikon*) might be delivered to no more than a small number of princes and professors who had all to give a written pledge that the work would be kept strictly private. But the Prussians had been justified in expecting that the powers of the censorship would be used with moderation, for the king, when establishing the supreme board of censorship, had expressly commanded that "the freedom of the press should be maintained, as far as possible, in accordance with liberal principles, abuse of such freedom being vigorously repressed." [1] Extraordinary was the manner in which this command was fulfilled! What could Germany think of the country of the War of Liberation when Grano now informed Reimer that "the present time" was "unsuitable" for the issue of a new edition of Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation* (a work which had circulated freely for years), and when the supreme board of censorship sustained this incredible prohibition? [2] The publication of a translation of Hutten's Latin works was likewise forbidden, lest offence should be given to the holy see.

Brockhaus of Leipzig suffered more than most from the Prussian censorship. He had long been in ill odour in Berlin, as an acknowledged liberal and as the publisher of Massenbach's *Memoirs*. When he now issued a bungling work by Benzenberg upon Frederick William III, which extolled

[1] Cabinet Order to Hardenberg, November 25, 1819.

[2] Instructions to Reimer: from Grano, February 27; from Lord-Lieutenant von Heydebreck, April 30; from the supreme board of censorship, September 8, 1824. Reprinted in the *Preussische Jahrbücher*, XLIV, pp. 1 et seq (1879).

the monarch and his chancellor for their constitutional principles, the king was personally annoyed, declaring, "The work contains expressions, more especially as regards the matter of the constitution, which are by no means in harmony with my intentions." Frederick William commanded that in future all the works issued by the firm of Brockhaus should be subjected to special examination, since no reliance could be placed upon the impotent Saxon censorship.[1] Vainly did Hardenberg endeavour to assuage the king's anger, for Schuckmann was always able to thwart the chancellor. Since Brockhaus published vigorous remonstrances, the minister forgot himself so far as to use threats, saying that, if Brockhaus could not keep quiet, all his publications would be prohibited in Prussia and their copyright would be forfeited! Nearly three years elapsed before the order for recensorship was at length withdrawn.

In the *Staatszeitung* there continually appeared mysterious hints about the discovery of conspiracies. Every admission on the part of the members of the league of youth was immediately pounced upon by Kamptz as a text for the utterance of vague journalistic suspicions. The harassed editor, Stägemann, who could not defend himself against such interference, was in despair. When accepting the thorny position, he observed grimly to his friends, "A man who has made up his mind to swallow the devil must not look at him too long,"[2] and he thanked heaven when he at length secured his release. Moreover, petty scandals were continually circulating at court; most of these were in themselves of trifling importance, and yet they sufficed to produce in this generation, already sufficiently embittered, a continual sense of uneasiness. How gladly would Wittgenstein have got rid of the hated Schleiermacher. Busily did he repeat the words which the chancellor had used years before regarding the theologian's political lectures, but in the end he did not venture to take action.[3] Schleiermacher's friend Gass was officially instructed to remove to Königsberg, on the ground that he had made himself impossible in Breslau by his participation in the dispute about the gymnasts; when he flatly

[1] Cabinet Order to Schuckmann, May 2, 1821. The other documents are reproduced by Brockhaus, F. A. Brockhaus, III, pp. 183 et seq.

[2] Stägemann to Solms-Laubach, December 22, 1818.

[3] Wittgenstein to Schuckmann, December 22, 1820. Cf. vol. III, p. 62.

refused to obey the order, he was left in peace.[1] Schulz, the university plenipotentiary in Berlin, wrote a fulminating opinion concerning Luden's lectures (based upon the notes of a manifestly incompetent student), and sent this opinion to Mainz and Frankfort; but ultimately the Jena traitor was likewise left unmolested.[2] The spies did not seriously venture to concern themselves with the heads of the officialdom. But in 1820 Lord-Lieutenant Merckel tendered his resignation, because he was weary of the perpetual talebearing, and was unwilling to hand over the curatorship of Breslau university to the new governmental plenipotentiary. Merckel, however, Silesian to the marrow, could not permanently endure to see the administration of his beloved homeland in other hands. Five years later, when a vacancy occurred in the lord-lieutenantship, the king allowed him, at his own request, to resume his former post.[3]

When Merckel and Grolman returned to official service, and when W. Humboldt had completely regained the king's favour, the worst period of the reaction was over. For Prussia's good fortune there now occurred the death of Prince Hatzfeldt (February, 1827). To his last breath he had remained the indefatigable sleuth-hound of old days. Just as unashamedly as he had once, for the sake of his possessions in Berg, described himself as "a subject of his majesty, the emperor of the French," had he of late years played the understrapper of Austria. Hatzfeldt believed in all the spooks which the Austrian police were able to conjure up, accepting even a report by Gentz, which enumerated in a single series the most dangerous political writers of Germany —Börne and Gagern, List and Wessenberg, Zachariä and Pölitz, appearing in friendly juxtaposition.[4] Matters went to such a pitch that on one occasion (the only one in all these years) Metternich actually gave the envoy advice concerning one of Prussia's internal affairs. In an account of the proceedings of the Prussian council of state, the Austrian chancellor had read that Gneisenau sat as president in the

[1] Altenstein and Schuckmann, Ministerial Despatch to Gass, April 26, 1823.
[2] Blittersdorff's Report, July 13; Appendix B to the secret minute of the federal assembly, under date July 3, 1823.
[3] Merckel to Lottum, August 18; Lottum's Reply, September 4, 1825.
[4] Hatzfeldt's Report, March 17, 1825, with appendix by Gentz, Survey of German Writers, etc.

diplomatic committee, and he assured the envoy that the existence of a second ministry of this kind rendered confidential communications impossible. Hatzfeldt permitted the encroachment without protest, and, to his mortification, received from Berlin a reply to the effect that the committee in question, as was well known, had been in existence since 1817, and that it met in extraordinary cases only, for the discussion of questions of supreme importance.[1] Bernstorff could no longer permit that to this servant of Austria should be entrusted the representation of Prussia at the court of Vienna, and in the spring of 1826 he gave Hatzfeldt leave of absence for an indefinite period. But the old prince absolutely refused to hand over the official papers to his substitute, since his correspondence with Metternich was not intended for the eyes of any third person,[2] and he succeeded in obtaining from the court permission to return to the Danube. His death, which occurred shortly afterwards, put an end to the scandal, and thenceforward, alike in foreign and domestic affairs, Prussia's policy resumed the dignified poise proper to a great power. The persecution of the demagogues was discontinued, and emotion gradually subsided.

In the case of the pardoned traitors, their sins were not cast up against them, and in official circles it even became a current jest that no one could count on so brilliant a career as a converted demagogue. Nevertheless, the king did not repent what had been done, for to the end of his life he failed to realise the extent of shame and distress in which his country had been involved by this foolish persecution. Even the crown prince, vexed as he had been by the pettiness of the methods employed, remained convinced of the reality of the great conspiracy skulking in obscurity. For this reason, when at a later date the Germans were again seized by revolutionary excitement, it was possible for Prussia to be afflicted a second time with all the distresses of the demagogue hunt.

§ 5. GERMAN COMMERCIAL POLICY OF MOTZ.

Owing to the prevalence of a more lenient system in internal affairs, and owing to the independent line taken by

[1] Witzleben's Diary, December 21, 1825.
[2] Maltzahn's Report, Vienna, May 15, 1826.

Bernstorff in the eastern question, towards the middle of the twenties the relationship between Prussia and the court of Vienna became notably cooler. In leading military circles the old hostility to Austria, which had never been completely overcome, secured new and decisive expression. What were the benefits which Prussia owed to her faithful allies on the Danube? First of all, the slack and unintelligent military leadership of the years 1813 and 1814, whose defects had been atoned by terrible sacrifices on the part of the Prussian army; next, the severe diplomatic reverses at the Vienna congress; last of all, the more than modest role played by Prussia at the Bundestag. How much firmer and more loyal had been Russia's friendship, both on the battlefield and in the Saxon affair! What reason was there for displaying a yielding disposition towards the Hofburg when this was repaid by dishonest intrigues? Would it not be far better to safeguard the European position of the monarchy by a close alliance with Russia, and then to concentrate the whole force of Prussia upon German affairs, upon domination of the petty states? With amazement did Frankenberg, the Badenese envoy, hear such views voiced by ambitious Prussian officers.[1] Many years were still to elapse before these ideas gained ascendency at court. But the bond by which the free voluntary energy of the state had so long been cramped was already broken. Once again, in Berlin, were people becoming keenly aware of the profound conflict of interests which divided our state from Austria.

Thus were the ways prepared for the acceptance of the commercio-political proposals of the bold statesman who, in this slumberous age, ventured to reopen the channels of Frederician statecraft—F. C. A. von Motz, the new minister for finance. Minister Klewitz had now entered upon the eighth year of his arduous office, having with imperturbable patience maintained the great fiscal reform against countless attacks from within and from without. Yet, notwithstanding all the new economies, he was unable to get rid of the deficit, for he contented himself with a modest position which made it possible for him to supervise the national finances in their entirety. Although before the world he was solely responsible for these finances, Ladenberg, with his board of general control, exercised an independent discretion over the whole

[1] Frankenberg's Reports, October 3 and November 7, 1826.

of the state expenditure and a portion of the revenue. In addition, there was the national debt administration, concerning whose installation Klewitz had not even been consulted. Owing to the disputes between the departments, it was quite impossible to draw up a complete financial statement, and in 1824 the minister was compelled to omit the publication of the budget, which had been promised for every third year. Weary of the incessant friction, and yet of too retiring a disposition to demand the powers needed for the proper fulfilment of his duties, in December, 1824, he informed the king that in view of existing departmental relationships he was unable to establish a financial equilibrium, and, tendering his resignation, he begged for the appointment of lord-lieutenant in his Saxon home.

Thereupon, on December 12th, the king sent the new draft estimates to four of the lord-lieutenants, Schön, Vincke, Motz, and Schönberg, asking them to formulate any objections that occurred to them, and to state what special powers they considered advisable for the next minister of finance, to enable him to adjust revenue to expenditure. Each of the four was to reply as if he had himself been appointed to direct the national finances, and not one of them was to consult any of the others before compiling his answer. In their rejoinders, all that Vincke and Schönberg had to recommend was a further reduction of expenditure, although neither had any precise suggestions as to ways and means. Schön went more deeply into the question. He proposed the amalgamation of the national debt administration and the public exchequer with the ministry of finance, and, in accordance with his usual custom, further declared that the ministry must be supported by "the confidence of the people." He also seized the opportunity of censuring the new instruction to lord-lieutenants; and, in a special memorial, he advocated his old and cherished plan, which had so recently and definitively been negatived by the king, of the appointment of provincial ministers.[1] Motz alone indicated with a sure hand the real seat of the trouble, the dualism of the financial administration. In short, he demanded that the minister of finance should have seat and vote on the board of general control, so that the estimates of expenditure could not be drawn up without his approval; he was also to

[1] Vide supra, p. 206.

have a perfectly free hand in the selection of his councillors; finally, the work of the treasury was to be centralised. In two further memorials which he sent almost immediately afterwards to Count Lottum, he demanded, in addition, that thoroughly trustworthy estimates should be drawn up, and expressed his strong opposition to the reintroduction of the provincial ministries. It was impossible, he said, that a minister of finance should be powerful vis-à-vis such subordinate ministers; the minister of finance must participate directly in the administration, if "irremediable errors, one-sidedness, and indolence" were to be avoided; "he must not be restricted to attempting to regulate the future in accordance with his own views by estimates and administrative stipulations; nor will it suffice him to be able to control the past through the instrumentality of dead figures." [1]

After these replies, there could be no doubt about the issue. The crown prince and Witzleben warmly recommended the appointment of Schön, but he had made himself impossible by questioning once again the principles of the new administrative organisation, and the private warnings of Wittgenstein were hardly needed to secure the defeat of the East Prussian. Frederick William decided in favour of Motz. Not even the king could foresee at this juncture how momentous an influence for good the choice was destined to exercise upon the course of German history. Schön would never have succeeded in establishing commercial unity in Germany; his Prussian self-sufficiency could find for Motz's design to secure a customs union no words but those of disdainful censure.

Motz was in his fiftieth year when he assumed his new office on July 1, 1825, the solitary statesman in a cabinet of men of short views. Like Eichhorn, this Electoral Hessian had been attracted into the Prussian service by the refulgence of Frederician times. Far more brilliant than Maassen, the quiet man of learning, his nature was no less solid. Vigorous and adventurous, inspired with bold self-confidence which frequently found expression in incisive sarcasms, this efficient

[1] Memorials concerning the financial administration; Schönberg, December 16; Motz, December 17; Vincke, December 18; Schön, December 22. Motz to Lottum concerning the estimates, December 21, 1824. Motz, Memorial Concerning the Provincial Ministers (undated, but obviously written at this time). Witzleben's Diary, December 3 and 31, 1824; January 10, 1825. See Appendix XVIII

and practical man had in a variegated career learned to despise mere book-learning and yet understood how to adapt himself to the living ideas of the time. After he became a minister, he would envy his younger friends for their "fine, bronzed, Landrat tint." Those had been his happiest days when, as a young Landrat he had gone up and down his circle in Eichsfeld, sometimes on horseback and sometimes with a sporting flintlock on his shoulder, visiting the peasants in their farms, rarely giving any orders, but ever ready to show the man of the people the way to self-help, saying, "Spontaneous activity accords best with the energetic character of the Prussians." It was in Eichsfeld that he became accustomed to prize the estate of peasants as the kernel of the nation. "Better," he said, "the most oppressive taxes upon articles of luxury, better to tax everything like Pitt, than to burden the sweat of the countryman." Through the peace of Tilsit he was constrained to enter the service of the detested kingdom of Westphalia. He was in charge of the finances of the department of Harz, twice put in an appearance as deputy at the farce of the Cassel diet, observing meanwhile with delighted anticipation how Prussia was realising the ideas of genuine German freedom. Immediately on receipt of the intelligence of the battle of Leipzig, he summoned his Eichsfelders beneath the old colours, and in Halle and Fulda played an active part in the organisation of the reconquered province. Subsequently becoming president in Erfurt, he helped to conclude with Sondershausen the customs treaty which was to serve as prototype of so many others. Here, in Thuringia, the utter impotence of German particularism was conspicuously displayed. Measureless was his contempt for the petty courts. He had sufficient knowledge of their inclinations from the fate of his own family, which had suffered much from the avarice of the electors of Hesse, and he became even more intimately acquainted with them when the king sent him to Cassel, commissioned to settle the conjugal disputes in the Hessian house—a task in which he was naturally unsuccessful. Proud to be a Prussian, invariably candid and independent, he would never listen to the praises of Austria which were voiced in official circles, expressing his frank detestation of the lazy, ignorant, dishonest Austrian administration. Besides Canning, Motz was the only statesman of this epoch who

had fully recognised the essential shallowness of Metternich. Whilst almost all Prussian men of affairs were unable to overcome secret trepidations, in this fresh mind the cheerful confidence of the year 1813 remained unimpaired. "A fine, big war will do us good," he often declared. "But it must be a national uprising, and then we shall develop energies which will surprise everyone."

Motz desired to see the reforms of Stein and Hardenberg pursued to their logical end. A new rural communes' ordinance should supplement the towns' ordinance; the burdens upon the soil should be completely abolished; the land tax should be perfectly equalised (as a matter of justice, even if the state were to lose thereby). Just as all the best officials of these days devoted themselves wholeheartedly to political work, so Motz lived entirely for the state, and even in his most intimate personal affairs he kept political ends in view. When his private fortune increased, he purchased a large estate in Posen, feeling himself here to be a pioneer of German civilisation. Without losing a moment, he attacked the neglected property in his energetic and far-sighted manner, attracted German settlers upon the land, and set an example to the province by efficient and well-ordered management. He said to his relatives, with a laugh: "Follow my example, all of you; I thoroughly understand what I am about."

During his strenuous administrative work in Erfurt and his subsequent tenure of office as lord-lieutenant in Magdeburg, he composed memorials regarding the rounding off of the Prussian state domain, the incorporation of the minor contingents into the Prussian army, and the reform of the administration.[1] Though rapidly produced, these served to display his whole method: his keen insight; his unprejudiced and magnanimous patriotism; but also a certain brilliant levity, which must not be omitted from the picture. Without such a delight in bold ventures and in the construction of far-reaching plans, he would hardly, in an epoch of exhaustion and renunciation, have found energy to pave the way for the reconstruction of the German state. Those in close contact with him received the impression that here was a man with grand natural endowments, one whose intelligence was full of ideas, restless, productive to excess, but threaten-

[1] See vol. II, pp. 383, 419, 472, 473; vol. IV, p. 205.

ing to work itself to pieces within an unduly restricted sphere of activity. He needed an extensive field of operations if the ideas which were fermenting in his brain were to become clarified, if his powerful ambition and his cheerful energy of will were to find free scope for development.

The king had appointed the new minister to make an end of the deficit. The fortunate performance of this immediate task was also the indispensable prerequisite to the success of those commercio-political designs which Motz had never ceased to cherish since the conclusion of the Sondershausen treaty. Only when the equilibrium of the national finances had been secured, could the crown venture upon customs treaties the prospect of whose financial success was dubious. In high official circles the general opinion regarding the state of the finances was extremely unfavourable. Six years earlier it had been found simply impossible to believe that a deficit could exist in Prussia; and now the position was regarded as absolutely desperate because the yield of the new taxes could not be precisely foreseen. Motz did not share these gloomy views. He was convinced that the much lamented deficit would long ere this have been done away with, if only unity, foresight, and order had been introduced into the financial administration. "But I was careful," he said later to his daughter, "to guard myself against promising that surpluses should be forthcoming; had I done so, they would have thought me mad." [1]

A man of less courage might well have been alarmed by the condition of the market. At the very time when Motz entered upon his new duties, England became affected by a terrible commercial crisis, one of the worst convulsions known to mercantile history. The opening up of South American trade had given rise to feverish speculation, which was now followed by a natural reaction. During a period of fifteen months, seventy banks and three thousand six hundred business houses failed. Modest as was still Germany's share in world commerce, our country was not exempt from the disaster; the great firm of Reichenbach in Leipzig and some of the leading houses of Berlin collapsed. But the significance of these troubles was trifling in our case in comparison with the incredible misery of German agriculture; and the agricultural

[1] From the Memoirs of Frau von Brinken.

crisis, as always happens, was more enduring in its effects. The years of famine had hardly come to an end, when there occurred a rapid and permanent fall in the price of all agricultural products. Foreign customs laws and the wretched state of the German roads hindered the transport of the exuberant harvests. Even the technical advances which German agriculture owed to its teachers Thaer and Schwerz, now exercised a disadvantageous influence, for consumption could not keep pace with the increased supply. In many regions, land values fell even lower than during the war. It was only the sheep farms which continued to prosper, Germany exporting to England more than twice as much wool as all other countries combined. But even this advantage threatened to disappear when foreigners began to learn from us, and when German shepherds and German stock were sent to Russia, Sweden, France, and Australia. Old Prussia suffered most severely of all. During the war more than half of the live stock had been lost; now in certain regions the daily wage was only three to four silbergroschen, while in others the *Scheffel* of rye was offered at five silbergroschen. Colonel Brünneck, Schön's brother-in-law, endeavoured to help his neighbours by the introduction of sheep-breeding and by other technical improvements, but very few of them were in a position to venture new undertakings. In response to the urgent petition of the estates, the king once more granted extraordinary assistance "to this nuclear old province." Roads were built, great purchases of grain were ordered for the army, and public granaries were established with the intention of maintaining the price of the *Scheffel* of rye at one thaler.[1]

Then Schön secured an additional allocation of three million thalers to save indebted landlords from ruin. As a good patriot, it was his chief desire that the old families, those whose names were intimately associated with the history of the region, should be maintained in their hereditary possessions. The same view was advocated in the royal cabinet by Schön's friend, Stägemann. Although an adherent of the new political economy, Stägemann had always considered that the ruin of the old landowners would involve the destruction of the state, saying, "This seems to me quite obvious,

[1] Petition to the king from the committee of the East Prussian estates, February 18; Cabinet Order to the ministry of state, April 11, 1822.

for a new state would take its place." But the sum provided was utterly inadequate, although it amounted to almost the sixteenth part of the entire state revenue, and in addition it was necessary at any cost to safeguard from bankruptcy the "Landschaft," the great credit institute of the province, to which the indebted landlords all owed money; had this not been done, the whole province would have been ruined. Upon Schön's suggestion, the king therefore recommended in 1824 that while the allocation should be primarily employed to save the old landed families, when it proved quite impossible to retain a family in possession of its property, a modest pension should be allotted, and the land should be sold at auction by the Landschaft.[1]

With these almost unrestricted powers, Schön set to work. The fate of the Old Prussian nobility was in his hands. Once again, and even more fiercely than some years earlier at the time of the distribution of the first instalments of the war indemnity,[2] did all now compete for the favour of the provincial ruler. He did his best, and many excellent members of the class of landed gentry owed the preservation of their property solely to his care, but when he regarded the position as hopeless, he inexorably authorised the Landschaft to sell the estate by auction. Thus it was that, with the cooperation of this benevolent government, the counts Schlieben, the counts Goltz, and many other highly respected noble families, were expelled from hearth and home, most of them perfectly innocent, for the ultimate cause of their poverty had been the patriotic sacrifices made by them during the war. Hundreds of estates were sold, on one occasion two hundred and eighteen were disposed of simultaneously, and the excessive supply depressed the price of land to so low a figure that the Landschaft could maintain its own solvency only by securing supplementary grants from the state. In many parts of the province quite half of the larger properties changed hands. Side by side with the Käswurms, the Bichlers, the Reichenbachs, and the other Salzburg exiles who had already made their way into the ranks of the landowners, there now of a sudden appeared a crowd of bourgeois landowners,

[1] Schön's Reports: to Schuckmann, August 23; to the king, December 6, 1824. Lottum, Cabinet Despatch to Schön, July 2, 1825. Stägemann to Schultz, October 13; Stägemann's Memorandum concerning the East Prussian Landlords, June, 1825.

[2] See vol. II, p. 532.

derived from Mecklenburg, Bremen, Brunswick, and Saxony Among these were many men of substance who could invest their capital at 15%, and who soon mingled on equal terms with the old aristocracy; but there were also many rough adventurers who never made a success of their new position.

Amid this social transformation, no one suffered more than the severe lord-lieutenant. At times he witnessed tears of thankfulness, but he was also overwhelmed with abuse. In the neighbouring provinces the story was current that the fanatical liberal had made up his mind to replace the slothful race of Prussian nobles by a new and more vigorous stock. It is quite possible that, in his haste, Schön may have jestingly made some such declaration; but his aims were just; he desired to save all that was possible of the old landed gentry, and it was only the scantiness of the financial resources which forced him to adopt harsh measures conflicting with his desires. How much more successfully had King Frederick, after the Seven Years' War, cared for the "conservation" of the landed gentry. But such thoroughgoing help would now have been possible in no other way than by pledging the national credit; but since the national debt account was closed, further increase was inadmissible without the assent of a national assembly. Thus obviously did it once more appear that the monarchy without a national assembly was a mere temporary expedient, sufficing in quiet times, but hopelessly embarrassed whenever extraordinary expenditure became necessary.

The minister for finance had no direct concern with these troubles, but the yield of the taxes made him intimately acquainted with the needs of agriculture, although the king, in furnishing assistance, strictly maintained the principle that even in cases of the utmost need no remission of taxation could be granted. In order to gain a thorough understanding of the difficulties, Motz wished, first of all, to grasp the precise state of the national finances, and he consequently renewed his former demand that the minister for finance should have seal and vote upon the board of general control. The king, following his usual practice, endeavoured to adopt a middle course, for he was unwilling to mortify his tried servant Ladenberg. He commanded that when any difference

of opinion occurred the minister of finance should, through the instrumentality of one of his councillors, negotiate verbally with the president of the board of general control.[1] Motz could not be content with any such half measure, for between the two coordinated authorities there had long been in progress a tragicomical contest of official zeal such as is possible nowhere else than in the Prussian bureaucracy. The board of 'general control' endeavoured to prove its vitality by appending to the financial statement innumerable ridiculous comments, ninety-one to the estimates for the domains, a hundred and forty-six to the estimates of the department of forestry; while the accountants of the ministry of finance naturally responded in kind. The dispute became so intolerable that Motz determined to tender his resignation unless his reasonable demands were granted. "I cannot agree," he wrote to Lottum, "to accept the role with which, for many years, to the disadvantage of the national finances, Herr von Klewitz had to put up." By the principles of the old absolutism, such a threat of resignation was a criminal act of defiance, and even Motz thought it necessary to add the assurance: "I should regard myself unworthy of the king's favour if, a prey to vanity and folly, I were to consent to retain office on any other terms.

Since, in the spring of 1807, in similar circumstances, Stein had been ungraciously dismissed, no other minister had ventured to assume such a tone. Even Hardenberg had on one occasion only, when he was really sure of the king's approval, uttered a gentle threat of resignation. Now four months were to elapse before Frederick William fully forgave the new minister for his act of self-assertion. But by this time he had through Lottum's proposals been thoroughly convinced that the existing dualism was impracticable, and since he was familiar with the stubbornness of his bureaucrats he at length made up his mind to a measure far in excess of what was demanded by the minister of finance. On April 8, 1826, he astonished Motz by the welcome information that he proposed to abolish the board of general control, and to hand over its powers to the ministry for finance. On May 29th, this command was carried into effect, and Ladenberg, in a doleful frame of mind, had to content himself with the

[1] Cabinet Order to Lottum and Motz, November 22 1825.

presidency of the audit office.[1] Motz was at length master of the situation, and the other ministers speedily learned that he considered himself justified in exercising strict supervision over all branches of the administration. The slow-moving Altenstein might have good reason for complaining of the finance minister's encroachments, for Motz was a hot tempered man, easily irritated by excess of formalities;[2] but no one could complain that he was parsimonious. Considering the resources available, he was free-handed in meeting the demands of art and science; and when Kamptz consulted him regarding the great expense involved in the revision of the code, he answered that Prussia must always find means for such work.

The vigorous hand of the new leader could be felt in every branch of the financial administration. By a thorough reform of the treasury department, he was able to secure the power of precisely supervising all that went on. He left the control of taxation in the hands of Maassen, the originator of the new customs legislation. In the official world, Maassen and Motz were regarded as rivals, but they were in fact friends. Maassen gladly allowed himself to be swayed by the quick resolution of his more youthful chief, while Motz recognised clearly enough all that he owed to the perspicacity and detailed knowledge of the general director of taxation. "I will always listen to Maassen," he said with a smile, when his cautious friend advised him against an ill-considered venture. Ludwig Kühne, Motz's friend of Erfurt days, worked under Maassen. He was the terror of idlers and mediocrities, and his subordinates hardly dared to breathe when he exclaimed to them, "Stupidity is God's gift, but to abuse it is a scandal!"

In the provinces, taxation had hitherto been in the hands of the local governments, but the king had of late come to recognise how little the tedious collegial system was suited to this branch of the administration, and in 1822, in the two western provinces, he had therefore placed the entire fiscal administration in the hands of a provincial director of taxation. This arrangement proved thoroughly satisfactory, and was extended by Motz to the other provinces. In

[1] Motz's Report to the king, November 28; Motz to Lottum, November 28 and 30, December 5 and 10, 1825; March 2, 1826; Cabinet Order to Lottum April 8; Ladenberg's Petition to the king, May 3, 1826.

[2] Altenstein to Lottum, February 20, 1828, and subsequent dates.

accordance with old established custom, the new authorities had frequently to contend with the jealousy of the local governments; and Schön, in especial, was able to make the tax director's life a burden. Among the populace, too, the officials were regarded with suspicion, for the name of tax-gatherer was in ill repute, and in the old provinces the monopoly directors of the great king were still remembered with terror. But people soon learned to esteem the punctuality and despatch with which the tax authorities worked, and on the Rhine Tax Director von Schütz was universally loved. Every far-reaching fiscal reform needs time to prove its worth. The business world had by now become accustomed to the new taxes, and the officials had acquired experience in the use of the unusual formalities. Even the smuggling traffic began to subside. By the year 1827 it was possible to regard the reform as completed, and as firmly rooted in the national habits.

As a supplement to this reform, Motz undertook to reorganise the administration of the domains, which had become chaotic during the great agricultural crisis. Accompanied by Kessler, the new director of the crown lands, Motz paid a personal visit to all the domains and forests of the monarchy, hailed everywhere with rejoicing by the forest rangers and the tenant farmers, who were hardly able to realise that the great men in Berlin were at length looking into their grievances. Motz, in order to make a clean sweep of these troubles, appointed a special authority to deal with the question of arrears, and drew up new and more equitable leases, the terms of which had to be strictly observed, but which saved hundreds of tenants from ruin. He went to work cautiously in the matter of the alienation of the domains. It was only in West Prussia and Posen that he permitted the sale of a number of outlying areas to German settlers, "in order to create an independent class of peasantry devoted to the government."

The best of all was that order was now restored to the finances. In little more than three years, on May 30, 1828, Motz was able to report to the king that instead of the dreaded deficit, there was a net surplus of 4,400,000 thalers, which the collection of arrears would increase to 7,800,000 thalers; 3,245,000 thalers had already been paid over to the state treasury, and 1,172,000 thalers had been devoted

to extraordinary expenses. He gladly admitted that but for the extensive reforms effected by his predecessor he would not have been able to give the king this gratifying intelligence; but he had the satisfaction of feeling that he alone had been competent to reap the harvest of that seedtime; and he already felt so sure of the financial position that he ventured to recommend a moderate reduction in the graduated poll tax, suggesting that henceforward the liability to taxation should begin two years later, at the age of fifteen. In other respects, declared the concluding words of the report drafted by L. Kühne, the principles of financial administration would remain: "Thrift and order in respect of regular expenditure; storage of the energies of peace for the needs of the next war; the maintenance of credit by punctual payments; the utilisation of part of the surplus to provide for future industrial development."[1]

Henceforward Motz was sure of the king's respect. At court he was regarded as an upstart, for his ancient Hessian noble family was new in the Prussian service. Wittgenstein's party soon scented out the minister's liberalism, while Lottum and the other advocates of unconditional thrift censured him for levity because he availed himself of the enhanced revenue to effect a gradual increase of the restricted expenditure, to the extent of about 900,000 thalers. Whenever such criticisms ventured out of obscurity, he always justified himself to the king in a frank personal explanation, for the finance minister, as supervisor of the whole administration, could not possibly dispense with the monarch's confidence.[2]

Commercial policy was now entirely in his hands. Since 1825, the ministry of commerce, hitherto conducted by Count Bülow, had been abolished; while Motz was on the best of terms with Beuth, chief of the newly founded ministerial department for commerce, industry, and engineering and building operations. What a pleasure it was for him to collaborate with this technician of genius, a man who was so absolutely assured that a new era of discovery and invention had now dawned, and one who contemplated with such confidence the future towards which the current of this great century was setting. "I have no interest in knights, or priests, or

[1] Motz, Administrative Report of the Finance Ministry for the years 1825-7 with the covering Despatch of May 30, 1828.

[2] Motz to Lottum, March 13, 1830.

robbers," wrote Beuth once in his jovial way; "my delight is in the spinners and weavers, men fertile in resource, who, in command of millions of money, build their houses on the hilltops, practice the arts, and are freely hospitable." Admiring the altitude in matters of creation and enjoyment to which the Britons had attained, he desired to see Germany mount to similar levels. Yet notwithstanding all the admiration he felt for the heaven storming "obelisks" of England's factory towns, he was proud to be the son of a more humane and broad-minded nation, referring with irony to the hopeless insularity of the English. The prosaic hideousness of modern manufacturing industry was, however, almost as repulsive to him as it was to his intimate friend Schinkel, and when the two visited England in 1826, they agreed that Germany must learn to control matters as perfectly as had the Britons, but must aspire towards an artistic refinement which was unknown to the island nation.

There were now sufficient indications that the Germans, and first of all the Prussians, were overcoming the terrible poverty ensuing on the war. Trade was increasing beyond expectation now that Prussia had seriously undertaken to set her roads in order. During the five years of Motz's administration, 285 miles [German] of main roads were completed, and 141 miles begun; among these were the costly and difficult routes through the Silesian and Westphalian mountains, through the valley of the Vistula, and through the marshy flats round Magdeburg and Merseburg—for it was above all in these hitherto impassable regions that the need of improved communication was greatest. To many parts of the remote east the roads brought an entirely new life: it now first became possible to suppress brigandage in the Tuchel Heath; and Schön, who had planned this new road, thoroughly deserved the monument which the grateful inhabitants erected to him in the middle of the forest. In the year 1831, the state possessed 1,147 miles of metalled roads, more than twice as much as in the year 1816. Of the 39,500,000 thalers whose expenditure upon extraordinary constructions, improvements, and works of art was authorised by the king during the years 1820 to 1834, 11,600,000 thalers were devoted to the highroads.[1]

[1] Survey of Expenditure for extraordinary Constructions, 1820–34, compiled by the royal privy cabinet, 1835.

The postmaster general knew how to make a good use of the roads. Nagler's posts aroused the envy of Prussia's neighbours, and were already making their way extensively into the irregularly shaped domains of the petty states. Just as the Prussian thaler continued to maintain its value everywhere, although Nassau and some of the other minor states ernestly endeavoured by princely edicts to keep it at a level of some kreutzers below par, so also these little neighbours found it impossible to keep out the dreaded postilions with the orange collars. In the towns of Thuringia the populace used to assemble to admire the royal diligence, which from 1825 onwards ran twice weekly between Berlin and Frankfort, journeying continuously night and day. In the seven years down to 1830, the income from the postal service advanced from 2,900,000 thalers to more than four millions. The number of letters increased greatly, for, soon after the abolition of the internal tolls, the *Binnenporto*—a special charge upon the transport of letters—was done away with (1824), together with all the mysterious supplementary taxes of the good old times. The rates of postage were now simply proportionate to the distance. They were still extremely high (from 1 to 5 silbergroschen for distances under thirty miles, with a further charge of 1 silbergroschen for every additional ten miles); but at least the Prussians knew what they had to pay, whilst in the minor states it would frequently happen that, for example, postage from Bremen to Stuttgart was higher than from Stuttgart to Bremen.

The wonderful power of steam had by now begun to exercise its influence upon German commerce. Bremen and Hamburg possessed several steamships. A regular service of steamboats began to ply upon the Baltic; and, after several unsuccessful attempts, the first river steamboats travelled up and down the Oder. At the same time (1822), to the limitless astonishment of the inhabitants along the Rhine, a Dutch company sent the steamship "Der Niederländer" up the river to Cologne. Three years later, the first Rhenish Navigation Company was formed in Cologne. Its three vessels navigated the stream from Rotterdam to Mainz, and after a little while to Mannheim. By the year 1830 they had carried 53,000 passengers. The whole income of the company barely exceeded 200,000 thalers, but works for the construction

of steamships were already being established in Ruhrort, and the Rhine shippers foresaw speedy destruction. How the bargees of the Rotterdam Beurten (shippers' syndicate) had been accustomed to carouse for days together in the sacred city of Cologne, when after a six weeks' voyage up stream, their heavy vessels, each drawn by twenty horses, had been brought safely to port. At that time, during the opening years of the nineteenth century, the freight upon a hundredweight of coffee was one thaler, forty stivers; now it fell to seventy-five centimes, for the natural law of modern economic life displayed its irresistible force, compelling traders to seek small profits and quick returns.

Even greater transformations were in prospect. In the year 1825, the first locomotive railway of Europe, that from Stockton to Darlington, was opened. Here and there an innovator ventured to ask whether Germany might not also turn the new discovery to account, for notwithstanding all the improvements of recent years the existing means of transport were utterly inadequate. At Gleiwitz, in the Upper Silesian mining district, when the Oder was low, coal to the amount of hundreds of thousands of tons would often lie idle in the canal boats for six months at a time. But demand for change was exceptional; the majority did not desire any disturbance of their ancient customs; the ideas of the merchants and manufacturers were hardly more advanced than those of the petty traders. When the plan of a railway to the Lower Elbe was first mooted in Leipzig in the year 1829, the elders among the Magdeburg merchants opposed the idea to a man, on the ground that the railway would lead to the capture of Magdeburg's trade by Leipzig. Motz was one of the few who recognised the power of the great innovation. As early as 1828 he advised the king to connect the Weser with the navigable Lippe by a railway from Minden to Lippstadt, and thus to secure that all the transit trade between Bremen and South Germany should pass through Prussian territory.[1]

Towards the end of the twenties, agriculture had fairly recovered from the devastating consequences of the great crisis, and ten years after the promulgation of the customs law, Privy Councillor Ferber, in *Contributions to the Knowledge*

[1] In the Administrative Report of the Finance Ministry. Vide supra, p. 260, note 1.

of the Prussian Monarchy, was able to demonstrate continuous advance in all departments of production and consumption. It is true that the sceptical statistical science of our own day has discredited many of the roseate accounts furnished by Ferber and subsequently by Dieterici. The brilliant calculations regarding the increase in the consumption of meat and grain were obviously devoid of an adequate basis of fact, for accurate details were lacking concerning the extent of agricultural production. There is somewhat more ground for accepting the accounts of the continued increase in the consumption of colonial produce. For example, in the year 1804, the consumption of coffee per head of the population was only 0.75 pounds, while in 1822 it had risen to 1.22 pounds, and in 1838 to 2.20 pounds—though, in considering these figures, it is necessary to take into account the decline of smuggling. The consumption of tobacco also increased notably, and from 1820 onwards the convenient cigar began to replace the traditional pipe. The density of population per square mile [German] increased during the years 1816 to 1831 from 2,006 to 2,521.

According to an approximately accurate estimate, the total trade in the year 1796, import, export, and transit, had been about 105,000,000 thalers; in the year 1828, the imports were estimated at 106,000,000, the exports at 85,000,000, while the transit trade was valued at 104,000,000. The number of persons engaged in commerce increased during the first six years after the promulgation of the customs law from about 70,000 to 82,000; the yield of the licence tax, 1,600,000 thalers in 1824, was 2,100,000 thalers in 1830. The growth of certain great industrial centres, especially Berlin, Aix-la-Chapelle, Elberfeldt, and Barmen, was extraordinarily rapid, not so much on account of the protective tariff, as because their produce was afforded an extensive free market. During the seven years from 1823 to 1829, the import of cotton yarn increased from 51,000 hundredweight to nearly 112,000. The amount of foreign goods sold in the Prussian fairs doubled in the course of twenty years. Promising, above all, was the advance in mining industry. The amount of coal dispatched from Ruhrort was, in 1831, 5,500,000 hundredweight, more than double the amount during any of the first years of peace. The industry of machine making, hitherto almost unknown to the Germans, now became estab-

lished in Prussia. Towards the middle of the twenties, James Cockerill, leaving the marvellous works established by his father at Seraing, removed to Aix-la-Chapelle, endeavouring to utilise in the German market the discoveries of English machine manufacture. By 1830, the machine factories of Hummel, Freund, and Egells, in Berlin, were employing about five hundred workmen. The best customers for their steam engines were still the royal mines and canals. As yet private manufacture made use of steam almost exclusively in spinning mills, but recently also in the new potato distilleries, which began work in 1820, and, after a few years of comparative ill-success, at length completely discomfited the old grain distilleries.

During the first years of German great industry, the importance of institutes for technical education was more extensive than to-day, when the materials for industrial culture are to be found practically in every street. The new industrial institute in Berlin, under the direct superintendence of Beuth, was a nursery of excellent architects, engineers, and manufacturers. Here taught Mauch, the Swabian, an admirable draftsman, a zealous collaborator in the production of the magnificent work by Beuth and Schinkel, *Standard Examples for Manufacturers and Handicraftsmen.* In the year during which this institute was opened (1821), Beuth founded the Union for the Promotion of Industrial Operations, which soon found emulators in Breslau and other industrial centres. This unresting worker was in friendly association with the principal manufacturers throughout the country. All of them, from Bachmann, the earthenware manufacturer of Mettlach on the Saar, to the directors of Königshütte in Upper Silesia, received from him advice, information, and models, and never was his delight keener than when he could contribute to an advance in taste simultaneously with effecting technical progress.

For some years past, Councillor Kunth, former tutor of the brothers Humboldt, had contended that the classical education of the gymnasia no longer sufficed to equip the manufacturers and merchants of the coming generation for the far more multifarious tasks of our own day. Moreover, the various preparatory institutions for technical occupations which, under divers names, had begun to exist in the beginning of the eighteenth century, were no longer adequate. The

defect was at length remedied by the foundation of technical schools, in which classical culture was entirely disregarded, instruction being limited to mathematics, natural science, drawing, and modern languages. The ministry for education was extremely unfavourable to this proposal when it was first made by Motz. Süvern and the other philologically trained advisers of Altenstein, were unwilling to abandon the ideal of a uniform system of education, an ideal which is not only unattainable amid the complexities of modern economic life, but is in truth superfluous, seeing that the great common interests of bourgeois society continually tend to harmonise the classes. In the great towns, however, the town councils inevitably gave way to the imperious demands of practical life. Magdeburg led the way in 1819, with the ardent cooperation of Kunth. In Berlin, five years later, Burgomaster Bärensprung, in a somewhat autocratic manner, secured the opening of a technical school. This thrived under the leadership of Klöden, a man of varied learning; and served as the prototype of kindred institutions in Breslau, Stettin, and Elberfeld. Before long, every province had its industrial schools and modern schools; in Upper Silesia, Beuth secured the simultaneous opening of three such institutions. Thus was originated a new form of German culture, less intellectual than the classical, but with foundations widely established upon the needs of contemporary society, and wealthy in peculiar moral energies—for mathematics will not tolerate any remission of industry, speedily awakening in the pupils' mind the happy belief that man is competent to discover absolute truths. The consequence was that most of the young men who had been trained at the technical schools entered life inspired with a proud confidence (which the gymnasium by no means always succeeds in furnishing) that they stood in the very forefront of civilisation. This realistic culture was sound and justified so long as it modestly observed its proper limits and did not raise the presumptuous claim that it was entitled to dethrone the universities and gymnasia from the altitude of their classical and historical outlook. Alexander Humboldt, and Bessel, the astronomer of Königsberg, hailed the new development with delight. When Goethe received a copy of Klöden's first programme, he wrote with gratification: "We are now assured of the comprehensive care with which the Prussian state is

endeavouring to keep pace with the incessant advances in technical methods effected by our neighbours.

When Beuth assembled the members of "his bodyguard" in manufacturing corporations, the confidence of the new generation found bold and joyful expression. Hither came Egells, Borsig's teacher, and Feilner, the man who provided the North Germans with their inseparable domestic companion, the great white-tiled stove; hither came Hossauer, the gilder, who introduced plated metal goods into Germany; hither came many other talented aspirants to technical excellence, unassuming men by our lights, but full of vigorous creative energy, and in reality happier than their wealthier successors. For as yet the world had not undergone extreme differentiation; the wretchedness of the masses and the oppressive power of large-scale capital were hardly perceptible; far easier than to-day was it for a poor tinsmith's apprentice like Hossauer to attain to great wealth simply by the energy of his intelligence and the industry of his hands. Without the firm conviction that the world belongs to the efficient, this impoverished generation would never have succeeded in founding an Essen for the Titans of modern manufacture.

The recovery of the shipping trade from the blows of the war was especially slow. During the war of 1806, our mercantile marine had suffered serious losses at the hands of the English; and when New Hither Pomerania passed to Prussia many of the ships of this region continued to fly the Swedish flag, which offered some protection against the Barbary pirates. In the year 1820, Prussia possessed no more than 705 vessels, for the most part old and dilapidated, with a tonnage of 145,000; whereas before the wars there had been 1,102 vessels trading in the ports from Barth to Memel. During the last years of the war, the Prussian flag had almost disappeared from the high seas. It was now essential to restore it to its proper position, and to train a race of hardy seamen. This work was successfully effected by the newly founded school of navigation in Danzig, and by the elementary schools of navigation in Memel, Pillau, Stettin, and Stralsund. The worn out ships were replaced by new ones, fewer in number, but stronger and of heavier tonnage, and in 1830 the Prussian mercantile marine consisted of 643 thoroughly seaworthy vessels with a tonnage of more than 150,000. Progress was, however, extremely laborious.

Of the ships entering and leaving Prussian harbours in the year 1828, no more than half flew the Prussian flag, while a fourth of them were English vessels.

However gratifying this gradual increase in strength, Motz was well aware that Prussia could do far greater things if only the obstacles imposed by the hostile commercial policy of her neighbours could be removed. After some years of ill feeling, relationships with England had taken a favourable turn. Since the island kingdom obstinately maintained the navigation act of Cromwell, and the trade of Danzig had been almost destroyed by the English navigation dues, Prussia had recourse to retaliatory measures, imposing heavy dues upon the shipping of all nations which did not offer complete mutuality (June 20, 1822). When the English court remonstrated, a cool answer was given to the effect that this was a domestic matter with which foreigners had no concern. The Prussian envoy declared that in his royal master's opinion mutual restrictions upon commerce were nothing but mutual injustice; it was Prussia's policy to replace such restrictions by mutual facilitations, but the king would insist upon reciprocity, and would in case of need even increase the navigation dues. Huskisson, president of the board of trade, recognised that he had no effective reply to this reasonable language. He saw what was at stake. The English exports to Prussia already amounted to at least £7,000,000, while Prussia exported to England barely half this amount.

The resolute attitude of the Berlin court gave the prudent statesman the desired opportunity for attempting a reform of English commercial policy. It is true that in parliament the ignorant and traditional English arrogance was once more dominant. Eight years after the Prussians had saved Wellington's army from destruction at Waterloo, a parliamentary orator declared that the Prussian navigation law was "a presumptuous exercise of power on the part of a German princeling." Even Huskisson hardly realised the formidable strength of Prussia, saying indifferently that it was unbefitting England's dignity to show a different front to the weak and to the strong. In the end, the presumptuous German princeling carried his will into effect. Parliament passed the reciprocity acts, empowering the crown to sign reciprocity treaties; and on April 2, 1824, a navigation

treaty was signed with Prussia for a term of ten years, placing the flags of the two contracting parties on equal terms. Two years later this favour, which in Europe England had hitherto vouchsafed to her protégé Portugal alone, was extended also to Prussian trade with the colonies. There ensued the long series of similar treaties with other powers, and the navigation laws gradually passed into abeyance. For the first time since the reestablishment of world peace, an effective blow had been delivered upon the bulwark of British rule of the seas. In earlier days, British broadsides had continually clamoured for the defence of commercial privileges, but now decades passed without anything of the kind. Henceforward England endeavoured to compensate for what had been lost in Europe by the expansion of her transatlantic commerce. That victory of liberal commercio-political ideas upon which the originator of the Prussian customs law had based his hopes, was now beginning, however slowly, to become apparent. In the English parliamentary debates of the next few years, the free traders were fond of referring to the Prussian and French import schedules, to the blessings of freedom, and to the paralysing effect of coercion. Huskisson declared, "I hope the day will come when the tariff of this country will be as free as that of Prussia."

Far more difficult was it, in these commercial questions, to come to terms with the Netherlands. The regulations for Rhenish navigation appended to the Vienna congress act, specified in unambiguous terms that navigation between Basle and the mouths of the river was to be subjected to those dues alone which had been agreed upon by treaty; not even a war between the states bordering on the Rhine was to effect any change in this matter. Yet never was a treaty broken more shamelessly. Even after all the proofs of avarice which Holland had in her commercial policy during past centuries furnished to her neighbours, the German world was astonished when this state, restored to existence at the cost of German blood, established upon the Netherland channels of the Rhine (which had been free under Napoleon) a number of custom houses. Goods in transit had to pay transit dues, so that the costs of transport upon the Netherland portion of the stream was thirteen times as high as the cost of transport upon a Prussian section of the same distance. The passage of some commodities was actually

prohibited. The ink of the treaties was hardly dry when, at the very first conference of the states bordering on the Rhine, which met at Mainz in the year 1816, Holland displayed the greatest possible illwill; and it was her fault that for many years these Rhenish navigation conferences remained just as unfruitful as had in former days the navigation capitulations of the four Rhenish electors.

The Hague cabinet flippantly declared that the Rhine specified in the treaty obviously meant the Old Rhine, that arm of the river now silted up which laboriously reaches the sea near Leyden and Katwyk; navigation upon the larger mouths was subject to the maritime tolls; it was only necessary to ask Hanover, which, for its part, levied maritime tolls at Stade; and where was it written that the Rhine was free "jusque dans la mer"? All that the Paris treaty of peace stipulated was "jusqu'à la mer." The exhortations of the Verona congress remained without effect, and when the English cabinet made representations at the Hagué, no explanations were forthcoming. When Austria reminded the king of the Netherlands of the benefits for which he had to thank the European powers, the court of the Hague loftily replied that the king owed his sovereignty, under Providence, to the blood and the glory of his forefathers and to the choice and confidence of a free people. Holland, he said, was ready if necessary to regard the Waal as the mouth of the Rhine—but the Waal terminated at Gorkum, nearly fifty miles from the sea! "The arm of the sea between the mouth of the Rhine and the ocean can in no respects be compared with the aforesaid river." [1] The very wording of this piece of sophistry showed beyond question that Holland was not acting in good faith. Shortly afterwards, for a change apparently, the Netherlands insisted that the Lek was alone to be regarded as a continuation of the Rhine; while in the year 1827 it was explained that the country was prepared to renounce its maritime rights if a duty-free route were granted for commerce from Liège to Aix-la-Chapelle.

It was with the hearty assent of all Germany that George Canning exclaimed:

> In matters of commerce the fault of the Dutch
> Is giving too little and asking too much.

[1] Memorial by the Netherland minister for foreign affairs, April 12, 1826.

According to the Netherland interpretation, the Rhine was not free for the German and other riverine states; but the German Rhine was free for the Dutch, the French, and the Swiss. From considerations of neighbourly interest the court of the Tuileries supported the Netherlands in this breach of treaty, for it was hoped in Paris that if the Rhine could be blocked, the trade between High Germany and the sea would make its way to Havre along the excellent canals of France. For a long time the joint resistance of these bad neighbours seemed insuperable. Many towns in the Rhenish region were beginning to obtain their colonial produce through Bremen or Hamburg, and the German press was in all earnest advocating the unprecedented design of connecting the Lippe with the Ems by a canal, and thus evading the Dutch duties by the Emden route.

At this juncture, Prussia intervened on behalf of Germany's rights. The Berlin court recognised from the first that the only way in which Dutch mischief-making could be overpowered was by retaliatory measures. Prussia demanded that navigation on the Lek and the Waal should be completely freed to the sea. She declared that the Rhenish staple at Cologne would be maintained until Holland had fulfilled her duties. In accordance with the Vienna treaties, Prussia was prepared to waive the exercise of this commercial right, though for the present she would enforce it as the only possible means of negotiation with Holland. The declaration was solemnly reiterated in numerous diplomatic documents and in the official articles of the *Staatszeitung*. "The king is absolutely determined," Witzleben assured the Badenese envoy, "not to yield a single step in this matter." "We know," he continued, "that by the abolition of the staple, our Rhenish towns will at first suffer, but we hope for an increase in general trade along the Rhine, and at all hazards we are prepared to fulfil our treaty obligations as soon as Holland is willing to do the same."[1] The question was all the more important because waterways continued to maintain a great superiority over the slow and expensive land routes for commerce; for example, artillery was sent from the Rhine to Pomerania by sea, and, notwithstanding the Dutch transit dues, the freight was less than if it had been conveyed by land.

[1] Frankenberg's Report, December 6, 1826.

The Berlin cabinet hoped for the support of all the German riverine states. But at first Hesse alone sided with Prussia in her resolute action, for the sagacious du Thil recognised that Prussia was here "representing the general interest of Germany."[1] Somewhat later, Bavaria joined forces. Nassau, on the other hand, made common cause with the Orange cousins, thus following the tradition of the ducal house. Baden continued for a long time to display an extremely weak attitude, uttering bitter complaints of Prussia's harshness, and defending on several occasions the Netherlanders' specious proposals for a compromise. The liberal world displayed the customary moral indignation, cursing Holland and Prussia in one breath as the oppressors of the Rhine. The envy inspired in the minds of the High Germans by the growing importance of Cologne, likewise made itself felt. Furthermore, the South German states engaged in neighbourly quarrels, Mannheim complaining of the Mainz staple, Würtemberg of the Mannheim staple, and Mainz of the Badenese Neckar dues. On one occasion Berstett conceived a fine plan of campaign. Baden was to allow Würtemberg to lodge a complaint at the Bundestag on account of the Mannheim staple, then the cabinets of Baden and Würtemberg were to combine to throw the blame upon the Cologne staple right, and were thus to give the signal for a general attack upon Prussia. Unfortunately this masterstroke of federal policy never came into practical effect, for the plan was prematurely disclosed.[2]

A decade passed before these quarrelsome minor states at length realised that the oppressive staple right of Cologne was the sole means available for bringing the Netherlanders to their senses. Baden remorsefully admitted her error. "We thankfully recognise Prussia's work on behalf of the complete liberation of the Rhine," such were the words of a despatch sent to Frankenberg by the orders of Grand Duke Louis. "Necessity alone has compelled us to make conditional proposals for a compromise. Still less readily shall we be inclined to separate ourselves from the Prussian interest now that this has become the general interest." Yet warmer were the terms in which Berstett expressed the gratitude of his court "for the principle so forcibly main-

[1] Du Thil to Motz, February 28, 1828.
[2] Blittersdorff's Report, September 21, 1821.

tained by Prussia, the establishment of which will now redound to the general advantage of navigation."[1] Even France was converted to the same view, and abandoned the hope of making Havre the outlet of Rhenish commerce.

Thus Prussia was at length enabled to lead all the Rhenish riverine states into the field against Holland and Nassau. The Netherlands began to give way, feeling that Prussia would be able to keep up the contest longer than themselves. The great powers sent new and urgent exhortations to the Hague. In this struggle, Russia in especial displayed herself a faithful ally of Prussia, making serious representations to the house of Orange concerning the unprecedented character of the violation of treaty. Once more setting all influences at work, Motz was able in the spring of 1829 to induce Holland to give way.[2] In August, the two courts, now reconciled, laid their joint proposals before the Rhine navigation conference at Mainz, and thus finally, after a paper war which had lasted sixteen years, the Rhine navigation convention of March 31, 1831, came into being, the work being notably assisted by the energy of Delius, a Prussian, and president of the congress. The Rhine was free "down to the sea." The Lek and the Waal, the two principal mouths at Rotterdam and Helvoetsluis, were opened for navigation, and Prussia immediately abolished the Cologne staple. There was still much to be done for the German river; the minor riverine states would by no means tolerate efficient supervision of their engineering works to control the stream. Nevertheless Prussia's firmness had effected a noteworthy facilitation of traffic—and had proved, in addition, that the petty states could secure permanent protection of their interests nowhere else than in Berlin.

While Motz ultimately gained a victory in the commercio-political struggle with Holland, he was defenceless in face of another bad neighbour, the crown of Denmark. At the Vienna congress, in order to avoid the complete destruction of Denmark, in any case severely injured, the question of the Sound dues had been left undiscussed. The consequence was that this preposterous sea toll continued in force, the solitary instance of its kind, conflicting with

[1] Instruction to Frankenberg, May 16, 1826; Berstett to Frankenberg, October 16, 1829.

[2] Frankenberg's Report, June 29, 1829.

all the principles of modern international law, justified solely by ancient tradition, levied without the rendering of any service in exchange, in a strait of which for more than a hundred and fifty years the western shore alone had been Danish, and which, as the experiences of the Napoleonic wars had testified on more than one occasion, could not be commanded by the guns of Kronborg. When Prussia concluded a commercial treaty with Denmark in 1818, the Prussian negotiator, Count Dohna, was extremely remiss. The tariff in force, recognised by most of the other flags, was that of 1645. The Further Pomeranian and Old Prussian harbours contended that they possessed an old-established right to special remissions; but Dohna, without consulting the merchants of the Baltic ports, accepted the tariff as applying to Prussia. Only to the two small harbours of Cammin and Colberg were certain privileges granted in a secret article. On these terms an agreement was effected for twenty years. The high dues (averaging one per cent. ad valorem) were permanently increased by arbitrary accessory charges; in 1827 the shippers of Stettin calculated that the excess payments made by them amounted to 40,000 thalers per annum. To all complaints from the great powers, the little state replied with that presumption which is characteristic of fallen greatness. The Sound dues were Denmark's gold mine, and the last vestiges of her days of power; the patriots cherished them as the apple of their eye, as the finest jewel in the Danish crown. The Baltic harbours of Prussia found them a severe oppression. The king vainly endeavoured to come to the rescue by conceding to the merchants of Stettin a rebate of taxation upon all goods imported through the Sound. The trade of the Pomeranian capital in colonial produce experienced a continuous decline; during the eight years following 1821 the import of coffee fell from 21,000 to 8,000 hundredweight, and before long coffee was cheaper in Berlin than in Stettin. Yet all this had to be endured because unanimous action on the part of the great powers was unattainable.

Far graver even than this was the commercial situation on the eastern frontier. After vexatious negotiations, the three partitioning powers had tacitly agreed that they would not literally enforce the incautious Vienna treaty regarding

Polish trade.[1] Just as little as Austria could Prussia concede a separate status in commercial matters to those portions of its territory which had formerly belonged to Poland, while Russia was disinclined to unite the Poles of Lithuania with the new kingdom of Poland in a single customs union. Such being the position of affairs, there was sufficient ground for satisfaction in Berlin when on December 19, 1818, a commercial treaty with Russia and Poland was at length secured, providing, on the one hand, great advantages to transit trade on the Vistula and the Niemen, and, on the other, giving certain preferences to Prussian manufactured articles. The nationalist party in Warsaw was greatly incensed, for although the agreement was described as a "supplementary act to the treaty of Vienna," and although it contained a few casual words regarding "the Poland of 1772," there was absolutely nothing in the document which could favour the much desired reestablishment of the old kingdom of Poland. The Russian concessions applied to all Prussian subjects, and not to the Poles alone; and at the frontier of Posen and West Prussia the same tariff prevailed as in the other Prussian provinces. For Prussia the consequences of this agreement were most favourable: Silesian industry showed itself strong enough to endure the Russian tariff, and the old trade of the region with Poland began to revive. But this fortunate state of affairs had lasted barely two years, when a momentous transformation occurred in the commercial policy of Russia. Of late Czar Alexander had vacillated between the traditions of the prohibitive system and the more liberal doctrines of Storch, tutor to the princes at St. Petersburg. But now Cancrin of Hesse gained his ear. This was another of that series of notable Germans whose talent for organisation has been devoted to the consolidation of czarist autocracy—a man bold, energetic, born to command, dominated by a single idea, namely, that "a developing country needs an independent commercial system."

Numerous misunderstandings with the Russian authorities on the frontier had convinced the Prussians that the wind in St. Petersburg was blowing from a different quarter. After Alopeus, the Russian envoy, had vainly approached Hardenberg on more than one occasion, in March, 1822, King

[1] Cf. vol. II, pp. 183–4.

Frederick William received a despatch from his royal friend (under date February 27th) in which the czar, after the usual assurances of affection, declared that he could no longer tolerate the infringement of his subjects' interests, and that inexorable necessity compelled him to demand important changes in the existing treaties. In truth, the advantages of the agreement had hitherto been preponderantly on the side of the Prussian manufacturer, for during these years when the Germans were producing grain in excess of their needs, Russian exports to Prussia were minimal. Alexander referred to a secret article in the agreement which was to the effect that the two governments should exchange observations every year, to aid them in overcoming any difficulties which might have arisen in carrying it into effect, and to assist them in coming to terms regarding any alterations that might prove necessary. Surprised and distressed, the king rejoined that the matter was at once serious and difficult, and that individual stipulations could hardly be altered without endangering the whole. "The development which national industry has taken in my states since our treaty was signed cannot be checked without inflicting upon a numerous class of my subjects losses at once cruel and irremediable."[1] In accordance, however, with the secret article, he commanded his ministers to negotiate concerning the Russian proposals. He took it as a matter of course that until a new understanding had been secured Russia would continue to observe the existing treaty, for the crowns had given a mutual pledge that neither would raise the tariff on the Polish frontier without the other's consent.

Hardly had this answer been despatched (March 22nd) when the astounding tidings came to hand that by the ukase of March 12th/24th the czar had introduced a strict prohibitive system, practically closing the Russian frontiers to foreign manufactured articles by means of prohibitions and exorbitant dues, and that the new arrangement was to come into force upon May 1st. Thus the supplementary act was annulled by Russia on her own independent initiative, and by a coup de main obviously prepared long in advance, though in order to provide a scanty cloak for the breach of treaty it was added that at the Prussian frontier the revised tolls were not to be enforced until the new year, so that in the

[1] King Frederick William to Czar Alexander, March 22, 1822.

interim a fresh agreement could be secured with the court of Berlin. No doubt the authorities in Berlin must have been prepared for the annulling of the treaty at any time, for no state can agree to subject its commercial policy in perpetuity to the will of a foreign power; but the inconsiderate roughness of Russian methods aroused well-grounded anger, and since a first attempt at an understanding remained fruitless, in 1823 the minister for finance had recourse to retaliatory duties, raising the tariff on grain and cattle on the Russian frontier twofold and threefold respectively. Several of his ablest advisers doubted from the first whether this measure of defence would be effective, and the result confirmed their opinion.[1] Cancrin had meanwhile been placed in formal control of the Russian finances, and his "restrictive system," as he termed it, was forthwith applied in full force. The embargo on the frontiers safeguarded the market for an artificially cultivated national industry, and the credit of the state was increased in the like artificial manner by a deliberate neglect of private credit. The financial result of the new system was brilliant. In the very first year of his administration the powerful minister succeeded in overcoming the deficit, and he acquired the czar's confidence so rapidly that he was already able to carry through notable economies in the upkeep of the court and in the military system. It was left to the future to show how weak was the foundation upon which the vigorously pushed system of state industry had been erected.

Prussia's position was embarrassing. There was much to demand from this unaccommodating neighbour, and extremely little to offer. The retaliatory duties proved unavailing, for in any case the import of grain had almost entirely ceased. Negotiations were reopened; and (since Klewitz was not the man to give Count Bernstorff effective support against Mohrenheim, the adroit Russian negotiator), on March 11, 1825, a second commercial treaty was signed, this time extremely unfavourable to Germany. Prussia rescinded her retaliatory duties, receiving in return a few trifling concessions in respect of textiles, and so on; but, for the rest, the accomplished fact of the Russian frontier embargo was left undisturbed. If Russians were already inclined to invoke imprecations upon the inflexible minister,

[1] Meyern's Report, Berlin, April 19, 1823.

it may be imagined that the ill wishes in the Prussian frontier provinces were even stronger. Here legal traffic with the neighbouring country was entirely suspended, for the custom house officers on the frontier did not even conscientiously enforce the high tariff, and the result was that a colossal smuggling trade came into existence, favoured by the venality of the Russian officials and the cunning of the Jews, and demoralising wide regions of the country. Such was the evil heritage taken over by Motz when he assumed office. He repeatedly but vainly endeavoured to secure some mitigation of the frontier embargo. When Alexander Humboldt, in 1829, returned from his Siberian journey and was received in St. Petersburg with princely honours, fulfilling a commission from Motz, he handed his friend Cancrin a memorial intended to explain to the Russian minister the two-edged working of the latter's potent system. Cancrin, however, resolute not to shift his ground, rejoined that Russia had no differential tariffs, and that Prussia, which purchased very little from Russia, could not be granted any preference over other nations. He spoke very frankly regarding the fiscal spirit of his commercial policy, saying: "Commercial systems are an evil in the world, and at bottom no more than a surreptitious form of taxation, based upon financial needs. For my own part, I am fully convinced of the truth *in abstracto*." [1]

It was necessary that Prussia should seek compensation in the German market for these losses in the east and in the north, but of late years she had secured very little success for her commercial policy even among her smaller neighbours. The minor states surrounded by Prussian territory had been terrified by the outcry from the courts and the press against the customs law. It was not until 1822 that the prince of Rudolstadt decided to follow the sensible example set by his cousin of Sondershausen three years earlier, and to join the Prussian customs system with his Unterherrschaft. In the following year, two bailiwicks of Weimar and the upper duchy of Bernburg were taken into the customs community, and all those concerned appreciated the advantages of the extended free market. But Berlin still continued to await vainly the oft promised accession of all the Anhalt

[1] Cancrin to A. von Humboldt, November 22, 1829.

territories. The duke of Coethen cheerfully continued to wage his smuggling war against his royal brother-in-law, encouraged thereto by the suggestions of Adam Müller and the incessant squabbling at the Bundestag. When Müller exceeded the bounds of decency, Hatzfeldt was forced to complain in Vienna. Metternich promptly administered a sharp reproof on account of "conduct conflicting utterly with the intimate and friendly relationship which, as is well known, exists between Austria and Prussia," and he obligingly communicated this despatch to the Prussian court.[1] It is probable that Müller's secret instructions had a different tenour, for he continued his activities unabashed, and found faithful allies in the jesuitic entourage of the duchess. The breach of faith of this little neighbour was all the more discouraging to the court of Berlin because in the interim (1824) the Hohenzollern princedoms and Würtemberg had concluded a customs treaty modelled upon the Prussian enclave treaties. Thus did the minor states slap their own faces. Those reasonable commercio-political principles for which in Frankfort Wangenheim had reproached the Prussian government, declaring them an infringement of international law, were introduced into Swabia; and the liberal press, which had overwhelmed the Prussian enclave system with invectives, now found the application of the same system in Würtemberg extremely gratifying.

As soon as Motz found himself at home in his new position, he declared to the foreign office that Prussia's long-suffering attitude towards her dishonest neighbour was being maintained to the point of weakness, and that it had become necessary, in this case, to apply the customs law in its full severity (January, 1826). Shortly afterwards, Dessau and Bernburg requested that certain bailiwicks should be accepted into the customs community. Upon Motz's instigation the reply was made that Prussia regarded such partial measures as futile, but that if the dukes would join with their entire domains they would be made welcome.[2] After some further hesitation, two negotiators from Anhalt now came to Berlin; and with one of these, von Salmuth of Bernburg, an able

[1] Hatzfeldt to Metternich, September 16; Reply, October 2. Metternich, Instruction to A. Müller, October 2, 1824.

[2] Ministerial Despatches from the foreign office to the dual government in Bernburg March 5 and May 6, 1826.

and humorous man who utterly despised the monkish tricks of the Coethen court, Motz was soon able to come to terms. During the course of this summer the duke of Bernburg announced the accession of his entire territory to the Prussian customs system. Thus eight years had elapsed after the promulgation of the customs law, before one of the German minor states in its entirety joined the customs union. The Dessau plenipotentiary, on the other hand, broke off the negotiations, for meanwhile Adam Müller had removed from Coethen to Dessau, ostensibly in order to bathe in the Mulde, but in reality to intrigue against the accession of Dessau to the Prussian customs system.

Duke Leopold of Dessau, who was married to one of the king's nieces, expressed his regret to his uncle in a heart-rending letter, saying that years before he had promised his cousin of Coethen not to join unless the latter did so as well. "The Prussian ministry demands that the enclave states should unhesitatingly accept foreign laws and foreign methods of administration. But, most gracious of kings, I venture to say with confidence that this cannot be your majesty's own desire. Prussia's mighty and just ruler, who, in the second article of the federal act, guaranteed sovereignty and independence, will never permit his ministers, by strict observance of the letter of the federal law, to kill the spirit by which that law is manifestly animated, and to distort it into a legal title for actual coercion. If I thus venture to defend, by appealing to your majesty's good heart and to the paternal sentiments which you have displayed towards me and my consort, the little heritage handed down to me by my ancestors (which, should God hear the prayers of my myself and my beloved wife, will pass from my hands to those of a king's great grandson), I do not take this course without very strong inducement"—to which was appended a long complaint regarding the "police line" with which the land of Anhalt was threatened. The king, however, manifested grave annoyance at his nephew's duplicity, reminding the duke that Prussia had not signed the Elbe navigation act at Dresden until the Ascanians had formally promised to join the Prussian customs system. He exhorted Leopold to follow Bernburg's example, and concluded by saying: "I find it impossible to admit that the pledge given in Dresden by all the dukes of Anhalt can have been invalidated by any under

taking entered into among them at a subsequent date."[1] A second despatch from the Dessau ruler, referring once more to the stubborn refusal of his Coethen cousin, remained unanswered.

The king now commanded that the war of the frogs and the mice should be brought to a conclusion, and that the Anhalt territories should be surrounded by the dreaded "police line," but that at the same time the two dukes should once again be invited to negotiate.[2] In March, 1827, customs barriers were established on the Elbe above and below Anhalt, and from all ships entering Anhalt the provisional payment of the Prussian customs dues was demanded, with the proviso that the duty would be refunded if the goods should really remain in Anhalt. The duke of Coethen promptly sent a lieutenant to Berlin with an ultimatum, choosing a lieutenant, either because he had not any higher officer available, or else because he wished in this way to show his contempt for Prussia. The valiant lieutenant threateningly demanded that the measures complained of should be annulled within a week; in default, Coethen would have to take more serious steps. Naturally he received no answer. Eichhorn and Heinrich von Bülow, Humboldt's son-in-law, who first displayed his diplomatic talents in this ridiculous negotiation, merely wrote a few tart observations on the margin of the Coethen ultimatum.[3] "Cette affaire ennuyante," as Bernstorff was accustomed to term it with a sigh, was now again brought before the Bundestag by Coethen. Once more did the entire press defend the innocent petty state, the magnanimous protector of the smugglers and the black brigade; once more did a committee meet in the Eschenheimer Gasse under the presidency of the Austrian envoy. Once more was a report issued in favour of Coethen, and once more had the Prussian envoy to read out a sharply worded rejoinder. Nagler said in plain terms that the report of the committee had served only to confirm the government in the conviction of its rectitude; while Bernstorff declared, "When the great states entered into a union with the small, it was not in order that the latter should exercise arbitrarily and fantastically that

[1] Duke Leopold of Dessau to King Frederick William (received June 20, 1826); Reply, Teplitz, July, 1826.

[2] Ministerial Despatches from the foreign office to the revenue offices of Dessau and Coethen, February 16, 1827.

[3] Ministerial Despatch to the Viennese embassy, March 16, 1827.

sovereignty which is inviolable when reasonably used." Throughout this affair, the attitude of Austria was ambiguous[1] Adam Müller was given long leave; but in other respects the Hofburg did nothing to support Prussia, and Count Trauttmansdorff, the Austrian envoy, even lodged a remonstrance about the coercive measures that had been instituted.[2]

The minor courts were terrified by this rude reminder of the natural limits of their sovereignty. In a despairing letter, Grand Duke George of Strelitz asked his royal brother-in-law whether it was really Frederick William's desire to endanger the existence of the Germanic Federation. But the king did not allow himself to be bluffed. In July, 1827, he sent the grand duke a memorial expounding yet again the whole unworthiness of the Anhalt smuggling policy. "This," he wrote, "may show you that the measures adopted are imperiously demanded by the interests of my subjects, that the steps I have taken were perfectly justified, and that neither the claims of the federal assembly nor the opinion of the public within and without Germany can influence me, but that the only thing which can bring about a change will be that the dukes of Anhalt should give way." With his usual sound sense, he went on to reiterate the pith of the matter in dispute: "Your highness, moreover, cannot fail to recognise that when the interests of a state containing from thirty to forty thousand inhabitants conflict with those of a state with a population of twelve millions, it lies in the nature of things that the former must give way as soon as complete compensation is offered. Should the Federation fail to restrict within bounds the pretensions of the smaller states against the larger, pretensions based upon a misunderstanding of the nature of sovereignty, federal relationships would soon become intolerable, and the Federation, as your highness truly remarks, would certainly be endangered."[3]

Meanwhile the two harassed minor princes began to understand that they could not maintain the unequal struggle. They resolved at length to keep their pledged word, and declared themselves ready to negotiate. On July 17, 1828, after nine years' experience of a smuggler's joys, Dessau and

[1] Instruction to Nagler, February 27, 1827.

[2] Maltzahn's Reports, Vienna, March 21, April 6 and August 6, 1827, March 18, 1828; Bernstorff to Trauttmansdorff, February 21, 1828.

[3] King Frederick William to Grand Duke George of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, July 28, 1827.

Coethen adhered to the Prussian customs system. In touching manifestoes, both the sovereign princes deplored having to burden their beloved subjects in this way. The Coethen ruler referred to "circumstances over which I have no control"; but the more straightforward Dessauer (with that cynical complacency which no one takes amiss in a German princeling) alluded to "the interests of my revenue system." All "these enclave treaties assigned to the minor courts a share in the Prussian import and export duties, calculated in accordance with population; their rights were duly honoured by the arrangement that on the custom houses the national arms should be displayed beside those of Prussia, and by similar vanities; but they were given no share in customs legislation. Dessau and Coethen reserved the right of veto in the event of any change in the essential principles of the customs law—happily an unmeaning proviso. Equally harmless was the clause declaring that the accession of Dessau and Bernburg was for six years only. Motz and Eichhorn knew very well that there would be no idea of withdrawal, and therefore no one grudged the pygmies the enheartening consciousness that they had not bound themselves to all eternity. In fact, in the Anhalt territories, honest trade began to thrive once more, and before long everyone felt that the natural order of things had been restored.

Whilst the Anhalt negotiations were still in progress, the prospect suddenly opened for Prussia of the entry of larger German states into the customs community. Taught by the discouraging experiences of the Vienna conferences, during the last few years the court of Berlin had waited patiently to see whether financial stress would not induce the middle-sized states to adhere to the Prussian customs system of their own free will. A supplementary advantage of this policy was that Prussia had no occasion to trouble herself about the countless plans for a customs union which appeared from time to time at the minor courts like cloud wraiths quick to form and quick to dissolve, and which were frequently communicated to the Prussian envoys. Facile scheming has ever been the privilege of impotence. A state representing a grand national idea could pay no attention to the fantasms of the political dilettantes in Nassau and Meiningen. A single customs treaty entered into by Prussia with undue

haste, which failed to stand the test of time and had consequently to be relinquished, would have alarmed alike the courts and the nation and would have paralysed Prussian commercial policy for years. Only if one of the middle-sized states, swallowing its pride and overcoming its mistrust, were spontaneously to make positive offers in Berlin, would it be possible to believe that this approach was dictated by powerful interests, and that a permanent alliance was possible.

Moreover, Adam Müller's intrigues sufficed to show what influences were at work at the minor courts, and the inference was obvious that all negotiations about the customs question ought to be conducted in Berlin. Here alone could be found the technical experts and the abundant statistical material requisite for the solution of numerous complicated questions of detail. Here alone could be found a tolerably secure protection against the machinations of the Hofburg and against the prejudices of the minor dynasties. Residence in a serious-minded community invariably exercises a beneficial and sobering influence, and even in this uneventful epoch Prussia continued to display an educative force of such a kind. It is manifest from the reports of the embassies that the lesser diplomats invariably set foot upon the ill-famed soil of Berlin with mistrust and hesitation, but that within a few months they became enabled to form an unprejudiced, nay, a benevolent, judgment concerning Prussian affairs. Even when the relationships between the cabinets were troubled, Count Bernstorff always remained on excellent terms with the envoys of the middle-sized states.

The unlucky course of the Darmstadt customs conferences had further shown that customs negotiations with several states at once were likely to prove fruitless, owing to the great diversity of interests. Berlin was firmly resolved to discuss customs questions in future with no more than one state at a time; or if with several, only when these had already combined among themselves to constitute a commercial unit.[1] But one exception was made to this rule. The small territories constituting Thuringia were neither able in isolation to supervise a customs frontier, nor yet, taken singly, were they competent to represent a definite commercio-political interest. For these reasons, as early as 1819 the Berlin cabinet had commended to the court of Gotha the formation

[1] Eichhorn, Instruction to the embassies, March 25, 1828.

of a Thuringian union, and at the Darmstadt conferences the well-informed Badenese plenipotentiary had recognised that there were excellent reasons why such a proposal should be carried into effect.[1] Vis-à-vis all the other states, the principle to treat with one at a time was faithfully observed.

The court of Berlin was well informed concerning the commercial plans of the middle-sized states, for at several of the lesser courts there existed an influential Prussian party, and in Munich and Stuttgart there was unquestionably more ill-feeling against Austria than against Prussia, a fact which redounded to the advantage of our men of business. The customary national hatred of neighbour for neighbour had also to be reckoned with. How could a secret be kept when to-day a Darmstadt minister and to-morrow a Badenese minister would feel impelled to confide his just indignation at the arrogant proposal of Bavaria or Würtemberg to the discreet ear of the friendly Prussian envoy? The *Posten* of Carlsruhe served as the most satisfactory observatory in which to note the mutations of the lesser stars. No one in Berlin advocated Prussia's participation in the proposed South German customs union, for it was considered that this had no chance of success. But the question was repeatedly discussed under what conditions Prussia could conclude a customs alliance with any of her larger neighbours. Klewitz's view as expressed in an Opinion dated June 27, 1822, was to the effect that Prussia could not accept any neighbour state into the customs union unless three conditions were fulfilled. Prussia must demand "the acceptance of the spirit tax and of a suitable beer tax," for thus only could trade be freed from all restrictions. Further, "Prussia must have a preponderant voice in deciding the rates of import, export, and transit duties." Finally, "the customs lines in such countries must be completely subject to Prussia," for the customs administration of adjacent states had hitherto given no guarantee for the conscientious enforcement of the laws.[2] It is easy to understand that a Prussian minister should desire such a commercial hegemony for his nation. Before long, however, Berlin recognised how little the middle-sized states were inclined to tolerate "foreign" administration in their territories, and the Prussian claims were accordingly abated.

[1] Nebenius' Report from Darmstadt, September 22, 1820.
[2] Memorial of the ministry for finance, June 27th, 1822.

In the year 1824, the ministers for foreign affairs, commerce, and finance reconsidered the question "what line ought to be taken by Prussia in the negotiations to secure a customs union." Privy Councillor Sotzmann, son of the well known geographer and one of the ablest men in the financial administration, callaborated with H. von Bülow to expound the outcome of the discussion in a great memorial which gave expression to several of the main principles of the subsequent draft of the customs union.[1] They declared that the accession to Prussia might be effected in either of two ways: by complete subordination, as had happened in the case of Bernburg; or by free association. Where a larger state was concerned, the latter only could be anticipated, but such a state must in any case make its customs dues and its taxes upon articles of consumption harmonise with those of Prussia. Thus the difference between "accession to the customs" (*Zollanschluss*) and "customs union" (*Zollverein*) was already obvious to the minds of the Prussian statesmen of that day, although they had not then begun to employ the modern formal terminology. Since the accession of such a state as Electoral Hesse would involve an addition to the system of an area "comparable only to one of our governmental districts," the court of Berlin could not contemplate making the development of its customs system unconditionally dependent upon the approval of such an ally. Hence Prussia must bind herself for a certain number of years only, so that when the specified term had expired a fresh agreement might be secured about changes and additions. Consequently all privileges were to be renounced, the full equality of the lesser ally was to be recognised; the only right reserved, as an indispensable counterpoise, being that of giving notice that the agreement was to terminate. Each of the two states was to appoint its own customs officials, but these were to be pledged to the service of both governments. Thus the plan of securing the supervision of the frontiers for Prussia exclusively, was abandoned. A very short step further was required to enable the Prussians to recognise that the swearing in of the customs officials to both the allies would be intolerable to the pride of the lesser courts, and that nothing more could be secured than a reciprocal control of customs administration. Prussia had

[1] H. von Bülow and Sotzmann, Memorandum of December 28, 1824.

not yet spoken her last word. The memorial did not conceal that the court of Berlin must be prepared for still greater concessions. "If only the primary aim be attained, the genuine introduction of the Prussian customs system and the Prussian taxes upon articles of consumption, with the prosecution of breaches of the law, then formalities which might prove offensive to the sense of sovereignty of our respective allies, may well be disregarded." In conclusion, an important idea was developed, to which henceforward the Prussian cabinet remained faithful, and which it carried a stage further. Should Electoral Hesse desire nothing more than mutual preferences on imports, this would not merely be more costly but more dangerous for Prussia on account of the higher Prussian duties. For every reason, therefore, the complete amalgamation of the two customs systems seemed greatly preferable. (In actual fact, it was not the height of the internal tolls which paralysed German trade, but the very existence of such tolls, and any reform which failed to attack this evil at the root would inevitably miscarry.)

For the moment, unfortunately, these reasonable principles could not be carried into effect, for the compilers of the memorial still adhered literally to the programme of 1819. They wished to secure a direct advance "from frontier to frontier," from the nearest neighbour to the most remote. What could seem simpler than the plan to win over first of all the most adjacent states, those which lay within the immediate sphere of Prussian influence, and not till then to see if the whole of united Germany could perhaps come to an understanding with the south? Yet this direct route was impassable. The memorial itself admitted that the court of Dresden, in any case hostile to all innovations would have nothing to do with the Prussian customs system were it only on account of the Leipzig fair. No mention at all was made of Hanover, an English bridgehead; and Danish Holstein was likewise ignored. Thuringia was "inclined towards Prussia," but, as explained in a separate memorandum, must first combine to form a customs unit, which was to serve as "an outwork and cover for the Prussian customs system." Darmstadt "has no coterminous frontier with us and even its Upper Hessian region does not come into the question unless Electoral Hesse also accedes." The upshot of all this was that the immediate aim could be no more

than the accession of Electoral Hesse with Waldeck. Even this aim was unattainable, for the elector of Hesse, after making a brief trial of a reasonable customs system, resumed the former hostile attitude towards his great neighbour. As long as such views, which were plainly associated with the old and unhappy idea of the Main customs line, continued to prevail in Berlin, there was no prospect of any enlargement of the customs system beyond the little enclaves.

It was by Motz that the charmed circle of these North German ideas was first broken. In this matter and in his putting an end to the deficit (whereby a grandly conceived commercial policy was first rendered possible), are to be found his permanent title to gratitude. Before any other Prussian statesman, he asked himself the question whether amid the marvellous confusions of German particularism the roundabout course might not after all lead sooner to the goal than the direct, whether it might not be better to circumvent or to climb over neighbours who were not to be convinced. Since the bold chessplayer could not advance on the board with his pawns, he brought his knights into action. He plucked up courage, directly the favourable hour arrived, to reach out his hand, across Electoral Hesse and the other immediate neighbours, to the South German states. At a time when the official German world regarded the perpetual league between Austria and Prussia as an inviolable law, he marched unhesitatingly towards the attainment of another end, the permanent union, under Prussia's leadership, of all Germany, Austria excluded, by the indestructible bond of economic interests, thus paving the way for enfranchisement from the dominion of the house of Lorraine. As soon as this resolution had been made, the ice was broken. The ascending path had been entered by which Prussia's commercial policy was to advance rapidly from achievement to achievement.

The key to the understanding of this happy turn in our history is to be found in the stunted and uneventful life of the North German minor states.

CHAPTER VII.

UNEVENTFUL LIFE OF THE OLD ORDER IN THE NORTH GERMAN STATES.

§ 1. THE KINGDOM OF SAXONY.

In those dull days, when the Germans were tending to succumb to an apathetic despair of their future, particularist philosophy was accustomed to make a virtue of necessity and to impute the disintegration of the fatherland directly to the character of our people. Yet it was obvious at the first glance, and even more than to-day, that the multifariousness of our state structures was by no means based upon the natural disposition of the German stocks and tribal subdivisions. Down to the year 1830, in respect of political development the lesser territories of the north were more remote from the Prussian state than were the constitutional countries of South Germany. They clung tenaciously to an obsolete social order, which the North German great power had outgrown as long ago as the days of the Great Elector, and which South Germany had discarded since the Napoleonic epoch In Prussia, as in Bavaria, Würtemberg and Baden, the feudalist state had in essentials been destroyed. Throughout the regions specified, if in extremely different forms, there now existed a modern community, animated by the ideas of common law and national unity. In Prussia, as in South Germany, a vigorous monarchical authority dominated social contrasts, and endeavoured to interest the nobles, the burghers, and the peasants in common labours for the national weal. In Prussia, as in South Germany, the acquisition of new provinces, characterised by religious differences difficult to conciliate, had enforced a lively administrative activity and an alert religious policy.

How different was the position of affairs in the North German small and middle-sized states. By proximity and by the associations of daily intercourse, by the kinship of blood and of Protestant culture, and also by the power of great landed proprietorship and by the general similarity of social conditions, they seemed to be altogether upon the same footing as Prussia. But they were utterly differentiated from their great neighbour through the disastrous stagnation of their political life. From the traffic in territory of Napoleonic days they had secured but trifling gains or none at all, and had preserved the constitutional forms of the old century side by side with their ancient limits, their hereditary princely houses, and the separateness of their Protestant life. Electoral Hesse was still characterised by the dominion of an absolute court; in Saxony, Hanover, and Mecklenburg, a feudal polyarchy continued to prevail; the Hansa towns were, as of old, under the rule of a bourgeois oligarchy. In Saxony and Mecklenburg, the old order had persisted unchanged throughout the storms of an extraordinarily troublous epoch; in Hesse, in the Guelph domains, and in the free towns, this old order had been reestablished almost unaltered after the brief episode of a detested interregnum. All these territories were equally anxious to exclude any innovation. In addition, Hanover and Holstein were still burdened by foreign rule, which, even when willingly endured, invariably exercises a paralysing influence; while in the case of the Hansa towns, the cosmopolitan interests of free trade rendered it difficult for them to participate in national policy. In Austria and in the inert masses of these small North German domains were centred the inhibitory energies of German life, while in Prussia and in South Germany were to be found the forces of mobility, although the average liberal opinion of those days was content, in its haste, to blame the two German great powers for all the miseries of our land. It was first through the after effects of the July revolution that these contrasts were somewhat mitigated, a few of the lesser states of North Germany being forced thereby to adopt a representative system.

Amid the marvellous confusions of German federal policy, since reason was powerless for good, unreason could at times work to the general advantage. During the twenties, the petrified constitutions of the north preserved Germany from

the danger of the trias (the sonderbund of the middle-sized states), for no understanding was conceivable between the bureaucracies of Bavaria and Würtemberg and the feudalist regimes of Saxony and Hanover. In addition, they preserved Prussian policy from the disastrous design of establishing the Main boundary, which at that time found powerful advocates in Berlin, for the diets of the north, exclusively in the hands of the nobles, dreaded in Prussia's powerful monarchy the born enemy of feudal licence, and avoided any approximation to the North German great power for the very reason that they knew themselves to belong by nature to its sphere of influence. The southern governments regarded themselves as less directly threatened. They were able to contemplate the successes of Prussian administration with a comparatively unprejudiced eye. Moreover, since the Germans of the south were easily forgetful of old grudges (differing in this from the northerners, who incline to harbour resentment), it resulted that the central lands of the Confederation of the Rhine exhibited a more friendly feeling towards the Berlin court than did Prussia's nearest neighbours, so that an association between Prussia and the South German states could lay the foundation for the economic unity of the nation.

For the present, Prussia was less able to expect the confidence of her smaller neighbours than that of the kingdom of Saxony, her unlucky ancient rival, who had so often felt the heavy hand of the Hohenzollerns, and who could see in them nothing but triumphant inheritors of her own power. How much more rapidly, continuously, and abundantly than in inhospitable Brandenburg had the beginnings of German life developed of old in the charming mountain country of the Elbe and the Mulde. When the first Ascanians were still contending with the Wends, in the mark of Meissen the conquest had long been completed after less terrible struggles, and by the fusion of the Thuringian and Franconian immigrants with the indigens of the region (few of whom had been killed off) a new High German stock had come into existence, exhibiting a fortunate combination of German energy with Slav mobility—an alert race with astonishingly multifarious endowments, richly equipped for art and research, efficient in war, enterprising in affairs, unpretentious, and yet, after the manner of the Marcomanni, looking down with

contempt upon the "Wendish and Bohemian dullards." As early as the days of Frederick Barbarossa were to be heard the roundelays and the cheerful cries of "God-speed" from the working miners in the Erzgebirge; proud of their Freiberg liberties, the busy mining towns flourished abundantly; and by the close of the middle ages the whole of this rude forest region was thickly populated, even as far as its "desolate outpost" at Annaberg. During the epoch of natural economy, it was to its mines that the mark of Meissen owed its rapidly increasing prosperity. Even though the margraves, at a merry Reichstag, would at times squander the easily gained wealth of the mines, the temptations and uncertainties of mining industry were unable to corrupt the constitutional diligence of the common people.

When the house of Wettin acquired the landgravate of Thuringia, and then (at the very time when the Hohenzollerns were making their way into the marks) gained in addition the electoral hat of the decayed old Saxon duchy, it seemed as if a brilliant political future were opening for the young colony. Henceforward the Meisseners, although there was but little Saxon blood in their veins, had the glorious reputation of being mightiest in arms among the Germans; and they revered the Ascanian coat of arms, with its five chevrons and its chaplet of rue, as if it had always been their own. Their princes proudly bore the swords of the Holy Empire, and the glories of their Albrechtsburg showed that they held themselves second to no other princely family. Yet they lacked the farsightedness and the lofty vision of the true ruler. Domestic quarrels, the old sin of the German princes, proved even more disastrous to the Wettins than to the Wittelsbachs. Time and again had foolish partitions and fierce fratricidal feuds retarded the development of the state, and now, when the bold work of Henry the Illustrious and Frederick the Quarrelsome seemed to be nearing completion, when at length out of the fragmented world of Central Germany a vigorous state-structure was arising, the house of Saxony demolished its own work, almost in the very hour when Albert Achilles, third elector of Brandenburg, secured for ever the indivisibility of the electoral lands of Hohenzollern.

After the Albertines became separated from the Ernestines and the mark of Meissen lost the electoral hat, for some

decades this former centre of Wettin authority sank once more into the ranks of the petty territories, and under its strict ruler Duke George long continued faithful to the old church, whereas the Ernestine domains were the home of the Reformation. But now there was a sudden transformation scene. An irresistible national movement forced the Albertines also into the Protestant camp, and during the brief twelve years of his extraordinary and heroic career as a ruler, Duke Maurice raised this land, so recently won for the Reformation, to become the leading power of German Protestantism. He was a politician through and through, one who to the hesitating and pious princes, his contemporaries, seemed utterly alien in the energy of his bold resolves; he was a formidable warrior, and a master of all the arts of Spanish mendacity. Yet, despite this, he was no more than the greatest of the German petty princes, the most gifted representative of the stupidities of particularism. Not a glimmer of any lofty national or religious idea illumined the devious paths of his dynastic policy, whose cunning pursued but the one pitiful end, to grab lands and peoples wherever he could, and to secure undisturbed independence for his well-rounded little state. By his treason to the cause of his coreligionists, the Judas of Meissen, as the embittered Protestant population termed him, secured the electoral hat and the most valuable possessions of the Ernestines. By a second treason, he sacrificed the Lorraine bishoprics to the French, wrested from the Spaniards the fruits of the Schmalkaldian war, saved the existence of Protestantism, and humiliated the imperial authority so profoundly that of its former majesty nothing was left but the name; but his ambitions never attained the altitude of attempting to establish a Protestant empire or any other new national order upon the ruins of the old empire which had been destroyed. He perished suddenly, in a wild feud, the fruit of his own rebellion. His ephemeral task was accomplished, for it would be to despair of the divine governance of human affairs to imagine that Providence could ever evoke the man of destiny before the coming of the ripe hour.

Under Maurice's successor the new Albertine electorate was for a brief period the best administered of all German territories, and long remained the focus of Protestant learning. Two great universities, the three princely schools, and a number of lesser educational institutions, diffused culture

throughout the nation. Cracow's constitutions secured a well-ordered legal system for the country. The exemplary administration of the crown lands was famed far and wide. Magnificent palaces and costly collections displayed the taste and the brilliancy of the wealthiest court in Germany. Commerce flourished under the protection of the Augsburg peace of religions, more especially now that the old diligence of the Meisseners found fresh stimulus and assistance in the highly skilled refugees from the Netherlands, who secured a hospitable reception. Not without reason did the grateful country speak of the coldly calculating elector, hard-hearted to the point of cruelty, as "Father Augustus." But it was momentous for the political sentiments of prince and people that precisely in this golden age of the history of Meissen the short-sighted German policy of the Albertines began once again to undermine the newly acquired power of Electoral Saxony. In this age pregnant with destiny, when Protestantism was still animated with the youthful energy of the conqueror, when the heroic struggles of the Netherlanders and the Huguenots, the secret intrigues of the Jesuits, the dangerous ambiguity of the peace of religions, and the anarchical confusion of the empire, imposed upon the Protestant estates the duty of joining forces in brotherly harmony to make war against the Hapsburg world-dominion, Augustus expelled the Calvinists from his country, and by the rigid prescriptions of his *Formula Concordiae* forfeited for ever the friendship of the members of the Reformed church, the most vigorous of the Protestants.

After this "victory of Christ over the Devil and Reason," Electoral Saxony succumbed to the religious unity of orthodox Lutheranism. The proverbial piety of the court of Dresden was utterly estranged from the primitive spirit of the Reformation; the rulers of Saxony no longer regarded the Evangelical doctrine as a liberating force for the whole of Christendom, but considered it the snug property of a favoured circle of believers. Deaf to the great Orange ruler's appeals for help and to the pressing needs of the Protestants of the Lower Rhine, the mightiest of the Evangelical princes took the side of the house of Austria, and did the best he could to maintain the balance between the creeds by means of weakly concessions to the Romish party that was pressing forward unceasingly, whereas the court of Heidelberg was by

this time assembling all the aspiring and combative energies of German Protestantism. Dynastic jealousy of the ambitious Palatiner, Lutheran hatred for Calvinism, and, not least, the enduring curse that was the fruit of old errors, hidden fear of the unconciliated Ernestine cousins, strengthened the Albertines in their conservative and peace-loving policy. After the death of Maurice, once only did Electoral Saxony dare to reenter the ways of a great Protestant policy, when Christian I and his enterprising chancellor Crell, ignoring the old fraternal dispute, endeavoured to come to an understanding with the Palatinate and with the Huguenots for the joint defence of the Evangelical faith. But hardly had the young elector closed his eyes, than the rigid Lutheranism of the court, the estates, and the theologians, brought about a sanguinary reaction, and the Saxon chancellor, sacrificed to the decision of a Bohemian law court, had to pay with his head for having ventured to detach the pious electorate from the archducal house of Austria. Thenceforward the Albertines, utterly hostile to the Reformed church, remained in the Austrian camp. Sunday after Sunday, the Saxon Lutherans prayed God to preserve them from the devilish arts of the Calvinists. Matters reached such a pitch that the court of Dresden seriously deliberated the question of joining the Catholic league.

Upon the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War (for which the suicidal policy of this degenerate Lutheranism must largely share the responsibility), the most powerful of the Evangelical electors fought for no more than four years on behalf of his faith. The court chaplain at Dresden exulted when the kingdom of the Palatiners in Bohemia was crushed by the Catholic league; it was with Saxony's help that the house of Austria subdued the Evangelical rebels in Silesia; and once again stormy outcries against the Saxon Judas resounded through the Protestant world when John George I sacrificed his co-religionists in the separate peace of Prague, and received Lusatia as a reward.

In the great catastrophes of history, the association between crime and punishment is apt to be inseparable; but solely through its own blindness and sloth did the princely house of Saxony forfeit the premier position among the Evangelical estates of the empire. The Great Elector was the inheritor of this position. By the peace of Westphalia,

despite the opposition of the court of Dresden, he secured the toleration of the Reformed church and acquired the leadership of German Protestantism. From this time forward the suspicions of Electoral Saxon policy were directed against the aspiring Brandenburg neighbour, just as these suspicions had hitherto been directed against the Palatinate. As the power of the country declined, its constitutional life became petrified. Under Maurice and Augustus, feudal licence had been restricted by a vigorous monarchical will, but beneath the lax rule of the two Christians and the four John Georges this licence was resumed. Electoral Saxony became the classic land of the Old Lutheran episcopal system, which secured its learned panegyrist in Benedict Carpzov of Leipzig.

In state and church, the teaching caste held undisputed sway, its members being all interconnected and interrelated by marriage and by blood; the military caste, composed then as to-day of the most arrogant nobles in Germany, worked with it in close alliance. As for the oppressed common people, in the church they had gratefully to accept the saving truths that fell from the lips of the holy ones of the Lord, whilst as far as political life was concerned their sole duty was to pay in all obedience the taxes decreed by the nobles' diet. It is true that in the wider relationships of Electoral Saxony the prestige of the crown was far better maintained than in Old Würtemberg, and in the days of John George III that prestige was still strong enough to enable the Saxon ruler to create a standing army; but the electoral house possessed neither the energy nor the will to protect the peasants against the nobles and to undertake far-reaching innovations. The forms of legislation and administration remained almost unchanged as they had been handed down by the elector Augustus. A similar conservative spirit prevailed at the university of Leipzig, though this, outshining the decayed Wittenberg, was now regarded as the chief of the German universities, and in foreign lands was looked upon as the metropolis of German learning. Ponderously erudite and respectable, in all the great transformations of our culture the university of Leipzig was inspired by the force of reaction. Just as during the first years of the Reformation it had resisted Luther's teaching, so now was it the acropolis of an unyielding Lutheran theology, and of that orthodox political doctrine by which

the Holy Empire was glorified as the fourth monarchy of the prophet Daniel. It was in conflict with the excellencies of the theological faculty of Leipzig that Calixtus advocated the idea of the Christian union; it was in conflict with them that Puffendorf established a secular theory of the state. To the tolling of the sinner's bell Thomasius was driven from the Athens on the Pleisse; and as a defiance to Leipzig there now came into existence the new university of Halle, the sanctuary of pietism and natural law.

Yet throughout this decline in the power of the state, its inhabitants immutably preserved their cheerful capacity for work. The strange contrast between social mobility and political stagnation long remained the distinctive characteristic of Saxon history. Astonishingly rapid was the recovery of the industrious land from the horrible ravages of Holk's yagers and the Swedish dragoons, notwithstanding the extravagance of the court and the cumbrousness of the administration. A priceless gain for Saxony was the influx of the Bohemian Lutherans, to whom John George I had refused armed help, but to whom he granted asylum after their defeat. About 150,000 exiles crossed the Erzgebirge, valiant, active, cheerful amid all their distresses, the very marrow of Bohemian national energy. What a magnificent group of men of talent, too, did Electoral Saxony now send forth to fertilise the aridity of German life. All three of the great reforming thinkers of the epoch, Puffendorf, Leibnitz, and Thomasius, belonged to the mark of Meissen. Never before had this stock intervened so decisively in the achievements of our national culture, and yet the decaying state could find no place for these brilliant intelligences, and expelled them every one.

The people clung with imperturbable loyalty to the chaplet of rue, although the alliance with the Catholic archducal house at times aroused manifestations of discontent, and in the mouths of the common people the names of the four Hans Jörgen (John Georges) acquired an extremely unflattering connotation. This loyalty remained unshaken even when the Albertine policy took the last step upon the downward path, and Augustus the Strong went over to Rome in order to secure the kingly crown of Poland. As if by a spontaneous outburst the Protestant hymn "Now save us, Lord, by Thine own word" resounded through all the

churches in the land when the incredible tidings came that the director of the corpus evangelicorum had abandoned the Evangelical faith—for in religious life the Saxons were as irascible as they were tolerant in political matters. In this Zion of Lutheran orthodoxy, it was only under severe penalties that any Protestant could attend the religious service held in the Catholic embassy. At school, children learned to honour their homeland as the cradle of the Reformation (though this was true of Kurkreis alone, and not of Meissen and Osterland). Every miner in Schneeberg and Schwarzenberg had a reflected share in the glory of the great Saxon, himself a miner's son, who had overthrown the pope of Rome. Nevertheless even the change of creed of the dynasty was tolerated. The Old Lutheran theocracy continued to flourish unaltered, except that the elector had now to cede his archiepiscopal authority to specially commissioned privy councillors, and at the Reichstag Electoral Saxony was still regarded as the first of the Evangelical estates, for it was held that King Augustus alone had changed his creed, and not the electoral house of Saxony. The diet took advantage of the monarch's difficulties to strengthen the privileges of the nobles, and to exclude from the Ritterschaft everyone who could not demonstrate the possession of eight ancestors. Catholics remained strictly excluded from all political rights. In Poland, the king could give his Jesuits a free hand against the Protestants of Thorn; but in Dresden the papal nuncio had to push his propaganda with extreme caution, and rarely obtained success.

Thus pacified regarding its Lutheran faith, the loyal populace continued for seventy years to make incredible sacrifices on behalf of the ungerman policy of its two Polish Augustuses. With the exception of West Prussia, no other German territory suffered such inexpressible ills through foreign associations. From time to time, at least, the Hanoverians, the Holsteiners, and the Swedish Pomeranians could thank their foreign rulers for military protection or for commercial advantages secured on behalf of the flag; but all that Electoral Saxony owed to the tinsel kingship of its rulers was an entanglement in the intrigues, the anarchical struggles, and the demoralisation of a decaying state. When the ostentation of the Albertines entered into friendly alliance with the dissoluteness of the Polish nobility, the sins of

German court absolutism began to flower in their richest luxuriance. The poor weavers and lacemakers of the mountain regions allowed themselves to be bled white, accepting all exactions with a patience which in us of a later generation arouses now compassion and now indignation. The best energies of the country were drained away to fill the greedy hands of the Königsmark, the Cosel, the countless other mistresses of Augustus the Strong; to bribe the magnates of the Polish Reichstag; to bring to pass the miracle by which the court of a middle-sized state in Germany could outbid even the Versailles prototype, and in its "opulent sumptuosity" could still find means to bestow upon the Varsovians their Saxon palace and other magnificent buildings. At the same time the unstable ambition of King Augustus and of his adventurous confidant Flemming dragged the unhappy land into the Swedish war. The valiant army suffered heavy losses in inglorious struggles under the banner of the white eagle; the Swedes, in days of yore driven back by the good swords of the Markers to the northernmost limits of Germany, now advanced victoriously once again into the heart of the realm; and, hard by the battlefield of Lutzen, Charles XII dictated a shameful peace to the discrowned king of Poland.

How utterly disastrous was the possession of this foreign kingship, first became fully manifest in the reign of the miserable successor of Augustus the Strong. Now it was, in the great and decisive days of the Silesian wars, that the politically unwise but humanly pardonable ill-feeling of the Albertines towards their fortunate northern rival increased to become blind hatred, and that the Polish-Catholic dreams of aggrandisement entertained by Count Brühl wrenched this German-Protestant land away from the paths of its natural policy. The diplomatic history of the German minor states, rich as it is in vaporous projects, can find nothing to rival in vacuity the covetous proposals of this worthless favourite. He proposed to strike down Prussia, to unite Saxony with Poland by the Silesian via regia, and by favouring the anarchy of the Polish nobles to make the Albertine kingship hereditary; and all this was to be effected without any permanent military equipment, simply through the assistance of Russia and the Catholic great powers. Terrible was the punishment. For seven years Saxony,

conquered, disarmed, in shameful impotence, was forced to assist the Prussian conqueror in paying the costs of his wars. After the peace of Hubertusburg, the country was laid waste almost as completely as it had been after the Thirty Years' War. The union with Poland was dissolved; the struggle for the second position in the German realm was definitively settled in Prussia's favour; while even in its family life the princely house had, since its change of creed, been completely isolated among the North German dynasties. The new and pretentious conjugal alliances with the Bourbon and Hapsburg courts served solely to increase the Albertines' pride without augmenting their influence.

The prolonged contest between Prussia and Saxony was not simply a struggle for power; it was also a struggle between two political ideals. The political kingship of the Hohenzollerns prevailed over the futilities of princely self-deification. Frederick the Great never lost sight of this essential difference of principle. In an ode full of fierce contempt, proud of his more virile virtue, he exclaimed to Count Brühl, the slave of pleasure: "I enfranchise poverty when it brings me. for a dowry honour and uprightness." Nevertheless the unscrupulous regime of the two Polish Augustuses left permanent traces in German history. The most luxurious court of Germany was also the most artistic. Augustus the Strong was not altogether lacking in manifestations of depraved genius, and his successor was at least fortunate enough to secure able connoisseurs as his assistants. Dresden became the repository of the German rococo style, a favourite centre of cheerful pleasures such as the sober Germanic world hardly knew elsewhere, a rendezvous of all the nations. In the ponderous cupola of the Frauenkirche, and in the Zwinger (the beautiful garden of the Hesperides established by the Saxon Hercules, with its golden Atlas over the portal), an art is immortalised which gave faithful expression to the sentiments of the day, and for this reason was truly alive. Side by side with the precious enamelled trifles by Dinglinger, the Saxon Cellini, side by side with the diamond clasps, the gilded ostrich eggs, and all the other expensive trifles of the Green Vault, there was also to be found the most beautiful and representative gallery in northern Europe, a permanent acquisition for Germany. The colony of southern artists in the Italian village, serious men of learning like

Count Bünau, together with numerous native artists and connoisseurs, contributed so much spiritual sustenance even to the frivolous life of "la Saxe galante" that Winckelmann drew a breath of delight when he removed from Altmark to the beautiful Florence-by-the-Elbe. In this land, whose women were full of charm and where humanistic culture prevailed, the elegance of cosmopolitan Dresden society found a grateful soil. Far and wide throughout the people was diffused a refinement of manners, such as elsewhere could thrive only in lands of ancient civilisation—that kindliness of transitional forms which Lessing, in his *Minna von Barnhelm*, with unconcealed self-satisfaction, contrasts with the coarse crudity of the Markers.

The North Germans, accustomed in true German fashion to take eager note of the beam in the neighbour's eye, had as long ago as the days of Luther formulated the unmerited saying, "ein Meissner, ein Gleissner" (a Meissener is a slippery fellow); and they now took delight in mocking at the verbose politeness of the supple Saxon. Yet in the character of these mid-Germans there exists a strange compost of fierceness and benevolence, of energy and refinement, just as their dialect is simultaneously characterised by a detestable accent and extreme grammatical accuracy. Perhaps no other stock in our passionate Germany numbers among its members so many turbulent and stormy natures as the Upper Saxon. Among the enormous crowd of gifted men Saxony has presented to the nation, there have, indeed, been many characterised by a soft, gentle, and yielding amiability; but there have from the first been just as many born fighters, those who, by a natural reaction, relentlessly and with passionate defiance, imposed their proud ego upon the world, archpowerful embodiments of Teutonic sincerity. Thus, of old, were contrasted in juxtaposition the peaceful Leibnitz and those two unruly disturbers Puffendorf and Thomasius; thus, in Frederician days, were contrasted two typical figures, that of Gellert and that of Lessing; thus, once more, in the Napoleonic epoch, were contrasted the smooth-tongued diplomats of the Confederation of the Rhine, Fichte on the one hand, and Theodor Körner on the other; thus, finally in our own days, were to be found among the professors, Lotze beside Moritz Haupt, and among the artists, Rietschel and Ludwig Richter beside Richard Wagner—always in the

most varied forms the same contrast, and yet, unmistakably manifested in them all, the same racial characteristics.

Nor was it by chance that these defiant natures made their appearance upon Upper Saxon soil. In this courteous and patient people was to be found an indestructible moral power of resistance, competent to meet the severest tests. The capital, a portion of the nobility, and perhaps even certain circles among Leipzig merchants, were affected by the atrocious corruption of the court; but the straightforward honesty of burgher and peasant remained intact. As courageously as they had done in the times of the Swedish distresses, did the inhabitants resume their labours after the Seven Years' War, to reconstruct with diligent hands all that the folly of the sovereign had destroyed. How manfully did the little army hold together, that army which, since its first days of glory at the relief of Vienna, had suffered hardly a reverse, and which was now driven from one defeat to another by the pitiable policy of its war lords. The fine mortars furnished by Herold, the Dresden gun-founder, were flaunted as trophies on the shores of Lake Malar, and the halberds of the Swiss guard of Electoral Saxony were arranged in a glittering palisade in the Berlin arsenal. But even after the crushing defeats of Fraustadt, Hohenfriedberg, and Kesselsdorf, the army had never been completely disorganised; and when, after the capitulation of Pirna, it had seemed that all was lost, at Collin, Frederick's fatal day, it was Benckendorff's Saxon cavalry which ensured the defeat of Prussia. Whole battalions of Saxon prisoners abandoned the enforced Prussian service, fleeing to Poland to join their king; upon the West German theatre of war the fragments of the defeated regiments fought on under French command; and shortly after the peace the army was once more to be found in tolerable order, as if nothing had happened.

It was true that under such princes political intelligences could not ripen. The disproportion between political and literary talent was even more striking here than in Swabia. During the century and a half which followed the execution of Crell, but one man worked in Electoral Saxony who deserved the name of statesman; this was Arnim of Boitzenburg, and even he never felt completely at home. Puffendorf, the leading political thinker of the country, shook the dust

of the homeland from his feet, and fought his great struggle on behalf of modern monarchy amid the hostile outcries of his fellow countrymen. Electoral Saxon diplomacy was everywhere notorious for its intrigues and its falseness; among the officials, place-hunting, slackness, and venality gained the upper hand; and even among the general population, whose domestic life remained so upright, the miserable political history of the country could hardly be expected to cultivate the civic sense. Too often had Electoral Saxony been a theatre of universal war; too often had the Saxons seen their hereditary ruler forced to take to flight, the treasures of the Green Vault disappear in the casemates of Königstein, and enemies established for years as masters in Saxony. The saying was current, "Hat in hand you may pass through all the land." Here, where there was so little to love, the deferential affection of the Germans for their rulers had necessarily to degenerate into base flattery. Even by the most devoted of subjects, the virtuous pelican which, over the portal of the Dresden palace, is seen nourishing its young with its own blood, could hardly be regarded as a true image of the government of Augustus the Strong. When the king's cenotaph in the Capuzinerkirche at Warsaw bore the inscription, morte quis fortior? gloria et amor; when the town of Leipzig solemnly hailed his successor as the "restorer of public serenity"; when the school teachers told their pupils about the magnificent cakes, ten yards in length, that were made at the pleasure camp of Mühlberg, or about the eight hundred and thirty-five pinches of snuff taken by Count Brühl, with the same pride as if they were recording the fine deeds of the fatherland—all these things served merely to give expression to a servility which seemed astonishing even to contemporaries.

Better days at length followed during the brief and excellent regime of Frederick Christian and the long reign of his successor Frederick Augustus. In many of the lesser German states it happened during the end of the eighteenth century that perspicacious and long-lived princes came to the throne, men who broke with the traditions of absolutism, and who, beloved by their relatives and by their subjects, gave the dominant tendency to their states for a long time to come. Thus it was in Baden under Charles Frederick;

in Weimar under Charles Augustus; in Darmstadt under Louis I; in Schwerin under Frederick Francis; and in Dessau under Leopold Frederick Francis. Frederick Augustus likewise belonged to this generation of benevolent rulers, who schooled themselves, consciously or unconsciously, upon the model of Frederick the Great. Just, conscientious, and laborious, he restored to his afflicted subjects the blessings of a careful government such as had been unknown since the days of the elector Augustus. He put an end to the debauchery of the court; restored the discipline of the officialdom; and reestablished financial order so thoroughly that the national credit was not permanently disturbed thereafter even by the storms of the Napoleonic epoch. He appointed to office men of notable efficiency, and above all his tutor Gutschmid, the first bourgeois from days immemorial in the nepotist world of this nobles' regime, to rise to the highest dignities, through genuine service and not through the arts of the lackey. In German policy, disregarding the past, he sensibly adhered to the side of Prussia, a path of renunciation which he was undoubtedly enabled to pursue more easily in consequence of his pious horror of the godless innovator Joseph II. But even in his most vigorous years he was far from being an organiser like Charles Frederick or Charles Augustus. A slave to feudalist conceptions, he was content to work for good within the narrow limits which the oligarchy of the diet imposed upon the monarchical will. There could be no thought of freeing the oppressed countryfolk from their burdens; there could be no thought of effecting all the economic reforms which his country required even more urgently than the neighbouring territories: such changes were impossible if only for the reason that in his view every infringement of the caste privileges of the nobility and gentry must be accounted an unscrupulous breach of law. The maintenance of all that existed soon became the motto of his government. At the outset, many old evils were swept away; but before long his regime was responsible for the fact that in her political development Saxony lagged a generation behind her neighbours.

Even the epoch of general transformation in the lands of the Confederation of the Rhine passed without leaving a trace upon the cumbrous structure of the Saxon state. Cruel was the destiny by which this gentle and thoughtful

prince was involved in the adventures of Napoleonic policy and by which he, in especial, was once more cursed with the gift of the crown of Poland. At the bottom of his heart, even throughout these stormy years, he remained the peace-loving father of his country, who desired nothing better than to rule his subjects in ease and quietude. Blindly as he confided in the luck of his great ally, he was personally but little influenced by the ambitious designs of his ministers Bose and Senfft. After the battle of Jena, to avoid sacrificing his country to the conqueror's rapacity, he allowed himself to be misled into the one breach of faith of his life, secession from the Prussian alliance. To preserve the mighty protector's favour on behalf of his country, he patiently endured every personal humiliation, even attending service in the ancient imperial cathedral of Frankfort in order to hear the Te Deum in honour of the victory of Wagram. Once more, after the battle of Grossgörschen, wishing to save his land from Napoleon's revenge, unsolicited, he announced to the Imperator his renewed adhesion.[1] When he subsequently fell into the hands of the Prussians as prisoner of war, he was aware of his guilt; but his actions throughout had been dictated by regard for his people, and he had conscientiously fulfilled his duties to the Confederation of the Rhine. He was simply unable to understand that it was now necessary for him to endure the consequences of defeat. On the other hand, the young princes and princesses, differing from their uncle, had after their manner always maintained good German sentiments; in the spring they had cordially rejoiced at the entry of the allies, and looked upon it as an act of treason that these liberators should now reduce the inheritance of their fathers.

When, in June, 1815, the king returned to his diminished realm, he was inspired with the feeling that he had been severely and unjustly afflicted, and his reception could not but serve to strengthen this view. At the time of the battle of Leipzig a large proportion of the cultured classes had severely condemned his ungerman policy. In the subsequent prolonged period of uncertainty, the feeling of attachment to the dynasty was revived, and this feeling became

[1] Such is the explanation of the king's conduct furnished by General von Gersdorff, who reproduces Frederick Augustus's letter to Napoleon. (Gersdorff, Memorial concerning the year 1813, June, 1814.)

completely predominant when tidings arrived of the partition of the country and of the impending return of the monarch. The few who had openly advocated the cause of Prussia now remained cautiously in the background; the populace termed them "the Prussians" or "the Germans." In the impotence of such particularism, many people changed their views without being aware of it. Mahlmann, the good-humoured Leipzig poet, editor of the favourite newspaper of the fashionable world, had written a fervent ode to the Imperator when Napoleon established the Saxon kingship, saying: "Terror stalks before him, but bounty comes behind." Just as movingly did he sing the glories of Czar Alexander and the national victory of Leipzig; while for the king's return he composed the new Saxon anthem, "Flourish, thou chaplet of rue!" The enormous majority of the people were unquestionably straightforward in their rejoicings. They had become so thoroughly accustomed to the unchanging government of their old ruler that they felt themselves unable to live without him, and even during his lifetime he was generally spoken of as "the Just." Similar demonstrations were renewed when Frederick Augustus celebrated his jubilee; several of the districts ceded to Prussia sent ardent congratulations, nor did the new sovereign interfere.

A number of stately tomes, profusely illustrated, announced to the world at large the glories of this "feast of joy of the loyal Saxon nation," describing the triumphal arches, the obelisks, and "the temples of immortality"; reproducing the graceful hymn, "The rue again is verdant, the violet blooms once more." Reported, also, were all the rhymed and unrhymed orations in honour of "the good father of the bees," who had so long faithfully watched over his diligent bee subjects, and who, after having been driven out by foreign robber bees, humble bees, and wasps, had at length been able to return to his innocent children. At times the servility of these children increased to become flat blasphemy. The Dresden Society of the Blue Star, which had been formed during the Prusso-Russian foreign dominion to keep loyalty to the dynasty alive, gave a solemn festival, and at this, after a ceremonious pause, there resounded the word of power:

Where but two or three assemble
In Frederick August's name,
His great precursor's also there.
God bless the king! Amen.

What a quantity of loathsome slime had during these wild times covered the still waters of the petty state. These were great days for informers and calumniators. Those who, during recent months, had abandoned the land to its fate, remaining sulkily at home, now cast suspicion upon the excellent officers and officials who had carried on the administration under the Russian and Prussian government. All of these, Generals Vieth and Carlowitz, Baron von Miltitz-Siebeneichen, and others, had rendered themselves impossible, and were compelled to leave the country. The king, after his return, founded some new orders, adorned with the freshly chosen green-and-white national colours, and these distinctions were bestowed, not only upon many faithful state servants, but also upon a number of wretched denunciators.

With the ardent veneration which was henceforward paid to these colours without a history, there was unfortunately associated, and inseparably, an equally passionate hatred for Prussia. Among all the Germans, it was the electoral Saxons who found the greatest difficulty in adapting themselves to the confusions of our modern history and in recognising the creative energies with which it was endowed. The facts were obvious: Prussia's ascent had been due to the decline of Electoral Saxony; during the last century and a half, almost every great day for Germany had been a defeat for Saxon policy. How could this be understood in a country which had experienced no more than fugitive traces of the national enthusiasm of recent years? Of the two vigorous Saxons who had contributed so much to fan the flames of this patriotic idealism, one, Fichte, was little known in his own land: men of learning esteemed him as a philosopher; the clergy did not forget that the Dresden consistory had once accused him of atheism; his *Address to the German Nation* was hardly known. As for "the dramatic poet Theodor Körner," a few days before his death there had appeared in the Dresden papers a citation against him for the non-fulfilment of his military duties; and people in good society were disinclined to mention his name, for, like his father, he had espoused the Prussian cause. Doubtless the writer of

Lyre and Sword did not stand alone among the Saxon youths. After the battle of Leipzig many who were enthusiasts for Germany's freedom sent in their names to the army, men who had long ere this demanded permission to fight against France under their own banner of the chaplet of rue. In order to attract young men of the upper classes in larger numbers, the Russian provisional government encouraged the formation of a troop of volunteers modelled upon the Lützowers, and this was joined by numerous honourable enthusiasts, among whom was Krug, the Leipzig philosopher. But participation in this movement was far from general, for the impulsive ardour of the Prussian volunteers was lacking. The new force had poor fortune, and its only sight of the enemy was behind the walls of the Mainz fortress. The patriotic undertaking was no less sterile than was the *Encyclopædic Synopsis of the Military Sciences* which, on the strength of his bloodless warlike experiences, Krug, the ready writer, published immediately after the war. Whilst the entire population of Prussia was fighting for Germany, many excellent young Saxons were still entirely dominated by the philistine views of traditional class pride, and were utterly unable to understand that a man of culture could shoulder a musket. Möbius, the learned young astronomer, voiced the cordial opinion of his Leipzig colleagues when he wrote in the summer of 1814: "I consider it utterly impossible that anyone should think of making me a recruit, me, a fully accredited magister of Leipzig university. This is the most horrible idea I have ever heard of; and anyone who shall dare, venture, hazard, make bold, and have the audacity to propose it, will not be safe from a dagger. I do not belong to the Prussians; I am in Saxon service."

When the partition came, with its rude disturbance of numerous neighbourly relationships, memories of the War of Liberation and of the misdeeds of the French were speedily forgotten. No longer did anyone ask what Prussia had contributed to the liberation of Saxony in addition to that of the rest of Germany; no one reflected that Talleyrand and Metternich were responsible for the partition, and that Prussia had accepted it only with reluctance. Naturally enough, boundless hatred was felt for the northern neighbour, and this hatred was raised to the pitch of fury when the horrible intelligence was received of the mutiny at Liège. No longer

was Saxon particularism proud, as it had been in the days of the electors Maurice and Augustus; it was sullen, spiteful, and venomous, after a fashion utterly opposed to the inborn characteristics of this kindly race. Whoever was a good Saxon must from time to time prove by a volley of abuse directed against Prussia that the Meissen dialect is as expressive and well equipped for rudeness as for politeness. For many years it was a peculiarity of Saxony that at every turn it was possible to encounter men of conspicuous ability and inspired with excellent German sentiments who could speak reasonably upon every topic in the world except Prussia.

During the first days after the partition, this mood found expression solely in a few detestable lampoons. Thus, for example, there appeared a manifestly false despatch from the Saxon grenadiers, describing for the "brothers-in-arms of all the German nations" the abominable crimes of the Prussian "dealers in souls" at Liège. Another pamphlet with an equally fictitious title, *Apologia of Councillor N. for his transfer from the Saxon to the Prussian Service*, developed the fine plan that the Old Saxon officials in the Prussian province of Saxony should secretly endeavour to hinder "the decline of Saxon national feeling and the amalgamation with Prussia" in order to prepare the inhabitants for "the dawn of better days." Further we read: "It is not without the profoundest grief, we may rest assured, that the imperial house of Austria has now yielded to the pressure of circumstances, and consented to the humiliation of a family so closely allied; of necessity, Austria must dread the rapacious northern eagle, and must as speedily as possible set a term to its advances. France, Bavaria, the pope, the clergy who are so powerful in Austria, all the lesser German princes who see in Saxony an example of the manner in which their own existence is threatened, will speak on our behalf, and will before long fan the flames of discord between the two rivals for supremacy in Germany!" The populace continued to hope for the reunion of the Albertine territories just as obstinately as of old the Ernestines had hoped for the restoration of the forfeited electoral hat. The children in the schools sang the defiant song: "Prussia has stolen our land, but we shall get it back again. Wait, wait, wait!"

Although the king, with his strict sense of justice, faithfully observed the treaty of peace, it was the inevitable result

of what had happened that he should now regard a closer union with Prussia as impracticable. Henceforward it seemed to him that his natural ally must be Austria, although whenever there was famine in the Erzgebirge the imperial state made a point of closing the frontier, and in other respects displayed herself a bad neighbour. The tacit animosity against Prussia failed to find plainer expression only because the two German great powers were now allied, and because Frederick Augustus again devoted himself exclusively to the tasks of internal administration. High politics were beyond his circle of vision, but he never failed to feel flattered when the envoys of the great powers gave him information concerning the troubles of the outer world.[1] At the Bundestag, the Saxon envoy obediently followed Austria's lead; and, for the rest, his activities were so inconspicuous that Metternich would occasionally suggest in a friendly way that it might be well for the court of Dresden to display its excellent sentiments in a somewhat more vigorous fashion. Thus it was that the partition long exercised a disastrous influence upon Saxon policy. Among the common people, it fostered a petty particularist spite which completely overshadowed German national pride; alike at court and among the general population, it rendered difficult the appropriate recognition of the great economic interests which bound Saxony to Prussia.

Beyond question the country had suffered irremediable losses. In addition to the beautiful Thuringian chapter lands and the greater part of Lusatia, Kurkreis had been sacrificed—Kurkreis, the pride of Upper Saxony—for a just destiny had restored to the home of the Reformation the blessings of a faithful Protestant governance. What precious intellectual energies, too, passed from the state with the loss of the two classical schools of Pforta and Rossleben. In Aster, the army was deprived of its most gifted officer. In Streckfuss, Schönberg, Ferber, and Theodor Körner's father, the Saxon officialdom had to dispense with the candid men who had long recognised and censured the errors of the nobles' regime. Nevertheless the dynasty still retained the more beautiful and richer moiety of Saxony, that which had of old endowed the Albertine state with its peculiar attributes. The area of the country was now, indeed,

[1] Jordan's Report, November 2, 1826.

ludicrously small in comparison with the pretentions of the new kingly crown, but it was sufficient to enable the kingdom of Saxony to secure in the Germanic Federation the next place to that held by Bavaria. How astonishingly multifarious were the culture and the intercourse of this narrow region. The industrious land took a share in almost everything which went to make up German life. The capital, half a royal seat and half a house-of-call for foreigners, continued to preserve almost unchanged the harmonious beauty of the baroque splendours which had once been celebrated by the brush of Canaletto. The gay life of those Polish days had long passed away, and but rarely were the ladies of the nobility borne to the palace in Old Franconian sedan chairs to attend some court festival; it was only the stores of art treasures and the charms of natural scenery which lured crowds of strangers to the Elbe. In this slumberous air, an independent bourgeoisie had never been able to come into existence. Here thrived those devout philistines among whom young Ludwig Richter found his most amusing figures: the controllers and court secretaries, who in the afternoons, after their moderate labours were finished, would wander with their families among the trees; the lesser nobility and the higher officials who spent the summer in their chalets at Loschwitz; and, last not least, the councillors, the artistically minded men of learning from the theatre and from the art-galleries, who in Old Dresden were no less respected than were the privy councillors in Old Berlin. Taking them all in all, they were cheerful and contented folk, ever out of doors, and characterised by immaculate political innocence and docility.

With feelings similar to those felt by Frankfort for the Golden Mainz, the rich town of Leipzig, the opposite pole of the multiform Saxon life, looked down upon her neighbour, the court city of Dresden. Leipzig was a bourgeois town, utterly devoid of beauty, but powerful from of old through a vigorous combination of mercantile and learned activities. After the close of the seventeenth century the German booktrade, scared away from Frankfort by the strict imperial censorship, had become centred on the Pleisse, assisted in this choice by the presence of the university and by the zeal of the electoral Saxons for authorship. Towards 1820, nearly one-third of all German books were printed in Leipzig;

every German publisher of note had an agent there, and attended the Easter fair. The smaller publishers of the Catholic highlands, who had hitherto disposed of their school books and devotional works among the peasant farms of the mountain districts through the instrumentality of travellers, were irresistibly drawn into the more orderly activities of the "Protestant booktrade"; and just as literature had been the first bond of our national unity, so did it now create the first recognised universal German corporation, and did this, not as Metternich had once designed through the assistance of the federal police, but by its own spontaneous energy. In the year 1824, chiefly through the initiative of Perthes in Gotha and Fleischer in Leipzig, there came into existence the Union of German Booksellers, and therewith was effected a beneficial centralisation of the trade in literature, such as no other country could boast—a striking testimony, at once to the business efficiency of the German bourgeoisie and to the hidden power of the national idea.

Although Leipzig lacked the advantage of being situated upon a navigable river, from the beginning of the eighteenth century onwards it had taken the lead of all other German towns as a fair-town. It owed this development chiefly to the superiority of the Erzgebirge industries and to the lively spirit of enterprise of its merchants, who were little troubled by the easygoing Electoral Saxon administration, whereas the well-intentioned guardianship of Frederician commercial policy succeeded in ruining the fair-traffic of Frankfort-on-the-Oder. As the German industrial land situated furthest to the east, Saxony was the natural mart for the peoples of eastern Europe, who were still but half civilised, and had not yet completely outgrown the customs of the caravan trade; and so long as German intercourse was still restricted by internal tolls, by the anarchical systems of coinage and weights and measures, and by the corporative rights and prohibitive rights of the towns, very definite advantages were offered by the intermittently recurrent free trade of the fairs. The attempts now made by the Prussian government to improve the trade of its own fair-towns, Naumburg and Frankfort-on-the-Oder, were labour lost, and served merely to arouse neighbourly resentment. Whenever the Naumburg fair was opened an interim fair was held at Leipzig, with the tacit connivance of the

authorities; as a measure of retaliation, the Prussian traders would during the Leipzig fair hold an accessory leather fair in Lützen. But Leipzig's superiority was decisive; and with the great increase in urban traffic which occurred here thrice every year, the horizon of the bourgeoisie gradually became widened. The second commercial town of Germany faced the court and the officialdom like a free imperial town, not rebelliously, but in an independent spirit, and inspired with a consciousness that it did not belong to the petty kingdom alone.

The small town of Freiberg was even more important for German mining than was Leipzig for German commerce. Here flourished the first of all mining academies, sending its pupils as far away as Mexico and Peru, and recently acquiring a wide reputation through the work of Werner, for the poorer the natural yield of the precious metals furnished by the Erzgebirge ores, the more intricate had become the artifices for their extraction. Here Humboldt and Buch had passed some of the rich years of youth; here had Heinitz, Stein's tutor, worked; and here had Novalis written the lofty *Song of the Miner*, "That man is lord of all the earth, who gauges earth's profound." Close at hand in Tharandt, Heinrich Cotta, the Thuringian, directed a great institute for the teaching of forestry, which before long became the model for all Germany. Throughout the Erzgebirge, above ground and beneath, there were carried on grandly conceived economic activities, such as elsewhere in Germany were known only on the Lower Rhine. The watercourses of the mountains were interconnected by a system of canals for rafts; the great coal mines of the Plauen and Zwickau basins were already being worked; since the days of the continental system the textile industries had undergone great development; in Chemnitz, C. G. Becker was by now employing more than 3,000 hands in his calico printing works and his cotton mills. Almost all the little mountain towns presented the same picture. At the entrance stood the tall mile-stone, bearing the sign manual of Augustus the Strong; upon the summit of a rock with the river circling round it was an old castle dating from electoral days; on the sides of the hills nestled the trim houses and workshops of the weavers, the clock-makers and the stone-workers, everywhere buzzing with hard-working men, who would live from week end to week end

upon potatoes, washed down with draughts of an infusion of chicory, supplied in yellow paper bags by Jordan and Timäus. Yet, notwithstanding the grinding poverty, everything was clean, and the workpeople always consoled themselves with the old phrase, "A pleasant life is ours in the Erzgebirge." There were excellent elementary schools, although the teachers were half starved; and there was manifold technical instruction, centred above all in the Dresden institute for technical education, founded in the year 1828. In this proud old Electoral Saxony there was to be found a magnificent share of German efficiency; and even in Rhineland General Aster would recall with complacency the varied life of his native country, well as he must have known that its restricted relationships could have afforded no scope for his talents.

But this abundance of social energies was impaired and repressed by a constitution which seemed like a fragment of topsy-turveydom. Everything which gave the country importance, science, commerce, and industry, was bourgeois. It is true that here, as in all the Germanised Slavonic lands, there existed an incredible number of manorial estates, but with few exceptions the landed gentry were impoverished, those of Lusatia alone being tolerably well-to-do, and the majority of the noble families finding it necessary to seek a supplementary means of livelihood in court or state service. With its dense population, and the predominantly urban character of its civilisation, Saxony resembled the German west far more closely than the aristocratic agricultural regions of the Baltic shores; and yet amid these thoroughly modern economic conditions, there persisted immutably, like a well-preserved political fossil, a nobles' regime whose inertia was hardly exceeded even by that of Mecklenburg. It was here as plainly necessary to effect a thorough transformation by a partition of the lands, as it had formerly been necessary in the Rhenish Confederate territories of South Germany to effect such a transformation by the enlargement of the state domain; the wide mantle of the old constitution hung in flapping folds around the limbs of the diminished kingdom. But who could expect the cautious Frederick Augustus, now advanced in years, to conceive such bold designs? Who would have ventured even to breathe these possibilities amid the exaggerated homagè of the days of his return? The

king imagined that he was fulfilling all the wishes of his grateful people when with his customary industry and knowledge of affairs he faithfully reinstated the old order, when he wound up the rusty clock once more. The pendulum moved again solemnly to and fro, so continuously, so monotonously, that the Prussian envoy was never able to report anything beyond "the persistent lack of events of interest."[1] Of all the reports sent in by Prussian diplomats, those from Dresden were the most void of matter.

Immediately after his return, the king reestablished the former rigid court etiquette which when Frederick Augustus was a prisoner of war in Berlin had given the inhabitants of that city so much opportunity for the exercise of their wit. Just as, a man of habit through and through, he continued to display his fine musical talent upon Silbermann's old clavicymbal although the pianoforte had long ere this been invented, so did he desire that his court should retain all the characteristics of 1780, and it was with reluctance that he constrained himself to the tacit recognition of some of the bold innovations which Prince Repnin, the Russian governor, had had the presumption to introduce. Repnin had disbanded the expensive yellow-and-blue Swiss guard, had thrown the Grosse Garten open to the public, and had connected the palace square with the Brühl Terrace by a flight of steps. These audacities of the foreign regime could not now be done away with. Subsequently some of the Dresden art collections were actually opened to the public. Hitherto these had been preserved as a court mystery, and, almost unknown to natives, had been visited solely by a few artists and foreigners, who gained entry, in accordance with the traditional Old Saxon manner, by the payment of a douceur. In other respects the court remained as unapproachable as ever. Day after day two chamberlains stood behind the king when he sat down to meat, solemnly lifting the tails of his coat, first the left and then the right, before pushing his chair beneath him; every evening he appeared with all his court in the theatre, where Morlachi conducted the Italian opera. On Sunday in winter, after mass, the well-behaved boys of the upper classes waited in the corridors of the palace to admire the dignified train of the returning "Herrschaften": first of all a great number of runners,

[1] Jordan's Reports, July 12, 1819, and subsequent dates.

equerries, chamberlains, and adjutants; then the king in his old fashioned dress, powdered and pigtailed, his hands buried in a huge muff; then followed the princes, Antony and Max, likewise with muffs, carrying their chapeau bras—a marvellous spectacle, which nowhere but in Dresden could have been contemplated with a straight face. The king never appeared on foot in the streets; he never saw the fine monument to his ancestor Maurice, recently restored, for it was in the pleasure grounds a hundred paces from the carriage road. If he wished to see a travelling menagerie, the elephants and the snakes must pay their respects to him in the palace yard. How astonished were the Dresdeners when Max Joseph, paying a visit to the Saxon court, in accordance with his Munich custom cheerfully perambulated the town, and even exchanged words with bourgeois, for the king of Saxony never conversed with anyone who was not of the highest rank.

No one had occasion to sigh more deeply over the oppression of all this court ceremony than the gifted children of Prince Max. Prince Frederick Augustus, the hope of the country, was an amiable young man fond of brilliant conversation, and even showing some understanding of liberal ideas; he associated freely with Wangenheim, who lived in Dresden after his dismissal, and the ever-sanguine trias politician confidently anticipated that he would one day be appointed chief of the Saxon ministry.[1] Prince John, the younger son, was a Dante enthusiast, and would at times describe Italy's misfortunes in verses which sounded almost sacrilegious in the mouth of this near relative of the archducal house:

A tyrant's minions practice arts of hell
In the proud city once the ocean's queen;
Cowards now flee where once the Fabii fell;
Where Dante sang, base flatterers now are seen.[2]

Their sister, Princess Amelia, wrote minor dramas. She displayed no striking talent, but her work was characterised by cordial natural sensibility, and by remarkable knowledge of petty bourgeois life.

In the presence of the king, before whom everything was hushed in timid veneration, it was impossible for the com-

[1] Wangenheim to Hartmann, February 20, 1824; September 23, 1827.
[2] Wangenheim to Hartmann, January 4, 1824.

paratively free tone of this youthful court to find expression. Heavy was the hand of the president of the privy cabinet, the prime minister Count Einsiedel, a spare, stiff man, chary of words, his master's most humble servant, and, though still young, absolutely petrified in the usages of the Saxon court and nobility. He was at first regarded with suspicion by the fanatics of particularism, for he had estates in Prussian Lusatia, and was therefore one of the enemy's "vassals."[1] In reality, however, his political horizon ended at the green-and-white boundary posts; he neither knew nor cared to know anything of the outer world, his Prussian ironworks at Lauchhammer alone excepted. Shortly before the king's return, Count Marcolini, the favourite of many years' standing, had died. The "Contino," as he was called, an Italian of the frivolous Old Bourbon school, had been generally detested in the country; but he had had one merit at least, namely, that he had exercised a cheering influence upon his royal friend, and had to some extent counterbalanced the influence of the father confessors. But all this was altered now, for Count Einsiedel, a rigidly orthodox Lutheran, was extremely friendly towards the claims of the Catholic clergy. The minister's predilection for Stephan, the preacher, who had become the centre of a fanatical sect at the Bohemian church in Dresden, and who was subsequently shown to be a common hypocrite, aroused well-grounded discontent. So inflamed was public opinion that Stephan's participation in the work of the Bible society, the missionary union, and other perfectly innocent Christian undertakings, was regarded by the populace as suspicious. For at this time among the Upper Saxons the Lutheran rationalism of the old century was still in full force; no one would hear a word of Evangelical union but every manifestation of a strongly religious sentiment was resisted with the utmost intolerance as cant and sanctimoniousness. Under Ammon's rationalistic rule, the circulation of orthodox tracts was absolutely prohibited. The conventicles of Count Dohna, grandson of Zinzendorf, and the pupils of Schubert, the poor and pious weavers in the Erzgebirge, had to keep just as quiet as the Moravian brethren who had founded Pella-Herrnhut in a charming corner of Lusatia.

[1] Report of Councillor Heun, July 23, 1817.

The cabinet was assisted by the privy council, whose powers were purely deliberative, and by the central boards of justice and police. In financial matters, the dualism of the feudalist state persisted unchanged. The royal privy financial council administered the domains, whilst the supreme college of taxation (partly controlled by the diet) had charge of most of the taxes, and the disputes between the financial and the fiscal authorities were unceasing. In the bailiwicks, affairs were in the hands of the bailiffs, state officials drawn from the ranks of the resident gentry, with authority resembling that wielded by the Prussian Landrats. But the lords of the manor recked little of these administrators, exercising almost unrestricted powers within their own estates, administering justice through patrimonial courts (which the lord justicer could dismiss at will), and controlling their copyholders by the corvée, by heavy taxation, and by tithes. In Lusatia, hereditary servitude still obtained. Finally, in the treaty-dominions of the house of Schönburg the crown possessed little more than the name of sovereignty, but on into the eighteen-twenties it continued to levy import and export duties at the frontiers of this petty vassal state. Hardly less autocratic was the rule of Count Solms-Wildenfels in his tiny mediatised territory; and when the officers of the neighbouring Zwickau garrison came to visit him, he would say to them, "Well, what's the latest news with you in Saxony?"

The towns, too, looked upon themselves as states within the state; their councils perpetuated themselves by cooptation, as had been the case in Prussia before the reforms of Frederick William I; and in the larger towns they were composed exclusively of lawyers. In Leipzig and Dresden the councils, in virtue of the charters granted by the Polish Augustuses, did not need to give any account of their administration, and the saying was current, "Who can withstand God or the Leipzig council?" Even when need was pressing, the government rarely ventured to curb the pride of these despotic town councillors; for many years the inhabitants of the Mulde flats had to get along without an indispensable bridge, because the town council of Warzen would not relinquish the profits of a lucrative ferry. Not until 1821 was the administration of Upper Lusatia, heretofore in the hands of the estates, entrusted to the government

of the regal authorities. Nor was this effected without strong opposition. The little region, although two-thirds of its former domain were now Prussian, greatly desired to remain an independent margravate, distinct from the "hereditary dominions"; nor would it abandon the right of receiving the king-margrave in state, after his accession to the throne. The reception took place at the Upper Lusatian frontier, four hours' walk from Dresden, beneath the fluttering blue-yellow-and-red territorial banners. After all, four of the proud Six Towns of Lusatia had remained Saxon, and among these was Bautzen, the capital of the dynastically minded Wends.

Some of the posts in the judiciary and the administration were reserved by law for the nobles, for in accordance with feudal tradition these authorities were still subdivided into two benches, the noble and the learned. As a rule the higher dignities of state were allotted in rotation among the members of a small circle of titled and influential families, whose numbers had been yet more restricted since the partition, and whose identity was well known to all. It was solely as volunteers that young men of bourgeois birth could enter the nobles' cadet corps, and the only military school they could attend was the artillery school. Not until 1825 was the old method of military recruiting replaced by a conscription system based upon French and Rhenish Confederate models. Even longer, down to as late as 1829, did the old traditions continue in force at the university, whose students were still classed in four nationalities, as Meisseners, Saxons, Franconians, and Poles. The rector had princely rank. Without any state supervision, the university officials carried on in antediluvian fashion the costly and tedious administration of the extensive university estates. Their authority, indeed, no longer extended to all students residing in Leipzig, for this power had been abrogated by an edict of Napoleon; but they still exercised unrestricted sway over every member of the corpus academicum.

In this world of special privileges, it was natural that the clergy should not be subjected without reserve to the authority of the secular state. In 1814, when Pastor Tinius was charged with robbery and murder, the Leipzig law court had first to come to a provisional decision that it was necessary to take proceedings against the accused; then, in

the Nikolaikirche, the poor sinner was publicly unfrocked; and only after this could he, now a layman, be handed over to the lay assize. But the old privileges of the Lutherans had not weathered the storms of the times. When, in the peace of Posen, Napoleon had bestowed civic equality upon the Catholics, it was not long before the members of the Reformed church (after paying the customary douceurs) secured like privileges. Subsequently Governor Repnin granted equality before the law to the Greek Catholics as well; while the Jews of Leipzig, who had hitherto been forced to carry their dead to Dessau for burial, were now at least permitted to found a local cemetery. It was characteristic enough that the Russian general should be universally regarded as a pioneer of reform. None the less, Jews were allowed to reside nowhere else in Saxony than in Leipzig and Dresden.

The nobles and the bourgeois rivalled one another in zeal for the preservation of the rigid forms of the ancient guild system. While the towns continued obstinately to complain of the competition of the rural traders, and endeavoured to prevent the marriage of journeymen, the gentry insisted that no peasant's son should be apprenticed to any handicraft until he had spent four years in agricultural occupations, two years of this time being devoted to the service of the lord of the manor. Illegitimate children, unless specially legitimised by the king (on the payment of high fees), remained "of ill repute," and as such were excluded from the guilds and from all respectable occupations.

Since the days of the first elector Augustus there had been no further attempt to carry out a deliberate commercial policy. The mercantile system never found its way into Saxony, and its absence caused no loss, for domestic industry was sufficiently vigorous to be independent of protection. The Polish Augustuses scattered money cheerfully with both hands, cherishing the agreeable delusion that extravagance on the part of the sovereign brings plenty of money into the hands of the people, and even when order had at length been restored to the finances, this powerful manufacturing country remained without proper supervision on the frontiers. The only aims of its economic policy were to secure abundant customers at the Leipzig fairs and to provide cheap commodities for the gentle class among the consumers.

Consequently imports were favoured by an extremely low tariff, while internal commerce was hindered by excises and transit dues, and in addition was hampered in Leipzig by the staple right and by a heavy octroi which was enforced until 1823. The taxes on articles of consumption differed in the urban and the rural districts, and the landed gentry and the clergy enjoyed numerous privileges. This ill-considered fiscal system, which paid absolutely no attention to the vital needs of domestic industry, was extolled as the wise "Saxon freedom of trade." When Prussia now established her custom houses in close proximity to the precincts of Leipzig, thus restricting export to the north, and when in many branches of industry the effects of Prussian competition became noticeable, considerable uneasiness was felt. But anger turned against Prussia alone, and was not directed against the paternal government, people even viewing with indulgence the obstinate way in which the cumbrous old convention-coins were retained, although the lighter Prussian thalers had long ere this invaded the entire country. Before long the manufacturers of the Erzgebirge were mainly, and those of Lusatia almost exclusively, dependent for a market upon the smuggling traffic to Austria, and business people of the old school considered this furtive trade a blessing. But anyone who noted the increasing savagery of the frontier districts could not fail to experience much concern, and to ask whether Saxony could continue to exist in this way, cut off from the sea and the northern market.

Like all the other Saxon institutions, the diet, as it proudly boasted, had "arisen from the very spirit of the golden days of eld." It is true that the "exalted loyal estates, prelates, counts, and lords, those of the Ritterschaft and those of the towns," as the official title ran, had been terribly jumbled together. The first estate had since the partition numbered no more than three heads. The Ritterschaft consisted of all lords of the manor who could show eight ancestors; the German ancestor test was excused only to the Catholic noble families which had come to Saxony from Poland, Italy, and Ireland, after the conversion of the dynasty to Rome. But owing to the enforcement of the test, fully three-fourths of the lords of the manor were now excluded from the diet; in the Leipzig circle, where many of the merchants of the fair-town had bought estates, among

217 lords of the manor, 14 only were eligible. The representatives of the towns were appointed solely by the town council, and the peasantry was entirely unrepresented. In matters of legislation the diet possessed deliberative powers merely, but enjoyed a well-established right of voting supply, and was thereby enabled to frustrate any serious attempt at reform. Even Augustus the Strong had rarely ventured to impose an unapproved tax, preferring to defray the expenses of his court by selling land and people to neighbouring princes. None but isolated experts could find their way through the labyrinth of Saxon fiscal administration. The land taxes, from which the estates of the gentry were naturally exempt, were levied in Schockgroschen (60 groschen pieces), in accordance with a cadaster of the seventeenth century; but since in the interim the Swedish, the Silesian, and the Napoleonic wars had ravaged the Upper Saxon plateau, many changes had taken place since the completion of the cadaster. Moreover, there were in circulation, besides the "good," large numbers of "poor, debased, defaced, and defective" Schockgroschen.

The entire position was so intolerable that in two instances even the crown could not avoid initiating a trifling change. For decades past, vain attempts had been made to unite the hereditary dominions with the lesser accessory territories; this union had now become unavoidable, for since the partition no more than a part of Upper Lusatia and a few fragments of the chapter lands of Naumburg and Merseburg had remained to the kingdom. These vestiges were at length (1817) incorporated in the diet of the hereditary dominions; nevertheless Lusatia still retained its special margravial diet, composed of the lords of the manor of noble birth and of the four remaining Six Towns. Three years later, after an animated struggle between the Ritterschaft and the towns, it was decided that the lords of the manor who could not pass the ancestor test might send forty elected representatives to the diet. The prelates, counts, and lords could not, however, be induced to unite with the Ritterschaft to form a single estate, and they considered that they were making a great concession when they agreed to accept the university of Leipzig into their order. When the estates expressed a desire to be furnished with a summary statement of income and expenditure, the

king could not make up his mind to accede to the suggestion. Nor was it really necessary to grant the petition, for no one seriously wished to put an end to the hopeless dualism of the financial system, and, for the rest, everything was managed quite honestly.

The king likewise rejected a proposal for the publication of part of the proceedings of the diet, for the inviolability of official secrecy was held to be a pillar of the Old Saxon state; moreover, alike in Vienna and in Frankfort, publicity of the diet was now looked upon with suspicion as demagogic. When a Leipzig professor published in the Nüremberg *Korrespondent* some details of the proceedings of the estates, he was favoured with an extremely definite expression of "exalted disfavour." To avoid the reproach of doing nothing at all, the king had a brief diet report published in the record of laws, but this was so richly adorned with the flourishes and periphrases of Saxon legal style that no one was able to read it. As a matter of fact, no reader would have found it easy to endure an unabbreviated account of the proceedings of the diet. For example, in the year 1820, the loyal estates sent in the following address: "Thankfully did the estates praise heaven for that momentous day on which the most exemplary of rulers and the model of all the domestic virtues celebrated the glories of a completed half century. With no less loyal and devoted participation did they receive tidings of the happy events which have recently occurred in the most exalted royal house, and in especial the gratifying bonds by which renewed associations have been formed with the most illustrious imperial house. This very morning they solemnly returned thanks to the Almighty for that he has preserved your majesty in such gratifying health to be a blessing and a joy to the entire country, that he has given your majesty energy to endure all the labours and the cares of government and to continue the customary unexampled application and activity. In profoundest veneration . . . . " and so on for several folio pages.[1] With how much effort, too, were these priceless documents composed! Every proposal was first discussed seven times, and on occasion nine times, by the various committees and directories of the diet before a vote could be taken, so that it was a joke among the

[1] Address from the diet of 1820.

people that the diet spent its time playing puss-in-the-corner.

When King Frederick Augustus died in the year 1827, alike at court and among the general population it was widely expected that his two elderly brothers would have the good sense to renounce the throne in favour of the young and vigorous Prince Frederick Augustus. King Antony, however, was unwilling to forego his rights; and Count Einsiedel remained in office, under the express condition, to which the minister willingly agreed, that no changes whatever were to take place.[1] The new king was a thoroughly good-hearted man, less formal than his elder brother, but ill fitted for affairs (having been trained in youth for the clerical profession), and a man of so little account that the veneration even of the Dresdeners could find for him no other nickname than "the good-natured." Thus it was that the regime of old men pursued its dull and sleepy course, but among the common people there was taking place a gradual change of mood. Here, as in Prussia, during the first years of peace economic distresses monopolised popular attention, for the country had suffered terribly. The losses of the villages on the Leipzig battlefield were officially reckoned at more than 3,500,000 thalers, and this was certainly an under-estimate. In Dresden, after the peace, a number of the garden plots on which the cheerful villas of the Antonsstadt have to-day been erected, changed hands at the price of five or ten thalers. Many householders had been ruined simply by the extensive billeting; the Körners, whose house was assessed at a rental value of 1,085 thalers, had in the summer of 1813, during a period of six and a half months, to billet on the average nearly forty men per diem.[2] The entire war costs of the year 1813 amounted to at least a hundred million thalers. These wounds had at length healed, and now that the evil days had passed the question arose whether the state and the people were maintaining in Germany the position to which history entitled them. It was impossible to rest content in perpetuity with the favourite self-congratulatory phrase, that Germany was the heart of Europe, Saxony the heart of Germany, and Dresden the heart of Saxony.

[1] Jordan's Report, May 17, 1827.

[2] C. G. Körner's own calculation.

Devotion to the dynasty was, indeed, still unshaken. The whole country was racked with anxiety concerning the future of the royal house, which for a time seemed extremely insecure, for the marriages of the two young princes remained childless. Urged to the step by the pope and the court chaplain, Prince Max, notwithstanding his advanced age, contracted a second marriage with a young princess of Lucca, but this union also was denied the blessing of offspring. All the greater were the rejoicings when a son was at length born to young Prince John, and in honour of the event enthusiastic Dresdeners were to be seen standing on the bridge holding bottles of champagne and compelling every passer-by to clink glasses with them in honour of the heir to the throne.[1] Yet despite all this servility it was no longer possible to ignore that the unnaturalness of the outworn political forms was beginning to paralyse national life. The industry of the Erzgebirge could not recover a healthy tone; and while the glories of the Leipzig fairs still persisted, during the rest of the year things seemed by contrast all the duller on the Pleisse. Country customers were already inclining to obtain their requirements of colonial produce by way of Magdeburg, where no excise was charged.

Nations, like individuals, have to endure periods of sterility, during which everything goes wrong. Such an epoch had now arrived for Upper Saxony, so that it became hardly possible to recognise this country, which had formerly abounded in men of first-class intelligence. The reputation of the university, once world-wide, was now limited to Saxony. It possessed at this time a number of respectable experts, but no more than two whose excellence was widely recognised abroad, Gottfried Hermann, and Tzschirner, the eminent theologian, to whose names may perhaps be added that of the voluminous but vapid writer, Pölitz, and that of the indefatigable Krug, who at least possessed the courage to shake up the sleepy Saxon world by his frankly worded censures of public abuses. After the war, Count Heinrich Vitzthum, patron of Carl Maria von Weber, had cherished the hope that Saxony would find due compensation for the loss of political power, and that (like Bavaria, subsequently, under King Louis) she would become a centre of German artistic

[1] Reports from Jordan, August 1; from Meyern, October 15; Witzleben's Diary, July 1825; Wangenheim to Hartmann, April 30, 1828.

life. What had been the issue of these proud dreams? The writer of *Lyre and Sword* did not enjoy the favour of the court, for he was suspect on account of his Germano-Prussian patriotism. Saxony had hardly any share in the successes of the new plastic art, for the youthful men of talent, Schnorr, Rietschel, and Richter, were still in the years of development. Tiedge, the meditative author of *Urania*, who, though not Saxon born, was nevertheless honoured in Dresden as a native product, the poetical harpist Therese aus dem Winckell, Tromlitz, Nordstern, and the other stars of the "Dresden Tea and Poetry Society"—these worthies could but radiate a very gentle refulgence over the land.

Mediocrity and petrifaction prevailed everywhere, and now, by the irony of fate, it was the spectacle of Prussian conditions which awakened political discontent among the inhabitants of town and country alike. However much people might abuse the Prussians, it was impossible for them to overlook the obvious fact that the province of Saxony was in all respects better off than the kingdom, and that no one in the province seriously desired to return to the sway of the chaplet of rue. The province possessed everything which was lacking in the kingdom: a sagacious and vigorous administration, friendly to the bourgeoisie; and a liberal system of municipal government, which contrasted strangely with the nepotism of the Electoral Saxon town councils, and, for this very reason, found its most ardent advocate in the Saxon, Streckfuss. Whilst in the province the relief of burdens on the peasant lands made continuous progress, in the kingdom the existing burdens were actually increasing. As late as 1828, a new order was issued concerning the right of common. Those upon whose land the right of common might be exercised by others could claim the privilege of herding their own beasts upon their own pastures only if they had exercised this privilege from time immemorial!

Thus it was that in Saxony people began to envy the towns' ordinance and the agrarian laws of Prussia, and to this well-grounded discontent there was superadded an utterly baseless suspicion that the royal house was animated by ultramontane sentiments. It was natural enough that in this Lutheran land—where the idea had once been seriously entertained of introducing a new chronology, the Lutheran

(starting from the year 1517), to supplant the Christian—sinister rumours should be continually circulated concerning the Catholic court. These suspicions became all the more irritable in proportion to the degree of servility with which in other respects the king's commands were obeyed, and for long years hardly any other political passion was known to the Electoral Saxon people. King Antony was even more of a bigot than had been his deceased brother, whose custom it was, speaking of Catholics, to say in confidence, "Il est de notre religion." From time to time some ambitious lieutenant or official would go over to Rome upon questionable grounds, but such cases were extremely rare, demonstrably rarer than conversions from Catholicism to Protestantism. Even if at court there had long existed a secret fund for the support of converts,[1] even if a former court lady was deprived of her pension because she brought up her children as Lutherans,[2] these were purely private affairs of the royal house and did not concern the state. Despite their strictly Catholic sentiments, the Albertines have during the nineteenth century always honourably avoided the deliberate favouring of proselytism. There was no possibility in Dresden of such a Jesuistic propaganda as prevailed at the newly converted court of Coethen, for none of the higher officials would have been a party to anything of the kind.

Nevertheless suspicion was rife, and found fresh nourishment in certain incidents harmless in themselves. In 1824, when the ecclesiastical jubilee was notified for the following year, and when a placard was posted in the Catholic Hofkirche inviting the faithful to offer up the customary prayers for the diffusion of Catholicism and the overthrow of heresy, a storm broke throughout the country. No one marked that in all the churches of Catholic Christendom the same traditional invitation was to be read; no one reflected that the Protestants were also accustomed to pray their God for the diffusion of the pure Protestant faith. An address from the Dresden burghers indignantly asked how this could possibly happen "in a German province from which the light of the Reformation first radiated."[3] Such a clamour issued from

[1] Baron von Oelssen's Report, December 28, 1818.
[2] Jordan's Report, November 4, 1828.
[3] Petition from the burghers of Dresden to the town council, December, 1824.

the pulpits that the king at length found it necessary to enjoin both parties to hold their peace. Fresh uproar was raised by the Lutherans in 1827 when the crown, against the advice of the estates, promulgated a mandate containing entirely unobjectionable prescriptions about Catholic parishes and the cure of souls. Another mandate left the matter of the religious education of the children of mixed marriages entirely to the free decision of the parents, and this law, manifestly well-intentioned, stimulated Lutheran intolerance to deliver violent attacks. It was universally believed that the Marcolini palace was to become a Jesuit college. A number of similar fables were current, and yet there was but one definite fact underlying them all, namely, that the king and Count Einsiedel favoured Bishop Mauermann with their especial confidence.

Beneath the surface, dissatisfaction became so intense as to render possible the foundation of an opposition newspaper, an unprecedented event in Saxony. The *Biene* [Bee], edited by Richter, the Zwickau theologian, was not properly speaking a political journal, but a forum for the discussion of public affairs—for by royal privilege politics were reserved for the subsidised *Leipziger Zeitung*. Here it became possible for thoughtful philistines to pour out their troubles to the "dear little bee" and the "worthy bee-father," to express their concern about Pennalismus[1] in the princely schools, about vermin in the university lock-up, about the dangerous condition of the Leipzig shooting-range, about the pug-dogs of the Dresden ladies. But side by side with such puerile grievances, there were serious complaints on behalf of the burdened countryfolk, especially from Schönburg, where the peasants had to hand over to the count a tithe of the grain harvest, and every seventh head of the new born stock; and there were strongly worded complaints of the abuses committed by the municipal administration, dealing not only with the beer monopoly and the scandalous thinness of the beer from the council cellar, but also with the irresponsible system of town government. The tone of the articles was at times definitely impassioned, and it could be felt that the new king could no longer count upon unconditional devotion. Men of the good old times contemplated with anxiety this contentious insect "which went buzzing about, disturbing everyone."

[1] See vol. III, p. 39.

In November, 1829, the *Biene* ventured to publish an "Address from the Saxon People" to the king, the work of Albert von Carlowitz, the most capable member of the Ritterschaft. In this address the writer referred to the example of Weimar, Bavaria, and Würtemberg; demanded the introduction of a genuine system of popular representation; recommended a more equitable distribution of the public burdens; the Ritterschaft would do well to release the king from the charters which guaranteed its members in the exercise of their popular rights!

Still plainer was the language employed shortly afterwards by another respected landowner, Otto von Watzdorf, an outspoken man, who at a much later date, irritated by the ill feeling displayed towards him by the members of his order, was forced into a radical attitude. At this time his position was still that of South German constitutional liberalism. In a *Memorial concerning the Saxon Constitution* he developed the programme of the party, demanding partition of authority, a bicameral system, and ministerial responsibility. The government refused its imprimatur to this essay in contemptuous terms, but it was printed none the less, and widely read. For a long time, now, these two aristocratic liberals had not stood alone. This was plainly manifest when the diet of 1830 again demanded that a summary statement of expenditure should be issued, and, when approving the taxes, it openly declared: "By far the smallest proportion of that which we approve is our own. The spirit of these days demands far more than the people demanded from its representatives in decades past." Once again the crown rejected all innovations, but its language was less confident than of yore. Everyone felt that the old system was tottering. After fifteen years had been wasted in dreamy inactivity, a peaceful transformation of the mouldy structure seemed extremely improbable.

2. ELECTORAL HESSE.

Like Upper Saxony, the Hesses had remained thoroughly mid-German, akin to the highland regions in blood and tongue, but associated with the north by intercourse and by religious and political history. Alone among the Teutons, the Catti

shared with the Frisii the glory of having throughout all the storms of the tribal migrations persisted in the old habitation and preserved their ancient name unchanged. Here and in Westphalia the Romans had encountered invincible enemies; only in Frisia and in a few regions of Lower Saxony was the Teutonic blood still entirely unmixed. These Upper Franconians contributed to the upbuilding of the world-controlling empire of the Franks; it was from their valleys, from Fulda, Hersfeld, and Fritzlar, that Christianity made its way into the interior of Germany; hence came Conrad, the last Franconian king of the Germans. Shortly thereafter the political influence of the Catti declined, and with the death of Duke Eberhard the Hessian duchy ceased to exist. Amalgamated for two centuries with Thuringia, Hesse was now of little account in German politics, although in prayer and in action the home of St. Elisabeth and of Conrad of Marburg, the inquisitor, played a noteworthy part in the hierarchical movement of the age of the Innocents. Not until the middle of the thirteenth century, when Henry, "the Child of Brabant," became landgrave of Hesse, did the independent history of the country recommence, to become more glorious and eventful than has often happened in the case of a petty state. To the victorious arms of the Hessian lion and the Ziegenhain star, to the struggles of Louis the Peaceable against Electoral Mainz, Germany owed her ability to prevent the formation of any all-powerful priestly state in the heart of the empire and to force the spiritual authority to abate in some degree its pretensions to temporal power.

In the landgrave of the little territory of Hesse, Martin Luther found the most valiant of his defenders. At Marburg was founded the first Protestant university, and at the synod of Homberg the constitution of the Evangelical church was first elaborated with logical precision. Philip the Magnanimous stimulated the hesitating Lutherans to a decision, not invariably with the caution of the statesman, but with the vigour of a man of action endowed with a powerful will. When he was defeated in the Schmalkaldian War, and subsequently imprisoned, his Hessians, fired with all the passion of a national war, took part in the struggle for his liberation, in the rebellion against Emperor Charles V. From the first the dynasty had been in close relations with the Swiss and the French reformers, and had undismayed supported the house of Orange

and the Huguenots. From the time of Maurice the Learned, the dynasty formally espoused the side of the most militant of the Protestant churches, and although the court of Cassel participated for a time in the sterile and hesitating arts of the Evangelical union, as soon as Gustavus Adolphus appeared upon the scene that court definitely took the side of the Swedish party. Before the walls of Hanau, the ancient military reputation of "the blind Hessians" was gloriously maintained; and down to the close of the war, during the reign of Landgrave William VI, the latter's mother and guardian, the celebrated Amelia Elisabeth, a shining example to her co-religionists, battled courageously for the Evangelical cause. Subsequently, during the difficult years when William VI and his wife Hedwig Sophia, sister of the Great Elector, were doing their utmost to heal the wounds inflicted by the great war, the princely house continued faithful to its Protestant policy. In the days of Landgrave Charles, the Huguenot refugees found an asylum in Hesse (as had formerly the Protestant Walloons); the nephew in Cassel rivalled his uncle in Berlin in his reputation for Protestant hospitality.

Doubtless the house of Brabant did not remain free from the sins of this age when sovereignty was idolised. The evil example of selling soldiers to foreign lands which John George III of Saxony had first set the German petty princes, seemed nowhere more alluring than here, where the doughty army was the pride of the country, and where it was impossible to maintain it without the aid of foreign subsidies. Thus it was that the army became a gold mine for the impoverished state. Hessian blood flowed in streams upon every battlefield in Europe, from Euboea to the Scottish highlands; in the War of the Austrian Succession, some of the Hessian troops were engaged in the armies of Emperor Charles VII, while the rest of the Hessian soldiers were fighting upon the other side, in the service of their English paymasters. None the less, in matters of German policy the attitude of the princely house was by no means dishonourable—in so far as the impotence of a petty state renders a political attitude possible at all. In all the wars against France, Hesse nobly fulfilled her duty to the German realm; at Höchstädt, Ramillies, and Malplaquet, her battle-stained banners earned new glories; and always the young landgraves fought in knightly fashion among their fellow countrymen.

During the Seven Years' War, the dynasty performed its last great service for Germany. Together with the Hanoverians, the Hessians formed the nucleus of the army with which Ferdinand Duke of Brunswick, the Prussian general, defended the German west against the overwhelming power of France. The significance of this war for the future of Protestantism was by few statesmen so clearly recognised as by the able minister F. A. von Hardenberg, who continually exhorted his master, the old landgrave William VIII, to adhere firmly to the "système naturel" of the Protestant estates of the empire. Among the common people the plunderings of the French aroused an intense feeling of anger, closely resembling national pride. Every peasant knew something of the deeds of that long series of tried warriors his land had sent into the German armies, from Kurt von Boyneburg, "the little Hessian," down to Gilsa and the other generals of Ferdinand of Brunswick. It is true that the country gained small advantage from the subsidies which these brave warcraftsmen earned for the landgrave, for the ostentatious extravagances of the court engulfed enormous sums. The cascades of Wilhelmshöhe, surmounted by the colossal Hercules, might well compete with the glories of Versailles; but notwithstanding its magnificent art gallery and the buildings of Du Rys, the quiet town of Cassel was but a little place, and Carlshafen, the new port on the Weser, which was to give the land of Hesse access to the high seas, was not even a North German Mannheim. Yet, in spite of all, the landgravate was still numbered among the best administered of the German minor states; the old sense of princely duty was never utterly lost; the sovereign was almost invariably on good terms with his estates.

It was not until after the Seven Years' War that, by a disastrous anachronism, all the evils of princely caprice broke over Hesse, at the very time when the clock of the old French absolutism had run down, when public opinion was already noting the activities of the great with a more critical eye, and when well-nigh all the notable princely houses of Germany were earnestly collecting their energies in the endeavour to follow King Frederick's lead. With Landgrave Frederick II, there began in the house of Philip the Magnanimous, and progressively increased, an enigmatic degeneration; in four generations the glories acquired in five rich centuries were

shamefully lost; and at length this venerable race of princes became detested by the loyal people, and passed to its destruction unlamented. The Hessians were familiar with their princes' hereditary sin, ungovernable anger; ill-controlled eroticism had of old brought much misery over the land, when Philip the Magnanimous concluded his double marriage; but entirely new was the heartless avarice, which was now with sinister regularity superadded to these two weaknesses, and owing to which the rulers necessarily appeared to be the enemies of the ruled.

As long as armies were still composed of soldiers obtained by voluntary recruiting, and serving for pay, no disgrace attached to war service under a foreign flag. It was not until the days of King Frederick that the Germans began to recognise that armed power belongs to the state. Even though, in the Seven Years' War, the Hessians fought as English mercenaries, they were fighting for hearth and home, for their own country's cause. Meanwhile the Prussian cantonal system had been introduced into Hesse (1762); and when the traffic in men was now carried on with the persons of these compulsory soldiers, and more vigorously than ever, to the changed sentiments of the time the traditional practice seemed extremely repulsive. Mirabeau, Burke, even Frederick the Great, expressed their reprobation in the severest terms when Landgrave Frederick and his son William, hereditary prince of Hanau, sold by degrees to England 19,400 of their 300,000 subjects, well nigh a third of all the men fit for military service. These men were employed in the civil war against the Americans, regarded by their contemporaries as champions of liberty. "The misdeeds of this German princeling", were pitilessly exposed in the English parliament. The old landgrave had at least been ever careful to preserve the forms of decency, and had concluded with Great Britain a treaty by which the two powers mutually guaranteed the integrity of each other's dominions; but the hereditary prince composed adulatory epistles to his "magnanimous protector and noble-minded benefactor" George III, placing himself and his army at the king's disposal. Father and son now outvied one another in fiscal arts calculated to overreach the English paymasters. William insisted on special compensation for every killed or wounded Hessian soldier; Frederick found it more lucrative to receive the soldiers' pay with his

own hands and to keep the names of the slain on the active list for a time. Of the unhappy mercenaries, more than a third never saw their homes again; and their name became a byword, for the Americans applied to everything base and slavish the contemptuous epithet of "Hessian."

Measureless was the distress of the depopulated land. Day and night, mounted patrols guarded the frontier to prevent the escape of men liable to military service. As a consolation for his people, and since he had no longer to pay for the army himself, the old landgrave remitted a modest proportion of the taxes for the duration of the American war. But to the hereditary prince, even this sacrifice seemed excessive. He was content with remitting taxation in the cases of the parents and wives of those who had gone to the war, and announced to his faithful subjects that it was "a real pleasure" to him "to be able to give such a mark of royal favour." By the son, the blood-money was thriftily stored away in his treasury. By the father, on the other hand, some of it was devoted to the construction of new buildings in Cassel, while much of the remainder was squandered upon unsavoury entertainments for the benefit of the French prostitutes and adventurers who dominated the court and corrupted the morals of the capital for many years to come. Despite this extravagance, Frederick II handed down to his son a princely private estate which had no parallel in Germany. Nevertheless, the former services of the landgrave and his house were still so greatly valued that during his lifetime the loyal estates erected in the Friedrichsplatz a monument to this "father of the fatherland."

When William IX succeeded to the landgravate, he remained true to the principles of government previously tried in Hanau. He put an end to ostentatious display, and extreme parsimony prevailed in court and state; but the old debauchery persisted unchanged. No one was able to reckon the precise number of the royal bastards. Everyone, however, knew the counts von Hessenstein and the brothers Haynau; and the saying was current that whenever the landgrave could feel assured once again that he was about to experience the joys of extra-conjugal fatherhood, it was his custom to raise the price of the salt in the state magazines another farthing per bushel. In the Rhenish campaigns, the army (again in English pay) fought once more in a manner worthy

of its ancient reputation, and this time for the German realm and for a cause which the prince himself held sacred, for he had the temperament of an autocrat, and detested the revolution. Where his avarice was not involved, his rule was during these years tolerable enough; and when he was ingloriously dethroned (a victim of his own wiles, and of his failure to forecast the winning side) his loyal subjects instantly forgot all the injustice they had suffered at his hands. On three occasions during the years 1806 and 1809 the Hessians attempted a rising against the foreign dominion. But the wealthy electoral prince was content to levy in Bohemia a small and badly paid volunteer corps; he had no alms for those upon whom misfortune fell for his sake; and he wished to pay off the valiant Colonel Dörnberg, the instigator of the second rising, with a paltry two hundred thalers. These sins were likewise forgotten. Upon his return, the entire land of Old Hesse luxuriated in patriotic enthusiasm. Even County Schaumburg, the remote and beautiful dependence on the Weser, was delighted at the restoration of the old regime. But here the well-to-do peasants, established in their farms shaded by oak trees and still accustomed to display the Saxon horse on the buttons of their linen jerkins, had nothing in common with the Old Hessians in respect either of tribal origin or of political constitution. Once a week only did they receive news from distant Cassel, brought by a diligence which invariably broke down at Höxter. Less powerful was the affection for the dynasty in busy Hanau, for this, associated by position and by trade relationships rather with Frankfort and the Rhenish territories, had never felt really at home in its connection with the comparatively poor agricultural region of Hesse; and the Hanauers, whose blood contained a considerable French admixture, had ever been regarded as turbulent and revolutionary.

Utterly foreign in the reestablished electoral state was a vestige of the ancient bishopric of Fulda, acquired in the peace by the elector through an exchange, and incorporated by him "with my other states" under the pretentious title of "Grand Duchy of Fulda." Here the church was all in all. The poverty-stricken inhabitants would still sadly recount what glorious times there had been of old in the magnificent rococo palace close to the tomb of St. Boniface; how at the banquets of the bishop and his canons the noble

Johannisberger would flow in streams; how on Palm Sunday the school children would get their Easter eggs from the belly of the consecrated donkey; and how the oppressed man of the common people, looking on at the splendid processions or enjoying the free soup provided by the monastery, could forget his troubles for a time. Even after the secularisation, a distinctively Catholic life tenaciously persisted in this rude region of the Rhöngebirge—by no means intolerant, but in habits and mode of thought differing very markedly from that of the neighbouring Protestant districts. In Fulda, the Christmas tree was still unknown, though it had long before made its way from the Lutheran lands into other parts of Catholic Germany. This focus of Catholicism accepted with reluctance the rule of the Protestant elector. When he took possession there was circulated an extremely disrespectful song: "Fuldans rejoicè, Heaven's kingdom's now at hand. The hero mates with heroes of like pattern; stout Hessians now are we, and valiant Catten," and so on.[1] But serious resistance was out of the question. Nothing of the kind could be expected from the inhabitants of a region which had within ten years enjoyed the successive blessings of episcopal, Orange, French, Berg, Frankfort, Austrian, and Prussian rule.

With a reasonable amount of justice and benevolence, no land in Germany would have been easier to rule than Electoral Hesse. How delighted were the inhabitants to be freed at length from the accursed dominion of Westphalia; everything could be accepted with gratitude from the Nestor of the German princes. But even Hessian loyalty was shaken when William, as if he had been asleep all the time, attempted, with a stroke of the pen, to annihilate the history of the last seven years. Everything was to return to the status quo ante November 1, 1806. The regiments then dismissed on furlough were to reassemble forthwith in their old garrisons; the state servants were to resume their former posts. The major became a lieutenant once more, and the councillor an assessor—unless the elector preferred to confirm them in their new dignities on the payment of fresh fees. The *code Napoléon* and all the Westphalian legislation were

[1] A Brief but Loyal Song of Rejoicing. Fulda, May 22, 1816. The poem is witty, but unprintable. Its author was presumably Baron von Meusebach.

immediately swept away: thousands of persons now regarded as of full legal age were to become minors once again, because majority was henceforward, as in old days, to begin at twenty-five instead of twenty-one. At New Year, 1816, when the troops returned from the siege operations in France, they had immediately to resume the wearing of fifteen-inch queues: one inch before the plait begins, thirteen inches plaited, one inch curled at the end—thus ran the regulations.

Things would not have been so bad if the follies of this restoration had at least been dictated by an honourable fanaticism. But the prince's legitimist zeal was aptly combined with mercantile calculation. Just as he robbed the purchasers of the domains but held fast to the new acquisitions of King Jerome, so did he reintroduce the taxes of Old Hesse while leaving in force the heaviest of the Westphalian exactions. The Westphalian national debt was repudiated, but of the Old Hessian debt William would recognise no more than a third because his administrator Jerome had arbitrarily written it down to that amount. What a contrast was this to the scupulous honesty of the king of Prussia.[1] The guild system, the corvée, and the burdens on the peasants were revived; but the patrimonial courts were not restored, for the elector mistrusted the gentry. The sons of those not of the highest rank were allowed entry to the university only upon receipt of a special permit from the sovereign prince.

The state servants, who under the foreign dominion had at least been able to count with some certainty upon the receipt of their pay, were once more exposed without defence to the prince's avarice. In the army it soon became the rule that on promotion officers should retain their old salary; there were generals with the pay of a cavalry captain, and not one of them received his due. When four years had elapsed, the father of the country was fleecing his servants so unmercifully that month by month he was able to save thirty-six thousand thalers on his pay-roll and to hide the sum away in his unfathomable treasure chests.[2] Those even who had served their time were for the most part allowed to hunger. When there was a possibility of defrauding a deserving old general of his pension, his record

[1] See vol III, p. 385.
[2] Hänlein's Reports, January 22, 1816, November 6, 1817.

in the service was besmirched with all kinds of trumped-up suspicions. Should any retired officer complain that he could afford nothing to eat but potatoes, the elector's blunt answer was; "For my part, I am very fond of potatoes." Now that England no longer paid any subsidies, the number of men on active service was soon reduced to 1,500 (eighty men in each battalion); but taxes had still to be paid for an army of 20,000. In order to effect further savings, the elector, who was building a palace, used the horses of the artillery to do the carting.[1] Not even endowments were safe from the old man's thievish hands. The university of Rinteln having been abolished, part of its property was assigned to the Rinteln gymnasium, and another part to Marburg university, while the balance, a sum by no means to be despised, passed to the insatiable princely treasure chest. The Jews came off best at this time. They had no difficulty in understanding the character of the man with whom they had to deal. Promptly paying over a good round sum in cash, they secured a confirmation of the rights assigned them by the *code Napoléon*.

In this way all the beneficial reforms of the Westphalian regime were abolished. The severities of that regime alone persisted, reinforcing the revived abuses of the good old time. The arbitrariness of the restored prince was so outrageous that even Goethe, who was as a rule disinclined to lend an ear to the complaints of the liberal world, penned the bitter verses:

From the spirit of our age
Far is the rich old prince,
Far, far indeed.
Yet whoever money understands
Understands the time
Aptly indeed!

At court, moreover, there were perpetual disputes between the elector, his son, and his mistress-in-chief; there were detestable usurious practices on the part of the favourite Buderus von Carlshausen; and there were continual affronts to the diplomatic corps, whose members could enforce decent treatment by threats alone. How gladly would the excellent Hänlein, the Prussian envoy, have related smooth things of

[1] Hänlein's Reports, May 25 and June 1, 1818.

this court which was so closely connected with the royal house of Prussia; but being a truthful man he had nothing to fill his reports with but stories of sultan's caprices and similar unsavoury matters. The ruler's cynical contempt for mankind was so ingrained that he never even noted the despair by which he was surrounded. At a patriotic festival the inhabitants of Cassel were privileged to read the inscription, appearing in letters of flame over the gateway of the palace: "The father to his children!"

Upon his entry into the grand alliance, the elector had been compelled to promise the great powers to reestablish his old diet, which in recent decades had been nothing more than a "Geldtag" (money diet), and had not met at all since 1798. After a year's interval, he fulfilled his pledge, and in March, 1815, summoned a "restricted diet" for Old Hesse, consisting of eight prelates and gentlemen, eight urban representatives, and a third curia of five members for the hitherto unrepresented peasantry. The Ritterschaft of the five Hessian *Ströme* (departments) of the Diemel, the Lahn, the Fulda, the Schwalm, and the Werra, had hitherto elected one representative for each *Strom*. The peasantry was to do the like in the future. This introduction of peasant representation was the solitary reform instituted by William I, and it was not inspired on his part by any desire to do justice to the countryfolk; his sole motive was to provide a counterpoise to the Ritterschaft, for he regarded that order with suspicion. The elector opened the assembly of the estates with words of paternal affection, and then introduced, as the only proposition for them to discuss, a demand for more than four million thalers. He claimed that he had expended this amount on behalf of the country, two million thalers before the year 1806; and with the same magnanimity as that with which he had in earlier days remitted taxation for the wives of the mercenaries, he now gave the estates to understand that, as an act of special grace, he was prepared to forego compensation for the burning of the palace in the year 1811.

In face of these claims, the diet maintained the firm and calm commonsense which has since then, amid severe trials, come to be considered the predominant trait of the Hessian character, securing for the inhabitants of this little

country the respect of the world. Although the Ritterschaft at times endeavoured to go its own way, the estates held firmly together in all matters of importance, the peasant representatives behaving extremely well. The Prussian envoy admired the courage and thoughtfulness of this diet, and even the Austrian envoy was impressed. Under such a prince, politics was nothing but a matter of business, and after prolonged chaffering the ruler's demand was ultimately abated to four hundred thousand thalers, and the elector was induced to recognise the Old Hessian debt at its full nominal value. But the estates were unable to secure any statement as to the condition of the national finances. Not only were they refused information about the cabinet treasury and the private treasury, which by ancient constitutional usage were the concern of the sovereign prince alone, but they could learn nothing about the state of the war chest, though this contained a part of the English subsidies estimated by the diet at 22,000,000 thalers, and claimed by that body on behalf of the state. The most odious sin of political life in the German petty states, disputes about money, were never so venomous as in Hesse, where the treasures of the princely house had unquestionably been obtained by the blood of the people.

Meanwhile the country began to show signs of ferment. The hereditary chamberlain Baron von Berlepsch, an honest but somewhat eccentric radical, issued a work in which he advanced proof that now in time of peace many of the peasants were paying twice as much in taxes as they had paid under the foreign dominion in time of war, and the countryfolk knew that the writer was speaking the truth. The peasants of the Diemel Strom (131 communes) sent a statement of grievances to the diet concerning the oppressive burden of taxation: "The days of French rule were bad, but if all that has to be paid out be added together, the present days are even worse, and if it were not that we are paying to our beloved elector, who is as good a Hessian as we are ourselves, the country would not have kept quiet so long." They went on to ask, in an artless manner, that the diet should enquire how much of the money that Hesse owed was really owed by the state, and what became of all the money which they were compelled to pay.[1] Before long similar

[1] Wishes of the peasants of the Diemel Strom, March, 1816.

petitions were circulated for signature in the other *Ströme*. Two officers, moreover, applied to the estates in the name of their comrades, asking that a report should be drawn up regarding the illegal withholding of pay; and even Hänlein found this procedure excusable, however improper from the military point of view, for the unhappy men were hardly able to keep body and soul together.[1]

When the estates reassembled in February, 1816, after a lengthy prorogation, the elector submitted to them a constitution for the new composite state of Electoral Hesse and Fulda. "I do not need a constitution," said the elector to the Prussian envoy, "but I shall give one for the sake of example and of effect."[2] The draft for a constitution, the work of the sympathetic minister von Schmerfeld, contained many excellent prescriptions, but lacked the one essential, the separation of the ruler's private property from the property of the state. In the lively discussions which followed, there were already to be heard from time to time the ambiguous battle cries of the dominant constitutionalist doctrine. It was proposed that "the ideal of a happy form of government, the English," should be taken as an example; to the intense indignation of the elector, the name of *Landesherr* (lord of the land) was replaced by the name *Regent* (ruler) used by the apostles of the law of reason; and the demand was voiced that the *Regent* should take an oath of fidelity to the constitution as a preliminary to its formal imauguration. Robert, the eloquent urban representative, spoke much of a "general state right" which took precedence of "territorial right." But most of the amendments suggested by the diet were thoroughly reasonable; and if it was finally proposed that "the united constitution" should be placed under the guarantee of two German powers,[3] this demand was by no means superfluous in relation to such a princely house, nor was it unprecedented in Hessian history. When the elector's father had become a Roman Catholic, Prussia, the naval powers, and the Scandinavian crowns, had guaranteed the Hessian act of assecuration, and had thus obtained for the country the maintenance of the religious status quo.

[1] Hänlein's Report, June 22, 1816.

[2] Hänlein's Report, January 11, 1816.

[3] Observations of the estates upon the proposal for a constitution, with Memorandum of March 29 and Address of April 1, 1816.

The elector was in a fury when he saw the unrestricted exercise of his sovereignty thus threatened. He had expected the estates to accept his gracious gift unexamined; he now announced to them his peculiar displeasure because they had not refrained from displaying "an inadmissible tendency towards the subversion of the old constitution. . . . Every independent state," he continued, "however small it may be, makes it a point of national honour not to permit foreign powers to interfere in its internal affairs, and it is a painful experience to his majesty that the estates should desire conditions to arise in Electoral Hesse by which the country's independence would be endangered."[1] To some of the representatives who had spoken of mediation on the part of the king of Prussia, he uttered personal threats, saying he would treat anyone as a rebel who should look abroad for help.

In respect of all these matters a compromise might still have been effected, but no understanding was possible as regards the distinction between the sovereign's private property and the property of the nation, although the demands of the diet were extremely moderate. Bluntly and scornfully, and with manifest intention to force a rupture, the sovereign commissary Johann Hassenpflug declared that what the ruling house had acquired by inheritance and subsidies belonged to the sovereign alone. A curse lay upon the English blood-money, for this was the rock upon which was shipwrecked the first attempt to establish a constitution. In May the elector dismissed his estates with nothing effected, not even permitting them to reassemble after a recess, an unprecedented incident in Hesse. The assembly broke up amid solemn protests of its right to vote supply, reiterating the assertion that the national property belonged to the country and not to the sovereign. Soon afterwards the two officers who had addressed the estates were, without a trial and in defiance of law, sent to Spangenberg, a small mountain fortress which in the history of the minor German states had long played a role similar to that played by Königstein or Hohenasperg; the deepest dungeon in Spangenberg, known as the Karthause, was one which no prisoner had ever left alive. The officers' corps was much enraged, and its members

[1] Despatch from the sovereign-committee to the estates, under date April 6, 1816.

were on the point of throwing up their commissions in a body. When this became known to the elector, he thought it expedient to set the prisoners at liberty.[1]

To the day of his death he continued to rule as an absolute sovereign, and could enjoy the pleasure of reducing salaries all round in the grand duchy of Fulda, and of thus adding several thousands a month to the fund in his cabinet treasury.[2] The debt committee of the estates, which continued to exist as an isolated vestige of the old constitution, was utterly impotent, being unable even to prevent an occasional arbitrary increase of taxation. No one could influence the elector, except that in monetary matters Amschel Rothschild's well-tried advice was gladly followed; even Hassenpflug's power went no further than to enable him to procure for his aspiring son, Hans Daniel, the opening of a varied career in official service. The weal and the woe of every Hessian were absolutely dependent upon the incalculable caprices of the aged ruler, who, as his health broke up, became ever more cranky and irritable. When promulgating the Carlsbad decrees, he fiercely appended the threat: "Herewith I declare to those of my subjects who shall be proved guilty of participating in the aforesaid subversive associations, that they are unworthy of the name of Hessian, and that they will consequently be expelled in perpetuity from among my trusty people, and will be deprived of all civil rights." [3]

The quiet interment of the ancient constitution was received by the nation with unexpected tranquillity, although the estates issued a printed report of their private proceedings. The town of Cassel expressed its gratitude to the departing diet; and when in the year 1817 the elector issued a legislative mandate upon his own initiative, it was suggested that a protest should be lodged with the German great powers.[4] But the design was never carried out. People had abandoned hope, and what time was there for political thought amid the economic distresses of this miserable and neglected land? When the traveller gained his first sight of the red rocks of the Werra or the Fulda valley, richly wooded, with the river sparkling at their base, or glimpsed the

[1] Hänlein's Report, June 24, 1816, and subsequent dates.
[2] Hänlein's Report, June 8, 1818.
[3] Proclamation to the Hessians from the elector, September 30, 1819.
[4] Hänlein's Report, March 17, 1817.

picturesque basalt domes beside the Eder or the Schwalm, he imagined that he would find here the cheerful repose which constitutes the charm of the Central German hill-country. But in the poverty-stricken villages he was soon astonished to note the extraordinary gloom of the inhabitants. Above all, in the careworn faces of the old peasant women; in the sadness of the great eyes gleaming beneath the black head-dress was often to be seen the tragical record of a long life of sorrows.

The Hessian stock was never noted for the production of heroes of art and science; its strength had always lain in its valiancy and in its unyielding sense of justice—although should the power of genius show itself among them, as in the brothers Grimm, there was then displayed the fundamental greatness of the Germanic character. But hardly ever before had the intellectual life of the country been so sterile. When the university of Marburg, within a brief period, lost Savigny, Creuzer, and Tiedemann, people said that, while able to win for itself young men of talent, it lacked the power to keep them for its own; and this reputation lasted down to the close of the electoral epoch. Even more distressing was the decline in civic prosperity. No other region of Germany showed so plainly the traces of the Thirty Years' War, no other had so completely lost the prosperity of the sixteenth century. The visitor to Fritzlar who contemplated the beautiful renaissance edifice of the Rymphäum could hardly believe that the inhabitants of the impoverished little country town could ever have built this nuptial house. In every farm, the women worked at distaff and loom to supply the needs of the household, and perhaps to provide a little linen for the market; but, with the solitary exception of Hanau, this "land of big pots and sour wine," as the Rhenish Franconians termed it, had never developed any vigorous industry. The first weakly stirrings of the spirit of economic enterprise were hampered by an antiquated customs system, by the internal tolls of the electorate, and by innumerable and absurd vexations. Years went by before the final removal of the narrow town-gate at Gelnhausen, which obstructed the great commercial route between Leipzig and Frankfort, making it necessary every year for hundreds of wagons to unload before they could pass through. Nearly half of the land was under forest. The countryfolk lived

with the extremest simplicity. In the Schwalm Strom, the region which contained the largest farms of Hesse, coffee was still entirely unknown, and *Covent*, a celebrated small beer of local manufacture, was the only beverage.

Dilapidation and poverty were manifest on all hands, and the Jewish usurers, the vultures that prey upon the miseries of the German peasantry, had long ere this flocked into the country. At the castle of Marburg, rich in memories, the birthplace of Philip the Magnanimous was used as a state prison; the beautiful church of St. Elisabeth beneath, the earliest example of German Gothic, was in a dirty and half-ruinous condition; while of the Hohenstaufen imperial palace on an island in the Kinzig at Gelnhausen, the best preserved portions were sold to the housebreakers. Even in Cassel nothing was done to keep the palace in repair, although this was a matter which even in the badly governed lesser states of Germany was apt to receive special attention from the ruling prince. In youth the elector had adorned a few health resorts with pleasure grounds, and had beautified the Wilhelmshöhe park with the ridiculous sham castle of Löwenburg; but now he considered that he did enough when he removed the statue of Napoleon from the Königsplatz and restored to the Friedrichsplatz that of the old *pater patriae*, the trafficker in human flesh. During the fifty years prior to the entry of the Prussians, Cassel remained completely unchanged, the art collections closed, and everything so dead and desolate that when the Göttingen students paid a visit to the town they were able even at midday to awaken the sixfold echo in the round Königsplatz. It was only in honour of his greatly desired but never secured dignity as king of the Catti that the elector began to build the Cattenburg at enormous expense, amounting at times to as much as ten thousand thalers a week. This was a gigantic palace, constructed on lines to fit it for the habitation of an imperial race, but was regarded in the country as a repulsive memorial of petty princely conceit.

A few days before the elector's death, a Prussian official, Hessian by birth, with an unsparing candour which seemed inconceivable to the minor courts, read him a lecture upon his folly. The reproof came from Motz, then president in Erfurt. He had intervened on behalf of his uncle, an elderly general arbitrarily deprived of pension, and when the customary

answer was returned that no recognition was accorded to the seven years of Westphalian regime, he did not hesitate to fling in the old prince's face the name of "Sevensleeper" which was universally current in the country. The subjects and servants of the elector, he wrote, would have been happy had they been able to say the same of themselves, "had they, with their wives and children, also fallen asleep for seven years, and, then refreshed for new services to your majesty, reawakened under the changed conditions." He continued: "Your majesty is rich, but your servant and subjects are poor"; and he adjured the old sinner, now in the evening of his days, to make a worthier use of his abundant wealth, and do his utmost to relieve the distresses of the loyal Hessian people, before he was compelled to appear "before Him who is lord over us all, and who puts down the mighty from their seats."[1] Such was the judgment passed upon the elector's doings by the leading political intelligence of contemporary Hesse. When William I died in February, 1821, there was found among his papers a political testament, impressing upon the heir the need for continuing to reign as a true autocrat.

The exhortation was hardly necessary. In the new reign the destiny of the country was associated more closely than ever with the personal circumstances of the princely house. By nature Elector William II was neither stupid nor malicious; but he had been badly brought up, had no taste for intellectual life, was unable to discipline his passions, and was a commonplace voluptuary and martinet. To his misfortune, while his father was yet alive, he fell under the sway of a mean-spirited woman from Berlin, Emilie Ortlöpp by name, and for her sake put coarse affronts upon his high-minded consort Augusta, sister of the king of Prussia. With William's ascent to the throne the power of this mistress attained a level unexampled in nineteenth century history. Hardly had a brilliant funeral train, led by the black knight of the house of Hesse, escorted the old ruler's coffin to Löwenburg, than there ensued the first liberating deed of the new government, the cutting of the queues. Loud were the rejoicings; by hundreds these symbols of the bad old days were to be seen lying on the pavements and in the

[1] Motz to Elector William, January 22, 1821. See Appendix XIX.

gutters of the capital, for the street arabs to play with. No less cheerful was the intelligence that the construction of the Cattenburg was to be discontinued; and henceforward, so long as the electorate of Hesse still existed, the pretentious structure remained as an ill-omened ruin, where beggars and vagabonds sought shelter by night beneath the lofty arches. In the same year, a proposal for administrative organisation, drafted by the ministerial councillor Krafft, was brought forward. By this scheme, after the boastful manner of the German petty states, the little territory was subdivided into four provinces, with four local governments and four financial directories, and with, in addition, a special board of government for Schaumburg—all this for a population of 600,000 souls. Despite its costliness, the new organisation, modelled upon that of Prussia, was unquestionably better than the old, an especially valuable point being the clear distinction between the executive and the judiciary.

These reforms, however, comprised the total of the praiseworthy deeds of William II. While the coronation was in progress, the Ortlöpp with her children was installed in her lover's palace,[1] and, known henceforward as Countess Reichenbach, enjoyed all the rights of an electoral consort. The diet was not summoned, although the Ritterschaft remonstrated on several occasions on account of the omission. Enjoying uncontrolled power, and associating with the corrupt riff-raff that followed in the countess Reichenbach's wake, the elector soon became an utter savage. His rages were brute-like; no one was safe from his ill usage—no one at least who could not summon up courage to respond to the ferocious despot with blow for blow. Things soon reached such a pitch that it was matter for congratulation when upon his journeys through the country nothing worse happened than "the whipping of one or two postmasters with his majesty's own hands."[2] Even the Reichenbach had to beware, but she knew how to take care of herself. If he attacked her she began throwing expensive vases and cups about the room, and continued to do so until the infuriated man realised the costliness of these missiles, so that his anger was tamed by avarice. As soon as such a scene was over, she could secure from her lover anything she pleased. Her

[1] Hänlein's Report, March 1, 1821.
[2] Thus Hänlein, August 21, 1824.

brother shone in the sunshine of her favour. This was an absolute ne'er-do-weel to whom the elector, greatly to the disgust of the Ritterschaft, assigned the name of an extinct family, that of the barons Heyer von Rosenfeld. The Rothschilds, the old friends of the family, could now reap their harvest, for though the son had inherited his father's avarice, he was no miser, and, rich as he was, was often in need of kindly financial aid, which his business administrator, Councillor Deines well knew how to secure from the Frankfort house.

Young Hänlein, who had now succeeded his deceased father as envoy, reported to his government that the elector had often declared himself to be firmly attached to Prussia —and there can be no doubt that these assurances were honest. But since King Frederick William was forced to intervene in favour of his ill-treated sister and her little son, the disputes between the two courts were unceasing. On one occasion there was an actual rupture when, under cover of darkness, the elector had had his sister, the duchess of Bernburg, removed from Bonn to Hanau. William's contention was that the poor lady was insane, but all that is proved is that the malady became unmistakable after her removal. Hänlein was recalled, on account of the violation of Prussian territory, and did not return to Cassel for some months, when the elector had apologised.[1] In the better ruled among the German territories the small scale upon which life was conducted rendered it easy to pay benevolent attention to personal and local interests, and herein was to be found the solitary advantage of the system of petty states. In Hesse, however, the outcome of this system was individual persecution. The Reichenbach knew everyone, and everyone's fate depended upon his position in the woman's favour. Upon a summer evening in the year 1823 the elector made a sudden descent upon Cassel from the Wilhelmshöhe, had the alarm sounded and the garrison mustered in the Friedrichsplatz; then Captain Radowitz of the general staff and three other officers were transferred to small garrison towns, with orders to depart on the instant to their new posts.[2] The men thus banished from Cassel were all friends of the electoral prince, and had made no secret of their opinion of Countess Reichen-

[1] Hänlein's Reports, February 28, 1822, and subsequent dates.
[2] Hänlein's Report, June 14, 1823.

bach. At a later date, through the favour of Prince Augustus, Radowitz was enabled to enter a new and richer field of activity in Prussia. When Heyer von Rosenfeld was challenged by an officer on account of an unsavoury love affair, the elector, for the protection of this beloved life, immediately promulgated a law by which the duel was proclaimed a capital offence, while the sending of a challenge made the challenger liable to degrading punishment. Especially dreaded were the Reichenbach's accouchements, which recurred with great regularity every year; at these times the elector, having nothing else to do, would pay evening visits to the government offices, note the names of absentees, and vent his spleen upon all who fell into his hands.

But all these things were trifles in comparison with the tragedy in the princely household. The electress Augusta had long been absent from Hesse, and at length came to an agreement with her husband by which her independent maintenance was secured. The electoral prince steadfastly espoused his mother's cause. He had taken a formal vow that he would never attend Countess Reichenbach's entertainments, and he kept his word, although the theologians at his father's court endeavoured to convince him that the oath was not binding. In 1822 he attended a public masked ball, accompanied by a confidential servant. The two men were of the same stature and wore similar dominoes. An unknown mask offered the servant a glass of grog. The man drank it, and died almost immediately, manifestly poisoned. The elector, who, after his manner, was greatly attached to his son, immediately commanded a strict investigation, and his police were equal to the occasion. They simply ordered that everyone who had attended the ball was to report within forty-eight hours, and that any who should neglect to do so would be arrested on suspicion.[2] Nevertheless this sinister affair was never cleared up. The general belief was that the blow had been launched from the circle of Countess Reichenbach. What a prospect was it for the country when this unhappy prince should some day come to the throne, foolishly brought up, suspicious and unsociable, exposed from early youth to roughness of every kind, with adultery and assassination continually under his eyes! The elector was ever

[2] Notice issued by the supreme direction of the electoral police, Cassel, February 5, 1822.

filled with apprehensions, as is customary with despots. On one occasion, when he believed that his life had been attempted by poison, he made his cook, after a formal investigation, take twenty-three solemn adjurations. From 1823 onwards he received a series of mysterious letters, threatening him with death unless he abandoned the Reichenbach. The whole country was disquieted by this affair; numerous arrests were made; "an electoral committee for the discovery of the threats levelled against his highness" promised a high reward to anyone who would throw light upon the origin of the letters. In the end suspicion actually fell upon Manger, the principal superintendent of police, a man generally detested. Confined in Spangenberg, all that he would admit was that he had failed to pursue the investigations to a close because the clues in his possession led to issues which he had not dared to follow up. Manger was sentenced to five years' imprisonment in a fortress, and the elector increased the sentence to one of imprisonment for life, but no further light was thrown on the matter.

The faithful country felt itself betrayed and sold. At first liberal ideas secured in Hesse no more than isolated supporters. A work by Martin, the advocate, demanding the summoning of the diet, aroused no interest. The national conscience, however, demanded its rights. Whenever the beloved electress showed herself she was received with a veneration which reflected unfavourably upon the Reichenbach. In Marburg an obelisk was erected upon the Augustenruh, above the Lahn, in honour of "the princess who loves nature." At times the repressed fury broke forth. After the death of Manger's brother it transpired that he had been a cheat and had killed himself. Thereupon the burghers of Cassel applied to the courts, and secured authority for the destruction of the desecrated town hearse, for the exhumation of the body, and for its reinterment outside the walls of the town.[1] The two excellent ministers, Witzleben and Krafft, at length resigned in disgust. There remained only Minister Schminke, a man too fond of good living; and Councillor Rivalier, now raised to the rank of Baron von Meysenbug, who would at times place obstacles in the way of the exercise of arbitrary power, but who was on the whole a mere pliable courtier. New and illegal taxes and

[1] Hänlein's Report, October 3, 1824.

fines were imposed to fill the empty national treasury. The elector went so far as to have the wax figures of his ancestors removed from the Cassel museum and melted down in order to sell the wax. His private wealth was invested, partly in foreign securities, and partly in the purchase of landed estates in Bohemia for the children of Countess Reichenbach.

In the case of the oppressed and neglected common people, the insane tariff war with Prussia served also to prevent neighbourly intercourse; discontent was rife; smuggling and poaching were on the increase. The last bulwark against despotism was found in the law-courts, which maintained their excellent reputation throughout this trying time. Just as in the days of the old elector Councillor Pfeiffer had intervened on behalf of the purchasers of the domains, so now President Wiederhold and the Cassel supreme court of appeal proved the falsity of the liberal prejudice that the free administration of justice is rendered impossible by the atmosphere of a court. Wherever they could, they championed the rights of the officials, of the creditors of the state, and of the taxpayers; but their power was circumscribed. The electoral state of Hesse shared the aimless futility common to the political life of all the petty German states. The only thing peculiar to Hesse was its unscrupulous tyranny, wherein it contrasted strongly with the well-intentioned stupidity of most of the other German courts, and went far to resemble Naples or Modena. Even more irresistibly than Saxony did Hesse move towards a violent explosion.

§ 3. THE GUELPH TERRITORIES. GEORGE IV AND CHARLES OF BRUNSWICK.

Electoral Hesse suffered from the despotism of its rulers; in Hanover conditions were hardly less unwholesome, but here the trouble was of the opposite kind, the weakness of the monarchical authority. Vast mutations, such as are known to the history of Germany alone, had occurred in these Lower Saxon domains; and at length, after a prolonged period of impotence, the region had recovered a part of its earlier importance and power. Long ago, the Romans and subsequently the Carlovingians, had been engaged in endless

struggles with this stubborn distinctive life of Low Germany. It was here that the national monarchy found its strongest support, so long as that monarchy remained in Saxon hands; and it was here that it found its fiercest enemy as soon as the monarchy was transferred to the South Germans. For the Saliens as for the Hohenstaufens, the territories adjacent to the Harz were the land of destiny. Twice, at Canossa and at Legnano, the pride of the Saxons of the empire was humbled in the dust before the papacy. After the house of Este united the Saxon duchy with the rich heritage of the Guelphs, the name of this new Guelph race became a rallying cry for all the enemies of the emperorship, on both sides the Alps. The domain of Henry the Lion extended from the high mountains to either sea, and was the mightiest state known to mediæval Germany before the rise of the Teutonic Knights. For long it seemed dubious whether the imperial eagle would continue to wave over the palace of Goslar, or whether the lion of the mighty conqueror of the Slavs would command the Brunswick fortress. With the overthrow of Henry the Lion, there perished also the ancient and renowned ducal dignity of the Liudolfing and Billings, for the existence of this powerful tribal state was incompatible with the prestige of the imperial authority. The white horse of Saxony was partitioned, and after the Guelphs had resisted for another generation, once even for a brief period securing for their house the imperial crown, in the end Otho the Child, grandson of Henry the Lion, accepted the award of emperor and empire, and received back from the hands of Frederick II, the Hohenstaufer, a small fragment of the dominions of his ancestors, the lands of Brunswick and Lüneburg, as feofs of the empire (1235).

Thenceforward the proud house, now humbled, sank to its ruin no less rapidly than did later the house of the Ernestines, declining into the narrows of German petty life. Of the great ambition of the founders nothing remained but a harsh obstinacy which displayed itself in deplorable fraternal quarrels, and weakened the vestiges of ancient power by repeated partitions. Before long there was hardly a place of note in the country which had not served at one time or other as a centre of dominion to this dynasty, whose policy was ever fluctuating, and which established its foundations upon the quicksands of time; in Münden and Neustadt-

am-Rübenberg, in Calenberg and Hertzberg, in Harburg, Gifhorn, and Dannenberg, in Celli and Hanover, in Wolfenbüttel, Bevern, and Brunswick, were to be found the successive or simultaneous seats of the innumerable, older and younger lines of the house of Guelph. Amid this disintegration of sovereign authority, feudal licence had free play, and through the Lüneburg settlement, the nobles even acquired the right of armed resistance. Since the wealthy towns of Lüneburg, Göttingen, and Brunswick, to which the Guelphs, as neighbours to the townless domains of the Ascanians, had once owed a great part of their power, soon sank into decay. Owing to the devastations of war and in consequence of changes in the trade routes, there no longer existed anywhere a counterpoise to the power of the feudal chiefs; "If our lord stands firm, we can do the same," said the defiant noble. At the time of the Reformation the Guelphs were subdivided into four lines; two of these remained with the old church whilst the two others adopted the new doctrine. The name of Ernest of Lüneburg was associated with that of the other illustrious princes who espoused the cause of Protestantism, but this disintegrated house could play little part in the decisive struggles of the time. Even after the Lutheran doctrine had become supreme throughout the Guelph lands, the Thirty Years' War once more took the Guelphs by surprise amid hopeless dissensions. Tossed to and fro between the parties, they ran the danger of losing their lands to the condottieri of the Catholic league, or of passing completely beneath the sway of Sweden.

Amid these troubles, the ruling race began at length to recover its influence. In Duke George, the new Calenberg line acquired a prudent head, who held his lands together, and made the town of Hanover his permanent capital. As in all the great princely races of Germany, so also in the Guelph house, by a strange turn of fortune the younger line became the more powerful. At the peace congress of Westphalia, Lampadius, the Guelph chancellor, joining forces with Brandenburg, vigorously advocated the unconditional equality of the three creeds. Henceforward the prestige of the dynasty continually increased. In the empire its princes combined to pursue a far-sighted policy, which held the scales equal between Brandenburg and Sweden, between Austria and France, and ever laboured "to avoid giving umbrage."

Simultaneously the princely authority became strengthened at home, supporting itself now with the aid of a standing army. Ernest Augustus, the last of the Guelphs to inherit something of the statesmanlike boldness of Henry the Lion, then acquired the electoral hat, established primogeniture, and by adroit diplomacy initiated the new splendour which was to attach to the Guelph house under his successors. Over the heads of four-and-fifty near relatives, George I ascended the throne of the Stuarts, and almost simultaneously his German electorate was rounded off, the house of Lüneburg being united with that of Calenberg, and the important coastal lands of Bremen and Verden being saved for Electoral Hanover out of the shipwreck of the Swedish-German great power.

With joy and pride the Hanoverian people observed the resurgence of its ruling house. No one noticed how trifling was the significance of this revolutionary shadow-kingship by the grace of parliament, how pitiful was the role played by the mediocrity of the four Georges amid the struggles between the factions of the British nobility. Since the English aristocracy cleverly maintained the outward dignity of the crown, and since the inhabitants of the lesser German territories had as yet no sense of the state, but recognised only the land and the subjects of princely families, the Hanoverians imagined in all seriousness that the power of England was the power of the Guelph house. The Britons of Germany felt themselves to be intimately associated by their common allegiance with the inhabitants of the British Isles; they sunned themselves luxuriously in the radiance of English freedom and English greatness; they sang *Rule Britannia* as a Hanoverian national song; and they looked towards the powerful sister nation with an ardent veneration to which the only response was an insular condescension. Even Spittler, the Swabian, in his own day the most liberal minded among all the political thinkers of Germany, was unable, when he lived in Göttingen, to escape the current illusion. He considered that the only thing remaining to desire for the Guelph power was that it should endure, saying with satisfaction, "We are all so glad to be half-English, not alone in dress, manners, and customs, but in character as well."

Thus Electoral Hanover, like Bavaria and Electoral

Saxony, became one of the strongholds of German political particularism. In Bavaria, the particularist sentiment was naive and spontaneous; in Upper Saxony, it was fierce and bitter; in Hanover, it was stiff and arrogant. The old separatist spirit of the Lower Saxons, and the treasured memories of the remote days of Guelph greatness, became associated with the new British conceit; and, after the German custom, there soon appeared learned systematists to bring English parliamentarism and Electoral Hanoverian patrician oligarchy within the sphere of a common formula, and to discover beside the Thames and beside the Leine the like blessings of "Guelph freedom." Puffed up with the consciousness of being an Englishman, the Electoral Hanoverian official looked down with contempt upon the poor devils who were mere Germans, and treated his neighbours of Hesse with disdain, as if it had been the elector of Hanover and not the English parliament which paid the Cassel landgrave for his mercenaries.

Servile princes were glad to recall the friendship which had centuries before existed between the Guelph house and the English crown. Yet how different in former days had been the attitude of Henry the Lion and Emperor Otho IV towards the island kingdom—the attitude of power vis-à-vis power. Now the German Guelph state was no more than a modest dependency of the British world empire, subject to continual misuse by its stronger associate. Amid the heat of parliamentary struggles, orators could sometimes be heard railing against Hanoverian influence, and wishing that this sinister country might be sunk beneath the sea; the detestation of everything foreign was so ingrained in the British nature that it was not until the fifth generation that the Guelphs were completely forgiven their German origin. But after the Napoleonic wars, when Castlereagh was drawing up a balance sheet summarising the experiences of the first century of Guelph rule in England, he was forced to make the honest admission that Hanover had lost rather than gained through the union. It is true that the first three of the Georges never attempted to use Electoral Hanover for English profit as Electoral Saxony was used for the profit of Poland. The English court was continually embarrassed owing to its lavish expenditure upon the corruption of members of parliament; and though the Hanoverian rulers had on

several occasions to beg the House of Commons to pay their debts, they continued with paternal benevolence to make considerable contributions towards the civil and military expenditure of their German homeland. But all the heavier was the blood toll which the German homeland had to contribute to the electors' English crown. Hanover had to yield up to the three kingdoms the best part of its army, sometimes in return for payment, sometimes at its own expense. Whenever war between England and France broke out in the colonies, France turned her arms against the sole vulnerable point of the island kingdom, while English commercial policy could maintain its distant conquests in no other way than by the dissipation of its enemy's forces and their diversion towards this German dependency. In order to conquer Canada upon German soil, during the Seven Years' War Electoral Hanover provided a force of 45,000 men, paying from its own treasury a sum of 17,000,000 thalers in addition to the like amount supplied by the elector. It was only in the civil war against the American rebels that George III did not call upon his German subjects for assistance. None the less, through these campaigns fought for foreign ends, the Guelph land regained a history full of incident, the army earned great memories, and the reflective portion of the population acquired a political sense which was virile and dignified in comparison with the slumbrous sloth of the neighbouring petty states. Although the feelings of the people were rather English than German, they were not simply ungerman, for the struggles on the Ganges and the St. Lawrence signified also the liberation of the German west from the French plunderers. In Hanover, as in Hesse, the victories of Ferdinand of Brunswick awakened a consciousness of German superiority and an inextinguishable hatred of Gallicism. The peasants of the Weser revered the veterans of Minden and Crefeld as paragons of German valour; and they nicknamed every rascal a "Kumpfländer" in honour of the plunderers of Conflans.

The union with England was extremely detrimental to the inner life of the Hanoverian state, which had so recently received fresh impetus under the vigorous rule of Ernest Augustus. The electorate was divided into six independent territories, and since these had separate diets and separate fiscal systems, they had little more in common than the

sovereign ruler, the army, the privy council, and a few central authorities. Now that the elector lived abroad and the nobility exercised unrestricted viceroyalty, it was impossible to continue the development of the weakly beginnings of monarchical unity in the direction taken by Ernest Augustus, it was impossible to compact these loosely associated territories to constitute a modern state. The six diets safeguarded their established liberties with increasing jealousy. Nearly half a century was spent in acrimonious negotiations before the estates of Calenberg could at length be induced to incorporate into their own body the diet of the principality of Grubenhagen, a region of which the population (apart from the Harzers, who were free from taxation) comprised no more than 35,000 souls. Guelph patriots were gratified to note that this memorable union of the nations of Calenberg and Grubenhagen took place in the same fortunate year of 1801 in which was effected the union between Great Britain and Ireland.

The Lower Saxon regions had never suffered from a scarcity of political talent. Whilst Swabia and Upper Saxony were characterised by an abundance of brilliant imaginative writers, the atmosphere of the lowlands was one of sober prose. The ancient proverb *Frisia non cantat* applied also to the hinterland of the Frisian coasts, and with the exception of Hölty the Old Guelph lands never presented Germany with a single notable poet. In the upper circles of society, the relationships with England fostered a tone of dull respectability unfavourable to the cheerful play of the arts; the popular dialect, too, with its heavy "mek" and "dek" ("me" and "thee") sounded coarse and ugly in comparison with the endearing drollery of the "mi" and "di" used by the neighbours of Holstein and Mecklenburg. But just as Middle High German poesy was preeminent over Low German, so, conversely, was the Sachsenspiegel (Old Saxon law code) preeminent over the Schwabenspiegel (Old Swabian law code); and whereas in Swabia and Upper Saxony, the German lands superexcellent in literature, there rarely appeared men of statesmanlike endowments, such men frequently played a part in the history of Lower Saxony. All that equips a nation for the struggles of statecraft, a strong sense of justice and an enduring force of will, courage, and candour, common sense and a keen eye for realities, was in Lower Saxony

a universal heritage. The political talents of the race were not displayed solely in the great days of the Saxon emperors and of the struggles between Guelphs and Ghibellines, but also in later times during the inert epoch of petty princely regime. Even Spittler did not disdain to write the history of Calenberg, for no other German territory of such limited extent numbered among its officials so many able jurists and skilful men of affairs as were all the Guelph chancellors and privy councillors, Jagemann, Schwartzkopf, Lampadius, Kipius, Ludolf Hugo, Struben, Bernstorff, Grote, Bothmer, and Münchhausen.

Yet how sterile was the political life of this vigorous stock under the mongrel regime of a monarchy without a monarch. The expensive court with its crowd of court marshals and chamberlains was retained, because no one wished to drive the nobles out of the country or to curtail the opportunities for profit-making offered to the burghers of the capital. Year after year the nobles, their wives decked in all the insignia of rank and adorned with ostrich feathers, would drive on gala days to Herrenhausen, to pay formal homage to the absentee king. But the living energy of monarchical will was utterly lost. George III never revisited his tribal domains, and the belief soon became generally diffused that it was forbidden to send in statements of grievances to the invisible sovereign. The bourgeois officials, who in earlier Guelph history had been highly respected, were by degrees excluded from the privy council, which now governed with almost unrestricted powers; the supreme dignities of state were reserved for the interrelated noble families of Platen, Grote, Münchhausen, and Bremer. The actual work of government was carried out by cabinet councillors and ministerial councillors of bourgeois origin, mostly derived from the "fine families" of Brandes, Patje, Rehberg, and Hoppenstedt—almost without exception able and highly cultured men whose superiority was tacitly recognised even by the Guelph nobles, accustomed as these were to say naively of a cousin or an uncle, "he was minister under Cabinet Councillor Rehberg." Despite the strictly conservative sentiment which this bourgeois "secretariat" shared with the nobility, it was inevitable that in the bourgeoisie there should gradually arise a strong and well-grounded sense of irritation against the privileged classes. The system

of government was a mild one, for there was no financial stringency and no need therefore for the fiscal severity of the Prussian administration; and the finely conceived foundation of the Georgia Augusta university showed how highly the ideal goods of life were prized. The sacred principle of tolerating no criticism was, however, sedulously maintained in respect of domestic affairs. Schlözer, in his *Staatsanzeige*, could say anything he liked about foreign potentates, but when he ventured to chide the abuses in the Electoral Hanoverian postal system, silence was imposed on him. Baron von Berlepsch, the friend of Hardenberg's youth, the man who at a later date took the field against the sultanism of the elector of Hesse, was dismissed and arbitrarily expelled the country because in the diet he had unsparingly exposed the weakness of the nobles' regime and had demanded that the Calenberg nation should remain neutral during the wars of the revolution.

Even under this well-meaning government, the feudalist state was not free from the injustices which had rendered the like regime opprobrious throughout Germany. Moderate as were the burdens imposed by the state, they fell almost exclusively upon the petty bourgeoisie and upon the peasantry. On no account would the Calenberg nobles reestablish the one heavy tax which their order had for a time paid, the *Zehnt- und Scheffelschatz*, for had this been done the national debt would have been paid off, and the estates would thus have been deprived of the lucrative privilege of administering it. In the financial administration of the diet committees there flourished all the sins of the feudalist regime: nepotism, secrecy, and the encouragement of sinecures. For seventy years the fact remained hidden from the estates of Calenberg that their committee had paid three hundred thousand thalers to George I to assist him to the English crown. In German politics, jealousy of Prussia was the outstanding idea of the Hanoverian privy council, although the nature of things sometimes enforced an alliance between the neighbour states. Guelph pride made it impossible to understand why in German affairs this contemptible and poverty-stricken neighbour should count for so much more than the distinguished England-Hanover. A sharp contrast of political ideas likewise made itself felt; to the easy-going old feudalism, the common law of the modern monarchy

seemed no better than "military despotism." When, in the Calenberg diet, young Hardenberg had vainly contended with the prejudices of his colleagues, and when in the state service he had subsequently become more intimately acquainted with the sins of the community, he candidly declared to King George III that the only possible method of reform was the personal intervention of the monarch.

The advice was disregarded, and when soon afterwards (once more on England's account) Hanover was attacked by the troops of Bonaparte, the nobles' regime was again influenced by the desire to avoid giving umbrage, and the valiant country was surrendered to the enemy without a blow. But Hanover's army and state lived on in the glorious German legion, for no nation is annihilated so long as it continues to strike a blow. With better right than the elector of Hesse could the Guelphs maintain after their reestablishment that the foreign dominion had here been nothing more than an illegal interregnum. The liberation of the country was effected solely by the armies of the allies; but Hanover played a distinguished part in the campaign of 1815, and the Old Hanoverians looked forward with proud confidence towards the future of their new kingdom. Sober onlookers, indeed, could not fail to recognise that the enlarged Guelph state, like the kingdom of the United Netherlands, the other edifice of English diplomacy, looked far more powerful on the map than it was in reality. The hope of the London court that in these two daughter states there would be secured for English interests a wider sphere of continental power, soon proved fallacious, for Holland contentedly pursued her own path. The kingdom of Hanover, notwithstanding its extended Dutch frontier, was but a petty German state like any other; and although its area amounted to 700 square miles [German], it was economically far weaker than the little kingdom of Saxony, for the inhabitants numbered no more than 1,400,000, and two-fifths of the soil consisted of untilled heaths, moors, and commons.

The Old Guelph domain secured the long desired rounding off with the accession of Hildesheim and Goslar, although the Göttingen region was still separated by a strip of Brunswick. But from this tolerably compacted mass, the newly acquired western half of the kingdom, the Frisian and Westphalian territory on the Ems and the Hase, was completely

detached. By trade relationships and history this belonged to Prussian Westphalia, and was connected with the Guelph land on the map alone by the narrow strip of marshland along the Dümmersee. None of the new territory passed willingly beneath the sway of the Guelphs. In Hildesheim, among the Lutheran majority of the bourgeois population, the brief interlude of Prussian rule, during which the heritage of the crosier had been so vigorously and yet temperately cleared away, was still recalled with tender affection. The loyal Ghibelline town of Goslar had from of old, as the motto on its coat of arms declared, been beyond all doubt faithful to the Holy Empire and hostile to the Guelphs. In Osnabrück, too, which during a century and a half had been ruled alternately by Catholic bishops and Guelph princes, Electoral Hanover had gained few friends. The cheerful commune, proud of its ancient history, regarded itself as a state within the state; and as late as the fifties "the Hanoverian children" of the officers and officials were in the schools regarded as interlopers by the native Westphalians. The valiant Prussians in East Frisia, to the astonishment of the Guelph officials, proved utterly unable to recognise that the union with Hanover was a blessing and even a promotion. With true Frisian obstinacy, they hardened their hearts against the new government, and were able to secure the maintenance of all their traditional customs and also of the Prussian code. The one piece of good fortune was that the Lutheran Guelph state had no occasion to dread the religious hostility of its new Catholic subjects. The Catholics of Osnabrück and Hildesheim were devout, but had become habituated to tolerance through living among Protestants, and had even followed the Lutheran example in admitting into their ritual the German practice of congregational singing. It was only the utterly impoverished inhabitants of the Upper Ems region, the much derided "Muffricans," who secured their scanty harvests with much labour from sand-dunes and moors, and the equally poor petty peasantry of Eichsfeld, that were completely under the dominion of the priests, who, however, were here also still on their good behaviour.

However artificial the structure of this state, a just monarchical authority, benevolently espousing the cause of the

burdened common people, would have been competent to master the centrifugal forces. The demand for such an authority was voiced by E. M. Arndt in an incisive essay published by him in the *Wächter* in the year 1815. In his Swedish-Pomeranian home he had had personal and unpleasing experience of the full-fed ease of the feudalists, and he proclaimed to the Hanoverians that they had no right to call themselves half-English until, following the English example, they gave merit its due and allowed the peasant's son access to the dignities of state. "The world is no mere institution for providing fodder," he bluntly concluded, "and men are not swine to be driven to the woods to fatten on the mast." King George III would hardly have understood such counsels even before he became insane. In former days he had made the last fruitless attempt to rule England by absolutist methods, and had then, through the stubbornness of his restricted intelligence, brought about the loss of the American colonies, and had thwarted Catholic emancipation and the other reforms advocated by the younger Pitt. He knew little of his ancestral home. As he declared in his first speech from the throne, he gloried in the name of Briton, and he never learned to speak German correctly. In accordance with the custom of his house, he was liberal in his gifts to the land of his origin, above all to the nobles and to the officials; but whenever there was a conflict of interests, he decided in favour of England. He would never permit Electoral Hanover to demand from the British parliament payment of the arrears of subsidies. Since, however, he did little to disturb the peaceful lives of his Hanoverian privy councillors, he received numberless proofs of loyalty, showing how much love can be lavished by the Germans. His German subjects venerated him because he bore the name of king, and because the petty bourgeois rectitude of his domestic life won their hearts. When his death took place, many severe things were said regarding the utter futility of this long life. Lord Byron wrote his brilliant and malicious satire, *A Vision of Judgment*, making St. Peter at the gate of heaven say:

> Ere heaven shall ope her portals to this Guelph,
> While I am guard, may I be damn'd myself!

But in the German Guelph territories grief was widespread and sincere.

His successor paid even less attention than the father had done to the Hanoverian dependency, but was none the less regarded with boundless respect alike in the days of the regency and after his ascent to the throne as King George IV. How remote now seemed the days when the prince had vied with Beau Brummell in the discovery of new pomades, cravats, and shoe-buckles, and when he had acquired the name of "the first gentleman of Europe." Now the idol of fashion was no more than a prematurely old debauchee and tippler, one of the most empty-headed men that ever disgraced a throne. This weakling had never even displayed the one incontestable virtue of his house, courage; only when he uttered frivolous jests upon his own infirmities did he exhibit for a moment a dull reflection of vanished vital energies. When Prince of Wales he had, after the manner of heirs to the throne, played the part of leader of the opposition, outbidding Fox and Sheridan, the mad "Sherry," in orations on behalf of liberty. After his accession to the regency, he became a rigid tory and a warm admirer of Metternich. But when he was encountered by a stronger will, he never dared to assert himself, so that, gnashing his teeth, he had to endure even the detested Canning. He considered that he had done enough for his German territory when he had provided for it a kingly crown, and had founded the Guelph order, a distinction which, lavishly distributed in England, was there as universally despised as it was coveted in Hanover.

The tedious affairs of government were left to the diplomatic creator of the new kingdom, Count Münster, who lived henceforward in London as German cabinet minister. By Münster's advice, the governor-generalship was not given to the headstrong Duke of Cumberland, who in the autumn of 1813 had taken over the country for the king, but to his more pliable younger brother, the Duke of Cambridge. This good-natured prince, a man of extremely moderate gifts, charmed all hearts by his affability; but by his own subsequent admission, during a period of fifteen years he remained entirely ignorant of Hanoverian conditions and sentiments.

Throughout life, Count Münster was firmly convinced of the incomparable excellence of Old Hanoverian institutions. Quite unwarrantably, at the time of the Vienna congress, he had acquired the reputation of being a man of liberal views,

simply because he had defended the representative system, which in Germany had always held its own, against the autocratic inclinations of the Rhenish Confederate princes. Equally without reason, he was subsequently accused of a change of sentiments when in Carlsbad he declared himself in favour of the traditional German estates, and when he opposed the introduction of foreign representative constitutions. In reality, when speaking in Vienna of the German representative system, he had had in mind nothing more than his Guelph diets. Since in Hanover, as in England, the nobles ruled, Münster could see no important distinction between the constitutions of these two Guelph countries; his amateurish political culture was insufficient to enable him to recognise that in England the common law was supreme, whereas in Hanover a rigid feudalist subdivision of classes prevailed. After the congress of Verona, he wrote to Hammerstein, the federal envoy, that the king of Hanover would never detach from himself the allied powers, whatever the English cabinet might decide; the reasonable liberties of Hanover, he said, harmonised perfectly with the principles of the Grand Alliance.[1] Some years later, the Guelph statesman was again highly extolled for his liberalism because in his despatches to the envoy in Vienna (1826) he sharply censured the utterly reactionary policy of Metternich. "Is it necessary," he asked, "in order to maintain the monarchical system, to become an absolutist, a defender of all abuses, and an embittered enemy of everything which seems to offer guarantees against the arbitrary exercise of authority?" Metternich defended himself in an arrogant rejoinder; Hatzfeldt wrote in a fury that he had never read anything so grossly revolutionary; and even Bernstorff expressed his displeasure at the incredible onslaught.[2] In any case, the fugitive ebullition remained without result, for it had been a mere manifestation of personal irritability, and not the expression of any profound contrast of sentiments. When Münster wrote the offending despatch he was involved in negotiations with Duke Charles of Brunswick, Metternich's protégé, and was likewise embittered on account of the turcophil attitude of the Hofburg, for he was unable completely to withstand

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, April 8, 1823.

[2] Hatzfeldt's Report, December 11, 1826; Bernstorff, Instruction to Hatzfeldt, January 15, 1827.

Canning's superiority. At the bottom of his heart he never abandoned the views of the restoration policy, and it was in accordance with the principles of this policy that he conducted the Hanoverian government. He refused the offer of the princely title, and drew a salary which was extremely moderate even according to Old Hanoverian ideas. But all the more jealously did he take care that in this state, which he rightly regarded as the product of his own skilful hands, no other will than his own should prevail. Unfortunately he knew little of his homeland. No more than three years of his early youth had been passed in the Hanoverian administration. All the rest of his manhood had been spent abroad in the diplomatic service, and his only personal knowledge of Germany was now gained in brief visits to his fine estate of Derneburg.

Thus the work of reestablishing the state, while under the supreme leadership of Münster, was mainly entrusted to Cabinet Councillor A. W. Rehberg, the ornament of the Old Hanoverian bourgeois officialdom. To a thorough knowledge of affairs Rehberg superadded an abundance of philosophic learning, and by his numerous political writings had acquired a great reputation, but very few readers—for the cold reasonableness of his somewhat sententious style was attractive only to connoisseurs. He detested the revolution, as he detested all abstract political theories; with the self-satisfaction of the practical statesman he looked critically down upon such fiery natures as Fichte and Arndt, considering that their passion gave umbrage. His political ideal, the feudalist state, was deduced by him from "the republican German spirit," the worst of whose enemies was the monarchy of Frederick the Great. It was for this reason that Prussia was universally hated in Germany, whereas Austria, which quietly allowed its crownlands to continue in the old ways, was universally beloved. How much sounder, besides, than the motley Prussian officialdom seemed the official aristocracy of the feudalist lands, consisting of men all closely associated by kinship and by residential ties! To him the catastrophe of 1806 was sufficient proof of the badness of Prussian institutions, and this man of historical learning never asked himself the obvious question why the exemplary state of Hanover had also, and far more ingloriously than Prussia, succumbed to the French arms. During the period of foreign dominion he had quietly

occupied a minor post, but he now joyously and zealously engaged in the reinstatement of the old order, in so far as it was possible to harmonise this with the changed conditions. He regarded the sturdy Lower Saxon peasants with pride, and for the vital conditions of communal self government he displayed a fine understanding which won him Niebuhr's approbation. Nor did he unconditionally reject the democratic demands of the new social order, but all innovations must come step by step, as a development of the existing system. The time when there should exist in Germany one general class of citizens still seemed to him incredibly remote.

In Lower Saxony, however, the feudalist system was of so rank a growth that even Münster and his conservative adviser Rehberg felt it necessary to make a cautious use of the sickle in this wilderness. On August 12, 1814, by royal ordinance, a summons was issued to "all the estates of the various territories belonging to the electorate," directing them to send representatives to a general assembly of the estates. The step was essential, for how could the prince regent come to terms with the vestiges of fourteen diets upon the matter of their amalgamation? But it was a dangerous breach with legal tradition. Inasmuch as the old estates were recognised, while their assent was not asked, they were given a pretext for questioning the legality of the new order. After the incorporation of the new provinces, the diet consisted of eight prelates, forty-eight lords of the manor, and thirty-eight representatives of the towns. Since the East Frisians would not give up the ancient right of their "third estate," there were also summoned five representatives of the East Frisian peasantry, and three free peasants from other territories. These eight votes were to suffice an estate of peasants which owned about three-fourths of the arable and forest land of the kingdom, for in accordance with the Old Guelph legal view, shared by Rehberg, the peasant copyholders were represented by the lords of the manor; and only a few years earlier the imperial court of chancery had declared to the countryfolk of Hildesheim, when these had sent in a statement of grievances, that the German constitution did not recognise any estate of peasants.

On December 15th the diet was opened with all the ostentation which distinguished the Hanoverian crown in common with that of Bavaria. The speech from the throne declared that in the summoning of his estates the prince regent set an example to all German princes. The president, Count Schulenburg, responded on behalf of the estates that by England the great powers had been influenced to restore freedom to Germany, and that now "from the British throne would proceed the sacred fire by which a nation is inflamed to become worthy of freedom." The Duke of Cambridge repeated the assurance that the diet had been summoned to be for the prince regent "that which parliament is in the sister land of Great Britain, a high council of the nation." The charm of these three magnificent addresses could be fully appreciated by those initiates alone who were able to whisper to one another that without exception they were the work of Rehberg's busy pen. In the diet, too, all did their best to imitate English forms, people speaking of "the House," of "the honourable member," of "the ministerial party" and "the opposition." It is true that the proceedings were characterised by the inertia customary in feudalist assemblies, and that the diet would not even agree to the publicity of its debates, although Rehberg recommended this.

One important reform was, however, effected. The various debts and taxes of the different territories were fused into a single mass, thus first establishing the political unity of Hanover. But shortly afterwards (1818), the prince regent restored, with but trifling alterations in their ancient constitutions, the seven provincial diets of Calenberg-Grubenhagen, Lüneburg-Lauenburg, Hoya-Diepholz, Bremen-Verden, Osnabrück, Hildesheim, and East Frisia. In these the privileges of the nobility were even more glaring than in the general assembly of the estates. In the Osnabrück curia of the Ritterschaft the test of noble birth was still enforced; while in Lüneburg and Bremen the estates voted individually and not by curiæ, so that the preponderance of the integral votes of the Ritterschaft was invariably decisive. It will readily be understood that the proud members of the Ritterschaft preferred to devote their energies to the provincial diets, which remained the focus of feudalist particularism. Their passive resistance to the general diet was all the more dangerous, inasmuch as, while they administered the

fire insurance funds and similar trifling matters, their relationships to the general assembly had never been clearly defined. No law declared unambiguously whether the general diet was a mere committee of the provincial diets, or whether it was superior in authority to these. Here were one general and seven provincial diets in a country no larger than a single Prussian province; there had further to be taken into account the special rights of the territory of Hadeln, and the assemblies which the plenipotentiaries of the free Worsatian Frisians held at Dorum: so that in truth the complicated medley of these relationships showed very clearly what would have happened to Prussia if the feudalist party in that country had been able to bring about the reestablishment of the old diets; and unquestionably the awful example of his Guelph homeland served to fortify the chancellor in his resistance to the feudalist party.

The reform of the fiscal system was but partially successful, for the feudalist dualism of the financial administration persisted without change. Side by side with the new general tax treasury of the estates (the financial councillors constituting this body were partly appointed by the crown and partly by the provincial diets and the general diet), there worked independently the royal domain treasury, administered in profound secrecy by officials of the crown. The rich domains comprised more than one-fifth of all the cultivated land; proportionally their yield was twice as great as that of the Prussian domains, but the sums thus secured were far from being sufficient (as the feudalist regime demanded) to cover the ordinary expenditure of the state. Consequently disputes between the two treasuries were perpetual, and both in the diet and among the general population there was an obstinate feeling of suspicion towards the secret royal treasury, whose income was generally overestimated. A national loan had to be raised in the year 1822, solely because the diet was not in a position to supervise the national finances.

With this separation of the treasuries were likewise restored all the other institutions of the good old time which had been swept away by the kingdom of Westphalia: the burdening of the peasantry with tithes and the corvée, the industrial privileges of the towns, patrimonial jurisdiction, secret legal procedure, and torture (although the actual use of this was no longer ventured), the confounding of the judiciary with

the executive, and the strict censorship ordinance of the year 1705. Even in Hildesheim the relief of the burdens upon the peasantry was immediately discontinued, although this land had passed from the crown of Prussia to the kingdom of Westphalia in virtue of a formal treaty, so that the foreign legislation had here been instituted strictly in accordance with the formalities. In the matter of individuals and of well-acquired rights, the restoration set to work cautiously, in accordance with the custom of the country. In one case only was gross injustice done, that of the noble-minded Frenchman Charles de Villers who, during the Napoleonic epoch, had courageously advocated the rights of the German nation, and who now, to the indignation of the entire German world, was expelled from his professorship at Göttingen. The ruling classes once more settled down comfortably in "the German China," as Baron von Stein was accustomed to term the Guelph land.

The real strength of the administration was to be found in the hundred and fifty-five bailiwicks, the nests of the minor bureaucracy. A semi-feudal Landrat's administration, such as had existed in Old Prussia, was impossible here, for the pretentious Guelph nobles possessed no more than about seven per cent of the land. In these tiny administrative areas, the bailiff, or *Oberamtmann*, who if of noble blood was given the more distinguished title of *Oberhauptmann*, patriarchally discharged judicial and executive duties. In many cases he was simultaneously farmer of the royal domains, so that with the aid of the remarkable natural productiveness of the country he could reckon upon an official income of 10,000 thalers and even more. The bailiffs were seldom troubled with instructions from the capital, and the saying was current that while it was extremely difficult to acquire an official position in Hanover, it was impossible to be deprived of one. Nevertheless there was no lack of excellent officials: such able men as von Bar of Osnabrück, the pupil of Justus Möser, F. E. von Bülow and Jacobi, who promoted the formation of the agricultural union in Celle, men who, without any supervision from above, sustained the old reputation of Low Saxon efficiency. In Celle, the Hanoverian Wetzlar, there flourished an extremely learned science of jurisprudence, living in an abstract world, remote from political life. Never did the Guelph supreme court of appeal take action like that of Electoral Hesse to curb the excesses of police authority.

The Georgia Augusta university likewise held aloof from political struggles. It lived for its cosmopolitan scientific reputation, doing so little for the practical needs of the country that it was necessary to fill almost all the higher posts in the schools with imported teachers. Although the university did not possess the right of making the appointments to its own professorial chairs, it was quite happy under the paternal guardianship of the distinguished and considerate officialdom, for bureaucratic routinism, the deadly enemy of the republic of learning, was here unknown. During the first hundred and ten years of its existence (leaving out of consideration the brief period of the Westphalian interregnum), five men only were responsible for the affairs of the university: first of all the founder, Münchhausen; then the two Brandes's, father and son; then the brothers Hoppenstedt—all men notable for high culture, great refinement, and a good knowledge of men. Thus an academic family tradition was handed down from generation to generation, and the sensibilities of the professors were respected with a delicacy which would have been obviously impracticable in the wider relationships of a large state. When the great Blumenbach, in his old age, adopted the vexatious practice of throwing unread into the waste-paper basket all official communications sent to him regarding the natural history collections, Hoppenstedt knew how to circumvent the difficulty without either taking or giving offence. Henceforward all ministerial despatches were sent to Göttingen in duplicate, one set to disappear in Blumenbach's waste-paper basket, the other set passing directly into the hands of the sub-director of the collections. When a chair became vacant, the advice of Heyne, Heeren, or some other trusted professor, was first sought; the names of all "learned porcupines," undesirable persons whose appointment would for one reason or another have proved unsatisfactory, were then carefully eliminated from the list; and in the end the appointment was almost always given, regardless of considerations of cost, to some efficient and peaceably disposed individual. Philosophy, indeed, and belles-lettres could not be expected to thrive in the chill atmosphere of Göttingen, but distinguished experts were at work in every faculty (in the faculty of law, for instance, besides old Hugo, there was C. F. Eichhorn, the favourite of all juristic teachers), and

Gauss was justified in boasting that there was no place here for mere phrase-making. Never before had the Georgia Augusta been visited so freely. The proverbial pride of its councillors was all the more comprehensible because the Guelph land did not possess any other centre of higher culture.

The capital lacked all the works of art and collections with which the German courts were accustomed to adorn their residential cities. Apart from the beautiful old Rathaus, the stranger could find nothing here worth seeing save, perhaps, the isabels of the royal stud. In the other towns, too, there was but little life. The vigorous trade which in the old days of the Hanseatic league had centred round the bridge across the Ilmenau in Lüneburg, had long ere this been diverted elsewhere; and at Hildesheim, also, the magnificence of the churches and the wonderful wood-carvings on the façades of the houses, spoke only of long vanished glories. In the Harz mountains the cheerful Franconian inhabitants, proud of their skill as miners, considered themselves far cleverer than the heavier-witted Low Saxons of the plain; but here too the spirit of enterprise was lacking; both forests and mines were owned by the royal authorities, who had in times of distress to come to the aid of their miners with doles of bread and the like. Less cared for than under the paternal mining authority at Claustal was life in the Communion Harz, the paradise of German parochialism. In this small region there were a few mining villages, with about seven hundred inhabitants in all, and it was ruled during alternate years by Hanover and Brunswick respectively. Since the two sovereign lords, the Directorium and the Non-Directorium, could never agree upon any active measure, from time immemorial no laws had been passed for the region. The people lived in an almost non-political state of nature, like that of Rousseau's primitive humanity, and the criminal code of Emperor Charles V, which was here still in force, had but rarely to be put in operation.

In harmony with these immature economic conditions was the antediluvian commercial policy which, immediately after the peace, reestablished everywhere the old internal tolls, and which, after the manner of well-to-do agricultural lands, endeavoured by low import tariffs to facilitate consumption for the possessing classes. The Guelph land was open for

English goods, serving England as a conveniently situated smuggling depot for trade with the interior of Germany. The linen industry of the chapter of Osnabrück was almost completely ruined by the competition of English cotton goods, but the majority of the population was content, and the well-nourished coast dwellers regarded it as their natural right to drink cheaper red wine than those who lived inland. The Prussian customs system was universally detested as an abominable fiscal tyranny; people were even unwilling to replace the impracticable old twenty gulden standard by the Prussian monetary system. The government was fond of speaking of the country as the German North Sea state; yet it failed to recognise that the time of awakening had now come for the North Sea coast of Germany, whereas the commercial energies of the Baltic had developed centuries earlier. From of old, Hanover had lived on bad terms with Hamburg and Bremen, its two great emporia. Soon after the reestablishment of the Guelph regime, the temporary wooden bridge which Davoust had thrown across the Elbe was removed. But the ports on the Ems could not thrive in competition with such powerful rivals. The government did its best to maintain the navigability of this river, but failed to construct the indispensable canal between the Elbe and the Weser. Even after the terrible inundation of 1825, the measures taken for the building of dikes along the coasts were inadequate. At no time under Guelph rule was so extensive an area wrested from the sea as the Prussian polders, which the loyal East Frisians cherished as a heritage of their great king.

Few of the other German territories equalled Hanover in the possession of material for a vigorous estate of peasants. Only in Göttingen and in Eichsfeld was the land subdivided into excessively small areas; almost everywhere else there existed fine peasant farms, whose indivisibility was in most cases secured by legal enactment, but sometimes (as in East Frisia and the Bremen fenlands) by inviolable custom. Just as the farmers of the royal domains made it a point of pride to do all their carting with teams of four horses, so also did the peasants work on the grand scale, and even on the ill-famed Lüneburg heath the large flocks of heath-fed sheep ensured a tolerable degree of prosperity for their owners. Wherever the head of the Saxon horse was

conspicuous upon the gables, the peasants foregathered as they had done a thousand years earlier to deliberate beneath the lime-tree upon the common; and perhaps the Frisians were even more independent, for in the treacherous marshlands servility flourishes as little as in the highlands. But the economic energies of this sturdy and self-reliant race were paralysed by numerous burdens upon the land, and by manorial dues which were in many cases extremely oppressive. It was only in horse-breeding that preeminent results were secured, this branch of stock-raising being assisted by the admirable stud farm of Celle. The peasants bore a grudge against the noble landowners, who contributed little to the national taxes and nothing at all towards the relief of the communal burdens, and who, when their farming was unsuccessful, could save themselves from their creditors by special bankruptcy privileges.

From childhood onwards the nobleman was unjustly favoured, and this could not fail in the end to arouse embitterment even in the minds of the law-abiding Low Saxons. In the Ritterakademie at Lüneburg, the nursery of Guelph junker arrogance, twelve noble bursars were meagrely but suitably instructed by fourteen teachers. If the young nobleman entered the administration as *Auditor* he speedily acquired the title of *Drost*, and therewith the right to promotion in advance of his bourgeois colleagues. To him alone were open the nobles' bench in the supreme court at Celle and the positions reserved for nobles in the forest service. Even domestic service among the nobles was provided for by the notorious *livrée carrière*, and the subordinate official posts were not filled as a rule by the appointment of soldiers who had served their time, but, after the English manner, upon the recommendation of some person of distinction. The wealthy possessions of the monasteries, which here, where the course of the Reformation had been so smooth, had remained practically undiminished, served also to provide for the ruling families. In the charming woodland retreat of Mariensee, and hidden away in other quiet corners, there were eighteen high class nunneries, where the daughters of the nobility, the military officers, and the higher officials, were supported as *chanoinesses*. The land was overburdened with privileges and exemptions. Everyone sought to secure advantages by favour and grace, so that even the booksellers of Göttingen

obtained in this way special rebates on the postal charges for the forwarding of their book packets.

In the army, the nobility had never counted for so much as in the officialdom. Among the officers of the German legion the army possessed battle-tried and widely-experienced leaders. These heroes of Torres Vedras, Salamanca, and Waterloo, swore by Wellington, "the duke," and clung to English customs even more firmly than did society at court, where it was customary to praise every man of distinction by saying that he looked like an Englishman. General Hartmann, as knight commander of the bath, was universally known as "Sir Julius." To the common soldier, the charms of British civilisation seemed less entrancing when he had a taste of the cat-o'-nine-tails. But even in this semi-English army the growing German national sentiment demanded its rights. The days of foreign mercenary service had passed. Upon the demand of the diet the crown promised that Hanoverian troops should never again be used for foreign purposes, and in this peaceful period there was no difficulty in keeping the pledge. On one occasion, Canning designed to use Hanoverian regiments for the occupation of Portugal, but abandoned the plan when Reinhard, French envoy in Frankfort, raised the alarm, and when the Bundestag became uneasy.[1] There was as yet no law enforcing military service, and levies were effected, often in an extremely arbitrary manner, at the discretion of the authorities. It was only the cavalry service into which the peasant lads entered willingly enough, for the cavalry soldiers with their fine horses were quartered upon the peasant farms, with relatives whenever possible, and in many cases father, son, and grandson would serve successively in the same squadron. The regiments were small, so as to leave scope, in accordance with the custom of the country, for the appointment of a great number of staff officers.

The army had little association with its Prussian comrades in arms of Belle Alliance, and this intercourse lacked cordiality, for in accordance with Guelph tradition it was considered that this victory had been the work solely of the British and the Hanoverians; it was true that the Prussians had helped a little towards the close, but even then the last

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, July 24; Meyern's Report, Berlin, September 25, 1824.

remnants of the imperial guard had been annihilated by the Osnabrück Landwehr. The brotherhood in arms of the Seven Years' War was forgotten, but the annexation of the year 1806 was still keenly remembered, and had not been atoned for even by the deeds of the War of Liberation. If a young man belonging to one of the old military families came to recognise that his Guelph realm was, after all, no more than a Prussian enclave, and if he longed for some wider sphere of activity, he always entered Austrian service, just as did the members of his order in Mecklenburg and Saxony, and did all that he could to consolidate that union between the Hofburg and the German nobility whose political consequences were so momentous. On the other hand, it was regarded as quite unprecedented when General Hartmann sent his son into the Prussian army, and when, shortly afterwards, the spirited young Goeben also entered Prussian military service. Among the common people, anger against Prussia was almost stronger. Wherever the Old Guelph territories marched with those of Prussia, there was to be heard in contempt for the Prussian starvelings the defiant song,

Good beer and good wine!
We are Hanoverians fine;

and the brawls in the frontier villages frequently exceeded the traditional measure of German neighbourly affection.

The proceedings of the estates ran an extremely tranquil course. The people paid hardly any attention to them, and at this time the kingdom did not possess a single political newspaper. In secret, however, there was at work a very active nobles' party, led by the able and quarrelsome privy councillor von Schele, and offering resolute opposition with the twenty-six votes at its command to all proposals for reform brought forward in the diet. By their suggestions, in the end, Count Münster was prejudiced against Rehberg, who, already suspect as a bourgeois, soon acquired the evil reputation of being a liberal, simply because he desired to effect a few cautious improvements in the way of abolishing established abuses. In the year 1819, even before the promulgation of the Carlsbad decrees, Rehberg retired in profound mortification, and henceforward Hanover was ruled from London.

Minister von Bremer and the other privy councillors in Hanover were treated by Münster as mere subordinates, and even Rose, the new cabinet councillor, although his business ability was gladly utilised, never gained any decisive influence. The officials speedily acquired the habit of ignoring the ministry and of reporting direct to the German chancellery in London.

The first act of Münster's autocratic regime was a fresh alteration in the constitution. The new kingdom had not been in existence for five years, and now for the second time, on this occasion without any urgent necessity, the foundations of its constitutional law were arbitrarily transformed by the crown. Beyond question, Münster had no intention of infringing the law. As hereditary marshal, the Hanoverian statesman was, indeed, leader of the estates. But in his arrogance he considered it needless to inform himself regarding the legal issues. Two royal rescripts recommended to the diet a reconstitution of the general assembly of the estates. The crown desired to introduce the bicameral system, which the courts had recently come to regard as a bulwark of order, and which seemed absolutely indispensable in aristocratic Hanover; consequently the free peasants were to receive fuller representation in the second chamber. Since the diet, while advising against the formation of two chambers, did not raise any formal objection, the government ignored the opposition, and pursued its design, without even communcating the decision directly to the general assembly of the estates, informing merely the provincial diets. These bodies, the degree of whose competence to participate in the decision of general Hanoverian concerns was known to no one, were tacitly placed upon an equal footing with the general assembly of the estates. Thus unstable was the legal foundation of the constitution in this ancient community.

A royal patent of December 7, 1819, decreed the definitive composition of the diet. The new first chamber was to consist only of a few prelates, the mediatised nobles, and the representatives of the Ritterschaft. Since the Guelph nobility never chose a bourgeois lord of the manor as delegate, the interests of the noble class were here more one-sidedly and exclusively represented than in any other German upper house. In the second chamber, twenty representatives of the free

peasant proprietors were to be added as members, but another ten years elapsed before this slow-moving government made up its mind to summon the peasant members. The East Frisians protested, and the representatives of their third estate remained absent from the diet. Thus for the time being the second chamber consisted mainly of the representatives of the towns, who were nominated by the town councils; and since the salaries of the members had to be paid by the electing bodies, the thrifty town councils confined their choice for the most part to officials already resident in the capital, whom it was not necessary to pay, while, for the like reason, the Ritterschaft gave its preference to nobles living in the town of Hanover. Thus the definitive diet was an even more inert body than had been the provisional. Schele and his nobles' party, which had hitherto usually been in the minority, now dominated the first chamber, and could prevent anything being done. As a rule the estates broke up having accomplished naught of value, after vexatious disputes and vain attempts at mediation on the part of the government. The summaries of the minutes, all that was disclosed to the world concerning the proceedings, soon ceased to appear, for no one troubled to read them.

Münster was not able to bring to fruition more than a few modest reforms. A circumscribed class of state servants was constituted in 1822, out of the different official corporations of the old times; an end was put to the special privileges in matters of promotion hitherto allotted to the nobles distinguished by the title of *Drost*; and the master foresters of noble blood were no longer differentiated, as far at least as the wearing of a resplendent uniform was concerned, from their bourgeois colleagues. Intermediate authorities were at length introduced into the administration, these consisting of the governing bodies of six *Landdrosteien* or archbailiwicks, whose frontiers were confusedly interlaced with those of the territorial divisions represented by the provincial diets. Compulsory military service was legally established, of course with the right of substitution. Torture and a few of the barbarous punishments of earlier days were abolished. Nevertheless the tone of the officials towards the common people still remained rough and masterful as of old, and the peasant, instead of being addressed with the courteous "you," was spoken to officially in the third person singular.

In the year 1821, the Guelph land celebrated a great dynastic festival of rejoicing which threw a glaring light upon the political culture and sentiments of German particularism. For two generations Hanoverian children had been taught that it was their duty to love their invisible king, just as it was their duty to love God whom they were never able to see; but now came the astounding tidings that the Invisible was about to deign to manifest himself to the eyes of his German subjects. In England, George IV had had sufficient experience of the mutability of popular favour.

> Ah! happy if each tear of thine
> Could wash a father's fault away!

had Byron once exclaimed to the weeping princess of Wales, and how many noble and liberal-minded men had since then invoked maledictions upon the head of this sovereign. When the trial of his luckless wife was proceeding, he could hardly venture forth into the streets of London. Then there ensued a sudden change of mood, and at his ostentatious coronation, the populace, ever fond of spectacles, greeted him with thunderous acclamations. Delighted with this homage, he now desired to display himself in all the glories of kingship to the two satellite peoples that circled round the English sun, to the Irish and to the Germans. Loud were the rejoicings of the Irish, and almost more cordial was the reception in Hanover. Of questionable aspect, indeed, was this ungainly figure with the bloated face and the youthfully brown cockatoo wig; it was difficult to see where the red uniform collar ended and the red neck began; and the renowned royal graciousness could be observed only when the father of the country was sober. But these drawbacks mattered little, and the populace could never weary of gazing upon the real live king. When the monarch, in an extremely jovial mood, assured the burghers of his German capital, "I have always been a Hanoverian, and as a Hanoverian I shall live and die," enthusiasm flamed fiercely up. A few weeks earlier, likewise in an exceptionally good humour, he had declared to the Irish that his heart had always been Irish! Throughout the country the same delight was displayed, in numberless speeches and poems, sometimes with Guelph arrogance, and sometimes with German good-nature. With fine

insight, a trusty peasant had discovered the only characteristic of George which appealed to the German mind, and over the gateway of his farm had painted a foaming tankard, with the inscription beneath: "Should he come along here, can sup pot of good beer." In an elaborate ode, the Georgia Augusta extolled the happiness of the united gens Britanna et gens Guelphica, whilst Heeren, with the thoroughness of the historian, subsequently described in a monograph the festival of reception at the town of the muses. The political outcome of this triumphal progress was aptly summed up by a patriotic poet in the couplet:

> Loudly can all now voice delight
> That of the king they've had a sight!

During the middle of the twenties, two new members of the diet brought a certain amount of life into that body: Lüntzel of Hildesheim, the learned chronicler of his native town, a well-meaning but somewhat loquacious liberal; and the Osnabrück advocate, Carl Bertram Stüve, a man in whom the peculiarities of the Low Saxon stock were incorporated with much the same completeness as were those of the Swabian character in Ludwig Uhland. "Free of spirit, self-contained, striving for the nearest end"—these lines of Goethe, which he had greatly loved, were inscribed upon his monument by his fellow countrymen. In actual fact, rarely in book-learned Germany had a statesman clung so firmly to the paternal soil, to the thoughts and customs of his immediate homeland. As syndic of Osnabrück, Stüve's father had been an intimate friend of Justus Möser, and the son's first literary work was to edit the posthumous volume of Möser's *History of Osnabrück*. This was Stüve's world, among the peasant farmers and the blunt petty bourgeois of Westphalia; the well-do-do bachelor had never even visited the Rhine, and the world of the beautiful remained closed to him. He had been a member of the Burschenschaft, and on the Hasenheide had been a vigorous gymnast under the direct supervision of the Turnvater; but even in those early days, with a precocious insight, he had definitely refused to participate in the extravagant plans of the youthful Teutonisers. Now, amid the labours of practical life, German unity seemed to him a splendid but impracticable dream.

Everything illimitable (we have his own assurance for the fact) was remote from his inclinations. He had found it difficult enough to become a Hanoverian instead of an Osnabrücker; this Guelph state must never disappear in a great national realm. Least of all must it be absorbed into Prussia, for his judgment of Prussian officialdom was identical with that of Rehberg. Very rarely and reluctantly would he admit that in Prussia there had occurred the most powerful development of the national idea, for the reason that in Prussia the ancient feudalist system had been so thoroughly destroyed. The serious, sober, strictly matter-of-fact characteristics of his thoughtful writings likewise recalled the work of Rehberg. But Stüve belonged to a younger and bolder generation, and it was his ambition to restore the old Germanic freedom to the burghers and to the peasants, and to restore it in new forms, so that the agriculturist might enjoy the fruits of the earth undiminished, and the burgher might turn his own hand to the management of the affairs of his commune. The liberals of the school of Rotteck did not know what to make of this despiser of doctrine, in whom Germanism and particularism, the zeal of the reformer and adherence to traditional custom, were so strangely mingled. Nor was he an easy man to get on with. Severe, blunt, abstemious almost to excess, somewhat pedantic, and utterly without a sense of humour, the slender little man could exercise no personal attraction, albeit he dominated opponents by the superiority of his understanding, by his comprehensive knowledge of affairs, and by his moral earnestness.

Stüve sat for six and twenty years in the diet, entering that assembly as successor to Councillor Buch, to whom, upon the government's orders, further leave had been refused by his college, because he had attacked the privileges of the nobility. Untiringly he devoted all his notable powers of work to the proceedings of this chamber, although it gave opportunity for monologues alone, since the ministers were not allowed to put in an appearance. The composition of the land taxes, long greatly desired by the peasants, had just been effected, very much to the advantage of the privileged classes. Stüve immediately went a step further, demanding that which the Hanoverian state above all required, the abolition of corvées, tithes, and manorial dues. He continually returned to this matter, his *ceterum censeo*, for

while the second chamber agreed with him, the first vetoed the proposal. Then the friend of the peasants took to his pen, and supplemented his speeches by an admirable work entitled *Concerning the Burdens upon Landed Property in Hanover* (1829). At length, in the spring of 1830, the house of nobles declared itself ready to negotiate upon the question, but how many years were still to elapse before the reform was to be carried! The countryfolk were beginning to lose patience. Hanover, too, had suffered severely from the great agricultural crisis, and the exasperation of the peasantry was now increased by a widespread failure of the crops.

A remarkable number of unreconciled antagonisms flourished in this extraordinary land. The provincial diets were hostile to the general assembly of the estates, the second chamber was at war with the first, and the tax treasury with the royal treasury; the officials resisted the diets, and the state servants of bourgeois origin were in conflict with those of noble birth; the peasants fought the landowners; the burghers fought the all powerful town councils; the Hanoverian ministry fought the German chancellery in London. As yet, indeed, discontent was by no means so serious as in Electoral Hesse, but in his remote retreat on Putney Hill Count Münster had no conception of the grievances that were fermenting in Hanover, and thus it was that here also incalculable complications were threatening to overwhelm the leaderless state.

The evil reputation which the Guelphs had acquired in Germany since the trial of Queen Caroline, became yet worse when shortly afterwards the old enmity between the two chief lines of the house gave rise to renewed public scandals. In the territorial partitions, the older ducal line had in the end secured no more than a few fragments of Low Saxon land, dispersed between Holzminden on the Weser and the Magdeburg region. Although the social conditions of this petty territory resembled those that obtained in the neighbouring Lüneburg domain, since the ruling dukes remained at home the nobles never gained such unrestricted power as they possessed in Hanover. Under the sway of the able Duke Charles, Brunswick had intimate experience of many of the sins of absolutism, such as courtly ostentation, the

trade in soldiers, and French depravity, but enjoyed also many of the advantages of this form of government. During the reign of Charles William Ferdinand, moreover, the finances of the state, hitherto greatly disordered, were reorganised by the excellent bourgeois minister, Feronce, and there began an epoch of careful administration, with a free press and a flourishing educational system—a period to which the people long continued to look back as "the good old days." The older branch of the family was greatly superior to the English Guelphs in ability and courage. In German politics, its members almost invariably pursued other paths than those chosen by their English cousins. Intermarrying with the Hohenzollerns, they entered into close alliance with Prussia; several of their princes died a hero's death beneath the Prussian flag; and Leopold, who was drowned in the Oder in the attempt to save life, was a Prussian officer. A change took place in the relationship, however, after Charles William Ferdinand had paid for his fidelity to Prussia with his life. His successor Frederick William, the hero of the Black Brunswickers, a landless prince and the deadly enemy of Napoleon, was forced to turn for help to England. It was through England's good word that, as the outcome of the War of Liberation, his hereditary dominions were restored to him. When he fell at Quatre Bras, he left a will in which he entrusted his two sons, both still under age, to the guardianship of the prince regent of Great Britain, and in which he begged Count Münster to do his best for the duchy.

The prince regent left the management of Brunswick affairs in the hands of the ducal privy council, subject to the supervision of Münster. The leading spirit in the council was von Schmidt-Phiseldeck, a perspicacious and conscientious official who had acquired the confidence of the deceased duke, and who was soon generally respected by the country. Since the hatred felt for the kingdom of Westphalia had been intense, the complete restoration of the old order aroused in Brunswick no discontent. The regency was carried on in the benevolent and cautious manner characteristic also of Hanover; but in Brunswick the problems were simpler, for no new territory had been acquired, and it was easier to effect certain necessary reforms. But in isolated instances it was not difficult to recognise that the cold hand of a foreign administrator was in control. The Brunswickers' own

duke would hardly have decided as light-heartedly as did the English prince regent that the Georgia Augusta must be regarded as the national university of Brunswick, and that the renowned university of Helmstädt was not to be reestablished, although the beautiful turreted structure of the Juleum and the wealthy territorial possessions of the old university were still available. How manifold had been the blessings which in former days had flowed over Germany from this peaceful town, from the little wooden house of Calixtus! But this tiny Guelph land never regained the notable position it had once occupied in German life. After the dukes had gained possession of the capital and had closed the doors of the Hanseatic hall in the ancient Rathaus, "the proud city" of Brunswick had declined to the level of a petty bourgeois ducal residential town, and even the Carolinum, which during the eighteenth century had been so important a centre of culture, was now merely a good gymnasium like any other.

But to the common people the peaceful days of the new time were far from unwelcome. The finances were well ordered, taxation was moderate, much was done in the way of road-building and for the furtherance of education, and under the thrifty management of Schmidt-Phiseldeck the young duke's private fortune underwent a notable increase. Upon the request of the Ritterschaft, the old diet was summoned in the year 1819 (the privileges of this body had been definitively established in 1770), and with the assent of the estates the *Erneuerte Landschaftsordnung*, a timely reform of the old constitutional law, came into being on April 25, 1820. This new Brunswick constitution was drawn up upon principles similar to those incorporated in the Hanoverian patent of December, 1819; but in the case of Brunswick the legal foundation of the new order was incontestable; and the free peasants, who in Hanover had been obliged to content themselves with a promise for the future, were here assigned forthwith the right to twenty representatives. But not even in Brunswick was the suffrage granted to the peasant copyholders, for throughout feudalist North Germany there were few who ventured to dream of this reform. In essentials, however, the new order was in accordance with the wishes of the country.

While the Brunswick privy council was thus faithfully discharging the political tasks of the regency, King George

was indifferently neglecting his personal duties as guardian. Their mother's early death and their father's adventurous career had resulted in making the young princes' childhood a stormy one, and, tossed incessantly to-and-fro in Germany, Sweden, and England, they had never been able to make themselves at home anywhere. Duke Frederick William could not fail to be aware of this trouble, and in his will he left instructions that for the future his sons were to be under the care of their grandmother, the venerable Amelia, margravine of Baden. The guardian, however, ignored this prescription, presumably because he wished the lads to remain entirely in Guelph hands. The consequence was that the gloomy youth of Duke Charles was never lightened by any gleams of feminine tenderness. His cousin, Princess Joanna of Saxony, and her sister-in-law, the good Princess Amelia, were the only two women of noble nature who ever came near enough to influence him, and they not until his character had already hardened. By the prince regent's orders, he was very strictly brought up by Councillor Eigner and Chamberlain von Linsingen. No credence can be placed on his own reports, for these abound in untruths; and no one can say with certainty precisely what was amiss with the management of the unruly young prince, who early displayed, in addition to all the arrogance and wilfulness of the Guelphs, a tendency to debauchery and an uncontrollable inclination for evil companionship. This much alone is certain, that the duke utterly detested his two governors, and that in the petty warfare which he waged against them day by day his natural spitefulness became increased to the pitch of arrant malice; it is equally certain that he was extremely ill-prepared for his work as a ruler, being neither trained as a soldier nor yet adequately informed regarding the laws and circumstances of his country. From the English point of view, such instruction was superfluous, for in England all governmental institutions are based upon the hypothesis that the king exercises no personal rule. King George hardly troubled to conceal his feeling that the care of these German wards was a nuisance. It was enough for him if they kept quiet and gave him no trouble. Besides, they were his wife's nephews, and the woman whom he hated so bitterly continued to fight against him from the tomb. Her coffin bore the inscription, "Here lies Caroline of Brunswick, the

ill-used queen of England"; and by her command it had been transported from the hostile island to the sepulchral vault of the Guelphs in Brunswick.

It was not by deliberate ill-will, but simply through the slothfulness of an unloving guardian, that the young duke's education was so shamefully neglected—although it may well be that his unhappy disposition would hardly have been bettered by a better upbringing. He was utterly weary of restraint and tedium, and with burning impatience he counted the hours to the day of his liberation. Then King George made a last and hardly credible mistake. By an ancient family convention, the Pactum Henrico-Wilhelminum of the year 1535, the Brunswick princes attained full age with the completion of the eighteenth year. It is true that this rule had not been inviolably maintained. In the deceased duke's will there was an obscure passage which was open to the interpretation that the father desired his successor's minority to be prolonged by some years. Preponderant grounds, however, could be urged in favour of the validity of the old family law, and since the king was aware of his nephew's suppressed discontent, it was essential that he should avoid anything which might afford the duke a pretext for complaining of illegal treatment. Nevertheless Count Münster desired that the period of guardianship should be prolonged. He had no unworthy motives, for the Brunswick regency gave him a good deal of work and brought him no possible advantage; but he was accustomed to ignore legal considerations, and in his view the young Guelph was not yet ripe to undertake the work of government. A very slight knowledge of men should have enabled him to foresee that this prince was not likely to be much wiser at twenty than at eighteen. To avoid all possibility of objection, King George asked the advice of the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin. Hardenberg's counsel, given in July, 1822, was that through the mediation of the court of Vienna, where the young duke was then living, the latter should be induced to give his free assent to the proposal; and upon Metternich's advice, Duke Charles actually agreed (though not until after he had legally attained full age) that the regency should be prolonged for an additional year.

Therewith all seemed in order. In October, 1823, the young man, now nineteen years of age, celebrated his accession as

reigning prince, amid storms of acclamation from his subjects, who idolised the valiant Guelphs. He avoided swearing to observe the new constitution, letting matters pass for the moment, and spent the greater part of the next three years in travel, in order, after the prolonged period of tutelage, to taste the joys of life to the full. At a later date he maintained, although little reliance can be placed upon the assertion, that he had been compelled to promise Prince Metternich to make no changes in the government during the first years of his reign. When at length he returned home, he had learned nothing; but in the whirlpool of wild dissipation he had lost the last remnants of shame, while from the teachings of Metternich (who was extremely fond of the young man and overwhelmed him with flattery) he had imbibed an exaggerated and well nigh insane conception of the boundlessness of his sovereign authority. A system of detestable persecution was immediately put in operation, and proved too much even for the patience of the devoted Brunswickers, for every word and every action of the duke gave expression to the impudence of an undisciplined boy. On May 10, 1827, Duke Charles issued an ordinance declaring that he recognised the proceedings of the regency only in so far as they did not transcend the well-established rights of regents or infringe the rights of property; but he reserved for himself the power of subjecting to special examination and approval everything that had happened during the year of the prolonged regency. His aim in this coup d'état was simultaneously to put a public slight upon his uncle and to subvert the new constitution. From the legal point of view he was manifestly in the wrong. By German constitutional law, a regency cannot be regarded in the same light as a guardianship in private life. To the regent of the undying state there accrue all the competencies of the head of the state, including the right of effecting changes in the constitution in due form of law. As regards the prolongation of the regency, Duke Charles, if his own princely word was sacred to him, could no longer raise any objection, for he had formally agreed to it.

Meanwhile Schmidt-Phiseldeck had had his work interfered with and his salary reduced, and had in addition been so greatly harassed by enquiries, reproaches, and threats, that he begged to be allowed to resign. He was told that his

resignation would be permitted; but in spite of repeated requests, the final ratification of the resignation was not vouchsafed. The alarmed man dreaded the worst, and fled to Hanover, receiving there, in fulfilment of a previous promise, a place in the privy council. The warrant for his arrest sent after him by the duke was ignored in Prussia and Hanover as manifestly *ultra vires*. The Brunswick privy council was now entirely reconstituted by the appointment of pliable men, the finances being entrusted to a former scrivener named Bitter. In the ducal cabinet, where the centre of gravity of public affairs was now to be found, sinister figures now appeared. Among these were Wit von Dörring, the betrayer of the demagogues; Dr. Klindworth, a secret agent, who during half a century worked as a spy, first for Countess Lichtenau and Prince Wittgenstein, and subsequently for Metternich, Guizot, William of Würtemberg and Manteuffel, and who commonly found himself able to play the lucrative part of spy in two camps; and the ill-famed Countess Görtz-Wrisberg likewise had a hand in the game. With the aid of these individuals, Duke Charles prepared a number of unsavoury pamphlets, in which the king, Münster, Schmidt-Phiseldeck and all the councillors of the regency, were overwhelmed with abuse, and in which the former guardian, in especial, was reproached on the ground that by a tyrannical system of education he had aimed at destroying the young duke's energy of will.

The proud English court was intensely irritated by the Brunswicker's onslaughts. The duke's political grievances could easily be shown to be without foundation, but the reproach of a defective education was on a different footing, however strangely it might sound in the mouth of the young man himself. Since King George recognised this, he lost all self-control, and allowed himself to be overpowered by his ancient hatred of his wife's kinsman. Upon the king's order, Münster wrote a *Refutation of the defamatory Accusations of the Duke of Brunswick*, a work which in respect of measureless invective was by no means inferior to the Brunswick documents. The count did not hesitate to menace the young Guelph with the revolution. "It seems," he wrote scornfully, "that the duke will not permit himself to be restrained in his unfortunate career." He further haughtily threatened the use of the war strength of the British king if

the Germanic Federation should prove unable to enforce the rendering of satisfaction, and he repeatedly expressed his "disgust at the black ingratitude" of the Brunswicker. What a spectacle! It is easy to imagine the impression produced in the mind of young radicals who had long ere this begun to have doubts about the monarchical order, when these two princes (who next to the elector of Hesse were now the most heartily despised members of the German high nobility) were thus washing their dirty linen in public, and when the ultra-conservative Guelph statesman openly spoke of a Guelph ruler in a tone which the orators of the Burschen hardly ventured to assume?

Duke Charles' reply to Münster's writing was a challenge, and by way of practice he spent several hours a day shooting at his enemy's picture. When Münster refused to accept the impossible suggestion, the duke's head ranger, von Praun, who had never even met the Hanoverian minister, was instructed to repeat the challenge in his own name. The scandal was intolerable, to the delight of all the opposition papers in Europe. Hanoverian troops had already been sent to the Brunswick frontier, the duke was also arming; and since King George had been affronted, not as federal prince, but in propria persona, this boyish piece of impudence seemed quite likely to lead to European complications. In the interim both parties had lodged complaints with the Bundestag. Duke Charles despatched von Buttlar, one of his confidants, to Stuttgart, and also endeavoured to induce King Louis of Bavaria to espouse his cause. The two liberal kings, however, would have nothing to do with the affair, and advised the young Guelph to give way.[1]

It was full time for the Federation to intervene. By the Vienna final act, the Bundestag was not only pledged to prevent mutual acts of violence on the part of members of the Federation, but also to compel any federal state that had given just cause of offence to a foreign power, to render appropriate satisfaction; and in the political dispute, which alone could concern the assembly, the English king was certainly right. Nevertheless the position of the Bundestag was most embarrassing. Münster said in his emotional manner that just as the Athenians had not enacted any punishment for parricide, so also the federal act had failed to provide

[1] Küster's Reports June 21, October 11 and 24, November 6, 1828.

for such a case as the present; and unquestionably the law givers of the Federation had never contemplated the possibility of any personal quarrel of this character between crowned heads. How could the Frankfort conference of envoys venture to administer a personal reproof to a German sovereign, or compel him to apologise? Metternich, the young Guelph's patron, knew how to make an adroit use of this consideration of form. As far as regard for Prussia rendered permissible, he took the side of the Brunswicker, and endeavoured to postpone or frustrate the Bundestag's decision. When Wit von Dörring, while the complaint was still sub judice, published a new lampoon, and Duke Charles denied all prior knowledge of its composition, Metternich pretended to believe the manifest falsehood, and the Prussian envoy found it necessary to prove to him that Wit had obviously made use of the duke's private papers, and that some of the phrases of the lampoon were literal reproductions of the Guelph's well-known schoolboy witticisms.[1] At the Bundestag, Reinhard and Anstett were also secretly working on behalf of the Brunswick ruler, presumably because they dreaded any strengthening of the federal authority.

The duke's most resolute opponent was the crown of Prussia, which had recently become very friendly to England-Hanover. At the court of Berlin, Charles had roused general dislike. Stein found him immoral, arrogant, impudent, and empty-headed; the generals could not forgive him for having completely adopted the Austrian side, in defiance of the ancient traditions of his house, and for having refrained (doubtless on Metternich's advice) from seeking a commission in the Prussian army. King Frederick William felt the annoyance naturally inspired in a serious-minded man by childish pranks which at once threatened the peace of the Germanic Federation and endangered the constitutional rights of Brunswick. His displeasure increased when the indefatigable Brunswick pamphleteers actually endeavoured to excuse the Guelph hole-and-corner tyranny with the use of demagogic catchwords, declaring that Duke Charles's sole reason for refusing to abide by the new constitution had been because it gave the nobles special privileges at the expense of the common people! In a paternal letter (December, 1827), Frederick William exhorted the duke to withdraw his

[1] Maltzahn's Reports, February 9 and 13, 1828.

" unwarranted accusations." The exhortation was vain. Other attempts at mediation, made jointly by Bernstorff and Metternich, proved fruitless owing to the duke's obstinacy and Austria's untrustworthiness.

The king now regarded it as indispensable that the Bundestag should exercise its authority. Should the Federation do this in earnest, Duke Charles might possibly be saved from committing additional follies, and in any case the people would be shown that in Germany limits were still imposed upon the arbitrary will of princes. It seemed to Frederick William that the settlement of this affair was a point of honour for the German estate of princes. When his envoy in London propounded the obvious question whether this family quarrel among the Guelphs might not be turned to advantage in order to exercise a gentle pressure in the matter of Hanover's tariff policy, Bernstorff gravely replied: " These two concerns (the commercial policy and the Brunswick affair) cannot be associated in any such manner. Whereas the first question involves material interests alone, we have in the second to deal with considerations about which it is quite impossible to bargain. We do not wish to set an example of want of confidence or even of actual injustice towards those German states which seem hitherto to have been animated by the desire to live upon terms of friendship with us."[1] Repeatedly Bernstorff sent instructions to Vienna that the language used against the duke must be very definite in tone, and that it was absolutely essential for the dispute to be settled promptly and definitely.[2] For nearly two years in Frankfort Nagler had to contend with the presidential envoy, who continually discovered fresh excuses for postponing the discussion. The real sentiments of the Hofburg were disclosed beyond the possibility of mistake by the simple fact that Duke Charles was represented at the Bundestag by Marschall of Nassau, Metternich's chief confidant. Indeed, much hesitation was aroused even in the minds of the well-disposed by the haughty and almost minatory language employed by the Hanoverian envoy von Stralenheim.

At length, on August 20, 1829, Münch found it necessary

[1] Ministerial Despatch to Bülow in London, September 26, 1828.

[2] Ministerial Despatches to Maltzahn, February 14 and 28, 1828, and subsequent dates.

to take a vote. The majority determined to ask the duke to rescind the ordinance of May, 1827; to send a letter of apology to King George; and to punish the head ranger for sending a challenge to Count Münster. Some days afterwards, Münch surprised the envoys by the information that the sittings of the Bundestag were suspended for the rest of the year. The Court of Berlin was exceedingly astonished "that at this particular moment, in view of the well-known position of affairs in the Brunswick-Hanoverian dispute, it could be regarded as advisable to announce such a prorogation." In fact, on September 17th, after several of the envoys had already left for home, Münch was compelled to hold a supplementary sitting, and now King George sent a conciliatory declaration to the effect that he did not desire to insist upon the letter of apology.[1] It hardly seemed possible that the decision thus mitigated would encounter any resistance; the committee of the Bundestag had done its utmost to avoid all bias, and had openly declared that it was unable to approve the tone of Münster's polemic writing. But the fertile spitefulness of the young Guelph was equal to the occasion. Once more he was prepared with innumerable objections and counter-complaints. Among other matters he referred to a territorial infringement, long ago condoned, which a Hanoverian battalion engaged in manœuvres had once committed to escape an inundation. He demanded that the decision of the Bundestag should be conveyed to him by word of mouth, and then, to place difficulties in the way of this, he went off to Paris.[2] Nothing was left for the Bundestag but to send an ultimatum (March, 1830). This had the desired effect. On April 22nd, after the dispute had lasted for three years, Duke Charles rescinded the momentous ordinance, but even in this extremity he acted unchivalrously and by subterfuge, wrapping up his revocation in a ministerial decree which declared certain other ordinances to be also inoperative. Prussia did not desire to rest content with such a mockery of satisfaction, but the Bundestag again followed the hint of Austria, and quietly let bygones be bygones.

This hesitation and slackness on the part of the Federation had served meanwhile to encourage the Guelph ruler

[1] Nagler's Reports, August 21, September 3 and 22: Bülow and Eichhorn, Ministerial Despatches to Nagler, September 13, 1828.

[2] Nagler's Report, December 19, 1829.

to new acts of violence, which had involved him in a dispute with his estates. For some years now he had dealt officially with the committees of the estates, but he suddenly declared to these that he would recognise only the old constitution of 1770. After an animated exchange of letters, the estates, too, appealed to the Federation, demanding protection and guarantees for the new constitution (1829). The duke was at once ready with counter-charges, and went so far as to ask the federal assembly to refuse its imprimatur to the estates' formulation of grievances.[1] There now came to hand a complaint from Baron von Sierstorpff, whom the duke had deprived of his offices at court, and who with his wife had been expelled the country. It is true that the supreme court in Wolfenbüttel had espoused the cause of the man thus attacked, but the decision of the court was solemnly torn up by an envoy of Duke Charles under the very eyes of the judges.

Thus matters went from bad to worse. Every month brought fresh arbitrary acts—utter futilities in the pitiable style of German particularism. A formal decree was issued to the entire officialdom forbidding any intercourse with the dismissed chamberlain von Cramm. As if he foresaw his approaching fall, the duke arbitrarily commanded the sale of certain portions of the crown lands (a proceeding which even von Bülow, the servile director of the crown lands, considered illegal), and pocketed the cash. He was torn by feverish unrest; one of his seals of a later date showed a dismasted and rudderless ship beaten about by the waves, with the inscription beneath "voilà mon sort"! In a Black Book, he sketched certain "methods of punishment": how dangerous individuals could be harassed by forbidding them to attend the theatre, keeping them on tenterhooks, police supervision, repeated arrests, and legal proceedings; or how they might be challenged by some intermediary to a duel with pistols. He had also cultivated a triple form of signature; one of these was "valid"; the second was "invalid"; the third "signifies precisely the opposite."[2] After the ancient

[1] Nagler's Report, September 22, 1829.

[2] This Black Book, whose authenticity is not open to dispute, was discovered during the burning of the Brunswick palace in 1830, and was brought to Berlin by Count von Veltheim, the plenipotentiary of the estates. Certain extracts from the volume were in September, 1830, communicated by Blittersdorff to the court of Baden.

manner of despots, he wreaked his fury chiefly on the nobility and the higher classes; the mass of the people was not oppressed, and there was no increase in taxation. But the duke's repulsive personality (in which no magnanimous trait existed to offer any excuse for his folly), and the continued presence of a dissolute rabble at the palace, at length aroused the anger of the common people. Venerable burghers shook their heads in dismay when they contemplated these disorderly practices, and the most preposterous rumours found credence, for the duke's conduct was calculated to stimulate the popular mythopœic faculty. As early as February, 1830, a special envoy from the estates to the Bundestag described the situation as utterly untenable.[1] Should a revolution break out, it was inevitable that all the simmering discontent would be directed against the person of the prince, and then, since the English-Hanoverian court was still unappeased, there might readily ensue an overthrow such as the easy-going world of petty states had never before experienced.

§ 4. MECKLENBURG. OLDENBURG. THE HANSA TOWNS.

In none of these petty states had the authority of the sovereign ruler been completely annihilated by the power of the estates; it was still everywhere possible for a powerful prince to bring disaster or blessings. In Mecklenburg alone was the feudalist oligarchy so firmly established that the personality of the ruler was no longer of any particular importance. During seven hundred years these domains had on two occasions only felt the strong hand of a monarch: first of all, when Wallenstein had seized the ducal coronet of the Obotrites, and, after his stormy fashion, had forthwith summoned Kepler to Rostock, with the intention of connecting the lake of Schwerin with Wismar Bay by means of a canal; and for the second time when during the Seven Years' War Frederick the Great had the wealthy country "pitilessly shaken out like a sack of meal." But the Friedländer's ephemeral regime vanished without leaving a trace, whilst Frederick worked here only as an enemy, without any intention of building for futurity. The native princes were rarely animated by the ambition, and never possessed the means, to acquire strong monarchical authority.

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, February 15, 1830.

The primitive German conquerors had been gentler upon the Baltic than beside the Spree and the Havel. This was by no means to the advantage of the country, for when hostile nations impinge upon one another, liberty and civilisation are most surely preserved for the future if the superior stock imposes its own peculiarities with relentless severity. The Wendish princely house of Niklot and Pribislav, which was confirmed in its sovereignty by the victorious Henry the Lion, gladly espoused the side of the conqueror, and promoted the German language and German culture as eagerly as the Piasts of Silesia or the Slavic dukes of Pomerania; but the uncontrollable impulse of the Teutons to activity never affected the Wends, who were of softer clay. No other princely race of the old empire had so unwarlike a history. On one occasion, indeed, an Albert of Mecklenburg extended his hand towards the three crowns of the north, while another, John Albert, took part in the rebel campaigns of Maurice of Saxony; but the great majority of these easy-going serene highnesses remained quietly at home, carousing and hunting, cosy and affable, much loved by the people, sometimes actively engaged in local feuds, but troubling themselves little about the affairs of the empire. No further important changes were made in the frontiers of the country after the domain had been rounded off by the acquisition of the territory of Stargard, the colony of the Brandenburg Ascanians. Occasionally some firebrand from the flames of the German and the northern wars would be wafted into this remote corner of the empire, especially after the crown of Sweden had established its chief German fortress in Wismar; but Mecklenburg was too far from the great routes of commerce and the armies to stimulate the avarice of the fighting powers as did her neighbours Pomerania and Schleswig-Holstein, which were such frequent bones of contention. Except for the inevitable Electoral Saxon candidates, this foreign world was rarely visited by a High German, and few in the empire knew how beautiful was this ill-reputed land, with its hundreds of little lakes, with its towering beeches and luxuriant fields, with its battlemented towns, Rostock, Wismar, Güstrow, and Neubrandenburg.

Thus almost undisturbed from without, the feudalist state could evolve in all its anarchic arbitrariness, and the

nobility could develop an unbridled power which was hardly inferior to that of the Polish szlachta. Some of the nobles, like the princely house, were of Wendish descent, and had from of old been inspired with that cynical contempt for human beings which everywhere characterises the Slav nobility. Among the common people, too, notwithstanding the strong admixture of Low Saxon blood, and notwithstanding the complete disappearance of the Wendish tongue, the old Slav servility never completely died out. After the union of the estates in the year 1523, a common diet was permanently secured for the Mecklenburg territories. At the time of the Northern War, Duke Charles Leopold, inspired by the example of Charles XII, attempted to subjugate the estates to his monarchical authority. He failed, however, although he did not hesitate to summon Russian troops to his aid. The imperial court, following its usual practice, supported the nobles in their existing freedoms, and after a prolonged period of disorder, the princely house was forced, in the Settlement of April 18, 1755, to recognise and enlarge the rights of the estates. At the very time when, in almost all other parts of Germany, the sovereign authority was attaining its maximum, in Mecklenburg that authority declined to its lowest level. In classical phraseology, this fundamental law gave utterance to that patrimonial view of the state which Haller at a later date elevated into a system. The state was regarded as no more than a medley of well-established separate rights; the common law was repudiated on principle; and even the common weal was recognised as but a secondary consideration. The territorial ordinances, declared sections 192 and 194, are subdivided into two classes: those which concern the ducal domains, and those which concern the country as a whole, the Ritterschaft and the Landschaft. Among ordinances of the latter kind are further to be distinguished those which concern the well-established rights of the Ritterschaft and the Landschaft, and "those laws of subsidiary importance which nevertheless aim at and are serviceable to the advantage and welfare of the country as a whole."

Such was the state of affairs when Duke Frederick Francis of Schwerin began his long reign in the year 1785. He was a prince altogether after the people's own heart, sturdy and outspoken, cheerful and full of fun, not over-

burdened with wisdom, but of sound intelligence and a declared enemy of cant. Who could blame him if he was addicted to women, wine, cards, and nearly all the pleasures of life, to a degree even greater than was customary in the country? His mother-wit and his kindly disposition, compensated for all. In Doberan, the first of German sea-side resorts, which had been founded by the duke, he might frequently be seen carousing for hours with the Rostock students, or at the gaming table with two or three master-craftsmen, until, with empty pockets, they thought it expedient to make their way home. Those "laws of subsidiary importance" tending to promote the general welfare were taken by him very seriously, and he attempted on several occasions, though in most cases fruitlessly, to support the peasants against the nobles. The humiliating position assigned to him by Mecklenburg constitutional law was repugnant to the duke's vigorous nature. He expressed his dislike of the nobles' regime in such plain terms that long after his death liberals continued to venerate his memory as that of the reforming prince of Mecklenburg. When he had secured sovereignty through the instrumentality of the Confederation of the Rhine, he declared to the estates his intention to grant a constitution to the entire country, but the diet, aware that the prince's mode of life had involved him in financial embarrassments, frustrated the reform by the timely approval of an increased land tax.

Thus it was that the Settlement of 1755, the oldest of the then existing German constitutional laws, was handed down quite unaltered into the new time, and was even recognised by the Bundestag, although its contents were not in perfect harmony with the prescriptions of the federal act. The grand duchy of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, which was enumerated by the federal laws among the sovereign federated states of Germany, was quite unknown to Mecklenburg constitutional law. This latter knew only of the existence of the duchy of Schwerin, comprising the Mecklenburg circle, and the duchy of Güstrow, consisting of the Wendish circle together with the grand duchy of Strelitz, which here passed by the name of the Stargard circle; each of the most serene princes, in accordance with feudalist tradition, bore the same title, being known as "grand duke of Mecklenburg, prince of the Wends, of Schwerin, and of Ratzeburg." But this union

of the estates by no means represented the entire territory of the two grand dukes of Mecklenburg. The town and the territory of Wismar, which the crown of Sweden had first restored by way of pledge in the year 1803, was not again taken into the union, and the princedom of Ratzeburg, as a new acquisition, was necessarily excluded. The town of Ratzeburg sent its representatives to the diet of the Danish duchy of Lauenburg, a diet which resembled that of Mecklenburg; but in front of the entrance to the ancient and magnificent cathedral of Lauenburg, two blue-yellow-and-red lamp-posts indicated that here began the unrestricted rule of the grand duke of Strelitz. This chance historical product was to remain inalterable for all time. Hard by the Prussian frontier was the manor of Wolde which since the remotest antiquity had neither paid taxes nor furnished soldiers, because Pomerania and Mecklenburg disputed with one another about the overlordship, and because Prussia found it absolutely impossible to induce her smaller neighbour to accept a reasonable compromise.

To legal experts it remained a doubtful point whether a state of Mecklenburg really existed; there was certainly no such thing as a formal Mecklenburg citizenship. The two grand dukes ruled in their own private domains, amounting to fully two-fifths of the entire territory, no less unrestrictedly than the lords of the manor ruled their respective villages, and the town councils the towns. Every one of these local authorities could accept foreigners into the community of the village or the town, and those thus accepted spoke of themselves as Mecklenburgers, although they were homeless everywhere else in the country. Nor was there any unity in respect of commercial matters. The harbours of Rostock and Wismar levied their own customs, and in the interior there were eighty-three distinct sovereign custom houses at which taxes had to be paid, in accordance with varying tariffs, the most recent of which was two hundred years old. Since, however, the lords of the manor, their tenant farmers, and numerous other privileged persons, were tax-free, and numbered among their established rights the use of the excellent duty-free Lübeck claret, this remarkable customs system did not bring in more than about 60,000 thalers per annum. Once a year the estates, in coaches drawn by magnificent teams of horses, drove to one of the two diet

towns, to Sternberg or to Malchin; the vassals of the nobles wearing red coats, which were absolutely prohibited to the burghers. The Ritterschaft had seven hundred integral votes; the Landschaft was represented by forty-five plenipotentiaries from the town councils. There was no question of rules of procedure; two or three orators would often speak at once. Every member could bring in visitors at will, and these, just as in the Polish diet, could wander freely about among the members. It was easy to distinguish them by their different bearing. The sumptuous banquet held every evening likewise recalled the glories of the Sarmatian nobles' regime.

The offices of Landrat and provincial marshal were reserved for the old nobility, for this aristocracy had a thorough understanding of the art of government. Many of the Mecklenburg nobles attained high office in the national service of Denmark, England-Hanover, and Würtemberg. In Austria, above all, the Mecklenburg nobility was almost invariably represented by influential statesmen, from Stralendorff down to Count Lützow. Thus they acquired knowledge of the world and secured powerful connections abroad. The Mecklenburg nobles, wiser than those of Electoral Saxony, did not insist upon proof of noble descent as a qualification for acceptance as a member of the noble's estate, for it was impossible to maintain this reservation in perpetuity. Satisfied with what was practically attainable, they secured that the class rights of the newly enrolled and bourgeois vassals should be notably restricted. Since the beginning of the eighteenth century, the old nobility had maintained the illegal claim that only the anciently established noble families, those which had been accepted as noble estates as early as 1572, had a right to assign to their female members places which fell vacant among the 340 pensionerships in the three wealthy convents of Mecklenburg; if any member of the new immigrant nobility wished for a share in this patronage, he must first secure acceptance into the old nobility by the payment of heavy fees. Soon after the Settlement of 1755, this estate within an estate became formally established. Notwithstanding the continual struggles of the *non recepti*, the old and the received nobles continued to divide the pensionerships among themselves, and dominated the estates so completely that the slowly increasing minority of bourgeois lords of the manor was quite unable to make any headway.

At the diets held during the twenties, Oertzen of Kittendorf was the most distinguished speaker, "a born and sworn patriot," as beseemed a genuine Old Mecklenburg Landrat; other men of note among the estates were Blücher of Sukow, provisor of the convent of Dobbertin, and Adolf Flotow, the elderly hotspur, who in the previous century had aroused the anger of Duke Frederick Francis by his zeal for the privileges of the old nobility. Whatever the assembly decided in accordance with the advice of its leaders was then elaborated in writing by Drewes, the syndic, an able jurist of Rostock, in an official style whose ceremonious incomprehensibility was hardly inferior to that of the involved periods employed by the estates of Electoral Saxony. Minister Plessen, a well-intentioned man, formerly envoy to the Bundestag, seldom found it advisable to resist the decisions of the diet. These were both excellent men, frank and outspoken after the Mecklenburg manner, extremely active in the work of feudalist administration, and thoroughly experienced in finding their way through the labyrinth of the ancient constitutional law; but neither could even have conceived the idea of any thoroughgoing reform. After the Settlement the estates retained "the customary right of property" in the serfs on their lands, also manorial jurisdiction and police powers, and also the right of appointment to the registrar's office and to the new supreme court of appeal at Parchim; through their narrower committee in Rostock they controlled the state treasury and the national debt, and sent commissaries to several of the princely administrative authorities; and they even had large exemptions from ordinary taxation. Thus the state seemed condemned to petrifaction; the most modest of reforms involved an invasion of the established rights of the estates, and was therefore impossible without the free assent of the privileged classes.

Grand Duke Frederick Francis had long recognised this, and had renounced many of the monarchical plans of his youth. He knew that his junkers regarded him as no more than *primus inter pares*. During the feudalist confusions of the eighteenth century, certain writers attached to the nobles' party had diligently propagated the story, manifestly untrue, that Duke Pribislav had not been a descendant of the old Obotrite princes, but a simple Wendish nobleman. Frederick Francis contented himself with caring for the

peasants of his own domain, where he was master. Rarely did he venture to address the diet with sovereign severity, as on one occasion when the estates were on the point of refusing to vote the expenses of his federal contingent.

Still weaker was monarchical ambition at the court of Strelitz. Here there ruled in succession the grand dukes Charles and George, respectively father and brother of Queen Louise. They were both well-meaning men, but so thoroughly accustomed to Mecklenburg tradition that they no longer perceived the ludicrousness of their shadow princeship. The prime minister of Mecklenburg-Strelitz was August von Oertzen, one of the most efficient of the Obotrite privy councillors of this generation, honest, active, and able, and yet utterly incompetent to see beyond the horizon of his class. How fiercely did he attack a bourgeois vassal who had ventured to recommend to Grand Duke George the complete fulfilment of article 13 of the federal act, by summoning a general representative assembly, and who had even gone so far as to suggest the abolition of the hereditary nobility. The grand-ducal answer ran as follows: "Your letter gives us occasion to set limits, not upon our venerable constitution, but upon what can be permitted to you as a vassal! We intimate to you our grave and just displeasure, indicate to you the need that you should preserve your proper station, forbid you most expressly to venture in future upon any similar piece of impertinence, warn you to amend your views and opinions, and above all to rid yourself of that arrogance which is the deadly enemy of all goodness." In so vigorous and fatherly a spirit did this little crown espouse the cause of the Settlement of 1755, which was hardly less inimical to the prestige of the sovereign than to the liberties of the peasant.

Feudal licence could be quelled in no other way than by the power of a strong throne, like the Prussian, and such a turn of affairs had become impossible now that the house of Mecklenburg, in former days often at enmity with Prussia, had since the marriage of Queen Louise entered into terms of intimate family friendship with the Hohenzollerns. In Berlin, as at all the other German courts, the opinion was firmly established that this German Abdera must be left to itself and to its own feudalist ways, since these were at any rate harmless to other states. The impulse to

innovation could not possibly be initiated by the Mecklenburg bourgeoisie. The sturdy populace, which seemed to strangers so comfortable and pleasure-loving, was by no means lacking in intelligence. A thoroughly healthy and serene disposition, rooted in a sound nature, was its dominant characteristic. How admirably had Johann Lauremberg, in his Low German comic poems, at once satirised and extolled the slow-moving energies of his fellow-countrymen:

> The old seems always best to me.
> Let my aim be all my days
> To follow in my father's ways.

He knew that in his beloved Low German version of Reynard the Fox (Reineke Vos), there was a peculiar wealth of virile humour unknown to the High Germans. Liscow, too, ripened in the air of Rostock to become a brilliant satirist, and remained a trusty Mecklenburger even when translated to Upper Saxony. Among the poietic intelligences of the great epoch of our literature, but one, Johann Heinrich Voss, was of Mecklenburg origin; but among the leading bourgeois families of Rostock and Wismar a keen delight was taken in the works of the new poesy, and even some of the nobles, like Herder's friend Count Hahn, revered classical ideals. The patriotic enthusiasm of the wars of liberation exercised a yet more powerful influence upon the home of Blucher and Queen Louise, and to the Mecklenburgers the *Franzosentid* (French epoch) was the abomination of desolation. The country gladly made severe sacrifices, and furnished numerous volunteers, especially to Lützow's yagers; and even a girl of the burgher class went to the war and earned the iron cross. After the peace, the kindly and warm-hearted patriots of the Warnow were in good repute at all the German universities; two of the three founders of the Burschenschaft and Haupt its chronicler were Mecklenburgers. But when these amiable young fellows returned to their comfortable homes, the evil geniuses of the country, the card-table, red wine, and champagne, began to exercise their soporific influence, and the grown man rarely fulfilled the promise of youth; without absolutely repudiating the ideals of his student days, he entered with a sigh into relationships such as are far easier to form than to break.

What could this easy-going patience effect against the bold encroachments of the arrogant junkers? Rostock, the town of the griffin passant, which had its own mint, and still exercised the prerogative of mercy, usually worked in the diet, hand in hand with the nobility, securing in this way the maintenance of its own privileges. The influential and extremely efficient profession of advocates could also turn to its account the tangle of privileges that existed in the disputatious little country. As had once been the case in Poland, so here, the proverb was applicable that a nobleman without a lawsuit was like a dog without a tail. The most trifling piece of business could hardly be concluded without the assistance of the law, and how many legal fees were obtainable when the advocate simultaneously superintended the patrimonial jurisdiction of his noble clients. In the year 1850 there were 296 advocates in Mecklenburg-Schwerin; thus every 1,700 inhabitants, including infants-in-arms, had to provide a living for a lawyer—a figure which could be rivalled nowhere else than in the kingdom of Saxony.

Nor could the bourgeoisie cope with the economic forces of the great landed proprietors. In the country towns the handicraftsmen, protected by guild privileges and other prescriptive rights, worked in leisurely fashion after the manner of their fathers. The Fürstenhof, Schwarzes Kloster, and other magnificent buildings of Old Wismar, lay neglected in deserted streets; and although Rostock possessed the largest mercantile fleet on the Baltic, its German trade was extremely small, for the customs dues and the proverbial badness of the roads rendered intercourse with the interior difficult. A Mecklenburg road was never worse than when the dwellers in the vicinity had just "mended" it by command of the feudal authorities. The first metalled road, part of the great highway between Hamburg and Berlin, was constructed in the year 1826, and by an English company. Thus practically cut off from the hinterland, the Rostock shippers considered themselves to be cosmopolitan Hanseats, and sent many of their ships, under the command of weatherproof captains from Fischland, to cruise for years between the ports of the East Indies or of China. The seamanship of the coast dwellers served to enrich a few great firms, but brought no advantage to the national trade.

The bourgeoisie could not boast even of superior culture.

The lords of the manor of bourgeois origin vied with the nobles in crass arrogance; those of longer standing, who were glad as "fattened sheep" to take their ease in Rostock, remained inaccessible to new impressions, and only a few of the younger ones, who were as yet of no account, were inspired by liberal ideas. The university of Rostock had never played more than a modest role among the German universities, and in the Lutheran territorial church the dominant arid rationalism was roughly combated by an equally unspiritual orthodoxy, which was patronised by the leaders of the nobility. Both parties agreed in this at least, that the Lutheran unity of faith, as rigidly controlled here as in Scandinavia, must remain untroubled. In violation of the federal laws, the Catholics were permitted public service in two communes alone, and the Evangelical union was strictly forbidden in the very first year of its origin If a member of the Reformed church desired to participate in the Lutheran communion service, he had first of all to abjure his Calvinistic heresy. As for the Jews, during the optimistic epoch of the War of Liberation, the good Frederick Francis had granted them equal rights, but four years later these were revoked at the instigation of the diet.

Still less than the undeveloped bourgeoisie, could the estate of peasants by its own force restrain the excessive power of the Ritterschaft. The long and cruel war of annihilation waged by the Mecklenburg landowners against the peasantry is certainly the darkest page in the history of the German nobility. Unhindered by the weakly sovereign power, since 1621 the nobles had arbitrarily arrogated the right of seizing the lands of their peasants unless these could produce title deeds. After the Thirty Years' War, there still existed in Mecklenburg as many as 12,000 free peasants, but there now ensued a great technical advance in agriculture, the introduction by Lühe of the Holstein system of rotation of crops, by which the estate of peasants was utterly ruined. Towards the year 1730, the great landowners began to vie with one another in dispossessing their peasants, until ultimately there were barely half a dozen villages of free peasants left throughout the country; the fine herds of cattle which now browsed upon the carefully tended pastures of the nobles were the ravenous beasts which had eaten up the peasants, like the sheep in England in the

days of Thomas More. The Settlement confirmed the Ritterschaft in the rights thus seized, demanding only that entire village areas should not be taken over without the permission of the duke and the committee of the estates—a prohibition which the great landowners easily evaded by annexing the peasant farms one by one. There thus ensued in the unhappy land an economic catastrophe such as might well have occurred in Brandenburg also had it not been for the strong controlling hand of its monarchs. At the opening of the new century, about forty-five per cent of all the land of Mecklenburg was in the possession of the Ritterschaft, but upon these areas there was sustained barely a third of the population, whose density here was only 1,300 to the square mile [German]. Nevertheless the common people continually endeavoured to escape from the forcibly desolated yet rich agricultural region, and severe laws were repeatedly passed forbidding the serfs, "whose bodies do not belong to themselves," to emigrate. The corvéable peasant had frequently to work six days in the week for his gracious lord, who, like the farmer on the royal domains, exercised the right of the corvée with the aid of cane and whip, while when the peasants were poor cultivators they were remorselessly evicted from their farms.

It was this misery of the peasantry which Stein had in mind when he compared the castle of the Mecklenburg noble with the lair of the beast of prey, and it was of this that Schlözer was thinking when he termed these lords of the manor "privileged traitors." It was amid such impressions that Voss acquired his passionate hatred of a hereditary nobility, "this stinking robe of honour taken out of the chest of their ancestors." So fertile, however, was the country that the situation of the peasants was not everywhere intolerable. On the Hahn estate the serfs were really better off than the free peasants elsewhere; and the Maltzans and certain other families noted for ancestral pride always cared paternally for their people. The severities of the corvée were gradually alleviated to some extent by the gentler customs of the new time. The majority of the common people, however, lived under extremely rude conditions, much maltreated, and receiving an almost worthless education in the most miserable schools.

During the decade of the Revolution, to the terror of the

nobles, the discontent of the poor found expression in several tumults; and when the War of Liberation had summoned the entire population to the colours, it was at length felt to be essential to make certain concessions. At the diet of 1815 the towns espoused the cause of "the high-minded serfs," who had fought so valiantly for Germany; and on January 18, 1820, the abolition of serfdom was decreed—the first social reform that had been effected in this country from time immemorial. But the egoism of the Ritterschaft had been careful to secure that the peasant should have no true enjoyment of his freedom. He was no longer tied to the soil, but was not granted any right to its ownership. Should he venture to give notice to his master, he became homeless, and learned in his own person the significance of the current cry of distress, "we are landless men." Hunted from one landed estate to another, he had in the end to seek refuge in the great poorhouse at Güstrow. At the end of a year, this old castle of the Obotrites proved too small to contain the masses of the new class of the homeless, and the diet decided that henceforward the landowners were to shelter the freed serfs. What boon was such a shelter, prepared by reluctant hands? From these estates, as Frederick Francis had long been aware, no serious alleviation of the condition of the peasantry was to be expected. The grand duke therefore determined that he himself would at least set a good example; and upon his own domains, from the year 1822 onwards, he carried out a comprehensive settlement. He wished to provide for the majority of his peasants a secure hereditary tenure of their farms, but through the red tape of the authorities and the extraordinary complications of the legal position, the well intentioned reform progressed with extreme slowness.

Among all the ultra-aristocratic states on the shores of the Baltic, Mecklenburg alone had preserved its nobles' regime entirely unchanged, clinging to it more tenaciously than even the Baltic provinces of Russia. The first step requisite in Mecklenburg was to establish the legal foundations for a modern type of society. The preconditions for popular representation were as yet entirely lacking; and as regards Prussia's German commercial policy, to the carrying out of which the existence of a well-ordered officialdom was essential, Mecklenburg could not as yet come into the reckoning.

The nobles were not alone responsible for the strange inertia of the North German petty states. Oldenburg, the land of the "Stedinger" heretics, where the pugnacious peasantry had almost destroyed the nobility many centuries earlier, and were settled upon free farms enclosed with oaken palisades, was characterised by similar stagnation. It was, indeed, far from easy to govern this most unnatural of all the state structures of Germany. In addition to the rigidly Protestant peasant lands beside the Hunte and the Jade, which had for hundreds of years been under Danish rule, the new grand duchy comprised also a part of Catholic Münster, and in addition the princedoms of Lübeck on the Baltic and Birkenfeld on the Nahe. To the well-intentioned dynasty it seemed that a rigidly bureaucratic regime was the only means by which these Frisians, Westphalians, Holsteiners, and Rhinelanders could be held together under a single ruler. The grand-ducal official was all powerful; the newly acquired territory of Jever lost its ancient communal liberties which even the Russian overlords had left undisturbed, and the promised constitution was not granted. In the wider field of German politics, Oldenburg was noted merely for its petty commercial quarrels with the Hansa town of Bremen.

All the miseries of German federalism were revealed in the contradictory and intolerable conditions that prevailed in the three Hansa towns. When the great Hanseatic league fell, the three towns had mutually pledged one another to maintain the old name and the old union; during the War of Liberation they had by vigorous and combined diplomatic action secured their reinstatement; and even after the peace they maintained neighbourly relationships with one another. The former order of precedence persisted, Lübeck ranking first, Bremen coming next, and last of all Hamburg; they faithfully guarded the last foreign possessions which still existed as remnants of the old Hanseatic glories, the Steelyard in London and the House of the Easterlings in Antwerp; they endeavoured in many cases to further their interests by joint consulates and joint commercial treaties; and they established in Lübeck a supreme court of appeal, which worked efficiently though somewhat slowly. It was a disaster whose influence continued through the centuries that long before, as Dahlmann complained, Hamburg and Lübeck, the two eyes of Schleswig-Holstein, had closed themselves, had cut themselves off from

their homeland across the Elbe, and that Bremen too, tormented by the arbitrary rule of its archbishops, had ruptured the political union with the hinterland. But as long as Schleswig-Holstein continued in Danish and Hanover in English hands, a reunion could be of no advantage.

Consequently in the autumn of 1813 even Stein vigorously advocated the independence of the Hansa towns. He started from the twofold assumption that henceforward a centralised German authority with effective rights of overlordship would exist, and that there would be a national customs boundary along a general German frontier. Neither of these expectations was fulfilled. As late as in the eighteenth century, imperial jurisdiction had constituted the keystone of the constitution of the Hansa towns, and imperial committees had frequently intervened to settle disturbances in the imperial cities. But by the federal act the Hansa towns acquired the complete independence of sovereign states, and acquired therewith numerous claims and duties whose fulfilment was impossible; for although Hamburg was in respect of population equal to a Thuringian duchy, in respect of its expenditure equal to the grand duchy of Oldenburg, and in respect of its economic energies actually superior to the kingdom of Würtemberg, the ultimate basis of all independent political existence, ability to defend itself by force of arms, was inconceivable in the case of a modern city state. Instead of the general German customs system which Stein had hoped for, the miseries of the territorial customs systems were revived, and the towns were compelled to return to their former independent commercial policy which since the days of the peace of Westphalia (who can deny it?) had ever thriven best in the atmosphere of neutrality.

Thus it came to pass that these proud communes, which as free members of a powerful state might well have been among Germany's chief ornaments, led henceforward a morbid and mongrel life. They were half town, half state; half German, half cosmopolitan; and although there was within their walls no lack of patriots who complained of the economic disintegration of the fatherland, habit could not fail to exercise its irresistible power. The free townsmen gave themselves up to a life of commercio-political particularism, and arrogantly denied to their inland fellow-countrymen (who unquestionably were apt to pass very unfair judgments upon

the complicated interests of the Hansa towns) all right to interfere in the affairs of the coastal region. The detachment from the fatherland, which could only be excused as a temporary measure of defence against internal tolls, was given the high-sounding name of freedom of trade. After the German manner, the free townsman made of necessity, not merely a virtue, but a theory. Whilst London, New York, Marseilles, and all the great seaports of the world throve under the protection of national customs lines, it was unhesitatingly declared that nature had constructed the mouths of the Elbe, the Weser, and the Trave in so peculiar a fashion that for them a customs system was impossible. Numerous and ardent asseverations were indeed forthcoming to the effect that the Hansa towns would gladly subordinate themselves to a general German commercial policy. But the great majority of merchants in the free cities were averse to any change, for they felt at ease in these convenient internationalised open ports, where they were enabled, untroubled by considerations about the hinterland, to grasp without a qualm at the most immediate commercial advantage.

The prolonged peace preserved the towns from the temptation of enriching themselves, as they had done during the eighteenth century, by a sedulously maintained neutrality; but the days were never to return in which the Hanseats had protected their commerce by armed merchantmen (Friedenskoggen). Being now defenceless, and unable to offer to foreigners any valuable advantages by way of counterpoise, they were compelled to compete for the favour of foreign powers in adroit but sometimes unworthy diplomatic negotiations, and had to swallow the affront when a president of the United States said to them: "The Hansa towns are mere chickens, and if the horse of the United States does not tread upon them, it is only from compassion." In such a situation, the life of the three city states was full of glaring contrasts. Grandeur and pettiness, progress and routine, freedom of trade and guild coercion, civic pride and official caprice, German sentiment and a pro-foreign spirit, were encountered in close juxtaposition. Side by side with royal merchants and stalwart republican statesmen who did not need to fear comparison with Gerhard von Attendorn, Johann von der Wyck, and the other great names of Hanseatic history, there flourished also the obscure representatives of

philistine particularism, strongly compounded of cosmopolitanism and parochialism.

German sentiment was most lively in the progressive town of Bremen, which during these first years of peace advanced more rapidly and vigorously than the wealthier city on the Elbe. During the middle ages, Bremen had been entirely immersed in commercial relationships with the north and with the Netherlands, and had been first carried by means of the Reformation into the current of national life, but had then heroically espoused the common cause of Protestantism. By the favour of emperor and empire, it acquired the rights and privileges belonging to an estate of the empire, in the face of the perpetual opposition of Sweden and Electoral Hanover, the lawful successors of the old archbishops. It was not until the principal resolution of the diet of deputation that the city secured full sovereign powers within its own walls. The electoral Hanoverian captain-general was withdrawn, and the Lutheran cathedral with its precincts, which had long existed in the Reformed city under Swedish and Hanoverian suzerainty, was annexed to the territory of Bremen. These disputes with unfriendly neighbours strengthened the burghers in that loyalty to the German realm for which they had centuries before been extolled by Frederick Barbarossa.

The disappearance of the detested foreign dominion was greeted with exultation, and the reestablishment of the well-tried ancient constitution, the "Eintracht" (agreement) of 1433 was regarded by all as a matter of course. The town council, a supreme authority which filled the vacancies occurring in its own body, resumed control, swearing in its members in the terms of the old Low German oath, "I will be a true councillor," and from time to time, at its own discretion, summoned as many qualified burghers as it pleased to participate in important deliberations. When a tax was levied, every citizen assessed his own contribution, and the magnificent simplicity of this Old Hanseatic system of self-taxation proved as gloriously successful now as it had done three centuries earlier when Machiavelli contemplated it with astonishment and admiration. Since near relatives were not permitted to sit simultaneously upon the council, and since mercantile wealth seldom endures for many generations, notwithstanding the aristocratic character of the constitution

no circumscribed patriciate came into existence. Certain rich families, such as the Meiers, the Wachmanns, and the Bentheims, enjoyed great prestige, but access to the council was by no means impossible to talented men of limited financial resources.

Such a man was the able statesman who for an entire generation exercised dictatorial power in the little republic, at once controlling foreign affairs as federal envoy and internal policy as senator and burgomaster. Johann Smidt had originally been a divinity student; in Jena he had sat at the feet of Fichte, had formed a friendship with Herbart, and had adopted the views of our classical literature; but after the young preacher entered the senate, he devoted all his energy to political life, and by the superiority of his practical mind, by his force of will, and by his skill in affairs, he speedily acquired an unchallenged supremacy, which was admitted all the more willingly inasmuch as, a convinced republican, he never failed to exercise prompt control over his autocratic tendencies and his sensitiveness to journalistic criticism. Cautious, reticent, calculating, but thoroughly honest, the inconspicuous little man with the serious countenance of a schoolmaster understood just as well how to handle his fellow citizens as how to manage the Frankfort diplomats. Wholly devoted to Bremen, he had, even in his student days, entered the arena against the dioscuri of Weimar, publishing *Anti-Xenien* because Schiller had ventured to put in the mouth of the Weser the derogatory utterance, "Unfortunately there is nothing at all to say about me!" Throughout life he never forgot the counsel once given him by a former burgomaster of Basle: "We always gave ourselves out to be a little bigger than we were, and found the pretence profitable." He was inclined to overestimate the political importance of the Hansa towns, and never recognised how untenable and dangerous was the unrestricted sovereignty of these communes; but he saw clearly enough that the chief aim of his petty state in its German-policy must always be to avoid getting under the wheels, and he was therefore careful when in Frankfort not to make any unnecessary parade of his moderate liberal views; moreover, though he approved the trias plans of his friend Wangenheim, he gave them no more than cautious support. On one occasion only, at the time of the Carlsbad decrees, did

Bremen incur the displeasure of the Hofburg; but when urged by the great powers, the senate hastened to administer a guarded reproof to the celebrated preacher Dräseke, who had delivered a patriotic sermon, while the censorship over the *Bremer Zeitung* was exercised with such strictness, that all anxiety in Vienna was speedily relieved. Notwithstanding many instances of friction, Metternich never completely broke with the liberal burgomaster of Bremen, for the chancellor knew that Smidt considered the house of Austria to be the mainstay of the Germanic Federation, and that he regarded Prussia as a most dangerous enemy to his beloved petty states.

Upon Smidt's advice the senate, soon after its reinstatement, resolved to undertake certain cautious reforms. Henceforward the burghers were to participate in the choice of town councillors; and the dispute between the Lutherans and the members of the Reformed church, which had so often disturbed the peace of the city, was brought to a fortunate conclusion by placing the two Protestant confessions upon an equal footing. The disabilities of the Jews, however, were still rigidly maintained; and the guild system, which was here utterly decayed, likewise continued unaltered. The burghers, however, were content; they delighted in the reawakening of a serious religious life; in their splendid and purely voluntary system of poor relief; and, above all, in the entire liberation of commerce, which could here call in even landed proprietorship to its aid. Every burgher owned his own house, and by raising money on mortgage or disposing of his title-deeds could devote the whole of his capital to commercial speculations.

The days of Bremen's warlike renown lay four centuries back in the past, but the epoch of its greatest commercial success was now approaching, at a time when the city discharged its military duties to the Federation by the provision of a single battalion of recruited soldiers. Immediately after the liberation of North America, the Bremen merchants, more enterprising than those of Hamburg, had opened up a brisk business with the ports of the young union; and although the town was not represented by a consul in North America until the year 1817, everyone felt that the future of Bremen depended chiefly upon the success of its American commerce. In the tobacco trade, the city was

already in advance of many other European ports, for the cheerful taste of the Germans for smoking was continually on the increase. Overland trade was still but lightly esteemed as an affair of secondary importance, and thrived but little, for internal tolls everywhere exercised a restrictive influence. The river steamboat traffic initiated by the enterprising F. Schröder was soon discontinued, for Hanover did not consider it worth while to rebuild the Hoya bridge which barred the passage to steamers. A more serious consideration was that the great ships now required for transatlantic commerce were unable to gain access to the town on the Weser, which was situate too far up the river. As Sweden and Hanover had done in former days, so now Oldenburg carried on a neighbourly feud against the Hansa town. The grand duke considered that he was personally affronted by the abolition of the Elsfleth dues, to which Smidt had with much labour forced him to agree at the Bundestag,[1] and he endeavoured to divert the maritime commerce of the Weser to the Oldenburg town of Brake, so that Bremen might no longer count among the seaports. How many battles had Bremen fought in former days to secure the freedom of "the royal road to the salt sea"; the town would be lost unless it could establish a port for itself upon the fully navigable waters of the Lower Weser, somewhere near the place where Sweden had constructed the fortress of Carlsburg, the old stronghold of Weser traffic.

Smidt was the first to conceive this happy thought. With masterly diplomatic art, he was able to stimulate the jealousy of Hanover against Oldenburg, and (since the bad neighbour was for the nonce on tolerably good terms with Bremen) to play off the former state against the latter. He represented to Count Münster and Cabinet Councillor Rose that it was essential to establish the Weser trade upon the right, the Hanoverian, bank of the river; and was actually able to induce Hanover, in January, 1827, to cede to Bremen several hundred acres of land on the foreshore of Lehe. The burghers of Bremen were inclined to grumble at the arrangement, asking what on earth was to be done with this quagmire. Smidt, however, did not allow himself to be diverted from his design, for he remembered the legend concerning the foundation of Carthage, and within three years

[1] See vol. III, p. 347.

the new port of Bremerhaven was opened—to the astonishment of the Hanoverians, who can hardly have grasped the full meaning of the agreement. Several years had still to elapse before the suspicious shippers of Bremen could become accustomed to discharge their cargoes in the new harbour, and the exchange of letters between Bremen and Bremerhaven had to be effected by foot-messengers, for Hanover would not tolerate the establishment of a Bremen post office in Bremerhaven. Thus it was that Germany's second seaport was able to maintain its position in the most unfavourable conditions conceivable. Smidt was by this time seriously contemplating the inauguration of railway communication between Bremen and Hanover, for the newspapers were advocating the plan of building a line between Lübeck and Brunswick, and this threatened to increase the trading area of Hamburg at the expense of that of Bremen. When we contemplate these indications of a bold and far-seeing commercial policy, it seems strange to have to record that long after the Prussian thaler had made good its footing throughout North Germany, the town of Bremen continued to cling to its obsolete coinage system, its louis-d'or thalers, groten, and schwaren.

In Hamburg the population was far more variously mingled than in the purely German town of Bremen. The numerous immigrants from England, France, and the Netherlands, and the Portuguese and Polish Jews, soon became inspired with the incredible self-satisfaction of the Hamburgers, but they rarely acquired a German national sentiment. Moreover, the commerce of Hamburg was more international in character than that of Bremen. Since the decline of Antwerp, Hamburg had gradually become the principal entrepôt for the nations of northern Europe. In the free port, great factories elaborated the raw materials brought here from abroad, and injured German industry by fierce competition. Hamburg owed even more to its neutrality than the other Hansa towns. Everyone looked back with longing to the golden days of the revolutionary wars, when the yield of the customs had been quadrupled, and when the number of ships entering the harbour had increased during eight years from 1,504 to 1,960. Moreover, Hamburg was a city of pleasure, in sharp contrast with the sober-minded Bremen. The charms of the taverns, the

show booths, and the dancing saloons, of the Hamburger Berg lured those in search of enjoyment from the most distant parts of Low Germany; the citizens of Hamburg, proud of the liberties of their imperial city, were filled also with an agreeable sensation of satisfied bodily appetite. A song which obtained wide currency during the happy days of neutrality, boasted:

> Free is our lot. Mark well, in Hamburg town
> There clink no chains of misery or slavery.
> Sweetly we sleep on beds of softest down.
> Unknown to us the fear of tyranny.
> Free is our lot!

But by the afflictions of the foreign dominion, this self-satisfied bourgeoisie was drastically recalled to a sense of community with the great fatherland. At the liberation in the spring of 1813, there was a mighty stirring of the German blood; the valiant Metterkamp and the Hanseatic legion fought lustily in ancient Hansa style; but the nerveless mercantile regime was not competent to meet the demands of this warlike epoch. During ten precious weeks the reestablished senate did little to provide for the defence of the place; the liberated city passed once more under the French yoke; and Niebuhr (himself a Holsteiner) declared with justice that the Hamburg rising was not to be compared with the profound earnestness of the Prussian efforts. In a spirited essay published in the *Preussische Korrespondent*, he pitilessly held up a mirror to enable these boastful denationalised burghers to contemplate their own faces: "Too long," he wrote, "have Hamburg and her sister towns devoted themselves to a life concerned only with money making; too long have they ignored all the problems of political life. These burgherships have been content with the gratification of carnal desires, and have regarded themselves as privileged to bend before the blast. Manliness can be found only among the citizens of a state filled with free and vigorous life, a state which can maintain itself in existence by means of its own unaided energies." He ventured to express to the particularists the truth which they were so reluctant to hear, that Bristol and Liverpool would as detached city states have attained to a far lower position than that which they now occupied as free municipalities within a great kingdom;

and he did not attempt to conceal his opinion that in no other way than under Prussian dominance could Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein secure the full development of their natural energies.

The historian's bold ideas were far in advance of the age. The free city was reestablished with all its ancient domains, and every Hamburger was delighted, although the evils of the multiplicity of German states were here especially obvious. Almost more bewildering than in the Frankfort region was the confusion of national boundaries in the corner between the Elbe and the Trave. Altona, Blankenese, and Wandsbeck, the suburbs of the great seaport, were Danish. Jointly with Lübeck, whose possessions were dispersed in nine or ten separate fragments, Hamburg owned the fertile Vierlande; and administrative conditions in this Bergedorf bailiwick, where duplex jurisdiction prevailed, strongly recalled those obtaining in Communion Harz. Whilst Denmark imposed tolls which interfered with neighbourly intercourse, the Hamburg senate reintroduced the preposterous practice of closing the gates at night, and this was endured with incredible patience for half a century. With a tolerance no less astounding, the merchants of the leading commercial city of the continent were content that their letters should have to be committed to seven different post offices, the town post, those of Prussia, Denmark, Mecklenburg, Hanover, Thurn and Taxis, and Sweden. In the year 1819, the Hansa towns proposed in Frankfort a reform of the German postal system, whereupon the Bundestag, following its usual practice, determined that the envoys should ask for instructions, which were never received. Thenceforward no one stirred a finger: six foreign post offices could be endured, but it would have been derogatory to the honour of Hamburg to hand over the postal system to Prussia. The genuine Hamburger was inclined to regard it as a sign of the power and glory of his native town that Hamburg should embellish the confusions of the German currency by a duplex coinage system: minor transactions were reckoned in Hamburg, as in Holstein, in Lübeck marks; but the great business houses kept their accounts in the terms of an ideal standard, the banco mark.

Despite all these hindrances, the privileged situation of the town at the outlet of the greatest purely German river-basin, and the old established commercial efficiency of its

population, produced their inevitable effect. With astounding rapidity did the wounds heal which had been produced by the pitiless hand of Davoust. Trade was on the increase, and the great majority of the contented burghers had no inclination to consider the proposals for reform which Perthes and other far-seeing men had brought forward in the year of liberation. In essentials the restored constitution of 1528 remained unaltered. The highly noble and highly wise senate, half of whose members were lawyers and half merchants, resumed its sway upon terms of cordial understanding with the two colleges of the elders and of the hundred and eighty which always held the decisive voice in the rare assemblies of those who possessed the hereditary burghership. As had so often been the case in Hanseatic history, the council showed more insight than the burghers in general. Considering a few minor reforms indispensable, it was at least able to secure parity of Christian confessions; but it was unable to induce the burghers to accept the emancipation of the Jews. The governance of their worships was by no means light-handed. The incalculable patriarchal caprices of the lords of the Hamburg police, their tolerance of public indecency, and the roughness of their venial subordinates, secured for them an evil reputation throughout the neighbourhood. Nowhere else in Germany was there any autocrat with the unlimited power possessed by the senator who resided as proconsul in the fine old castle of Ritzebüttel, whose duty it was to guard the entrance to the Elbe with a battery of useless guns.

Hamburg, like Bremen, had been first brought to share in the spiritual work of the nation by the Reformation, through the powerful instrumentality of Johann Bugenhagen, and had subsequently in the work of Hagedorn and of Brockes, and later in that of Klopstock, Reimarus, and Lessing, taken a distinguished part in Germany's literary creations. But these days of spiritual brilliancy did not return. The liberated town gave itself up entirely to business and to pleasure. Nothing could be found at Hamburg to compare with the magnificent collections with which Senckenberg and Städel had enriched Frankfort. The Johanneum continued to flourish, but the elementary school system was neglected, and universal compulsory education was still unknown. The republic did, indeed, care for commerce with considerable

insight. There sat in the senate, in addition to the venerable burgomaster Bartels, numerous other distinguished men of business, such as Abendroth, Hudtwalker, and Sieveking. The old communal sense of the burghers was still manifested in many useful institutions, and with increasing wealth the ancient particularist self-satisfaction returned.

Patriotic enthusiasm was most vociferously displayed in connection with the parades of the "citizen army," which consisted of seven battalions of the line, yagers, cavalry, and artillery, and looked down with boundless contempt upon "the Hanseats," the poor devils of the standing army. What a festive occasion, when in the morning the buglers sounded their *Comrades Come* in the streets, and afterwards the officiating burgomaster (known among the populace as "the great man"), wearing three-cornered hat and dress-sword, held a grand review of the citizen army outside the gates of the town. After a mighty carouse, the battalions reeled home, for most of the warriors were by this time thoroughly drunk, and many of them came arm-in-arm with a vivandière; the return march was accompanied by the street arabs, who, to the air of *Bring your Pigs along to the Pigmarket,* sang the proud national song, *The Hamburgers have won the Victory, Ho Ho, Ho Ho!* It was no insignificant matter that in the third city of the Germanic Federation the noble craft of arms should be treated in a manner so ungerman and so closely resembling that adopted by the purse-proud bourgeoisie of Paris—for the poor, the serious work and the burden of national defence, and for the well-to-do, the agreeable relaxation of the national guard!

At these citizen festivals there was never any talk of Germany. Yet no one could fail to see how intimately the wealth of the great commercial city depended upon the prosperity of the hinterland. The condition of Hamburg commerce, apparently so flourishing, was far from being the manifestation of sound economic conditions. In the trans-atlantic trade, the town on the Elbe lagged far behind Bremen. As late as the year 1840, no more than thirty-eight vessels cleared from Hamburg for the United States, twenty-two of which were American bottoms, while eleven sailed under the Hamburg flag; the ships entering Hamburg from America during the same year were no more than seventy in number. Far more vigorous was traffic with France, but in this case

also exports were moderate when compared with imports; the principal import from France was Bordeaux wine, which in the middle of the eighteenth century had been introduced into Germany by Hamburg merchants, and had gradually replaced Spanish and Rhenish wines in the German north. But by far the greatest amount of shipping entering Hamburg came from England. In the year 1840, sixteen hundred and ten vessels called at Hamburg from English ports, eight hundred and twenty-six being English bottoms, and one hundred and fifty-one belonging to Hamburg. The clearances to England were eleven hundred and ninety only, a notably low figure, for at least nine-tenths of German exports to Great Britain went by way of Hamburg and Altona. The reproach often heard in South Germany that the Hanseats were merely English agents was at that time by no means unjustified as regards Hamburg. Many Hamburg merchants did not trouble to conceal that they had no desire for the strengthening of German industry, since they feared that this would mean the sacrifice of the customary English import trade. The future was to show how short-sighted were such calculations. It was by the advantages derived from the customs union, by the increasing export of German manufactured articles, that Hamburg was first enabled to enlarge her transatlantic commerce.

The venerable Lübeck seemed stiff and dead in comparison with her two more fortunate sister cities. The queen of the Baltic had lost fully two-thirds of her population and nearly five-sixths of her trade. The twin towers of the cathedral and of the Marienkirche were conspicuous as of yore for a great distance across the Bight of Wagrien (Bay of Lübeck). But the ancient landmarks were no longer jubilantly greeted by war-fleets returning from victory. The nations of the north which Lübeck had once dominated with arms and money, had long since attained their majority; and since the expansion of ocean commerce the Baltic had shrunk to the dimensions of a modest inland sea. The hundred cities of the German realm which had once had their supreme court of jurisdiction upon the Trave, had entered new paths in their juristic life. In Lübeck, also, the antique aristocratic constitution of 1669 was reintroduced; and in Lübeck, also, the council vainly endeavoured to induce the burghers to accept a few modest reforms. The city possessed

two excellent statesmen in Georg Curtius, the syndic, and Hach, the senator. But although in certain fundamental respects the old Hansa prosperity still persisted, and although the almshouse of the Holy Ghost and other admirable foundations of earlier days were fully able to prevent the distresses of poverty, the town, artificially cut off from its hinterland, could never really thrive. The bad neighbourship of the Danes became intolerable, for these, as if quite unable to forget the battle of Bornhöved, did not cease the endeavour to check the advance of Lübeck by harassments of every kind. It was not until after years of negotiation that the Danish crown permitted the construction across Holstein of the indispensable road to Hamburg, and even then an extensive detour was insisted upon.

§ 5. FIRST INTIMATIONS OF THE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN QUESTION.

The hand of this bad neighbour pressed far more heavily upon the transelbian northern march. A day pregnant with destiny, decisive for four centuries to come, was March 3, 1460, when, at Ribe, the Landrats of Schleswig-Holstein, in council assembled, elected Christian I, King of Denmark, to be Duke of Schleswig and Count of Holstein. "Thus did the Holsteiners become Danes," complained the Lübeck chronicler. Doubtless many of the councillors may have been influenced by Danish gold, and many by the hope that the distant sovereign, Carsten aver'n Belte (Christian across the Belt), would do little to disturb the liberties of the Schleswig-Holstein nobles; but the decisive influence was exercised by the consideration that the old association between the Danish fief of Schleswig and the German imperial fief of Holstein, maintained by means of so many bloody fights against the united crowns of the north, could be preserved in no other way than by this election. Christian was expressly chosen, "not as a king of Denmark" but as a lord of these lands; and in the Magna Charta and its Valorous Emendation he had to give a solemn guarantee to maintain the constitutional law of the united territories. Christian, and after him the long series of his successors, had to swear that Schleswig and Holstein should remain for ever united, that only Holsteiners of German descent should

receive public appointments, that taxes should not be levied without the assent of the estates, and that military service should be exacted solely within the limits of Schleswig-Holstein. Great was the price that had to be paid for these charters of freedom. The Old Holsatian domain of Hamburg now became separated, as Lübeck had previously been separated, from its primitive homeland. In place of the renowned race of the Schauenburg counts, there ruled foreign princes, who came with pockets empty and returned with them full. By its union with the Danish land of Schleswig, the German imperial territory of Holstein became involved in an untenable legal situation, which was tolerated only for the reason that henceforward the tie with the empire was of so little significance. By their Danish sovereign, both lands were estranged from German political life and entangled in the affairs of Scandinavia.

Nevertheless, the one thing was secured whereon was to rest the whole future of German law and German sentiment, namely, the inseparability of the duchies. It is true that Schleswig-Holstein did not escape the common German destiny of repeated territorial partitions. But Schleswig was never detached from Holstein; the Gottorp dukes, who so long divided with their royal cousins the sovereignty of the northern march, were always the simultaneous owners of parts of Holstein and parts of Schleswig; and the presence in the country of these German princes afforded a guarantee against Danish encroachments. For centuries the two duchies held a common diet, whose proceedings were conducted in the German tongue; and under the protection of this German constitutional law the superior German civilisation made its way uninterruptedly towards the north. German was the language of culture, and was dominant in all the towns as far north as Hadersleben; Hamburg, "the town" as it was termed, constituted the centre of trade and intercourse for the whole region. Doubtless Schleswig, during the course of its primitive history had acquired numerous Old Norse institutions, such as the Jutish *Lov* (law), and the subdivision of the country into *Harden*: but all the newer juristic culture of Schleswig was German; and Holstein was quite uninfluenced by the Danish legal system, except for the adoption of a few Danish words into official terminology. Even the peasants of northern Schleswig, who spoke a Danish

patois, continued on terms of perfect harmony with their German neighbours. The country from the river Konge to the Elbe constituted an integral whole; no one thought of it as anything else; and after the house of Gottorp had renounced its cosuzerainty in the year 1773, the legal unity of the region was once more fully established.

A sense of tyrannical oppression was all the less likely to arise in Schleswig-Holstein because the Danish united state was frequently governed by members of the Schleswig-Holstein nobility, and these, thus schooled in the wider relationships of life, were advantageously distinguished from persons of the same class in Saxony and Hanover by knowledge of the world and breadth of view. The kings were of German blood, and in earlier days were for the most part educated in Germany. In 1665, with the promulgation of the so-called King's Law, they acquired unrestricted authority in Denmark, and the new hereditary autocrats enjoyed henceforward the advantage which especially accrues to absolutism in respect of the power it gives for the obliteration of national contrasts. They were enabled to do that which is rarely possible to a constitutional prince, namely, to adopt a neutral and intermediate position vis-à-vis the various nations over which their sway extended, so that to none of them did the monarchs appear simply as foreigners. Down to the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Hansa heritage, the ancient community of Baltic civilisation, still persisted, the destruction of this community being first effected very gradually by the growth of Scandinavian nationality. German speech and German culture remained preponderant in all the Baltic lands; the universities of Lund and Copenhagen remained closely akin, alike in their merits and their defects, to their German sisters of Kiel, Rostock, Greifswald, and Königsberg; and even in the Danish army, orders were still issued in the German tongue. The Schleswig-Holsteiners, while inspired with a sentiment of superiority over their brother Danes, regarded these without bitterness. Unquestionably a strong natural contrast divided the two nations. The mobile and astute Danish nature was unpleasing to the Holsteiners, themselves essentially honest, somewhat inert, and slow to warm up; and after the promulgation of the King's Law, there predominated in the Danish state a bourgeois and bureaucratic spirit which comported ill with the aristocratic

and feudalist self-government of the duchies. But the inhabitants of the German borderland had not yet become conscious of these contrasts. Joys and sorrows had so long been shared, so long had all their subjects looked up with common veneration towards the dull Fredericks and Christians of the Oldenburg house (who can be distinguished from one another for the most part only by the figures that follow their names), that as late as the eighteen-twenties many excellent Germans in Schleswig unreflectingly declared, "Zealanders and Jutes, Holsteiners and Icelanders, are all good Danes."

During many centuries of separatist life, it was natural, that German particularism should here undergo a strong and peculiar development. This particularism was not, properly speaking, political, for the anomalous and hybrid condition of the country was not one to stimulate political ambition; but it was manifested, just as among the Swabians, by an intolerant sense of unlimited personal self-satisfaction. To the Kielers of the old stock, there were but two nations on earth, the "outsiders" and themselves; the former class comprised all persons living beyond Lübeck and Hamburg as far away as the south pole, who were regarded with very moderate respect. Nor was such conceit entirely unjustified. In the course of an honourable history, these Saxons, Ditmarshers, Angles, and Frisians, had developed a lively sense of community, and had strenuously maintained their ancient popular liberties and German characteristics. Even among the loyal Germans, especial respects were paid to the celebrated Holstein fidelity; while the extent to which precious spiritual energies continued to exist in this region had been proved in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the art of the Holstein woodcarvers, and quite recently by the work of Carstens and the two Niebuhrs. During the literary movement of the old century, this remote march displayed grateful receptivity rather than creative energy; only the friends at Cutin—Stolberg, Voss, Boie, and Jacobi, together with the *Wandsbecker Bote* of the pious Matthias Claudius—were of any account in the struggles of the day. In Schleswig-Holstein, too, there was little trace of the national passion of the War of Liberation. But even in its separateness, this highly gifted stock preserved a happy freshness of sensibility; and in the ensuing generation the

soil which had so long lain fallow was to supply the fatherland with an extraordinary abundance of talented writers and statesmen of outstanding ability.

Since the absentee king was accustomed as a general rule to leave his German duchies to manage their own affairs, Schleswig-Holstein was, even to a greater extent than Hanover, a land of traditional practices and ancient customs. How many natural contrasts were closely compacted in this narrow space between two seas. The Schleswig peasant compared his beautiful land to a pig with lean back and fat sides. In the centre was the picturesque solitude of the Schwarze Heide; in the west, higher ground, and further on the fertile Marshland sheltered by the golden ring of dikes; bordering these, between the placid grey shoal waters of the Watten and the stormy North Sea were the far flung dunes of the North Frisian islands and the flat islets which seemed to swim upon the waves. Along the eastern coast, beside the deeply indented bays and fiords of the blue Baltic, were splendid beechwoods in an undulating landscape, rich pastures, fertile fields, enclosed with quickset hedges. In eastern Holstein, there were also the large estates of the nobles; but in Schleswig and the marsh regions nearly all the land was owned by peasants.

Amid these multiplex conditions, there had sprouted a luxuriant and incalculable confusion of distinctive communal rights, about which even the Schleswig-Holstein chancellery in Copenhagen was but ill informed. By all it was considered impossible that this region, whose population numbered 700,000 souls, could ever acquire a common circles' organisation; and it was, in fact, impossible that this should happen without the intervention of a strong and centralised German national authority. There were territories, bailiwicks and hardens; there were chartered polders in the diked marsh districts; there were independent towns, properties of landed gentry, and four noble monastery districts ruled by their provosts and *Verbitters*; here the organisation was democratic, there it was aristocratic, and there again monarchical; here were held the traditional assemblies of entire village communities, there was to be found a council of delegates elected by the peasants, and there again were wardens appointed by the bailiff. Ditmarsh, the celebrated peasant republic, which had heroically defended its liberties for three

centuries, was compelled, after its ill fortune in the "last feud," to accept the sway of the Danish kings, but even then retained precious special privileges. Only those of native birth could here be appointed to office, and only with the approval of the elected parish councils could the two bailiffs issue orders. How extensive, too, were the differences even within this limited region: in southern Ditmarsh, which had long been under the rule of the Gottorps, everything was neglected, whereas in northern Ditmarsh the royal bailiffs had always kept things in good order. On the island of Sylt, the elected local assembly and the bailiff possessed a certain measure of autonomy, so that the region managed its own affairs pretty much as it liked. On the nobles' estates, on the other hand, the peasant bailiff exercised minor police powers, and announced to the peasants tied to the land the commands of their feudal lord. Well-disposed landowners frequently instituted good schools and almshouses, and arranged for the discharge of communal obligations by agreement; but even after the abolition of serfdom the right of local self-government was rarely vouchsafed to the settled peasantry.

The development of this motley communal life was largely in the hands of the royal officials. These were paid liberal salaries, were almost all men of high culture, and were well versed in the forms of good society, but were also for the most part little inclined to hard work. Numerous privileges existed to secure the ease of the upper classes. The professor at Kiel paid neither taxes nor customs dues; and even the well-to-do student, since he was infallibly the cousin of a bailiff or some other official, could count with certainty on securing the benefits attaching to a certificate of poverty. In civil law, the extremely ancient institution of the *Einlager* still existed, and many debtors remained for years under this voluntary arrest, bound solely by their word of honour. As a rule all accounts for the previous year were settled in January at the Kiel fair, cartloads of silver money being conveyed for the purpose through the streets. The Holsteiners would not tolerate any mitigation of the severe debt law that was enforced at this fair. It was with them a point of pride that nowhere else in the world was a pledge so highly esteemed.

Amid such antique relationships little development of the economic energies of the country was possible. "The

favourite of two seas," as Dahlmann termed his Transalbingia, could derive little advantage from its fortunate situation, for free trade with Denmark was no substitute for severance from the great German hinterland. The ephemeral blossoming of the two harbours of Husum and Tönningen, which during the enforcement of the continental system were able to carry on a lucrative smuggling traffic with Heligoland, came to an end immediately after the peace. The Eider canal, connecting the two seas, was navigable for small ships only. Kiel, the finest harbour on the Baltic, had barely 12,000 inhabitants; and even Altona, despite all the care of its admirable governor, Count Blücher, never attained to independent commercial importance, for the town lived solely upon the crumbs which fell from the richly furnished table of Hamburg. To an astounding degree had the craftsmanship of the duchies, at one time so artistic, degenerated amid the routinism of the guild system. The well-to-do agriculturists troubled little about these matters; they were wealthy enough to supply their domestic needs from Hamburg notwithstanding the high customs dues. Poverty was unknown. In Ditmarsh it might even happen that the recipient of alms, when visited by the bailiff of the poor, would set before his visitor a bottle of claret; this was one of the necessaries of life. Thus the wealthy country lived easily and quietly by agriculture, in like conditions with those which had obtained eight centuries earlier among the British Anglo-Saxons, the nearest blood relatives of the Holsteiners, before the Norman conquest shook them out of their slumbers. It was an excellent, loyal, honest people, well endowed by nature, and fitted for great things, but fettered by excessive ease, lacking ambition, and still without any inkling of its historical vocation.

Nothing but manifest arbitrariness and breaches of law could spur on this land of inertia to engage in a national struggle. The Danish crown had long been endeavouring to extend over Schleswig-Holstein the absolute authority which it had exercised in Denmark since the enactment of the King's Law. The diet of the duchies, once so powerful, had fallen into decay, for, with the characteristic defects of a feudalist organisation, it had been incompetent to find a way, by a timely increase in taxation, to fulfil the increasing demands of a modern state. Its last regular meeting had taken place in the year 1675. The towns withdrew from the diet.

One last full assembly of the prelates and the Ritterschaft was held in the year 1711. Then the venerable institution gradually dozed off, and by the close of the eighteenth century the only relic that remained was the permanent deputation of the prelates and the Ritterschaft. These seven men with their secretary, like the committee of the estates of Electoral Mark, attended to the joint affairs of the territorial nobles. Upon the existence of this inconspicuous corporation, and upon the social nexus of the Ritterschaft, the legal inseparability of the two duchies was mainly dependent. The crown was careful, at the opening of each new reign, to utter a solemn confirmation of the local rights of Schleswig-Holstein, and wisely avoided demanding any increase in the ordinary taxes which had been voted once for all by the estates.

At the court of Copenhagen, however, the wish had long been secretly cherished that Schleswig, at least, should be unconditionally united with Denmark, for the King's Law with its new ordinance of hereditary succession did not apply to the German duchies. Since 1658, Schleswig had been a sovereign duchy, and when in the year 1721 King Frederick IV united the Gottorp portion of the land with the royal portion, he made the prelates, nobles, and officials who paid him homage take an ambiguous oath, the terms of which obviously concealed a secret design. They had to pledge themselves to be "leal, true, and serviceable to him and his hereditary successors in the government *secundum tenorem legis regiae.*" He was already contemplating the formal annexation of the whole of Schleswig to the Danish kingdom, but influenced by the representations of his cautious councillors he abandoned the idea, consoling himself with the hope that the annexation would take place spontaneously, *peu adpres peu.* Subsequently a common denizenship for Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein was introduced, and the charters of this were in the care of the Danish chancellery alone. In Denmark, meanwhile, far earlier than in Schleswig-Holstein, a sentiment of national ambition was awakening; the island people was becoming weary of being ruled by German ministers. The hatred of Dane for German had much to do with the tragical fall of Struensee. Under the sagacious regime of the two elder Counts Bernstorff, wise principles of statecraft were once again in control, and an honest endeavour was made to keep distinct the affairs of

Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein, and Norway. But the third Bernstorff, Count Christian (subsequently Prussian minister), occupied a difficult position in face of the Danish national party led by Rosenkrantz.

Whilst Bernstorff was in charge of foreign affairs, the crown began its open attacks upon the local rights of Schleswig-Holstein by the issue of a patent, in which the unconditional right of taxation was claimed for the king (1802). The Ritterschaft protested, and was about to send in a complaint to the imperial courts. Then the Holy Empire collapsed; the ancient inscription upon the nothern gate of Rendsburg, Eidora Romani terminus imperii, was removed; and by a patent under date September 9, 1806, Holstein was united "with the entire political body of the monarchy, as a part thereof in every respect inseparable." The ancient territorial constitution was not as yet directly endangered, for owing to an objection raised by Bernstorff the contemplated introduction of the King's Law into Holstein was omitted.[1] Now that the German land was no longer protected by the imperial courts, blow after blow was directed against the independence of the duchies. Public ordinances were issued in Danish as well as German; all investitures were carried out in Danish; the examination of theological candidates was held in the Danish tongue; in all the higher classes in the schools education was carried on in Danish; and at length (1813) the Danish royal bank was founded, and all landed property in Schleswig-Holstein was burdened with the *Bankhaft* to the extent of 6% of its value. At the same time, the severe financial distresses of Denmark reacted disastrously upon the German duchies; the arrogated right of taxation was pitilessly used, so that entire village communities succumbed to the burdens and became insolvent. The arrogance of the Danish people increased pari passu with the adoption of these arbitrary measures by the national authority. Frederick VI, the new king, regarded himself purely as a

[1] The conduct of Count Christian Bernstorff by no means merits the reproaches which were first (as far as I know) voiced by Droysen and Samwer (The Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein and the Kingdom of Denmark, p. 63), and subsequently often repeated. His letter of August 26, 1806 (published by Wegener, Contributions to the History of Denmark, vol. I, p. 331), furnishes a complete justification. Rist's Memoirs, moreover, show most clearly that he was attacked by the Danish national party. His subsequent conduct towards the duchies exhibits, it is true, little statesmanlike insight, but does not manifest any hostility.

Dane, and though he had been baptised by the German name of Friedrich, he preferred to use the Danish form of Frederick. As early as 1804, when he was still living in Kiel as crown prince, his tutor Hoegh-Guldberg inculcated upon him the doctrine that it was the duty of the duchies to learn the speech of "the motherland"; indifferently he added as a consolation that this did not mean that it was necessary to lay aside the German speech at once and completely. When Norway was subsequently lost, the Danes, naturally enough, endeavoured with convulsive energy to retain the last vestiges of their ancient power. Then for the first time was heard the unprecedented contention that in the year 1721 Schleswig had been subjected to the Danish King's Law. The Danes once more began to speak of the duchy by the long disused name of South Jutland. Simultaneously a Danish patriot, describing himself as "a man who has the honour of his national tongue at heart," propounded the problem, how the historical evolution of the two languages had proceeded in the two duchies, asking, "What are the means by which South Jutland, in respect of language as of other matters, may once more become a Danish province?"

In face of these encroachments, the duchies immutably preserved a law-abiding attitude. Hoping for better days, people bowed before the inevitable; they respected the stupid but well-meaning Frederick VI; in common with him they execrated the robber campaigns instituted by English commercial policy. When Bernadotte occupied the peninsula in December, 1813, and mooted the plan of a kingdom of Cimbria, there was not found in Schleswig-Holstein anyone who was prepared for the dissolution of the sworn union with Denmark. The immigrant professors and a few men of wide outlook among the native Holsteiners rejoiced at the War of Liberation, but the masses of the people remained firmly upon the side of Napoleon because this was the attitude of their king. Many excellent Schleswig-Holsteiners, who in respect of culture were thoroughly German, made it a point of honour in political matters to follow unconditionally the lead of the Danish crown. Among such men may be numbered Dahlmann's uncle Jensen, an influential official in the chancellory at Copenhagen, and Rist, the able diplomatist, who shrugged his shoulders when recounting that Niebuhr, driven by an extraordinary "itch," had left free Denmark

to enter "the mechanism" of the Prussian state service. Strong opposition was aroused by Dahlmann even among the Kiel students when in his speech upon the battle of Waterloo he said that the men of Schleswig had always belonged to Germany through their kinship with the Holsteiners. So strong was hatred of England, Germany's ally, that he was unable to deliver a lecture upon German history. For some time after the peace, the street arabs of Hamburg and of Altona used to engage in fierce quarrels as respective representatives of the Germans and the French. When C. T. Welcker wished to introduce into Kiel the October festival in honour of the battle of Leipzig, certain students demanded that all loyal subjects of the king should rather commemorate the skirmish of Sehestedt, where, in the winter of 1813, the Danish-Holstein regiments had gloriously encountered the Mecklenburgers and other troops of Bernadotte; and consequently for some time thereafter the Holsteiners were in bad odour at German universities. This zeal on behalf of the Danes gradually passed off in smoke, but now the young men of Holstein, with all the ardour of immaturity, espoused the ideas of the Teutonising enthusiasts, and Binzer and Lornsen were among the leaders of the Burschenschaft.

The first opposition to Danish encroachment came from the university of Kiel. For the second time since the formation of the Germanic Federation the professorial caste made its appearance upon the political stage; but whereas the Jena professors of the day, while advocating in the *Isis* and the *Nemesis* numerous excellent ideas, espoused also many foolish ones, the political campaign of the Kiel professors was justified and valuable throughout. It awakened in the slumbering population of the North German march a clear consciousness of nationality; and by defending traditional law it gave to the national movement in Schleswig-Holstein that character of thoughtful moderation by which the movement was so strikingly distinguished from other national uprisings of the century. Dalhmann was the leader of these combatant professors. Born in Wismar as a Swedish subject, from childhood upwards he had had personal experience of the evils of the foreign regime, and hoped even then that the whole of Schleswig-Holstein would some day enter the Germanic Federation. At the same time he desired that this beloved land, which was dearer to him than his own home, should

move on in advance of the Germans, and should set them the example of establishing upon the firm foundation of traditional law such a representative system as he had recently described in his *A Word concerning Constitution*. Nowhere, in his view, was the soil so favourable for the growth of a political system of such a character, akin to that of England, as among this people of Saxon stock, "since ancient days the freest in Germany." But he had not the remotest thought of a separation from Denmark. No German professor had as yet made any serious study of the differences in the right of monarchical succession in the various parts of the Danish state; the question seemed devoid of practical interest, for the royal house still possessed a sufficiency of male issue. To this declared enemy of the revolution, a forcible detachment would have seemed an abomination. Moderate and serious in everything, a man of cautious Low German temperament, of admirable disposition, equally proof against vanity and the undue respect of persons, even in youth he seemed to his friends a faithful Eckart. Only through the terrible legal confusions in the North German minor states was it possible that this man should be twice slandered as a revolutionary, in Schleswig-Holstein and in Hanover. What he had come to recognise as right, he defended with the candour of a good conscience, with a sturdy and penetrating eloquence which never failed of effect, for it sprang from the depths of a controlled nature.

It was not quite without reason that the Danes at a later date mockingly declared that Dahlmann was the discoverer of the Schleswig-Holstein question, for *A Word concerning Constitution* restored for the educated classes of the country the understanding of the half-forgotten constitutional history of the homeland. Then Dahlmann's colleague, the jurist Nikolaus Falck, published a detailed legal and historical study of the relationship of Schleswig to Denmark and Holstein, declaring that "ignorance of history is the tomb of all constitutions." Falck, too, took a firm stand upon traditional law, being a man yet more cautious than Dahlmann, inspired with childlike loyalty towards the royal house, and no friend of liberal doctrines. The majority of the Kiel professors, Dahlmann's brother-in-law Hegewisch, Pfaff, Twesten, and others, followed these leaders; the immigrants did not lag behind those of native origin, for they had

all speedily come to look upon the beautiful frontier land as their home. The *Kieler Blätter*, the literary arena of the university, published in rapid succession articles upon the language question, articles concerning local contributions to national taxation and the legal taxability of the territory, and sharp rejoinders to Danish onslaughts. Thus began the paper war between the universities of Kiel and Copenhagen which initiated the political struggles of Schleswig-Holstein. Subsequently Dahlmann likewise edited the valuable *Dithmarscher Chronik* of the old pastor Necorus, to remind his fellow countrymen of the heroic struggles of "these Swiss of the lowlands," and of the ancient Holstein saying "what a noble treasure and splendid thing is our beloved freedom."

Meanwhile Dahlmann had been appointed secretary of the Ritterschaft, while Falck had been chosen by the non-noble landowners to be their legal adviser. The professors entered into an alliance with the landowners, and an understanding was not difficult to effect, although in recent decades certain differences had arisen between the nobles and the bourgeoisie, which found an echo in the feud between Voss and Stolberg. The narrow spirit of junkerdom was unknown to these Ahlefeldts, Holsteins, Brockdorffs, Moltkes, Rumohrs, and Rantzaus. They knew, one and all, that an antiquated constitution, by which a full third of the country, and even the towns of Altona and Glückstadt, were excluded from representation, could not be simply reestablished; they were perfectly willing to renounce the privileges of the nobles in respect of taxation; and they were prepared to recognise a joint representative system for the two duchies. But they held firmly to the excellent principle, that while privileges must yield before right, such privileges must yield before right alone. Only if the king-duke would recognise their privileges, and would recognise therewith the inseparability of the duchies, could a legal development of constitutional law become possible. As early as the days of the Vienna congress, the Ritterschaft, acting through the instrumentality of Niebuhr's friend Count Adam Moltke, had begged the king to summon "a diet adapted to the circumstances of the day." Upon reiterated requests, Frederick VI finally went so far as to grant the Ritterschaft at least that confirmation of privileges which had hitherto been withheld, but this confirmation (August 17, 1816)

was effected in two separate charters, one for Schleswig and one for Holstein.

With undiminished confidence had the loyal German gentry and professors hitherto accepted their king's policy, and with reluctance did they make up their minds that they must now perforce discern calculated hostility where they had hitherto perceived only the isolated blunders of a well-meaning monarch. During the dispute, Falck wrote naively that in the region most implicated nothing was known about that Danification of the duchies concerning which there was so much talk abroad; the use of the German tongue when the king's daughter was confirmed, was, he said, a proof of this. Even Dahlmann, who was less confident, continued to declare that no one had ever dreamed of attempting to subject Schleswig to the absolute authority of the King's Law. But now, only two days after the confirmation of the privileges, a committee was appointed in Copenhagen to draft a new constitution for Holstein alone, and this began to cause serious anxiety. In the same breath, Denmark had recognised the rights of the country, and had threatened the indivisibility of the duchies, the principle upon which those rights were based. In an urgent representation, Dahlmann, on behalf of the Ritterschaft, expressed "the hope that the king will not decree any separation, where separation is neither likely to be useful, nor can be effected without the infringement of sacred relationships." Now, too, feeling began to grow among the common people. No warmth of sentiment had been aroused about the gilded parchments of the Ritterschaft; but directly the ancient watchword "for ever undivided" seemed threatened, all the towns of Schleswig and most of those of Holstein sent vehement protests to Copenhagen.

Nevertheless the excitement was far from being either profound or general. The struggle on behalf of an obsolete law whose complete revival was not desired even by the Ritterschaft, was an aim beyond the people's understanding, and so long as there was nothing but uncertain rumour to warrant anxiety the masses found it impossible to believe that the unity of the country was really endangered. Many liberals made fun of the privileges of the nobles. A. von Hennings, the man who long before, in his *Genius of the Age*, had hailed the French Revolution with delight, openly

took the field against the Ritterschaft. Even Niebuhr, greatest of Schleswig-Holsteiners, regarded this complicated and confused legal dispute as fruitless. All the same, the petitions sufficed to render the court uneasy. The new Holstein constitution, which, as was equitable, made the dangerous professors eligible for election to the diet, was quietly shelved, but the old estates were not summoned. An attempt on the part of the landowners to combine for the purpose of refusing payment of the illegal exactions, was strictly prohibited; forces of dragoons visited the estates to levy the taxes. Years passed, and at length the Ritterschaft made a formal protest, while Dahlmann published his *Documentary Demonstration of the Right of the Schleswig-Holstein Estates to approve Taxation.* Further protests, petitions, and representations were answered only by the threat that the king would dissolve the deputation of the Ritterschaft. There remained nothing but to send in a statement of grievances to the Bundestag.

On December 4, 1822, the petition of the Holstein prelates and gentry was handed in at Frankfort. It requested that the Bundestag, acting in accordance with article 56 of the Vienna final act, should take under its protection and should safeguard the ancient constitution of Schleswig-Holstein, and that the reform of this constitution (necessary to adapt it to modern needs) should be effected solely by constitutional methods. An admirable memorial written by Dahlmann supported the petition. "Though we differ on many subjects," he wrote in conclusion, "we are in full agreement upon this point, that we can thrive in a strong fraternal association with Denmark, living happily under a common overlord belonging to the beloved old family, but that we can never thrive in actual amalgamation with Denmark. Between Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein nature has established too definite a partition, one of which it is impossible to make light, composed of differences in speech, customs, constitution, and historical memories."

Seldom had more cordial or more dignified language been heard at the Bundestag; for the first time the North German march solemnly declared its desire to remain German. But was the federal law on the side of the petitioners? Article 56 specified that "representative constitutions existing in recognised efficiency" could be altered only in accordance

with constitutional methods. Could it be said that the ancient constitution of Schleswig-Holstein did actually continue to exist in recognised efficiency, seeing that the diet had not met since 1675, nor the Ritterschaft since 1711, and that of all the representative institutions nothing remained but the Ritterschaft committee of seven members? Dahlmann confidently answered the question in the affirmative, and almost all the historians who, since then, have discussed the case, have expressed the same opinion.[1] But none of them possessed detailed knowledge of the deliberations of the Vienna conferences held in the year 1820. It is from these alone that the intentions of the legislators can be ascertained, and from these alone is it possible to demonstrate with certainty what the final act meant when it referred to the "recognised efficiency" of a constitution. The wording of article 56 was chosen in Vienna at Bernstorff's suggestion, and the term "recognised efficiency" was expressly selected because it was the aim of Prussia to prevent such decayed feudalist constitutions as that of Electoral Mark, Pomerania, and Cleves from appealing for protection to the Bundestag.[2] Anyone acquainted with the Viennese proceedings was unhappily forced to conclude that by the federal law the constitution of Schleswig-Holstein was not extant in recognised efficiency.

Yet another consideration of form constituted an obstacle to the satisfaction of the grievance. Schleswig did not belong to the Germanic Federation, the federal council was not entitled to concern itself about the affairs of the duchy, and for this reason it was only the gentry of Holstein who had gone to Frankfort. It is true that this consideration would not have imposed any hindrance in the way of a bold and far-sighted German policy. Why should the Bundestag be less courageous than Emperor Leopold I, who had once declared to the Danes that whosoever desired to protect Holstein must be prepared to intervene in Schleswig affairs as well? If the Federation should take decisive action on behalf of the inseparability of the union between Schleswig and Holstein, it would in this way maintain an incontestable right of the federal territory of Holstein, and would perhaps pave the way for the subsequent accession of Schleswig to

[1] Including the present author, in the earlier edition of his paper on Dahlmann (Historical and Political Essays, vol. I).

[2] Cf. vol. III, p. 323.

the Federation—Schleswig, which once before, during the Thirty Years' War, had contributed to the imperial taxes. But neither the Bundestag nor the nation could rise to the height of such conceptions. The German press contemplated the affair with an equanimity which showed all too clearly that hardly anyone had as yet the slightest perception of the wide historical significance of the struggle here heralded, and some of the liberal journals considered the zealotry of the transelbians on behalf of their privileges to be almost ludicrous. In Frankfort, a purely formalist view of the federal law prevailed. Since Austria, Prussia, and Luxemburg refused for good reasons to permit the Federation any kind of interference in the affairs of Hungary, Posen, and Holland, respectively, they desired also to restrain the Bundestag from mixing itself up in the Schleswig troubles. Moreover, it had long been the custom in the Eschenheimer Gasse to regard every expression of grievances on the part of subjects against rulers as the manifestation of a dangerously subversive spirit.

In an opinion which was probably written by Klüber, Count Goltz expressed friendly approbation of "the dignified and moderate tone" by which Dahlmann's memorial was characterised. He admitted that the deputation of the Ritterschaft represented the ultimate vestige of the old assembly of the estates and that the king-duke had confirmed the privileges of the gentry as recently as 1816, at a time, that is to say, when the Germanic Federation had already come into existence. But he could not see his way to disregard considerations of form, holding it "quite inconceivable" that the Federation should concern itself with the affairs of Schleswig.[1] Nor was Bernstorff by any means hostile to the petitioners. He admitted in confidence to Ancillon that the Danish crown had been guilty of manifold injustices towards the Holstein nobles.[2] But he neither could nor would admit an appeal to article 56 of the final act. Having himself drafted this article, he knew better than anyone that Dahlmann's interpretation of it was incorrect. At this very moment there was being prepared the law concerning the Prussian provincial diets, a law which was to make a clean sweep of all the lumber of feudalist constitutions

[1] Goltz, Report upon the Petition of the Holstein Ritterschaft, December 14, 1822.

[2] Bernstorff to Ancillon, January 24, 1823.

in Cleves, Pomerania, the Marks, and Lusatia. The estates of Schleswig-Holstein were in point of law in precisely the same position as the estates of Electoral Mark or of Lower Lusatia, with this difference alone, that the king of Denmark had recently recognised their privileges anew; and the ultra-conservative Councillor Schlosser, who had five years earlier taken up his pen on behalf of the nobles of Jülich-Cleves-Berg,[1] was now agent for the Holstein gentry in Frankfort. Thus it was that the Prussian constitutional struggle became interconnected with transalbingian disputes. Should Prussia agree that the Bundestag was to recognise the old constitution of Schleswig-Holstein (in defiance of the correct interpretation of article 56 of the final act), the way would be opened for the old estates of Lusatia or Electoral Mark to put in an appearance at any time in Frankfort to invoke the aid of the federal assembly for the purpose of overthrowing the system of provincial diets about to be established in the Prussian monarchy.

For these reasons Bernstorff sent instructions to the federal envoy (April 22, 1823) to the effect that there could be no question of the "recognised efficiency" of the old constitution of Schleswig-Holstein. The gentry might have appealed, he said, with better justification to article 54 of the final act, which admonished the Bundestag to take care that the promised introduction of a representative constitution "should not remain unfulfilled in any state of the federation." In a report to the king he reiterated his assertion that the proposed interpretation of article 56 was "manifestly false."[2] The minister's contention was in this respect indubitably sound. Yet how completely did he misunderstand the situation, inasmuch as he made no attempt whatever with the aid of that article 54 of the federal act to which he had himself referred to insure the inseparability of the duchies, and, instead of this, simply instructed the federal envoy to vote for the rejection of the petition. He did this although, through the reports of the Prussian envoy in Copenhagen, it was already known in Berlin that King Frederick VI purposed to introduce a new constitution for Holstein alone, in order to dissolve (altérer) the union between the two

[1] Cf. vol. III, p. 89.

[2] Instruction to Goltz (compiled by Eichhorn, revised by Bernstorff), April 22; Bernstorff's Report to the king, April 22, 1823.

duchies.[1] The Prussian court was still entirely in the dark as to the importance of the unity of Schleswig-Holstein in relation to Germany's power in the north. No one knew that this apparently insignificant recent dispute was but one link in a series of national struggles enduring for many centuries. Unreflectingly Bernstorff, in response to repeated requests from the king of Denmark, gave the latter an assurance that Prussia would vote with Denmark, for the petitioners had misunderstood article 56.[2]

Since Prussia displayed so little understanding of the seriousness of the matter it was not difficult to foresee the fate of the petition. Denmark had meanwhile circulated among the German courts an opinion drafted by Schlegel, the celebrated Copenhagen jurist, wherein he showed, not merely that article 56 was inapplicable, but also proved, with masterly sophistical ingenuity, that there was no plaintiff in the case. The gentry could not raise their plea as Schleswig-Holsteiners, for Schleswig did not belong to the Federation; nor could they do so as Holsteiners, for, "by their own previously expressed desire, they did not constitute a special corporation as Holsteiners."[3] Quite in the sense of this *danica fides* were also the words used by the federal envoy Count Eyben, when in June, 1823, the petition at length came up for discussion. He represented the gentry, now as unruly subjects who desired to impose a constitution upon their sovereign instead of accepting one at his hands, now as a presumptuous privileged caste striving against the development of the modern state. He spoke scornfully of this constitution, "which the petitioners very characteristically speak of as theirs, but which the territory would certainly not wish to acknowledge as its own"; and he coolly declared that in confirming the privileges of the Ritterschaft his king had by no means recognised the ancient territorial constitution, for had not the monarch two days later appointed a committee to elaborate a new constitution?

Even when this intervention was concluded, the proceedings remained lifeless and void of content. The great political interest around which everything turned, the indivisibility of Transalbingia, was barely touched upon by either party. The

[1] Report of Count Dohna from Copenhagen, January 11, 1823.
[2] Dohna's Report, April 5; Instruction to Dohna, April 22, 1823.
[3] Schlegel, Legal Opinion, August, 1822, in rebuttal of an Opinion by Schlosser.

only dispute was about the interpretation of the final act, and here the secrecy of the Vienna conferences was avenged. The federal envoys were like blind men talking about colours, for hardly any of them had the remotest knowledge of what had happened in Vienna. Wangenheim, well-intentioned as usual, once more displayed all the arts of the dialectical conjuror. The very man who had so recently and so arrogantly made a mock of the good old law of Würtemberg, was now a zealous advocate on behalf of the feudalist constitution of Schleswig-Holstein, although it was undeniable that this was far less deeply rooted in the popular consciousness than was the constitution of Old Würtemberg; and he went so far as to avail himself of this remarkable opportunity for the glorification of the much decried character of the first king of Swabia, who had been a deadly enemy of the feudalist order. Wangenheim's friend Lepel declared that it was never right "to pay attention to considerations of policy or convenience where matters of principle were involved"—which drew upon him a sharp rebuke from the presidential envoy. To the general surprise, Hanover likewise espoused Wangenheim's view that within six months Denmark should be summoned to give a declaration in answer to the petition. Münster's attachment to the old feudalist system, and the spirit of opposition characteristic of Hammerstein, the federal envoy, were on this occasion in harmony. The Hanoverian expressed himself in extremely strong terms, saying point-blank to the Danish envoy: "It seems to me impossible that the efficiency of this constitution could find plainer recognition than it secured in the royal confirmation of the year 1816."

Austria could see in the petitioners nothing more than revolutionaries. Count Münch proposed that the demand of the Ritterschaft should be rejected, and that they should be referred for consolation to Denmark's promise that a new constitution was to be granted in the future, for it was impossible that the imperial court should suffer the Federation to impose upon sovereigns a time limit for the introduction of a representative system. "The thoughtful German," he said unctuously, "will not mistrust the purity of will of the government because his prince acts cautiously and after giving due weight to all relevant considerations; and the loyal German will not fail to pay all the greater respect and devo-

tion to his sovereign prince because the latter, with paternal caution, ponders everything with necessary care." In a quietly worded speech, Goltz espoused the Austrian view, a course for which King Frederick VI expressed his lively gratitude to the court of Berlin.[1] Most of the other envoys followed Goltz's example.

The final decision was postponed until after the recess. But during this recess there was effected the epuration of the Bundestag and the destruction of Wangenheim's party, so that when the vote was at length taken on November 27, 1823, no one ventured to run counter to Austria's proposal. Even Hammerstein was silent.[2] On the previous day, Dahlmann had sent in a second memorial, in refutation of the Danish envoy's contentions. Count Münch, however, had the thousand copies placed under an embargo, and forbade the distribution to the federal envoys. It was not until January, 1824, when the matter was settled, that the trusty Blittersdorff reported upon this second address. After his frivolous way, Blittersdorff had made fun of the efforts of Wangenheim's friends, and had declared to his court in plain terms that it was impossible for him to make common cause with such fellows, were it only because he must avoid drawing suspicion upon himself.[3] He now proved the soundness of his sentiments by a passionate polemic against Dahlmann, saying that the Ritterschaft was too respectable to be burdened with such a man. Blittersdorff complained that Dahlmann had completely misunderstood his position in relation to the Bundestag. Plaintiff and defendant before the federal assembly were by no means "parties standing upon an equal footing"; private individuals ought never to subject to unsuitable criticism the declarations made by federal envoys. Such was the fate of the Ritterschaft's second memorial, and it was almost superfluous to decide that henceforward every printed address to the Federation should be submitted to the censorship. Years afterwards, when the memorial had long been obsolete, Münch had a letter sent to the secretary of the Ritterschaft stating that the thousand copies were now at his disposal.

Thus for the first time did the oppressed northern march

[1] Dohna's Report, July 26, 1823.
[2] Goltz's Report, November 29, 1823.
[3] Blittersdorff's Reports, April 6 and July 11, 1823.

knock at the doors of the Bundestag. No one would attend to the summons. The nation did not yet understand the significance of the dispute, and authoritarianism and red tape dominated the Federation. Abandoned by Germany, the Ritterschaft had to yield to superior force, since it was impossible for German patriots to adopt the only course still open, an appeal to the Russian court, which in the year 1773 had confirmed the privileges of the estates. The absolutist regime persisted, and nothing more was heard of the promised new constitution. The territory seemed pacified, for its prosperity increased. When Dr. Franzen, in the year 1828, published a boastful eulogium of "unrestricted Denmark, the land of freedom" no German took the trouble to reply. But the seed scattered by the valiant professors of Kiel was quietly bearing fruit. More heartily than ever before did the growing generation become assimilated in spirit to greater Germany; for Schleswig-Holstein the epoch of unconscious political innocence was at an end.

Lamentable was the condition of the petty territories of the north. Almost everywhere was the state of affairs untenable, over-ripe for destruction, and yet nowhere was there any recognition of the nearest attainable goal of national policy, the economic unity of the fatherland.

CHAPTER VIII

THE TARIFF WAR AND THE FIRST CUSTOMS UNION

§ 1. KING LOUIS OF BAVARIA.

While the petty states of the north were fast bound in profound quietude, a new and hopeful life broke noisily forth in Bavaria. King Louis was in his fortieth year when he ascended the throne, and in the view of his physicians he was not destined for a long life. It was necessary, therefore, to set speedily to work. He had long been the hope of the patriotic youth of the south, but during recent years had for the most part held discontentedly aloof from the paternal court, for in social graces he could compete neither with his brother-in-law, Eugene Beauharnais, nor with his younger brother Charles, his parent's admitted favourite; moreover, his pride was hurt by the indecisive political attitude of the cabinet, by the secret appeals for aid which were issued from Munich to the great powers. At length he was master, and could show the nation what it was to have a king who was at once "German, religious, and a defender of popular rights." Frederick the Great was his ideal ruler, although he had little in common with his exemplar beyond an inexhaustible love of work. There was nothing of the brilliant sobriety of the historic hero in this fantastically excitable nature, endowed with insatiable receptivity for all the new political, religious, and artistic ideals evolving in a time of ferment.

A true child of the romanticist movement, King Louis strongly resembled his brother-in-law, the crown prince of Prussia. More fortunate, however, than Frederick William, he was saved from the curse of sterile dilettantism, for among the gifts of his many-sided and sensitive nature, there was one which dominated all the rest, and which gave stability and definite direction to his life—the artistic sense.

> "Ever does the busy worker's mind
> Fashion joys that spring anew to life.
> Never he to time shall fall a prey,
> Living always in a bright to-day,
> And his spirit aye with love is rife."

It is in these terms that he describes immortality in one of his works. It was his ambition to awaken the slumbering sense of colour and form, to reintroduce the world of the beautiful among the life habits of a nation which, despite the masterpieces of its poets and composers, continued to lead a poor, tasteless, and philistine existence; and he devoted himself to this grand aim with a delight in self-sacrifice which could have been the outcome of nothing else than genuine inspiration. In marked contrast with Frederick William of Prussia, he possessed what enthusiasts commonly lack, an iron force of will, a stubbornness recalling that which characterised his ancestor, Charles XII of Sweden. Of the innumerable artistic plans with which his mind was filled, many never ripened, and many miscarried; but not one of those which he seriously undertook to bring to fruition was left in a state of half completion. Thus it was that next to Charles Augustus he became the greatest Mæcenas in German history, and he is more highly esteemed by his successors than he was esteemed by his contemporaries outside Bavaria. Forgotten are his foolish crotchets, which to those of his own day seemed now ludicrous, now repulsive; healed are the wounds which his capricious and inconstant policy inflicted upon Bavaria: but there remains as an enduring possession of the nation an abundance of magnificent works which would never have come into existence but for the open hand and the restlessly scheming intelligence of King Louis, works which have awakened new creative energies in every domain of art and craftsmanship. He made his capital one of those great foci of culture which have become essential to German life, and royally fulfilled his promise to bring it to pass that no one could know Germany without having seen Munich.

Rarely has a single human intelligence fostered such extraordinary contradictions in close and disturbing juxtaposition. Hellenic sense of beauty, and bigoted Catholic credulity; honest love for his people, and an over-esteem for the royal dignity which approximated to self-idolisation; enthusiastic Teutonism, and Wittelsbach dynastic pride—all these qualities were displayed conspicuously and crudely, for nature, when endowing the king, had been chary with the plain gifts of common sense, tact, and moderation. The harmony which he was so well able to appreciate in works of art was lacking in his own personality. The impatient movements of the tall figure, the oblique glances of the fiery eyes, and the hasty, stuttering speech, betrayed a strange inward unrest. The same man who could engage hour after hour in light, good-

humoured, and innocent converse with his artists at work would, when infuriated, in some access of masterful caprice, outrage his friends' most delicate sensibilities, or, crying out " The king, the king ! " would in the street strike the hat from the head of a passer-by. A connoisseur of the beautiful, he nevertheless mishandled the German tongue, using grossly involved sentences and participial constructions of unparalleled complexity, and he would fashion seven-footed hexameters with utter disregard of all the laws of prosody. He worked incessantly from early dawn, and renounced the ordinary comforts of life in order to save money for the purchase of works of art ; but when seized with a passion for a pretty woman, he forgot self-control and consideration for his wife Theresa (whom he nevertheless continued to love), and displayed his desires with a Hellenic unrestraint which could not fail to arouse scandal in the sober-minded modern world.

The Bavarians were partly responsible for the king's extravagances, for when he ascended the throne he was hailed with an exaggerated veneration which might well have turned a cooler head. Thiersch actually declared : " Here is one greater than Frederick ! " Platen announced the artistic and political hopes of the younger generation in a spirited ode :

> " You discern in the marble, not marble merely,
> But the countenance of a future Jove.
> In the coat of arms of ancient tradition
> Your mind figures the roses of modern freedom ! "

Of greater political significance was an emotional address to the new king from Elector Maximilian I which Görres published in the *Katholik*. Herein, the founder of the Catholic league, the man who exercised so strict a control over the feudal licence of Old Bavaria, exhorted his descendant to be loyal to the constitution, to maintain the peace of the creeds, to fight against the zealots in both camps who believed faith and freedom of thought to be incompatible. The leading idea of the writing was not, however, to be found in these flashy liberal catchwords, but in the unambiguous proposition that King Louis was to be protector of the Catholic faith, " so that Bavaria may again become that which it was before the converse was falsely imputed, the shield and corner stone of the German church." The clericalist demagogue believed that in the crowned romanticist he had found the man who would no longer restrict by " so-called organic edicts " the carrying of the concordat into full effect, and the man who would expel from orthodox Bavaria " the

evil sect of the fanatics of reason." Görres did not spare turgid expressions of praise.

The lesser Bavarian journalists outvied one another in flatteries whose grossness aroused disgust even in the diplomatic corps.[1] " Bavaria's Louis " was the most German of all the German princes, the star for all men of German sentiments, wisdom enthroned; upon his wife's feast day, the moon appeared in the heavens to express humble wishes for the happiness of the royal pair. Praise was even bestowed upon the king's military genius, which unquestionably occupied the last place among his manifold gifts. He was termed " the laurel-crowned victor of Pultusk," although every veteran knew how little share the crown prince, then twenty-one years of age, had had in the glories of that bloody affray. This Byzantine tone persisted. Year after year, when the feast of St. Louis recurred, Schelling, as president of the university, extolled the king's glories with a servility which was in odious contrast with the dignified candour of the ceremonial orations delivered by Boeckh in Berlin; nor did the grateful artists spare incense. A lithographic print which was widely circulated among the village inns of the mountain district represented the king amid the magnificent new edifices of his capital, with the inscription: Posterity will one day speak of him as the Great. Everything he did was considered a mark of genius. Even his poems were admired, and this not at court merely, for so honest a liberal as Andreas Schmeller exclaimed in delight, " Would it be possible for such growths to thrive upon ice-bound summits? " Beyond the blue-and-white frontier posts, the unexpected appearance of this unfortunate collection of verses awakened, indeed, different sentiments. Conservatives demanded in astonishment whether the Bavarian monarch had not a single candid friend to give him a kindly hint. As far as the members of the opposition were concerned, the barbarous shapelessness of the Wittelsbach metrical atrocities afforded them inexhaustible material for malicious jests. For many years to come, to the despair of the censors, quotations from King Louis' poems remained welcome tit-bits for the readers of liberal newspapers, and people became accustomed to make light of the king's genuine services. Chamisso alone could find a word of sympathy for the tragic isolation of the crowned singer of liberty.

The blind admiration of the Bavarians for their new ruler, following hard upon years spent in the background, could not fail to strengthen his despotic inclinations. In the establishment

[1] Küster's Report, October 11, 1826.

of the fundamental law, and subsequently in the struggle against the Carlsbad decrees, he had unceasingly and valiantly displayed his loyalty to the constitution. He boasted of belonging to the leading constitutional princely house of Germany, and in his poem, *A King's Sentiments*, he wrote:

> " Glorious to rule by free assent of all,
> And not as despot sways the will-less thrall ! "

With good reason he refused to admit for his Bavaria the validity of the neo-French doctrine that the king reigns but does not govern, and with his restless desire to participate in everything that went on, he made so comprehensive a use of his monarchical authority that, in reality, without any deliberate infringement of the constitution, his will was universally decisive. Alike the greatest and smallest in the land were subject to the strange caprices of his uneasy intelligence. For example, since it pleased him to spell the name of his country " Bayern," this antique orthography was insisted on, and no Bavarian printer dared any longer to use the form " Baiern." The finances, which under the good-natured Max Joseph had never been in a state of complete equilibrium, were his first care. In pensions alone, leaving the army out of account, nearly 5,000,000 gulden were expended every year. " Right is sacred to me," wrote King Louis to Stein, " and this makes it all the more difficult to balance income and expenditure, but with God's help I shall succeed." And succeed he did, though not without much harshness. The heirlooms received from his father, even the sword and the articles of daily use, were at once sold by auction, and he exhibited little consideration for his step-mother, Queen Caroline. The expenditure of the court was restricted to the utmost, and two economy committees, under his personal presidency, were instituted to supervise the national expenditure.

To the general surprise, the king dismissed, not only his old opponent Rechberg, whose fall everyone had anticipated, but also Lerchenfeld, minister for finance, a confidant of many years standing, for the king considered that his methods of retrenchment lacked thoroughness. Louis at length secured a finance minister after his own heart in Count Armansperg, a man of the world, young, brilliant, of mobile intelligence, and with the reputation of a liberal. The count set to work with bureaucratic stringency, and speedily acquired in the popular mouth the nickname of " Sparmansperg." By the remorseless deletion of items of expenditure, he was enabled

as early as the year 1827 to lay before the chambers, for the first time, a budget without a deficit. But the thriftiness of the new regime, beneficial at first, soon became a torment. Hardly had equilibrium been restored to the national finances, when the king demanded of his authorities that out of the prescribed disbursements they should furnish "economies," and these economies he unhesitatingly regarded as a free gain, with which the crown might deal as it pleased. Even during the first months of his constitutionalist zeal, he dolorously admitted to the duke of Nassau that a rigidly limited civil list was "extremely inconvenient";[1] not even the wealth of the Wittelsbachs sufficed for his grandiose artistic plans. It was here that the economies were to help him out.

The zealous officials endeavoured by such economies to secure the monarch's favour. Road construction, abolition of the burdens on the soil, care of the elementary schools, and many other important but inconspicuous duties of administration, were grossly neglected. The army suffered most severely of all under this remarkable system of thrift practised by the royal patron of the arts. Amid the joyous acclamations of the liberal world, he immediately reduced army expenditure by 1,000,000 gulden, and subsequently lowered it still further to 5,500,000, whereas Frederick William III, himself economical to excess, spent over 21,000,000 thalers upon the Prussian army, more than double proportionally to population; it had become the custom in the middle-sized states to leave the defence of the fatherland with an easy mind to the care of Prussia. The nominal strength of the regiments was left undiminished, for the king required a powerful army to support his policy of making Bavaria a great power; but 16,000 men were sent on furlough every year, whilst the old officers were hardly ever allowed to retire, even if they were no longer able to ride. Field-Marshal Wrede, whose opinion had once counted for so much with the crown prince, now lost all influence, for the veteran soldier recognised the defects in the military system, and the unwarlike monarch could not tolerate contradiction. As early as the days of the July revolution, the army was in such a plight that Bavaria's war-experienced neighbour, King William of Würtemberg, expressed himself as being greatly concerned about the matter;[2] but it was not until the Main campaign of 1866 that the evil consequences of this system of false economy, slowly working out to their natural issue, became plainly manifest.

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, September 9, 1829.
[2] Küster's Report, October 2, 1830.

The king opened his first diet with an address from the throne in the monumental style. "It is presumably superfluous for me to offer assurance of my sentiments in favour of lawful freedom, the rights of the throne, and the constitution which extends its protection over all; nor can it be necessary for me to say that I regard religion as the most important element in life, and that I shall know how to uphold all that thereto appertains." The tedious session led to some noteworthy result: the local council which had long existed in the Rhenish Palatinate was with certain changes introduced into the other circles of Bavaria, and thus a firm foundation was for the first time given to the constitution. It is true that these local councils, constituted after the model of the French *conseils généraux*, possessed extremely restricted powers; they did not conduct any administrative affairs, but had merely to approve tax assessments and the extraordinary expenditure of the circles. Nevertheless they made it possible for subjects to affect the course of administration by means of petitions, statements of grievances, and expressions of opinion, and thus exercised certain restrictions upon the power of the officials. For the rest, the crown was just as unyielding towards the chambers as in the previous reign. As of old, Zentner, still the ablest man of affairs in the ministry, declared, upon extremely dubious grounds, that the government was entitled to refuse leave to attend the diet even in the case of municipal officials; consequently Burgomaster Behr was absolutely unable to secure admission to the chamber, although he defended his legal right in a vigorous polemic writing, and had recently in Würzburg been in friendly association with the crown prince. Many of the king's romanticist proposals had to be shelved. Like his brother-in-law in Berlin, he was much concerned about the future of the German nobility, and he, too, believed that it would be advantageous to follow a foreign model, and to introduce the English right of primogeniture; but the dissatisfaction of the members of the upper chamber showed him that ancient customs cannot be abolished by the simple fiat of a ruler; the proposed nobles' law was withdrawn, and even the newly established Rhenish Confederate personal nobility, whose creation was obviously intended to reduce the prestige of the hereditary nobility, remained a Bavarian peculiarity.

The consequences of the presence of a new personality upon the throne were manifested far more plainly in the spiritual life of the country than in the proceedings of the representative assemblies.

It was in the world of ideas and of dreams that the new king felt most at home, the man who said of himself :

> Let me yearn, dream, be an enthusiast ;
> Imagination alone gives satisfaction and delight."

He rescinded the press ordinance which had been enforced after the promulgation of the Carlsbad decrees ; and although the censorship of political newspapers was continued, during these first years of confidence it was by no means severe, the principle being that everyone was to be allowed to express candid opinions regarding the conduct of the Bavarian authorities. Henceforward, too, the church was to enjoy greater freedom than it had possessed under the " enlightened " bureaucratic rule of the late king. Louis, as a faithful Catholic, re-established the ancient family customs of the Wittelsbachs, washed the feet of the poor on Maundy Thursday, and walked devoutly in the Corpus Christi procession ; he restored to the capital its ancient coat-of-arms, of which Montgelas had formerly deprived it because the little boy of Munich had unfortunately been an unenlightened little monk ; he permitted the peasants of Oberammergau to resume the representation of their fine old Passion Play, and hastened to fulfil the pledges of the concordat which had not yet been carried into effect. Eight monasteries and four nunneries were immediately reinstated, beginning with Charlemagne's venerable foundation, the Benedictine abbey of Metten on the Danube. The number of convents gradually increased. With astonishment did the inhabitants of Munich once more see the Benedictines, Capuchins and Franciscans, the memory of whom had long passed away, walking through the streets. The minds of the peasants were now more at ease, when they were again able to buy from the hands of consecrated men of God the water of St. Ignatius, Quirinus oil and Walpurgis oil, the tablets of St. Luke, and the other charms of customary local use. The king soon exceeded the prescriptions of the concordat, inasmuch as he founded two Catholic schools for boys in addition to the promised seminary for the priesthood. He desired pious priests who should cleanse the orthodox land of Bavaria from the last dregs of the enlightenment, and failed to understand how much estranged from the fatherland the clergy of the coming generation would necessarily become if from earliest youth they were to be cut off from lay society.

Roth, the Swabian, was appointed chief of the Protestant consistory, a man of rigidly orthodox views, who regarded the ultra-

montanes as welcome allies against rationalistic unbelief. Since the queen-mother had had to remove to Würzburg, her chaplain, the conciliatory Schmitt, lost his influence, and the strict Lutheranism, hostile to the Evangelical union, which flourished at Erlangen under the younger theologians, was everywhere favoured. But the king was by no means disposed to restrict the freedom of Protestants or to subject the state to the Roman church. He would not hear a word of the recall of the Jesuits, saying, " They have never been German " ; and among the other orders he gave the preference to the gentle and learned Benedictines. His favourite among the priests was the venerable Sailer, who, now restored to the pope's favour, had become bishop of Ratisbon. What delight did it afford the king to give a pleasant summer holiday to his old tutor, " the German Fénelon," in the neighbouring country seat of Barbing. Occasionally Louis put in an appearance in the clerical circle which assembled here, and refreshed himself with the serious conversation of old canon Wittmann and of Diepenbrock, the young Westphalian. But almost as gladly as with these gentle priests of Ratisbon did he associate with Geissel and Weis, canons of Spires, the pugnacious collaborators upon the staff of the clericalist *Katholik*. Among his personal intimates were to be found, on the one hand, Baron Heinrich von der Tann, the moderate liberal, a Franconian of Protestant family, and, on the other hand, his " beloved little Muckel," the talented physician Nepomuk Ringseis, a strict Catholic of Old Bavaria, a mystic alike in matters of faith and of natural science.

From the beginning of the new reign, the clericalists raised their voices ever more loudly. It was their custom, in *Eos* and other journals, to extol Catholic Old Bavaria with much zeal as the land of Wittelsbach loyalty, and this aroused acrimonious rejoinders from Franconia. Before long in the new provinces, and even in diplomatic circles, it became usual to speak of an ultramontane " Congregation," which was said to carry on secret activities in Munich after the Bourbon model.[1] These rumours were for the most part false or exaggerated, but so incalculable was the king's character that a clericalist triumph seemed by no means unlikely sooner or later. Eduard von Schenk, the new minister for home affairs, a young Rhinelander who had won the king's favour by his romanticist dramas, was suspect to the Protestants, if only for the reason that he was a convert to Catholicism, and he was certainly not strong enough to withstand a sudden onslaught. Even during

[1] Küster's Report, February 17, 1830.

the first years of the new reign, the joy of the liberals was already dashed by these anxieties.

On the other hand, the removal of the Old Bavarian university to Munich secured the approval of far-sighted persons. The happy thought occurred in the first instance to Ringseis, and was carried out by the king, with his customary promptitude, in the year 1826. In Landshut the university had evolved somewhat more freely than previously in the Jesuit stronghold of Ingolstadt. But even here it had been far from vigorous. In this paradise of the Lower Bavarian wheat-barons, the danger that the professors would become rustical was all too obvious; and moreover, the ancient semi-clerical compulsory curriculum continued to exercise its restrictive influence. The king now permitted the university the entire freedom of teaching and study characteristic of North Germany, a freedom he had learned to prize when a student in Göttingen. By combining this university with the Munich academy, he hoped to favour the culture of youth by a stimulating environment, and simultaneously to enrich the capital with an abundance of spiritual energies. For the scientific life of Catholic Germany his Munich was to become such a focus as was Berlin for the Protestant north.

Among the numerous new appointments that were offered, Tieck, Thibaud, Raumer and several others refused, most of them because they dreaded the renowned inhospitableness of the Bavarians. Schelling, however, accepted, and for a long time to come his valuable activities as a teacher gave the transformed university its characteristic stamp. He now lived in the mystic circle of ideas of his long-heralded theosophy and gave the watchword for the campaign against Hegel. This opposition to the Berlin school of philosophy was likewise manifest in the lectures of Baader the mystic, of Schubert the pious natural philosopher, Stahl the young demonstrator, Puchta, and Döllinger. Most conspicuously, however, was it displayed in the fantastical addresses of Görres, whose appointment threw a glaring light upon the strange mingling of Catholic and liberal sentiments in the mind of King Louis. Thus did the unctuous exhortation to Maximilian receive its due reward, and the grateful Wittelsbach ruler was not to be diverted from his purpose when the Prussian government, upon the express command of Frederick William, inquired whether this appointment, made without prior reference to the Prussian authorities, was in accordance with the federal law.[1] Görres had no gifts as a

[1] Cabinet Order to Altenstein, December 25, 1827.

teacher. The mystically imaginative ornateness of his rhetoric drew a large audience, but the members of this audience carried nothing away from the lecture room beyond the intoxication of a vague enthusiasm. How, indeed, were they to learn anything when an entire term was required for the description of the course of universal history down to the days of the deluge? All the greater was his influence as party chief, as champion of the church militant. Through religious and personal embitterment, his hatred for Prussia rose gradually to the pitch of fanaticism. The halo of political martyrdom came to his assistance; the clericalists spoke of Görres with veneration, as the liberals spoke of Arndt and Jahn. Oken received a professional appointment, and following his usual practice was soon engaged in quarrels. The stout-hearted Massmann, too, the book burner of the Wartburg, was enabled not only to give lectures upon "Old German literature" but also to school his young Teutonisers on the gymnastic ground.

Munich university possessed in Thiersch an admirable trainer of teachers, and in Schmeller a highly gifted authority on the German tongue, a man unduly modest and far too little known, whose *Bavarian Dictionary* was a pioneer work in the study of German dialects. Next to Berlin, Munich soon became the most frequented of the German universities outside Austria, contributing much to raise the tone of the capital and to approximate Old Bavarian life to the national civilisation, for although the new streets inhabited by the North German professors were for a long time to come spoken of in the town as "the Protestant quarter," people gradually began to tolerate and to understand one another. During these first terms, moreover, when young men were still gratefully enjoying the newly acquired freedom of study, student life was sound and lively. In the common room, where the young philosopher Beckers and his friends set the tone, a cheerful scientific idealism prevailed. Nevertheless the success of the venture was far from equalling the king's exaggerated expectations. The university of the Bavarian capital could not be compared, even remotely, with the leading university of Prussia. The soil, which had here only just been brought under cultivation, was not as yet fertile enough for such a comparison to be possible. In Berlin Hegel was but one among many. Beside the rich variety of scientific life in the Prussian capital, the learning of Munich, whose dominant characteristics were those of a Catholic natural philosophy, seemed poor, limited, and biased, and at times the royal enthusiast may

well have thought of the epigram he had once penned in an hour of depression:

> Like to a swimmer, unskilful, Bavaria, wast thou and art thou,
> Upstriving with forcible strokes, quickly to sink then adown!

Among the non-academic men of learning summoned by the king to Munich, the historian of Tyrol, Hormayr, proved of especial merit. Many years before, he had written *The Austrian Plutarch, Life and Characteristics of all the Rulers of the Austrian Imperial State;* he had participated in Andreas Hofer's uprising; and he had roundly abused the Bavarians as "Rhenish Confederate slaves." Having been treated ill by Metternich, he now placed his caustic pen at the disposal of the liberal minded king of Bavaria, and at once proceeded to write, concerning the historical frescoes of the Munich arcades, a booklet which for Bavarian self-adulation and courtly servility would be difficult to parallel; again and again he reminded the Bavarians how in earlier days, when their state was barely a third of its present size, their influence had often been decisive in European politics. This sudden change of sentiments was hardly likely to awaken confidence, but since Hormayr was familiar with all Metternich's weaknesses he was not to be despised as Wittelsbach court publicist. The indefatigable Cotta, too, who had just established a steamship service upon the lake of Constance, was induced by King Louis to found in Munich a branch of his book-selling business. Here was to be published a great liberal newspaper, *Neue Politische Annalen*, a continuation of Murhard's undertaking; Lindner, the confidant of the court of Stuttgart, and the youthful Heinrich Heine, were entrusted with the editorship. The newspaper, however, succumbed within a few months, and Lindner subsequently made a quiet living on the staff of the *Bayrische Staatszeitung*, where he continued for years to sing his old song of "pure Germany," but did so with muffled voice, securing little attention.

The king zealously promoted the reform of the gymnasia. He wished to reconstruct them after the fashion of the Saxon and Würtemberg classical schools, and to do away altogether with the lycées, which still occupied an untenable intermediate position between the university and the gymnasium. With Schelling's support, Thiersch brought forward a profoundly considered scheme of education whose aim it was, by the simplicity of a thorough humanistic culture, to teach young men, first of all practice, and

subsequently theory. The overburdening of the scholar with divers items of instruction, which was already increasing to a serious extent at the Prussian gymnasia under the guidance of Johannes Schulze, was to be avoided; the soul-destroying curse of examinations was to be restricted; the number of school hours was to be sufficiently reduced to enable the teachers to give equable instruction in all branches and to exercise a spiritual influence upon their pupils by the vigour of their personalities.

But when this admirable schools' ordinance appeared (1829) resistance was offered to it on all hands, so that it became only too plain with what difficulty the new century, influenced by such manifold interests, was able to adapt itself to the essential conditions of culture. Schrank, the ecclesiastical councillor, and his associates wished to return to the educational methods of the Jesuits, whereas the *Sophronizon* of Paulus scented hierarchical leanings in the new schools' ordinance. Franconia, a land of industrial progress, demanded the favouring of instruction in natural science (which beyond question was unduly neglected in Thiersch's scheme); and Oken, the spokesman of these realists, bluntly demanded that the pupils should be introduced to "the entire culture of the world," and that they should be instructed in advance concerning everything which they might possibly require to know during life. To the older officials, on the other hand, it seemed that the demands of the new plan of education were excessive. Zentner, in especial, an ex-professor, spoke with the utmost contempt of science (resembling in this many professors who have abandoned the professorial chair for a life of affairs); it was his opinion that all the state ought to demand of the schools was that they should train future officials for the practical needs of state service. These opponents were joined by Grandauer, the influential cabinet secretary, a man of second-rate intelligence, but one who knew well enough how to make himself indispensable to the monarch. Thus assailed from all sides, the king, after a year's delay, determined in a new schools' ordinance to reduce classical instruction to some extent. The lycées, unhappy hybrid structures, continued to exist; and, worst of all, the proposal made by Thiersch that the teachers' miserable salaries should be increased was never carried into effect, the result being that the majority of the teaching posts were soon filled by priests and even by monks. Thus, while the well-intentioned reform of the Bavarian gymnasia certainly effected a few improvements, these schools were very far from resembling the Saxon classical schools.

The king was much more fortunate in his efforts on behalf of art. Less than science, is art affected by the vicissitudes of public life, and in Munich it found a soil far from ungrateful. These Old Bavarians, with their keen love of sensuous delights and their natural joy in colour, unperturbed by the over-refinements of criticism, only needed some one who could arouse their dormant energies in order to make them capable of learning to build and to create once again as vigorously and well as in the days when the conspicuous steeple of the church of St. Martin at Landshut and the ponderous masses of the Frauenkirche at Munich were designed by Bavarian masters. In most cases, too, artists made themselves at home here more rapidly than professors. The mistrust felt at first by the born Bavarians soon waned, and the newcomers enjoyed the freedom characteristic of this pleasure-loving city. The painters wandered on foot through the adjoining mountains, or spent their days merrily in summer time on the island of Frauenwörth in the Chiemsee ; at their festivals there prevailed a rough humour which had been almost unknown to the Germans since the carnival sports of Hans Sachs.

Leaving out of account the expenditure of state, public corporations, and municipalities, King Louis disbursed from his private treasury upon buildings and works of art no less a sum than 18,000,000 gulden ; nor would even this amount have sufficed had he not attended to details with meticulous exactitude. Paying no attention to the unjust reproach of stinginess, he openly declared his opinion that artists had no reason to be ashamed of working for monetary reward ; but he knew how to pay them due honour, and secured for them a worthy position in the state and in society. When quite a young man he had entertained the idea of providing a comfortable home for Schiller in a villa upon the Palatine. After he had become king he paid a visit to Weimar on Goethe's birthday in order to render homage to the poet. With his support was erected the first monument to be devoted in Germany to the commemoration of artistic services, the statue of Dürer in Nüremberg. Taking a lofty view of the civilising power of art, he considered that works of art were not solely for critics and connoisseurs, but for the people at large. He would never allow a charge to be made for visiting the collections, or guardians to be appointed for the protection of costly monuments ; his Bavarians were to become accustomed to endure, and ultimately to love, the beautiful.

That which art must discover for itself could not be bestowed

by its royal protector. Unity of style was impossible in a disturbed epoch which overlooked all the literary creations of an earlier age, which almost succumbed beneath the burden of new and contradictory ideas, and which had to learn for itself once again to pass beyond prosaic tastelessness by acquiring the alphabet of the form sense. To Munich painting, its " Peter the Great," Cornelius, gave from the first a tendency towards the sublime and the monumental. But the king could not find among his architects a single one competent by the overwhelming force of a great personality to dominate the architecture of Munich as completely as Schinkel dominated that of Berlin ; and although he himself preferred the classical, he was practically compelled to direct his architects to undertake the free imitation of various other styles. He was tasteful in his selections, and the chosen style almost invariably corresponded with the function of the building. But when compared with the picturesque narrow alleys of the old town, wherein the quiet Catholic life of the two previous centuries was so faithfully reflected, the wide streets and squares of new Munich had a strange, motley, and characterless aspect, above all during these early years, when the commercial life of the city was as yet unable to keep pace with the king's bold designs. Greek temples, Roman triumphal arches, and Florentine palaces, towered quaintly above mean lines of houses, or stood quite alone upon some desolate building site; and such a man as Heinrich Heine, who would see nothing but the defects of Munich architecture, found ample opportunity for mocking at the artificial glories of the German " Beer-Athens." Moreover, the burning impatience of the master builder was disastrous to his work. Ever busied with new plans, he could seldom devote the requisite affection to the half completed, and pressed on ever to get the work finished, although the untrained hands of German craftsmen still needed consideration and patience on the part of their employer. He abounded in proposals, until at length it seemed as if there was hardly a great Bavarian left to whom a monument could still be erected; and since he considered himself to be the real creator, he would occasionally mar the artist's handiwork by some capricious order. Among the numerous artists who flocked to the Isar, many men of distinguished powers were unjustly treated, one of whom was the magnificent draughtsman Bonaventura Genellis. The rivalries inevitable in this turmoil speedily led to odious quarrels, for the king was completely lacking in the easy assurance of Charles Augustus. With a jealous eye to his own prestige, he at once furnished a rival for anyone who seemed inclined

to play the part of "grand vizier." But despite all its human weaknesses, this was a rich epoch, full of bold creation and sanguine hope, which now dawned for German art, when Cornelius, surrounded by respectful pupils, erected his painter's scaffolding in the Glyptothek; and in later years the master continued to look back with yearning to this ecstatic springtime.

Hardly had Louis ascended the throne when he resumed the design for a Walhalla which he had first conceived in the days of the foreign dominion. At Ratisbon, high above the Danube, was to rise the German temple of fame, a sober Doric building standing upon mighty terraces. Whilst this scheme was still under discussion, the foundation stones were laid almost simultaneously for the Königsbau, the Allerheiligenkirche, and the Pinakothek. The architect of all these was Leo Klenze, a Lower Saxon from the Harz region, an admirer of Hellenic ideals, less rich in original ideas than Schinkel, but endowed with a fertile imagination, and sufficiently pliable to adapt himself to the monarch's moods; an abundance of building material dear to the architect's heart was provided from the marble quarry which the king had purchased at Untersberg. The Königsbau, copied from the Pitti palace, bore all too plainly the stamp of deliberate imitation, and failed to attain the overwhelming sublimity of Brunellesco's stone masses, placed as if by the hands of Titans. More successful was the interior of the Byzantine Hofkapelle, an imaginative and harmonious structure in which the king had incorporated his favourite dreams, shining with gold and marble, almost as beautiful as its glorious prototype, the Cappella Palatina of the Norman kings in Palermo; when contemplating in the half light that played around the arches the sombre frescoes of Heinrich Hess, the observer was overcome with a feeling of hallowed devotion such as the cold religious edifices of our worldly century are seldom able to arouse. In the Florentine palace of the Pinakothek, Dillis, the director, installed, in addition to the collection of the brothers Boisserée, the newly acquired Wallerstein gallery, so that both the Rhenish and the High German art of old days were magnificently represented. Here were also to be found the great Rubens pictures from Düsseldorf, splendid Murillos, and works by Italian masters, the whole constituting a collection which was excelled in Germany by that of Dresden alone. Nüremberg had had to sacrifice many of its treasures to enrich the Pinakothek. But Louis was by no means inclined to rob his provincial towns, issuing an ordinance for the protection of ancient monuments, and seeing that it was strictly observed. The vandalism of Rhenish

Confederate days had come to an end. The Bavarians were once again able to rejoice in their beautiful towns, now that Heideloff, the Swabian, and a whole school of architects with Old German sentiments, had in Nüremberg, Bamberg, and Ratisbon, restored the crumbling churches and other edifices in conformity with the original design, acting, in most cases, upon the king's orders.

In Munich, sculpture did not thrive satisfactorily at the outset, and the king frequently recalled Thorwaldsen's saying, that Protestantism was favourable to sculpture, Catholicism to painting. Louis, therefore, looked abroad for aid, and had his father's monument designed by Rauch, and the equestrian statue of Elector Maximilian I by Thorwaldsen. At length, however, in Ludwig Schwanthaler there appeared a native artist who was exactly what the impatient Mæcenas needed, a man whose imagination worked with marvellous ease, who was always graceful, and whose touch was ever sure, but who had little competence for executing sketchy designs charmingly in respect of individual detail. Statuary which was to exercise its own independent influence was work in which he was seldom entirely successful; but no one understood better than he the art of providing in reliefs and statues brilliant and thoughtful adornment for the pediments of temples of art and for the halls of palaces. The art of bronze-founding likewise exhibited new life. Although the first cast of the monument to Max Joseph was a failure, the king did not rest until his new foundry, under the management of Stiglmayr, was equal to the best in Europe.

But the crown of Munich art was painting. Hardly had Cornelius finished the frescoes in the Glyptothek, when he began another great cycle of paintings, the History of Painting in the loggias of the Pinakothek. Even those artists who, like Schnorr, the painter of the mighty Nibelung pictures, went their own way, could not escape the heroic influence of this epic genius. Landscape painting actually became inspired by the wealth of ideas of the historic style. The Italian landscapes with which the Palatiner Rottmann adorned the arcades adjoining the palace did not merely awaken an indefinite lyrical mood, but told of the human greatness which had made its way athwart these scenes, and did this with such eloquence that the onlooker could condone the abominable royal distichs inscribed beneath. A considerable period had to elapse before the Munichers became accustomed to the presence of the busy community of artists. They grumbled at the mad expenditure; they mocked at the king's philhellenic adviser Thiersch, who had given not only the library (Bibliothek) but also the Glyptothek

and the Pinakothek; and they were delighted when one morning there was found on Thiersch's door the word *Nepiotheke* (the store-house of fools). Gradually, however, they began to notice that their royal town was by these strange artistic activities being raised to the rank of a great city; and ultimately (though late, for the restless experiments in one style after another were by no means favourable to the growth of sound taste) the day arrived when art reacted upon craftsmanship and Munich handicraft flourished abundantly.

King Louis's most characteristic energies were displayed in this field. "Now I can lay aside my chains and live," he was accustomed to say when, almost every year, throwing off the cares of government, he took refuge in Rome. Here he could enjoy himself, in the Villa di Malta on the Pincio hill, just opposite the dome of St. Peter's. In Rome he could devoutly follow the tracks of Goethe, whose favourite spot, the quiet fountain of the Acqua Acetosa, he had some years before had adorned with trees and benches. Here he visited Thorwaldsen's studio, and here he forged new plans for Bavarian art, by the thought of which he was at times so greatly excited that he would positively leap for joy. Anyone who saw him in this poetic ecstasy necessarily gathered the impression that in the mind of this prince there was no place for statecraft. Never would he have admitted this himself. He considered that he was predestined to greatness in the realm of action as well as in that of thought, and, like the Medicis of old, his artistic creations were simultaneously inspired by dynastic aims. It was his hope that an aesthetic reputation would gain for the house of Wittelsbach a brilliant position in Europe. He loved Germany ardently, cherishing the memories of the War of Liberation, and naming his new streets after the battles of Arcis, Bar, and Brienne, to the annoyance of the French envoy, who was still unable to understand that the Rhenish Confederate days of Bavaria were at an end. But he considered also that the German fatherland must permit the crown of Bavaria free scope for its European policy. Consequently the loose constitution of the Germanic Federation was congenial to the king, and he expressly declared that he had no desire to see a federal state, but only a harmonious federation of states. Quite in conflict with his usual thrifty habits, he immediately recalled several diplomatists. He then sent Lerchenfeld to Frankfort, Cetto to London; he worked much with the ambitious Count Bray; and the foreign envoys had marvels to relate concerning the great European designs of the court of Munich.

Outside Germany, this Bavarian impulse to activity had but one primary aim, to support the beloved land of Greece, now becoming re-established. Shortly after the opening of the new reign, a philhellenist appeal was circulated in the Bavarian newspapers, containing the words, " However divergent opinions may be in other matters, in respect of effective participation here, we are all agreed ! " This phrase could have issued from one pen alone. In Vienna the personality of the illustrious author was immediately detected, and with growing anger Metternich learned that Colonel Heideck and several other Bavarian officers had gone to help the insurgents, and that large sums of money had been sent to Greece from the court of Munich.[1] Thiersch, in the intoxication of philhellenist enthusiasm, now conceived the idea of having the Greeks trained for civilisation by Bavaria, and of having the king's son, the youthful Prince Otho, established at the head of the growing Hellenic state. Never, assuredly, could a stranger whimsy have originated in the brain of an excellent professor, for in the whole of Europe there could hardly have been found two races more remote in nature than were the crafty and temperate Greeks and the straightforward and pleasure-loving Bavarians. King Louis, however, embraced the idea with enthusiasm, opening in Munich a Panhellenion where the sons of the Greek heroes, Bozzaris, Miaulis, and Kanaris were to be educated ; and he assailed the great powers with proposals which were to secure for the house of Wittelsbach the undying glory of being the restorer of Hellenic freedom.

In German politics it was his aim that Bavaria should take her place proudly beside the two great powers as the mightiest of the " purely German states," and as the born leader of the minor courts. He hated Austria in accordance with the ancient tradition of his race, and his hatred had been increased by recent wrongdoing ; never could he forgive the court of Vienna for having simultaneously cheated his house of Salzburg and the Palatinate. He looked up with cordial admiration towards Prussia's warlike greatness. Thankfully did he remember the protection which his ancestors had once secured in Berlin, and would often say, " Had it not been for Frederick the Great, perhaps I should not stand here." Nevertheless he could not free himself from that old family superstition which accounts for so many of the transformations of neo-Bavarian policy. It was only by the blind caprice of chance that " the historical parvenus " of the north had been raised to an elevation which accrued by right to the more distinguished house

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, September 4 ; Küster's Report, May 19, 1826 ; etc.

of Wittelsbach! He desired to live upon terms of loyal understanding with Prussia, but the "semi-Slav state" must not interfere in purely German matters. For support in his German plans he counted chiefly upon the king of Würtemberg, who did actually overcome his personal antagonism, and entered into confidential relationships with his new neighbour.

Bernstorff, who was under no illusions about the character of Louis, regarded this sudden friendship with indifference. He instructed the Prussian envoy to assure the court of Munich that Prussia's sentiments were friendly, but this was not to be done in unduly cordial terms lest the king should presume upon it.[1] Metternich, who was at first extremely suspicious, soon became easy in his mind, and allayed the anxieties of the Badenese government in his usual ponderous and didactic manner. "If we enter more deeply into the matter, if we raise ourselves to a high standpoint, and contemplate the questionthere from in its essence and in its probable and possible consequences, we soon perceive that the artificial structure undergoes dissolution into a tenuous and airy tissue which utterly lacks internal fixity and any sort of potentiality for vigorous persistence. It can find no fulcrum in the character of either of the two princes, for in so far as they can be said to possess characters at all, these exhibit the most glaring contrasts. There is but one point wherein, perhaps, these two temperaments may be said to present a certain similarity, and this is the fondness of both for strutting upon the stage. The independence of which the king of Bavaria dreams is so extensive in its scope that the independence of his less powerful neighbour will necessarily be driven from the field. Both these princes have likewise an itch for popularity, and two men who court the same bride are not disposed towards harmonious personal relations"—a malicious play upon words involving a reminder of the long-forgotten days when Louis, then crown prince, had aspired to the hand of the princess who subsequently became Queen Catharine of Würtemberg. "They are rejoicing in false imaginings," concluded the Austrian, "they are building castles in the air, when they are really unable to give any clear account of what they desire, and when they certainly desire a great deal more than they are competent to perform. In this case also time will not fail to exercise its rights."[2]

The ill-humour unmistakably displayed in these lines was not

[1] Bernstorff, Instruction to Küster, November 19, 1825.

[2] Hatzfeldt's Report, November 23, 1825. Metternich, Instruction to the envoy von Hruby in Carlsruhe, March 31, 1826.

occasioned solely by the constitutionalist utterances of the Bavarian autocrat, nor yet by the hosannas of his liberal admirers. King Louis hardly troubled to conceal his sentiments towards the hereditary enemy of Bavaria ; commanding, for instance, that Ingolstadt should be fortified, although he knew that Emperor Francis regarded this as a direct manifestation of hostility ; [1] and profoundly mortifying the Hofburg by promptly reviving the unhappy dispute about the Badenese Palatinate, which had seemed finally buried since the decisions of the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle.[2] Having been brought up in Rohrbach and Mannheim, the monarch regarded himself as a Palatiner, and just as when crown prince he had with the utmost obstinacy defended the alleged claims of his house, so now did he consider it a point of honour to bring his former home under Wittelsbach rule at any cost. An abundance of blessings was to flow over the fortunate land; the Otto-Heinrichsbau in Heidelberg was to re-arise upon its ruins ; Mannheim was to become the brilliant meeting-place of the Bundestag ; and when the chain of fortresses of Philippsburg, Germersheim, and Landau had been completed, Bavaria would be the Prussia of the Upper Rhine.

There was naturally no reason to anticipate that the great powers would without just cause repudiate the pledges they had given the court of Baden. But Louis believed that Russia, which had in Aix-la-Chapelle championed the rights of Baden, would suddenly come over to Bavaria's side. After the accession of Nicholas I, he sent Wrede to St. Petersburg with congratulations, and wrote a holograph letter to the czar declaring that it seemed to him a good augury that they should have received their crowns almost simultaneously. He went on to beg for Russia's assistance, and in his eagerness he actually forgot his renowned German pride. " In Russia," he declared, " I recognise Bavaria's chief pillar of support ; this, I repeat, is my political credo ! " Nicholas, as was to be expected, returned a civil but evasive answer, and it was fruitless to shower marks of consideration upon his envoy in Munich. Next Count Bray wrote a great monograph *Sur la Réversibilité du Palatinat*, which made the round of the European courts. Then the king brought up the extinct Sponheim claims to the succession, and put forward the extraordinary demand that upon the acccession to the throne of the count of Hochberg (whose right to succeed had long ere this been recognised by all the great powers) Baden should cede the Main-Tauber circle in compensation for Sponheim.

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, December 12, 1826.

[2] See vol. II, pp. 388–9 ; vol. III, pp. 123 et seq.

How bluntly, too, were these preposterous claims defended; how tactlessly did the king expose his personal dignity! Vainly did invidious pamphlets and offensive newspaper articles endeavour to arouse public enthusiasm on behalf of the rightful counts palatine. Winter, the Badenese councillor, routed the adversary in a well-informed memorial. Threats were not lacking, and more than once the good town of Heidelberg had occasion to dread a coup de main on the part of its neighbour, although the Bavarian army was by this time in a state little fitted for bold deeds-at-arms. In August, 1826, the king journeyed from Würzburg to Aschaffenburg, and stayed for a time close to the frontier of the main territory of Baden, which he had marked down as his prey. Concerning this move, the political journals of Munich reported as follows: "Hills and valleys vied one with another to manifest in the most brilliant manner possible the overwhelming delight felt by all the inhabitants at so inspiriting an occurrence. Heaven and earth, delirious with joy, exulted in unison. From the Badenese town of Wertheim came mothers with nurslings in their arms; artisans closed their workshops; even journeymen forgot their work and their wages. The enthusiasm of the dwellers in the neighbouring land rivalled in all respects that of the native Bavarians, so that the former gave plain indication of their desire that they also might become subjects of a prince whose pride it is to be loved by his people." When the Badenese envoy made a remonstrance about the use of these remarkable expressions, Count Thürheim, the Bavarian minister, responded with a shrug of the shoulders that the editor had printed the article in the exact form in which he had received it from a certain quarter![1]

For several years in succession these childish manœuvres were repeated. In the spring of 1829 the king visited the Bavarian Palatinate, suddenly diverged from the direct route, and, on a public holiday, appeared at Rheinschanze, opposite Mannheim. Upon this spot, where subsequently under Louis's vigorous care the industrious town of Ludwigshafen flourished, there existed at that epoch no more than a few smugglers' houses, places of ill repute, an inn, and a Bavarian lottery office, designed to effect a neighbourly lightening of Mannheim purses. Precautions had been taken to ensure that the king's advent should be widely known. Crowds of people streamed into the disreputable haunt; the monarch secured a good reception, showing himself several times at the window of the inn, and glancing tenderly across towards

[1] Küster's Report, August 25; Blittersdorff's Report, August 30, 1826.

Mannheim.[1] More than once, also, the royal muse gave expression in halting verses to the yearning of the Wittelsbachs; and when the monarch's hopes began to wane, he gave utterance to the touching complaint:

In his homeland so fine
The palsgrave of Rhine
Now wanders alone.
Though love fills his mind,
To silence resigned,
He by none would be known.

The acquisition of the Palatinate became an obsession by which Louis was affected throughout life. The unsolicited benefits which in old age he continued to shower upon the Palatine towns, the statue of Dalberg in Mannheim, the Wrede monument in Heidelberg, were the issue of the haunting elegiac strains which still became audible to his mind when he recalled the sirens' songs heard in the twenties. The king felt absolutely certain that the Palatiners shared his feelings, although in reality it was in Mannheim alone that isolated traces might still be discerned of Bavario-Palatine sentiment.

The king of Prussia had formally recognised the Hochberg right to the succession, and it was not his way to yield to suggestion where questions of right were involved. He considered the Bavarian claims the outcome of frivolous arrogance; never would he allow violence to be offered to a German princely house, or Baden and Würtemberg to be cut off from the German north. With just as much right, said General Witzleben to Frankenberg, the Badenese envoy, Prussia might demand the return of Ansbach-Baireuth. The crown prince exclaimed in his stormy fashion: "My brother-in-law is mad, absolutely mad; he wants to become a thoroughgoing Palatiner, and employs to this end ways and means which are unsavoury and altogether unprecedented!"[2] The court of Vienna also was extremely perturbed about the Munich claims, and advocated at the Bundestag a proposal, plainly directed against Bavaria, that Mannheim should become a federal fortress; but Austria felt bound by her unfulfilled promises, and gave smooth words to both parties.

At the courts of the great powers, however, the Bavarian grievances, continually reiterated in the confident tone of those who honestly feel that their legal rights have been infringed, began

[1] Berstett, Ministerial Despatch to Frankenberg, June 13, 1829.
[2] Frankenberg's Report, May 15, 1828.

ultimately to make an impression. Russia held back, although Anstett, Russian envoy in Frankfort, an old well-wisher of Baden, was secretly busied on behalf of his protégé.[1] Prussia alone stood definitely upon Baden's side. The king urged the grand duke to make no concessions to Bavaria upon any account. Berstett expressed his thanks in the most gushing terms, saying, "This noble monarch is our best protector"; while Frankenberg wrote, "The policy of the last years of Frederick the Great has been revived, and Prussia stands alone as the true protector of the lesser German states." A definite declaration was made to Munich that Prussia would not tolerate the resort to force, and at the same time Frederick William had an elaborate memorial prepared to expound to the great powers the rights of Baden in the matter (January, 1828). In this way the integrity of Baden was safeguarded. The sole result of the obstinate repetition of Bavarian grievances was that King Louis kept his own passion alive, and that the eternal Sponheim affair acquired in the diplomatic world a reputation similar to that which had been secured by the Coethen customs dispute.

§ 2. THE STUTTGART CUSTOMS CONFERENCES.

In his arrogant judgment of the ambitious designs of the two South German kings, Metternich entirely ignored that both of them, after all, were pursuing a justified and attainable aim. Both looked with a single mind towards Germany's economic needs, and both seriously desired to put an end to the distresses caused by internal tolls, though it is true they thought at first of doing so by a sonderbund of "pure Germany." The league of the lesser powers soon dissolved under the dreamers' very eyes. But what they had been aiming to secure for German economic life contained a sound kernel; to extract that kernel from the fantastic husk was left for Prussian statecraft. King Louis's plan for Bavaria, "independence of both the great powers and amity with Prussia," though not itself the right path, led in the right direction. Bavaria, like Prussia, started from the correct principle that German commercial unity was to be secured, not by the Federation, but by agreements between individual states. The conviction thus shared by the two greatest German states opened the way to a complete understanding. As soon as the actual course of events had enabled the Berlin

[1] Blittersdorff's Reports, August 13, November 7, and December 12, 1826.

cabinet to demonstrate that German commercial unity was impossible without Prussia, the two South German kings, after violent resistance, abandoned their dreams of a sonderbund. They remained true to the idea of the customs union even when in Prussia's hands it had acquired an entirely different form, and the renewed alliance between Prussia and Bavaria was to provide even richer fruits for the fatherland than such an alliance had provided in Frederician days. But before Bavaria and Würtemberg were to attain to this pitch of magnanimous self-denial, it was necessary that they should endure a prolonged schooling of painful experiences.

When the Darmstadt conferences were expiring,[1] the small Thuringian states issued a declaration to the effect that if no understanding were secured in Darmstadt they considered it would be necessary to carry out a conditional agreement previously drawn up, and to combine "to constitute a circumscribed commercial state, a means of self-help which would be calculated to bring to the highest perfection the picture of dissensions presented by Germany's states." In truth, the south offered a miserable spectacle after the break-off of the Darmstadt negotiations. In a defiant and angry mood each cabinet went its own way. The Darmstadt government once more attempted (February, 1824) to induce the Upper Rhenish courts to adopt uniform customs laws. When this miscarried Hesse-Darmstadt was given an independent customs system which, detested by the people, yielded barely 80,000 gulden per annum. The sagacious du Thil had foreseen this pitiful result, but wished to provide himself with something to bargain with in future customs negotiations. In the same year Würtemberg likewise introduced a new customs law, closely resembling that of Bavaria. In Frankfort and in Baden, smuggling flourished as it had never flourished before. Trade was hampered by foolish retaliations. When Würtemberg was negotiating with Switzerland about a commercial treaty, Baden immediately sent a plenipotentiary to Zurich, to keep a wary eye upon the proceedings. In Switzerland, dismemberment prevailed similar to that which obtained in Germany; the concording and the non-concording cantons quarrelled unceasingly, and the negotiations made practically no progress.

In this time of general confusion, the court of Stuttgart was the only one which would abandon neither trias dreams nor plans for customs unity. Baron von Schmitz-Grollenburg,

[1] Vide supra, pp. 87 and 88.

Würtemberg envoy in Munich, an ardent liberal, and like his patron Wangenheim an enthusiast for the league of the lesser powers, continued to beg the Bavarian cabinet to resume negotiations. For a considerable time he was unable to secure a hearing; his friend Lerchenfeld could make no headway against Rechberg, who roundly declared that a common customs frontier would lower the dignity of the states situated away from the frontier.[1] Moreover, by the Old Bavarian populace the plans for a customs union were regarded with little cordiality; the continual repetition of fruitless negotiations had undermined public confidence

Nevertheless the Darmstadt deliberations had to some extent cleared the situation. The states of South Germany fell into two groups. The two kingdoms on the one hand, and the Rhenish states on the other, had become aware of a community of interest. Even this separation into two groups led to new attempts at union. On September 10, 1824, Baden concluded with Darmstadt a treaty which mutually accorded certain mitigations of tariff to the home products of the respective states; and Baden then sent Nebenius to Würtemberg on a mission to make similar arrangements there. The Badenese plenipotentiary was accorded an extremely unfriendly reception in Stuttgart, and was kept waiting for weeks, for the Würtemberg negotiator was invariably taken ill at some inopportune moment. Mortified and out of humour Nebenius was on the point of returning home when he learned that Würtemberg had in the interim begun new secret negotiations with Bavaria.[2] The court of Munich had been greatly concerned by the news of the convention between Baden and Hesse. Bavaria was afraid of losing the leadership of the south, and was disquieted about the Rhenish Palatinate. This discontented province demanded urgently and almost threateningly an understanding with the Rhenish states, which was of far more consequence to the local interests of the Bavarian Palatinate than to those of Old Bavaria. Moreover, Blittersdorff had quite recently brought up the eternal article 19 and the commercial question, for discussion at the Bundestag; and although this was merely a sign of hopeless perplexity, Bavaria wished to avert any interference on the part of the Federation. Thus it came to pass that Schmitz-Grollenburg's proposals at length encountered a more favourable mood in Munich. King Max Joseph agreed that Herzog, the Würtemberg privy councillor, should come to Munich. Whilst in Stuttgart Nebenius was being fobbed off with empty excuses, on

[1] Küster's Report, October 3, 1824.
[2] Nebenius' Report, September 15, 1824, and subsequent dates.

the Isar negotiations were in progress for the formation of a South German customs union.

On October 4, 1824, a provisional convention was signed at Munich. Next month the plenipotentiaries of the two kingdoms met in Stuttgart to arrange the definitive understanding. Warned by the aimless confusion of opinions which had characterised the Darmstadt conferences, Bavaria and Würtemberg preferred on this occasion to come to terms first of all between themselves, and only then to ask their smaller neighbours to join. The idea was certainly sound, but the secrecy of procedure was obnoxious to the Upper Rhenish courts. In Carlsruhe and in Darmstadt, people were glad to say boastingly: "We can do without Bavaria, but Bavaria cannot do without us, for we control the union of Bavaria with the Rhenish Palatinate. All the more bitter, therefore, was the feeling aroused by the speedy and decisive action of the court of Munich. "To counteract the pretensions of the royal courts," Berstett hastened to Frankfort and held a consultation there with Marschall. Immediately afterwards (November 19, 1824), Berstett, Nebenius, du Thil, and Hoffmann held a secret meeting at Heidelberg, which the Badenese minister, in a private letter, himself described as "an antidote" against Bavario-Würtemberg intrigues.[1]

The protocol to which agreement was here secured, and which was subsequently signed by Marschall as well, was of importance in the history of German commercial policy, for here particularism played its highest trump, formulated its last and most significant condition. The allied states pledged themselves to act in close conformity, and, in especial, to maintain firmly the principle that each state should conduct its own customs administration independently; on these terms alone, they considered, was a customs union possible. Baden, although in Vienna and in Darmstadt it had recommended a central administration, now obstinately asserted the opposite view. The two kingdoms had given frequent and offensive expression to their mistrust of the unduly circumspect Badenese customs administration. The court of Carlsruhe had been profoundly mortified, and dreaded, moreover, the presence of Bavarian customs officials in its threatened Palatine domain. "We do not desire," wrote Berstett to du Thil, "to see established any kind of *status in statu*, to have any foreign officials functioning upon Badenese soil"; to which du Thil replied that it was also essential that the customs authorities should not be held responsible to the union of states, for if this were done the grand-ducal customs director

[1] Berstett to Blittersdorff, November 27, 1824.

might set himself in opposition to the minister. Nebenius expressed himself no less definitely, saying: "The question is simply this, whether the subjects of individual states are to stand in direct relationship to the community of states"; without confidence in honest administration on the part of the allies, a customs union was, he said, inconceivable.[1] The mood here nakedly exposed was simply the mood of jealous particularism, that particularism which was the very breath of life to the German federal law. The Badenese-Darmstadt proposal was the logical outcome of the nature of a federation of states. A central administration for the customs system was possible only in a federated state, a unified realm.

Meanwhile Würtemberg and Bavaria had drafted their proposal and had invited the Upper Rhenish cabinets to negotiate about the terms upon which the two kingdoms had come to an agreement. In February, 1825, the Stuttgart conferences began, and proved a lamentable repetition of the Darmstadt conferences, being vitiated throughout by ill-temper and mistrust. The Prussian diplomats at once recognised that Nassau was not playing a straightforward part; how could such be expected from her plenipotentiary, the stubborn particularist Röntgen? The Darmstadt government had for some time doubted whether a South German union would be profitable to itself. Wine and grain, the chief exports of the little territory, found their market in the north; and even if the union should come into existence, Darmstadt would still be a frontier land, surrounded everywhere by tolls. Electoral Hesse held aloof from the conferences. Even Nebenius, the Badenese plenipotentiary, could not shake off his disheartened and unsanguine mood, and the negotiations were hampered by his irritability. The Bavario-Würtemberg proposal, based upon the Bavarian customs law, gave the two kingdoms a preponderant voting power (an immediate subject of dispute), and suggested the distribution of income from the customs proportionally to population. This led to a contention which again threw a clear light upon the sentiments of the lesser courts. Was the population to be calculated upon the basis of a new census, or upon that of the provisional federal register which served as basis for the respective military contingents of the federated states? When this register had been drawn up, a deplorable depopulation in many of the smaller states had been noted, the figure being astonishingly low. But now, when the income from the customs was to be divided in accordance with

[1] Berstett to du Thil, November, 1824; du Thil to Berstett, December 14, 1824; Nebenius, Memorial concerning the Customs Administration, March 20, 1825.

the number of population, the envoys of the lesser states declared with one voice that the register had long ceased to correspond with existing facts, that, to the gratification of all well-disposed persons, the population had in the interim undergone extraordinarily rapid increase!

The most important point in dispute, however, was that which concerned the forms of administration. The royal courts demanded throughout a joint central administration, for they had no confidence in the officials of the smaller states. To the Würtemberg minister for finance, separate administrators seemed inadmissible, if only for the reason that in that case the amount of customs dues directly received by his treasury would be extremely small; who would guarantee that the allies of Würtemberg would hand over their surpluses with punctuality? Annoyed at this lack of confidence, in the end of March, 1825, the ministers of the Rhenish states held a further meeting in Mainz, and determined to abide by the Heidelberg protocol. Marschall triumphantly recounted to Berstett the success with which his duke had administered a snub to the crown prince of Bavaria during a visit to Biebrich. "Never," had the proud Nassauer declared in holy wrath, "never shall I allow you to lay down the law in my country. My 300,000 subjects are no less dear to me than your 3,000,000 are to you. I have no need of your assistance!"—whereupon the Bavarian broke off the exchange of friendly sentiments with the exclamation: "I also have no need of your assistance!"[1] Simultaneously the court of Carlsruhe set its submissive diet to work. Carl Salomon Zachariä, the able teacher of constitutional law, an unbending particularist, raised his voice in the assembly against the encroachments of the royal courts, asking, "Who is master in his own house if he must share the mastery with others?" In the end, therefore, Bavaria and Würtemberg gave way.

But a new source of dissension soon came to light. This was the question of the tariff, and in view of the fundamental divergence of opinion upon this matter a rupture was inevitable. Baden suggested one and a half gulden as the highest duty upon colonial produce, and regarded even this as a great concession, whilst Bavaria demanded that the tax on coffee should be sixteen florins. Bavaria wanted to impose a duty of sixty florins upon woollen goods, whilst Baden would agree to no more than eight florins as the highest duty on manufactured articles. Vainly did Miller of Immenstadt implore the court of Carlsruhe to yield; the prohibitive

[1] Marschall to Berstett, May 4, 1825.

system was dominant throughout the world, and Huskisson could make no headway with his dreams of free trade. Berstett stood firm. "Bavaria," he wrote to Marschall, "demands that, without compensation, we should share with her all the advantages of our geographical situation. The king of Würtemberg agreed to the Bavarian claims in order to retain the favour of a certain person." [1] In August, 1825, Baden announced her secession, simultaneously promulgating a new customs law, the low duties embodied therein arousing general delight in the country. Nassau also withdrew.

Upon this occasion, too, political considerations were at work. A journey made by the king of Würtemberg to Paris had aroused apprehensions lest the league of the lesser powers might be established with French help. At a later date Nebenius declared that in Stuttgart he had ever been dominated by the thought of Germany's future commercial unity, considering that high protective duties in the south would impede the subsequent union with the north. Unquestionably, had a young manufacturing industry sprung to life in High Germany under the protection of the Bavarian customs dues, there would have been little hope that the earlier developed Prussian industry could conquer the South German market; thus the Prussian state would have lost the solitary advantage to be derived from a general customs union, the only thing to which it could look for compensation for severe financial sacrifices. It is, however, impossible not to see that even the brilliant Badenese economist was affected by the universal depression which prevailed at the gloomy Stuttgart conferences. There was no question of high protective duties. The tariff upon manufactured articles proposed by Bavaria was considerably lower than the Prussian tariff, and the danger dreaded by Nebenius was at any rate remote. In the following winter, Bavaria once more attempted to establish a customs union without Baden and Nassau. Baron von Zu Rhein acted as negotiator in Stuttgart and Darmstadt. But the Darmstadt government refused to join, in default of co-operation on the part of Electoral Hesse,[2] and since the court of Cassel declined, this last attempt likewise miscarried.

Thus hopeless was the outlook when King Louis ascended the throne. Anger and bitterness were universal. Even the modest commercial treaty between Baden and Darmstadt was annulled after a year, because the authorities were making a neighbourly misuse of the certificates of origin. But the beginning of a new

[1] Berstett to Marschall, May 11, 1825.
[2] Maltzan's Report, January 11, 1826.

reign in Bavaria gave William of Würtemberg fresh courage. In December, 1826, he sent a letter to his illustrious neighbour, proposing resumption of negotiations, and, as preliminary, the foundation of a Bavario-Würtemberg union. King Louis agreed to the idea. Since the two states had previously come to terms in Darmstadt and Stuttgart, and their tariffs exhibited but trifling differences, the negotiations begun at Munich in the following month progressed favourably, though very slowly. On April 12, 1827, a preliminary convention was signed. It was determined to invite "the bordering states" to accede, and at the same time to impress upon them the political significance of this league of pure Germany. The new union was not positively directed against Prussia, and its formation was regarded in Berlin with indifference. It is true that the wording of the convention and the general conduct of the allies proved beyond dispute that they had not the remotest thought of Prussia's accession. The hope was that it would become possible to treat with Prussia upon equal terms about the facilitation of commerce, and that in case of need retaliation against the Prussian customs dues would even be possible. The union was to form the nucleus of "pure Germany"; as the Bavarian cabinet wrote to Stuttgart, "its immediate and valuable consequence would be an even closer mutual approximation in all political relationships.[1]

The bordering states had long since ceased to hope for a South German customs union, and they dreaded Bavarian hegemony. On May 15, 1827, Berstett and du Thil met again in Heidelberg to discuss the matter, and immediately afterwards the three Upper Rhenish courts sent refusals to Munich. Berstett declared bluntly that Baden did not wish to foster artificial manufacturing industry with the aid of protective duties. The court of Nassau expressed to Stuttgart its astonishment that Würtemberg should adopt a "mercantile system" of this character, and should subject itself to a greater court.[2] But Hesse-Darmstadt, unable to maintain any longer its oppressive and unremunerative system of tolls, on bad terms with Electoral Hesse, and profoundly suspicious of its South German neighbours, at length made definite proposals to Berlin. Thus it was that the Munich negotiations gave a decisive turn to the history of German commercial policy—a valuable outcome, designed neither by King Louis nor by King William. [See Appendix XX.]

[1] Bavarian ministerial Despatch of March 22, 1827.
[2] Maltzan's Report, May 23; Blittersdorff's Report, May 11, 1827.

§ 3. THE PRUSSO-HESSIAN AND THE BAVARIO-WÜRTEMBERG CUSTOMS UNIONS.

Du Thil, who was now simultaneously administering the finances and managing the foreign affairs of the grand duchy of Hesse-Darmstadt, was, as he himself relates, in a mood of desperation. Financial stringency was increasing, and the people were murmuring. By the Spanish revolution the poor linen-weavers of Vogelsberg had been deprived of their market; the hinterland around Biedenkopf, hemmed in by Prussian territory, could no longer find a way to dispose of its carpets and woollen manufactures; the commercial classes of Mainz were hardly able to endure any longer the burden imposed by the proximity of the Prussian customs system. Years earlier, Perrot had in the diet advocated an understanding with Prussia, and this demand was now re-echoed by several voices, whilst others favoured the plan of a South German union. Upon one point, at least, there was general agreement, namely, that the state could no longer maintain its isolated position. The chambers expressed the hope that in one way or another a customs union would be formed, and they gave the government a free hand. A great impression was made upon the ministers by a memorial composed by Pastor Frank and handed in by Bayer, a Vogelsberg manufacturer, in which a laborious attempt was made to demonstrate that the bulk of the transit trade of Germany passed through Hesse. Du Thil therefore rejected the Bavarian invitation, although Lerchenfeld twice came over from Frankfurt, and in the spa of Brückenau King Louis made a personal attempt to win over Hoffmann, the Hessian councillor. More and more clearly did du Thil recognise that the only means of salvation was to adhere to the Prussian customs system. This was a bold resolve on the part of the minister of one of the mid-German states, for hitherto the essential aim of all the South German customs negotiations had been to secure defence against the Prussian customs; and since the Coethen dispute the opinion of all the courts had been that an understanding with Prussia could be effected solely at the cost of a shameful sacrifice of sovereign dignity. The bold minister was, however, accustomed to hold the moods of the day in light esteem; in the diet debates he often expressed his independent opinion in extremely incisive and sometimes ironical terms.

But would Prussia accede to the unexpected proposal? As early as the summer of 1825, the court of Darmstadt had enquired

in Berlin whether Prussia was disposed to enter into a customs union with the two Hesses, and had immediately received an affirmative reply. Subsequently, however, Prussia had withdrawn this assent, for Electoral Hesse refused to agree to the scheme, and at that time the opinion was generally held in Berlin that the expansion of the customs system must proceed "from frontier to frontier," from the nearer neighbours to the more remote.[1] The prevalence of this view explains why it was that, six months later, when a second and extremely indefinite enquiry was made by Darmstadt, the answer was returned that negotiations with Darmstadt alone would be fruitless, because the grand duchy was not coterminous with Prussia.[2]

Du Thil had no inkling of the more liberal and bolder views which Motz had conceived in the interim. So small was his hope of success that he did not even venture to inform the grand duke of his design, addressing first of all a confidential enquiry to Bernstorff, with whom he had been on terms of intimacy since the Vienna conferences. But Bernstorff, accustomed for years to leave commercial matters in the hands of Eichhorn, knew just as little about Motz's plans as the Hessian, and returned a non-committal answer, to the effect that the proposed treaty did not offer any financial advantages to Prussia, and that Frederick William would certainly be averse to any thought of an unconditional subjection of the duchy to Prussia. But when du Thil replied that he himself had no idea whatever of suggesting the mediation of his grand duke, Bernstorff at length responded with a more encouraging letter.[3]

The Hessian minister now divulged the secret to the grand duke, and on August 10, 1827, addressed to Maltzan, the Prussian envoy, who despite repeated hints had studiously maintained his reserve, a formal enquiry whether Berlin would be disposed to receive a secret negotiator from the court of Hesse-Darmstadt.[4] The wording of the question was still far from definite, for du Thil spoke merely of mutual trading concessions. Even if the Darmstadt court, as was to be expected in view of its embarrassments, should be prepared to go further, and should offer to conclude a definite

[1] Maltzan's Report, June 23; Instructions to Maltzan, July 5 and August 6, 1825.

[2] Maltzan's Report, February 3; Schuckmann's Ministerial Despatch, March 25, 1826.

[3] In this account I make use (among other sources) of du Thil's Memoirs, but with caution, for they were not dictated until a generation later (1854), and are demonstrably vitiated by errors of memory.

[4] Maltzan's Reports, April 22, July 9, and August 10, 1827.

customs treaty, what advantages would such a treaty offer to Prussian finances or Prussian trade? The little state did not possess coherent territories, and at three points only, for very short stretches, were its frontiers contiguous to those of Prussia. Berlin was now hoping that a settlement was at length about to be secured with the enclaves; this would be a clear gain, for the length of the customs frontiers would be reduced from 1,073 to 992 miles [German]. Should Darmstadt join the Prussian customs system, the extent of the frontier would be increased to 1,108 miles, while the area of the free market would be enlarged by no more than 152 square miles. There was no prospect of any considerable increase in the market for Prussian manufactured articles, for Darmstadt was not one of the countries with a faculty for considerable consumption. The manufacturers of Berg and Mark alone might reckon upon some expansion. In the Moselle region of Rhenish Prussia, on the other hand, the competition of Rhenish-Hessian wines was dreaded. Should the income from the customs be allotted proportionally to population, Prussia actually stood to lose by the bargain. The little neighbour consumed a far smaller quantity of colonial produce than Prussia, and had a far smaller customs revenue; in Darmstadt this revenue was barely 2½ silbergroschen per head of population, whilst in Prussia it was 24 silbergroschen.

Motz was absent on an official journey when the news came from Hesse. Maassen, who represented him, being merely a locum tenens, could do no more than repeat the declarations which had already been given twice by the ministry of finance. He did not refuse to negotiate about mutual trading facilities, but considered a customs union impossible on the ground that Hesse was unduly dismembered and possessed a fiscal system so divergent from that of Prussia. In the foreign office, bolder views prevailed. Eichhorn thought that it would be an extremely serious matter to repulse a German federal ally who, in a position of grave embarrassment, turned for help to Prussia. On political grounds he urgently advised that an advance should be made to meet du Thil's wishes, but he advocated the formation of an enduring alliance, and not the mere inauguration of a commercial treaty. Simultaneously, Otterstedt reported from Carlsruhe that King Louis, in his design for a customs union, was notoriously pursuing subsidiary political aims; and it was essential to maintain Prussia's prestige. He guaranteed du Thil's honesty, but exhorted that the negotiations should be conducted with the utmost secrecy lest Austria and Bavaria should unite to exert a counteracting influence in

Darmstadt.[1] Meanwhile Motz had returned, and immediately brought forward the plans which he had formulated during recent years. The bold statesman declared himself prepared to close the disadvantageous bargain with Hesse-Darmstadt, because he hoped that this example would be followed by her mid-German neighbours; the Low German states could not be counted on. "It is extremely important," he wrote to the minister for foreign affairs, "that the two Hesses and all the Saxon governments, including the kingdom of Saxony, should be accepted into our fiscal system. I have no fear that these states will choose to join some other fiscal union, for their financial interests can be adequately promoted in a union with Prussia only, and in this way only can they be relieved from pressing financial troubles. I hope and believe that Hesse-Darmstadt, whose financial embarrassments are notorious, and who is here discovering the right medicine for her troubles, will lead the way, and that the other governments aforesaid will soon follow in her footsteps."[2]

Whilst the authorities in Berlin were discussing the matter, Bavaria and Würtemberg were setting all possible influences to work to win over the elector of Hesse to join their nascent union. Should they succeed, the association between Darmstadt and Prussia hardly seemed advisable. Consequently du Thil sent Prince August Wittgenstein to Cassel, presumably, as Maltzan said, in order to warn the elector, but perhaps also in order to be prepared for all eventualities.[3] At the court of Cassel, hostility to the constitutionalist south and dread of any limitation of sovereignty gained the upper hand, and the efforts of Bavaria proved unavailing.

At length the field was clear. The king permitted negotiations to be opened, and on January 6, 1828, Councillor Hoffmann came to Berlin. It was he who had collaborated so fruitfully in the establishment of the Hessian constitution. He was an experienced business man, very ambitious, and by no means insensible to the advantages which are apt to accrue to the negotiator when important agreements are brought to a successful issue. He had been adroit enough to maintain a good understanding with the liberals while continuing to enjoy the confidence of the grand duke, and he had been able to live on friendly terms with Wangenheim without becoming an object of suspicion to the great powers.

[1] Maassen to the Foreign Office, September 9; Eichhorn to Maassen, September 9; Otterstedt's Report, September 17, 1827.

[2] Motz to the Foreign Office, January 4, 1828.

[3] Maltzan's Report, October 1, 1827.

For years he had entertained the idea of a commercio-political understanding with Prussia. In the diplomatic world it was a subject of dispute whether Hoffmann was travelling upon the private affairs of one of the Hessian princes, or whether he had gone to Berlin as intermediary in the sale of the Kreuznach salt works. Thus through the back door, like a thief in the night, was this momentous decision introduced into our history. Secrecy was essential. It is true that in Darmstadt Minister Grolmann and Prince Emilius honestly desired an understanding with Prussia; but the Austrian party was working underground, and a premature disclosure might have ruined all.

The Hessian plenipotentiary proposed no more than the reduction of a long series of dues to one-tenth of the previous figure; and he demanded as an indispensable condition the kernel of the Heidelberg protocol, an independent customs administration for Darmstadt. Motz promptly countered him with the objection that a simple lowering of dues would be sterile, complicated, and dangerous, and that Prussia was forced to demand the integral acceptance of her customs law.[1] In these circumstances, if the negotiations were not to prove unavailing, there would have to be a compromise. A customs union must be formed upon the basis of the Prussian customs law, but with independent customs administration for both parties. With astonishing quickness, within a few days, was the solution found which the South German cabinets had been seeking for many years. On January 11, 1828, the first formal conference was held in the ministry of finance, and it was generally agreed that the only possible course was complete union. Darmstadt was to enter the Prussian customs system; while Prussia, long prepared "to make light of considerations of form," agreed that her ally should be accorded equal voting power as regards any change in customs laws, and should have independent customs administration, which must, however, be instituted strictly in accordance with the Prussian model. Herewith all essential matters were settled. At the next conference, held on January 17, it was

[1] Du Thil himself subsequently admitted that Motz had been the first to propose complete customs unity, for on February 28, 1828, he wrote to Motz as follows: "When your excellency declared to our plenipotentiary that the aim we had in view could not be attained by a simple commercial treaty, but only by a customs union, you did no more than express my own inward conviction. Nor did you find us unprepared for such an idea, for it was one with which we had long been familiar; and I frankly admit that it was only because we feared to encounter conditions which his highness the grand duke would have been unable to accept without the sacrifice of his independence, that we did not approach you in the first instance with such a proposal."

only questions of detail that remained for discussion. On January 24th, Eichhorn reported to the king that to Hesse the convention would be advantageous solely from the financial and commercial outlook, but that to Prussia it promised great political gains, "for in this way the minor states will be permanently bound to us." On February 3rd the king approved that the negotiations should be closed on these terms. Animated by his customary law-abiding sentiments, he expressly added the condition: "The interests of the neighbouring German states, and especially those of Baden, must not suffer in any way."

Thus it was that on February 14, 1828, there was signed the memorable treaty by which in truth the constitution of the German customs union was established. Its relationship to the subsequent treaties of the customs union was exactly the same as the relationship between the constitution of the North German Federation and the constitution of the German empire of to-day. Subsequently, by the accession of some of the more important among the middle-sized states, the centrifugal energies of the customs union were considerably augmented and some of the provisions of the treaty were weakened by being modified in the federalist direction; but the fundamental principles of the Prusso-Hessian treaty remained unshaken. Darmstadt accepted the Prussian tariff, and also gave a confidential undertaking to introduce the chief Prussian taxes upon articles of consumption. The Wetzlar circle was placed under the customs authorities of Darmstadt, the Hessian hinterland under those of Westphalia. Prussia nominated a councillor to sit upon the customs board in Darmstadt, while Hesse sent a councillor to the revenue board in Cologne. Through the instrumentality of auditors, Hesse and Prussia exercised a reciprocal supervision of the principal customs areas; a conference of plenipotentiaries met annually to allot the joint customs revenue proportionally to population. Thus the legal equality of the allies and the sovereign dignity of the realm of Darmstadt were meticulously preserved. The supervision was so little rigorous that the independence of the Hessian customs administration was practically unaffected; substantially, the union was maintained by mutual confidence alone. In view of the previous records of customs administration in the petty states, it was impossible for Prussian men of affairs to subscribe such a treaty without serious anxiety. But the Hessian government justified the trust that was reposed in it, and the new customs system was carried out firmly and straightforwardly under the sagacious direction of Financial Councillor

Viersack. This German fidelity, this honourable fulfilment of the engagements that had been entered into, constitutes on the whole the leading service rendered to the customs union by the middle-sized states, for it was not patriotism but hard necessity which in the first instance induced the lesser courts to sign the customs treaty.

Equality of the allies was maintained no less strictly in matters of customs legislation. As originally drafted, article 4 ran as follows: "Changes in the customs laws can be effected solely by mutual agreement, and in the grand duchy of Hesse all such changes shall be promulgated in the name of his highness the grand duke." In Darmstadt this wording aroused much concern. Prince Emilius, hastening to Maltzan, represented to him that the grand duke was convinced that there could be no desire in Berlin to lower the grand ducal government in the esteem of Germany at large.[1] Eichhorn, who had long ceased to wonder at the views of the German petty princes, agreed to the erasure of the humiliating words, and to their replacement by the expression: "And all such changes shall be respectively promulgated by the governments concerned." Thus was reestablished the balance of European power between Prussia and Darmstadt.

However willing the Prussian statesmen might be to yield the point upon this ridiculous consideration of form, it was a difficult matter for them to decide upon accepting the general substance of article 4. Had a great power ever before this subordinated its customs legislation to the goodwill of a state of the third rank? It was not difficult to foresee that the treaty with Darmstadt would serve as model for all subsequent customs treaties, just as the Sondershausen treaty had been the model for all subsequent enclave treaties. At the moment, indeed, the lesser cabinets were actually more inclined than was Prussia to accept the ideas of free trade. But to the keen insight of Motz and Maassen it was obvious that such sentiments were destined to be of brief duration, and that they would completely disappear as soon as large-scale manufacturing industry should become established in High Germany. If the middle-sized states were to be assigned the power of veto, Prussian customs legislation might be exposed to the risks of arrest and atrophy.

All such economic considerations were silenced in view of the brilliant prospects which now opened before Prussia's national policy. As Eichhorn reported to the king, the treaty would secure

[1] Maltzan's Report, February 20, 1828.

for Darmstadt the possibility of a stable customs system; Prussia would gain the preponderant position in Mainz; it would become impossible for the South German sonderbund to advance towards the north; and it was certain that other states would follow Hesse's example, and that a great commercio-political union would spring to life. Reiterated assurances were given to the king that all hostility towards German states would be avoided. "This union has not been solicited by your majesty's authorities, and still less have these authorities yielded to glittering temptations; all that they have done is to respond to the advances and proposals made to them by the grand-ducal government." [1]

The new customs union was to continue in force until December 31, 1834, and then, in default of any fresh announcement on the matter, was to be prolonged for an additional term of six years. As Sotzmann's memorial had prophesied, the retention of the right to give notice that the treaty was to lapse remained the sole weapon whereby Prussia could protect herself against misuse of the equality of voting power possessed by her partners in the customs union. Prussia was alone empowered to enter into further customs treaties in the future—for the proviso that such treaties were to be made "with the cooperation and assent of Darmstadt" was practically unmeaning. In all other respects complete equality of rights was maintained.

A futile dispute concerning priority has arisen in connection with this treaty. Particularist jealousy refuses to admit that the formation of the customs union was conceived in Berlin. It is claimed that the Prusso-Hessian union was simply modelled upon the Bavario-Würtemberg union, which was ratified a few weeks earlier, upon January 18, 1828, and likewise accorded equal voting power to the associates and recognised the independence of their respective customs administrations. A glance at the dates will suffice to confute this fable. The essential principle of the customs treaty, equality and independence of the allies, had been agreed upon in the conference between Prussia and Darmstadt on January 11th, a week before the agreement between Bavaria and Würtemberg was concluded, and at a time when Berlin had received no precise information regarding the progress of the Munich negotiations. The latest advices from Munich were merely to the effect that it was still doubtful whether the South German union was or was not to have joint customs administration; on the whole the latter seemed

[1] Eichhorn's Report to the king, February 21, 1828.

more probable.[1] The idea was in the air, a necessary result of the fruitless customs negotiations of recent years, and it was adopted by the North German and the South German customs unions simultaneously and independently. But the whole dispute is vain. The decision upon which rested the future of German commercial policy could be made in Berlin alone. Whether Bavaria and Würtemberg should agree to enter a union upon equal terms was a matter of indifference; but whether the North German great power would be able to exercise the unprecedented self-denial of modestly ranging itself beside a state of the third rank was the point upon which everything turned. As soon as Prussia had made this resolve the last excuse had been removed by which the arrogant sovereigns of the lesser courts were withheld from joining the union, and the way had been opened towards the attainment of Germany's commercial unity. The conscientious chronicler must doubtless bear in mind that Bavaria and Würtemberg founded the "first" of German customs unions, that their negotiations were concluded somewhat earlier than those between Prussia and Darmstadt. But this fact is of trifling importance to the historian. For the South German union proved a failure, and speedily perished, whereas the Prusso-Hessian union throve and grew. Thus it was from the latter and not from the former that the German customs union issued.

Eichhorn felt that things were at length moving. Filled with cheerful confidence, in March he issued detailed instructions to the embassies in Germany. He described the course of Prussian commercial policy, the system of calculated delay which had borne such excellent fruit. He went on to show that the treaty with Darmstadt marked a decisive turn in the course of affairs, saying that these negotiations had proved especially valuable because they had shown the possibility of a common customs system for states that were geographically independent. "An explicit demonstration has replaced that vague sentiment which had previously sought union by some indeterminate means." The acceptance of the economic principles of another state was no longer regarded as an abrogation of sovereignty; but diplomacy was to continue to maintain an attitude of tranquil expectancy. Motz wrote to Eichhorn no less confidently to the effect that Prussia's commercial policy had been justified by the event, and that Prussia would secure successes yet more striking if she would patiently await the advances of other states. The Bavario-Würtemberg union was

[1] Küster's Report, December 10, 1827.

a weak one, and would become weaker still if, contrary to all expectation, additional adherents should be secured.[1]

In Hesse, as at an earlier date had been the case with the enclaves, the blessings attendant on the Prussian laws were speedily manifest. At the outset opinions in the country were divided. The province of Starkenburg found that the customary petty traffic with the Frankfort market suffered in various ways, and in the chamber isolated patriots (following the approved German method) were not slow to complain of the " leonine treaty," which Prussian cunning had imposed upon Hessian innocence. But the commercial classes in Mainz and Offenbach expressed their gratitude to the government, and it was not long before a renewed life became active throughout the Hessian realm. Shortly before, there had been conceived in Berlin the design of establishing at Cologne a fair which was to act as counterpoise to the trade of Mainz and of Frankfort ; but now a busy mart founded in Offenbach began to excel the activities of the wealthy city of Frankfort, especially in the leather trade. The two allies constructed a high road from Paderborn by way of Biedenkopf to Giessen and onwards towards the south, so that the Neckar became connected with the Baltic by a route that was practically duty-free. When two years had elapsed, the opposition in the chambers had almost ceased to find voice. Count Lehrbach, who desired the minister to be impeached for treason, stood quite alone. Schenk, the deputy, thanked the government for its action, saying amiably that the only means to counteract the desire for political unity was to establish customs unity ! Hoffmann made contented references to the satisfactory settlements of account, confidently prophesying " strength and durability for this alliance based upon reciprocal interest," and going on to say : " It may be hoped that you will soon see realised that which a few years ago was the object of your most earnest desires, but which, after the failure of so many vain efforts, hardly seemed to lie within the bounds of possibility.[2] In Prussia, too, the complaints of the business world, though vociferous at first, did not long persist. Meanwhile the king had included the whole of his Thuringian domain within the Prussian customs system, and the situation of the Ernestine princedoms had become almost intolerable. It appeared inconceivable that Electoral Hesse and Thuringia, thus encircled, should continue their fatuous resistance.

[1] Eichhorn, Instruction to the embassies, March 25; Eichhorn to Motz March 30, 1828.

[2] Hoffman, Report on the Finances, 1824-1829.

Yet the inconceivable was to happen. Upon the first tidings of the new customs union, some of the minor states did indeed make advances towards the allies, but solely in order to learn the precise content of the treaty, which was still kept a profound secret. President Krafft, of Meiningen, wrote to Hoffmann begging for information and giving weighty suggestions to the effect that Meiningen might well follow the Hessian example if adequate guarantees were given to respect the power and dignity of this potential new ally. "Owing to the geographical situation of the land of Meiningen, its importance is great to a degree disproportionate with its size. Several of its most frequented roads connect the trading ports of the North Sea with a considerable part of southern Germany, with Switzerland, and with Italy; while Prussia, Bavaria, and Electoral Hesse are among its most intimate neighbours." [1] It was undeniable that the Meiningen routes of world commerce exhibited an imposing appearance on the map; but the roads were still to be built, and the little land neither had nor was likely to have funds for their construction. Motz, to whom the natural history of the German minor states afforded unfailing delight, returned the Meiningen despatch to Hoffmann with the assurance that the geographical importance of the duchy was entirely new to him, and concluded with the plaint: "It is lamentable that such eccentric servants as this should supplement the sovereign arrogance of their liege lords with a road arrogance of their own." The sagacious statesman did not forget the incident, and the "road arrogance" of Meiningen was destined, when the right moment came, to play a part in German history. Even more transparent was a diplomatic artifice of the free city of Frankfort. Rothschild, visiting Otterstedt, courteously enquired whether Prussia could not conclude a similar treaty with Frankfort. Now all the world knew that the commercial policy of the republic consisted solely in a systematic pursuit of the smuggling traffic. It was obvious, therefore, that the only purpose of the enquiry was to procure information for the Frankfort senate regarding the conditions of the Prusso-Hessian treaty, so that the Frankfort smugglers might be enabled to adapt themselves to the new arrangements. It is hardly necessary to say that the prince of the stock exchange, for all his diplomatic wiles, could glean no more than a few meaningless generalities. [2]

Among the German courts there was but one, the court of Baden,

[1] Krafft to Hoffmann, March 15, 1828.
[2] Otterstedt's Report, February 29, 1828.

which joyfully greeted the Prusso-Hessian union. By Prussia's help alone could Grand Duke Louis hope to defend the Badenese Palatinate against the designs of Bavaria, and he therefore wrote to Blittersdorff: " I am delighted to see the increase of an influence to which, especially at the present juncture, I owe so much." The hope also prevailed in Carlsruhe that the designs of Badenese commercial policy might now be carried out in South Germany, for since Darmstadt had made common cause with Prussia there remained only Baden to provide the indispensable means of communication between Franconia and the Bavarian Palatinate.

At all the other courts, the first vague intelligence from Berlin was received with indescribable alarm, the news falling into the diplomatic world like a bombshell. Even Blittersdorff, though familiar with the contrary views of his sovereign, could not refrain from complaining of " this misfortune, this new demonstration of Prussian selfishness " ; it was clear, he said, that Prussia desired to exploit the Hessian market for her manufactured articles, and did not herself believe in the permanence of the alliance. The blusterings of this hotspur were no more than the re-echo of the excited language used by the Austrian party at the Bundestag. Münch and Langenau declared with great indignation that Prussia's immeasurable lust for dominion had at length been openly displayed. It was but a little while since they had declaimed against Prussian arrogance, which rejected all understanding with a neighbour. Loudest of all were the outcries of Marschall against this " treaty of subjugation " of which he had had no more inkling than others of the Austrian party. He promptly made arrangements to favour smuggling in Biebrich and the other ports on the Rhine. The idea that Nassau was now, like Anhalt, to become a Prussian enclave, was a terrible offence to his national pride. Through the medium of the trusty *Oberpostamtszeitung* he circulated the falsehood that Prussia had invited Nassau also to join the customs union, but that the invitation had been proudly declined. The servile diet agreed with the minister when the latter declared that an increase in the income of the state was needless, and that for Nassau to join the Prussian customs union would be dangerous at once to Nassau's European policy and to her home economy.

It was not difficult to divine that Münch and Langenau were acting upon secret instructions. Prince Metternich expressed his dismay in sour though sugary phraseology. The Prussian envoy sent the Austrian chancellor a memorial giving a detailed account of Prussia's commercial policy. The prince made answer as follows:

"The Darmstadt treaty has raised a great uproar, for everything in Germany is misinterpreted. But we in Austria are delighted that Prussia has expressed herself so openly, and in essentials I find myself in agreement with the memorial. We recently received a request from Bavaria to use our influence against the conclusion of the Prusso-Hessian treaty. We refused, for such treaties are matters for sovereign powers to decide as they will. But I cannot conceal my opinion that as soon as these unions cease to be regarded from the purely administrative standpoint, and when they are based upon political tendency, they are opposed to the fundamental laws of the Federation." Once more he commended to the Prussian court, as he had done at the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, the advantages of the Austrian provincial dues; if such dues were introduced into Prussia, there would be no need of burdensome customs treaties! This oracular utterance furnished intense amusement to Motz, who wrote to Eichhorn: "I fear we shall not be able to make any use of the financial suggestions offered by Prince von Metternich. But we cannot deny that it would be in many respects advantageous to Prussia were he obstinately to persist in carrying out these enlightened views in Austria." [1] Moreover, Eichhorn knew how zealously the Austrian envoy in Darmstadt had endeavoured to prevent the ratification of the treaty. As late as February, Otterstedt had hastened from Carlsruhe in order to counteract Austrian influence.

Even Hanover, the German cabinet which was at that time most closely allied with the court of Berlin, gave cause for astonishment by a display of extraordinary rudeness. The king did not wish his friendly neighbour to suffer any disadvantage from the new union. He therefore commanded that in this case there should be made an exception to the rule in accordance with which Prussia was to abstain from any commercio-political offers, and proposed to Hanover the construction of certain new routes, together with notable lowerings of tariff—for the principles by which Hanoverian policy was then regulated made it impossible to expect a genuine customs union. No response was made to these advances. Here was something more than simple ill-humour; the silence indicated hostile designs, pursued in secret.

As happened throughout the history of the customs union, public opinion was even blinder than were the views of the cabinets, and the Hofburg, despite its hatred of liberalism, was well able to take advantage of liberal stupidity. In Frankfort a journalistic

[1] Maltzan's Report, April 14; Motz to Eichhorn, April 21, 1828.

agency was at work under Münch's supervision. With strange unanimity the *Nürnbergische Korrespondent* the *Elberfelder Zeitung*, and the *Frankfurter Journal* deplored the fate of unfortunate Darmstadt manufacturers, compelled to leave house and home in order to escape the Prussian customs. The *Allgemeine Zeitung*, of Augsburg, published a letter from Darmstadt to the effect that it was now necessary to speak Prussian twenty-one times before speaking Hessian once; the unhappy land had to bear a twofold burden, that of the new dues and that of the old, since compensatory duties were being levied upon wine and tobacco. Even independent journals, like the *Altonaer Merkur* and the *Neue Mainzer Zeitung*, referred to the fable of the fox who in the stable had said to the horse: "If you don't tread on me I will not tread on you!".

The Prussian government could never vie with Austria in this literary warfare of mine and countermine, and was content to furnish in the *Staatszeitung* didactic rectifications of Austrian falsehoods, but the paper suffered from the original sin of all official journals—it was dull. In this fault-finding land it was impossible that any step taken by the government should secure general approval. It was not the manufacturers alone that were alarmed at the menaced increase in competition. Even among the officials there was a party, consisting of Schön and his East Prussian friends, which railed against these loafers in Berlin who could not find enough to do at home and engaged in useless activities abroad.

Among all the forces of resistance, the most dangerous was the hostile attitude of the court of Munich. In October, 1827, negotiations had been resumed between the two South German kingdoms, Schmitz-Grollenburg and Armansperg setting to work with fiery zeal. Thus it was that on January 18, 1828, the first of German customs unions came into existence. As had frequently been prophesied in Berlin, in respect of tariff and of administrative methods the principles adopted by the new union closely resembled those of Prussian customs legislation, for the South German crowns were faced with the problems which Prussia had solved by the law of 1818. The duties on manufactured articles were lower than in Prussia, while those on colonial groceries were somewhat higher. Upon the hundredweight of coffee, Prussia levied 6 thalers and 20 silbergroschen, while Bavaria and Würtemberg levied 15 gulden upon the Bavarian hundredweight (about 9 per cent heavier than that of Prussia). In other respects the regulations were almost identical with those of the Prusso-Hessian union: separate customs administrations with reciprocal audit;

allotment of revenue proportionally to population; frontier duties, and bonded warehouses.

But the reasonable constitution of this alliance could not atone for its fundamental defect. Eichhorn's prediction was fulfilled; the area concerned was too limited, and it was therefore impossible for the union to prove viable. It is true that during the first year the customs revenue of Würtemberg increased by 220,000 florins, for naturally the smaller of the two allies derived preponderant advantage from the widening of the market. Still, the customs revenue amounted to no more than 9½ silbergroschen per head of population, whereas the Prussian customs revenue was 24 silbergroschen per head, two and a half times as much as that of Würtemberg. The cost of customs administration swallowed at least 44 per cent of the revenue. In Bavaria, the gross receipts for the year 1828–9 were 2,842,000,000 florins, and the net receipts only 1,582,000,000 florins. The low duties on imports were insufficient to afford adequate protection to home industries, and yet it was impossible to raise the tariff, for this would have led to a loss of the entire state revenue from the customs. The situation of the Bavarian Palatinate was especially deplorable. For the time being, this remote province was to remain excluded from the customs barriers, and was to have the privilege of introducing its own products duty-free into the area covered by the customs union. The immediate result of this arrangement was to induce French, Badenese, Rhenish Prussian, and Hessian manufacturers to engage in smuggling enterprises upon a grand scale. Voices in the Palatinate loudly demanded adhesion to the Prussian customs union; Camuzzi, a leading manufacturer, wrote to this effect to the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, but the firm of Cotta refused to publish the letter.

For a long time King Louis was unwilling to recognise the defects of the union. He was proud of his handiwork, the first German customs union, and he indulged in grandiose visions of immortal fame. He desired to live in the mind of future generations as the man who had completed the *fossa Carolina*, the canal between the Baltic and the Black Sea of which Charlemagne had dreamed without being able to construct it; and after Baader had had a steam carriage constructed which ran in Nymphenburg Park, Louis became busied, in addition, with great railway schemes. The current saying at court was, "The customs systems of the two great powers need no longer be dreaded." A negotiator had already been sent to Zurich to invite Switzerland to enter the South German union, or at least to agree to a commercial

treaty. Never had the star of Bavaria shone more brilliantly than in January, 1828; never before had the king used such exalted language against the Bundestag. As Blittersdorff complained, "The anti-social, anti-federalistic tendencies of Bavarian policy" ran directly counter to the influence of the presidential envoy. Immediately after the signing of the South German customs treaty, Baron von Zu Rhein was despatched to Darmstadt to invite the grand duchy to enter the union, and to make an unconditional offer of that equality which the two kingdoms had hitherto refused to concede.[1] If Hesse could be won over, the recalcitrant Baden would be compelled to surrender at discretion.

These magnificent fantasies were shattered by the tidings of the Prusso-Hessian treaty. It was obvious to all that by the new union the South German union was instantly deprived of meaning and importance. King Louis saw that his dearest hopes were frustrated, and for several weeks he remained utterly disconsolate. "I have now done all that was possible to rescue my poor subjects," he said despairingly to Schmitz-Grollenburg. His anger found vent in coarse abuse; he railed against the traitor Hoffmann, and openly declared that Prussia had bribed Prince Emilius of Hesse with the sum of 400,000 florins. In his rage he once more forgot his German pride. As long as it was still possible for these minor courts to have a European policy, even patriotic princes were not safe from disastrous errors. Just as Louis, when crown prince, notwithstanding his detestation of Napoleon, had written a number of servile letters to the creator of the Bavarian kingship, and had even expressed the hope that his son Max would some day pay homage to the king of Rome,[2] so recently in the Sponheim affair, he had invoked the help of Russia, and had again made approaches to the hated France. The duke of Dalberg had been at work in Munich throughout the winter, and attention was now paid to his suggestions. King Louis warned the French court against the ambition of Prussia, saying that Prussia was already attempting to gain foothold in South Germany. In the same sense, Lerchenfeld endeavoured in Frankfort to influence Reinhard. Forthwith Minister La Ferronays instructed the chargé d'affaires in Munich, to be on the watch for the danger threatening from Prussia; he also proposed a few trading advantages in favour of "la troisième Allemagne."

In the course of a few months, King Louis overcame these

[1] Du Thil's Memoirs.

[2] Two of these letters, those of April 6 and November 29, 1811, were published in the Preussische Jahrbücher, November, 1885.

passionate aberrations, and the deplorable intrigues with foreign lands were consequently discontinued. But the reality of the occurrence is guaranteed by the unanimous testimony of friend and foe. Not only did Küster, the Prussian envoy, furnish detailed reports to his court; Fahnenberg, the Badenese envoy, sent an identical story to Carlsruhe. Count Spiegel, the Austrian envoy, openly complained to the Bavarian minister for foreign affairs that the latter was endeavouring to involve France in matters of German commercial policy. Blittersdorff (himself greatly inclined to use all possible means for the destruction of the Prusso-Hessian union) is the source of our knowledge of Lerchenfeld's conduct.[1] The veering of Bavarian policy towards France was soon notorious throughout the diplomatic world.

For a time King Louis abandoned himself blindly to the stormy anger of injured vanity. Cabinet Councillor Grandauer exercised a bad influence over him, and Baron von der Tann likewise dreamed dreams of a Bavarian great power. Zentner, however, a minister of long experience, was able to take a more dispassionate view. Even King William of Würtemberg remained sober-minded and equable. His knowledge of affairs was stronger than his animus against Prussia, and it is probable that he had not forgotten the bitter experiences of Verona days. In conversation with du Thil, while not concealing his disappointment, he admitted that "sooner or later we shall be compelled to follow your example." Similarly, his minister Beroldingen assured the Prussian envoy "that Würtemberg has never had the smallest doubt of the German and patriotic sentiments inspiring the Prussian government, and that Würtemberg regards the existing customs unions as a means by which some day may be attained the common aim of effecting a further advance along the same path."[2]

Since, in everything it did to promote the power and unity of our fatherland, Prussia had to encounter the antagonism of the foreign world, it was natural that the Prusso-Hessian alliance should immediately lead to hostile intrigues on the part of foreign powers In conjunction with France, Holland endeavoured to sow discord between south and north. Minister Verstolck van Soelen drew the attention of the Würtemberg chargé d'affaires to the dangers threatening German freedom of trade and the independence of the minor states. The Würtemberger, a man of intelli-

[1] Küster's Report, March 26; Fahnenberg's Report, March 5; Maltzan's Report, April 14; Blittersdorff's Reports, March 24 and 26, 1828.

[2] Beroldingen to Küster, March 27 and April 22, 1828.

gence, who was accustomed to communicate everything to his Prussian colleague, Count Truchsess-Waldburg, made the apt answer that the duties imposed by foreign powers, and not least by Holland, compelled the Germans to unite, and to seek new channels of commerce. Verstolck rejoined with a solemn assurance that the Netherland tariff would speedily be lowered, but that for the moment they must think only of fighting the common enemy, Prussia.[1] Eichhorn, who had sufficient acquaintance with the Dutch merchants and the eternal negotiations about Rhenish navigation, wrote the following comment on the margin of the despatch :. " The Netherlands have no positive political aim, for their only desire is to hinder the further unification of Germany in customs matters." The Netherland chargé d'affaires, Mollerus, did in fact invite the court of Munich to conclude a commercial treaty with Holland on the part of the South German union, giving at the same time assurances of the good intentions of his court, which desired to come to an understanding with the High German states in the matter of the Rhine dues, over the head of Prussia. He did not bring forward any definite or tangible proposals, for his sole aim was to hold Bavaria and Würtemberg aloof from Prussia.[2] England likewise manifested her dissatisfaction. Charles Grant, President of the Board of Trade, made strong representations to Bülow, the Prussian envoy, concerning the high tariff imposed by the Prusso-Hessian union, to which Bülow answered coolly that the union had not led to any change in the Prussian tariff, but that everyone knew that the commercial principles of Prussia were more liberal than those of England.[3]

These foreign intrigues speedily assumed an extremely menacing aspect, and there now became intertwined with them the unhappy Sponheim negotiations. King Louis, who was able to appeal to the unfulfilled promises of Austria, was profoundly convinced of his right to the reversion of the Palatinate, and felt greatly injured when Prussia opposed his pretensions. The Prussian envoy was not slow to perceive that the king had something upon his mind. Then, one day, the two met in the street. The king walked beside Küster for some distance, giving vent to his anger in the following terms: " I cannot find words to express my profound grief that Prussia, above all, should set herself in opposition to me in the Badenese affair. For I can describe only as opposition

[1] Truchsess' Report, April 20, 1828.
[2] Fahnenberg's Reports, May 6 and 16; Küster's Report, May 8, 1828.
[3] Bülow's Report, May 5, 1828.

the memorial in which Prussia, without listening to my side of the case, has taken the initiative against me with the other courts. Bernstorff continues to think of the old Bavaria; but to-day there is a new Bavaria, with a new king. Prussia has never had a greater enthusiast for her cause than myself. All the more mortifying, therefore, do I find it that no value should be placed upon my friendship. Do the Prussians wish to turn me into an opponent?" The king became heated, and raised his voice: passers-by paused to listen to the conversation. The envoy could not make himself understood by the monarch, who was hard of hearing. Greatly distressed by the incident, he counselled his court to do something to appease the angry ruler.[1] For the moment, little could be done, for King Frederick William was unwilling to permit the rights of Baden to be sacrificed. But as far as the future was concerned nothing was as yet lost. Even as an opponent, the hot-blooded Wittelsbach remained open and straightforward. Since his heart was really devoted to the cause of Germany's commercial unity, there was hope for the resumption of friendly relationships as soon as his anger had cooled. At present, indeed, the court of Munich worked openly against the Prusso-Hessian union, endeavouring by the gratuitous provision of relay horses and similar petty means to attract the trade between Giessen and Vilbel to the Hersfeld-Fulda route; asking the house of Thurn and Taxis to despatch the Frankfort-Aschaffenberg post by way of Hanau instead of, as previously, sending it through Darmstadt territory; and so on.

The decisive struggle took place at the court of Cassel; once again the commercial policy of Electoral Hesse exercised a momentous influence upon the rest of Germany. The grand duke of Hesse-Darmstadt had approved the Berlin negotiations solely upon the definite expectation that his example would be imitated by his cousin in Cassel. Consequently, the Prusso-Hessian treaty was kept secret until May, for the pride of the despot of Cassel was so intense that it would have been impossible for him to make up his mind to accede to a treaty that had already been published, and thus to admit before all the world that he had followed the lead of the lesser power of Darmstadt. In February, Hoffmann visited Cassel on his way back from Berlin, and at last considered that the situation was tolerably favourable. Baron von Meysenbug and other high officials with whom he had confidential conversations readily admitted that after Darmstadt's accession it was no longer possible for Electoral Hesse to hesitate, that the disordered national

[1] Küster's Report, April 15, 1828.

finances could be saved in no other way than by adhesion to the Prussian customs union. But Hoffmann was mistaken, and after four-and-twenty hours had passed he had to leave Cassel with nothing settled. "Rational calculations do not apply at this court," he wrote to du Thil. The Reichenbach, who still cherished hopes of an Austrian coronet, was at work among the officials and behind their backs.

Thus was the soil prepared for the contemptible arts of the minor courts. In the spring of 1828 a host of official and unofficial negotiators assembled in Cassel for the purpose of holding the elector aloof from Prussia. From Bavaria came the privy councillors Oberkamp and Siebein, the former well trained in the intrigues of the Eschenheimer Gasse; in addition, King Louis sent his friend von der Tann. The old agitator Miller of Immenstadt, now financial councillor for Würtemberg, worked on behalf of this state. Baron von Lützerode came from Saxony, Councillor Lüder from Hanover, and negotiators were sent also by Coburg and Meiningen. Then, "to the general consternation," President von Porbeck appeared from Arnsberg, having been sent to keep the Berlin cabinet informed regarding these complicated intrigues. In March, the Darmstadt government made a renewed attempt, sending Prince Wittgenstein to inform the elector that Prussia had agreed to leave open the possibility of Electoral Hesse's accession to the treaty, and that Darmstadt should make proposals to this effect; the grand duke therefore ventured to ask whether the elector would approve the sending of a plenipotentiary. On March 12th the elector expressed his gracious thanks to the prince. But three days later the wind changed. It may be that Wittgenstein had assumed an overconfident attitude, or it may be that Oberkamp and the Reichenbach had convinced the elector that it would be derogatory to subject himself to Prussia's orders. Whatever the cause, on March 15th, Schminke, minister for finance, sent a despatch to du Thil couched in phraseology possible only in Cassel or Coethen: "His highness cannot fail to be profoundly affected by the intelligence that the grand-ducal court has, in an utterly foreign treaty, made stipulations affecting the electoral state of Hesse, and that in this respect he has taken an initiative which the electoral house never agreed to accord to the grand-ducal house. The elector is not convinced that it would be to the advantage of the electoral state to sacrifice in favour of any such agreement the system that has heretofore existed." [1] The rudest turns of phrase had been introduced into

[1] Schminke to du Thil, March 15, 1828.

the despatch by the elector in person. In a further audience he thundered at Wittgenstein, saying: "I am chief of the Hessian house. I will not tolerate such pretensions as the grand duke has permitted himself. I cannot accede to the grand duke's request." Thus Wittgenstein's mission likewise proved a failure.

Eichhorn, divining that the South German crowns had taken a hand in the game, advised Nagler, the federal envoy, and also all the envoys in the German highlands, to keep a close watch upon the commercial policy of the lesser states. Two tendencies, he wrote, were working against Prussia in Cassel. The Bavario-Würtemberg union was endeavouring to secure the accession of Electoral Hesse; this union was affected by perverse political considerations, and was based upon the false principle that the inland states ought to make themselves independent of the coastal states. "Every extension of the system will result in a loss of internal strength and cohesion." More dangerous was the plan cherished by some of the Thuringian states to form a Hesso-Thuringian customs union under the leadership of Electoral Hesse, a union that should be able to negotiate at will either with Prussia or with the south. "This fantasy," wrote Eichhorn, "is so seductive to the elector's pride that he will hardly find it possible to withstand the lure." [1]

After Wittgenstein's departure, the Bavario-Würtemberg negotiators believed they had won the game. Bavaria promised the elector to guarantee his previous revenue from the customs if he would join the South German union. The elector, a keen hand at a bargain, promptly brought forward an old monetary claim against the princely house of Oettingen, whose domains had been added to Bavaria by Napoleon; and in this matter, too, Bavaria was prepared to meet his wishes. Oberkamp, accompanied by an Electoral Hessian official from the financial department, was already visiting the Bavarian frontier in order to arrange for the institution of the customs, when a more skilful hand intervened, and deprived the South German courts of their anticipated victory.

It was generally known that Austria was unfriendly to the idea of an enlargement of the Prusso-Hessian union. Although the Austrian chargé d'affaires in Cassel obligingly showed Prince Wittgenstein his instructions to the effect that he was in all respects to give loyal support to his Prussian colleague, Berlin had long been familiar with the real value of these Austrian wiles. But Vienna considered that the customs union of the southern con-

[1] Instruction to Nagler, Otterstedt, and others, April 5, 1828.

stitutional states was also extremely dangerous. As soon as the diplomatic intrigues in Cassel were afoot, Baron von Hruby was recalled from Carlsruhe, and commissioned as envoy to Hanover and Cassel. Hruby was one of the fiercest and most dangerous enemies of Prussia, a typical representative of the arrogance of Ferdinandian days. He was able to convince the elector that Electoral Hessian national honour would be no less affected by accession to Bavaria, and in May "the Bavarian custom house officers," as the elector scornfully termed them, were dismissed with a rebuff. Soon was fulfilled the prophecy which one well acquainted with Hessian affairs had made to Hänlein, the Prussian envoy: "Electoral Hesse will endeavour to retain her lucrative transit dues and will prefer to avoid making any change in the existing system. Only if it should prove impossible to come to an understanding with the electress will our state, which, as you know, consists of but a single person, be likely, from pique, to take the side of Prussia's opponents."

To this had it come, that the future of German commercial policy was mainly dependent upon the conjugal peace of the electoral Hessian house. Hoping to reconcile the elector with his consort and thereafter to win over the appeased despot to join the customs union, King Frederick William sent General Natzmer to Cassel. The instruction given by Motz to this negotiator had a Frederician ring which contrasted strangely with the tame diplomatic language then current. It seemed as if the valiant Hessian had already foreseen the year 1866. He began by saying that it was in Electoral Hesse's own interest to enter into an alliance with Prussia; that it was impossible to have an independent customs system for a population of no more than 600,000. It would be unnatural for Hesse to join the financially barren union between Bavaria and Würtemberg. But to join Prussia would bring a notable revenue amounting to from 20 to 24 silbergroschen per head. It would provide access to a market with 13,000,000 inhabitants. As Prussia's example showed, manufacturing industry was favoured, not by prohibitions, but by the freedom of an extensive internal market. Finally, Electoral Hesse would secure the command of great commercial routes. In default of this accession, Prussia would have to seek a route through Hanover, and the traffic between Bremen and South Germany would have, after reaching Minden, to be diverted towards the Rhine. Many of the courts, and especially Minister Marschall in Wiesbaden, maintained that a customs union involved an infringement of sovereignty. But the grand duke of Hesse remained

sovereign, for the treaty guaranteed equal rights to both parties. "The newer ideas of sovereignty are somewhat fallacious. Particularly do I ask: Is Electoral Hesse more fully sovereign in a treaty with the most powerful of her immediate neighbours, a treaty based upon the principle of equal sovereignty; or is she more fully sovereign in default of such an alliance, when the relationships between herself and the aforesaid most powerful neighbour are unfriendly? Circumstances might arise, perhaps in a distant future, in which a hostile neighbour may be more useful to Prussia than one bound to her by fixed treaties."[1] The terrible frankness of this language was not calculated to win over the elector. Natzmer was dismissed with extreme discourtesy; and Ludwig Kühne, who visited Cassel and also Brunswick at this time to support the general's efforts, was able to effect nothing at either place. In such a mood, furious with his wife and with everything Prussian, the Hessian despot was ready to follow Austria's suggestions blindly.

The Hofburg did not merely desire to prevent the expansion of the Prussian customs system, but hoped to destroy that system, to annihilate the laboriously acquired beginning of German commercial unity. At the North German courts, which by all their natural interests were associated with Prussia, these aims found support. The dynastic hatred of Saxony, the Guelph pride of Hanover, the rage of the elector against his royal brother-in-law, the megalomania of the duke of Nassau, the foolish timidities of the smaller courts, all the base and weakly elements among the North German petty princedoms, were secretly united in the struggle against Prussia. With the support of Austria, and favoured by the commercial jealousy of England, France, and Holland, there now came into existence the Mid-German commercial union, a malicious and unnatural conspiracy against the fatherland, bearing witness, like the Confederation of the Rhine, to the inherent possibilities of the German system of petty princedoms.

§ 4. THE MID-GERMAN COMMERCIAL UNION.

Nowhere did the Prusso-Hessian treaty arouse greater anxiety than at the court of Dresden. How comfortably everything had settled down amid the old tangle of privileges; how delightful it was to talk unctuously at the Bundestag about "German com-

[1] Motz, Confidential Observations for General von Natzmer.

mercial unity " and the " federal customs," animated by the cheerful expectation that nothing whatever would be done, that all serious resolves, all wholesome reforms, could be eternally postponed! Now there suddenly sprang into existence, hard by Saxony's frontiers, two customs unions. What would happen if the momentary ill-humour of the king of Bavaria were to pass away, if these two unions, based upon such similar principles, were to fuse into one, if they were to gain over Thuringia, so that for Leipzig trade the path to the sea would be barred everywhere by custom houses. The complaints of the manufacturers in the Erzgebirge became continually louder. Twice during the year 1828 petitions were sent to the king, imploring him to join either the Prussian or the South German union, since it was essential to adopt a course which would rescue Saxony from its position of isolation. Count Einsiedel, the minister, who, being an owner of iron works, was well acquainted with the needs of large-scale manufacture, began to be dissatisfied with the old system. In an eloquent memorial Wietersheim, one of the ablest of the younger officials, dwelt upon the painful predicament of manufacturing industry and upon the government's sins of omission. King Antony, however, like his minister Manteuffel, considered that a commercial union with Prussia was out of the question. It was in these years that an old and cherished idea of Albertinian policy was revived. Not long before, after the extinction of the house of Gotha, the king of Saxony had played the arbiter and fatherly mediator between the Ernestine cousins. It was hoped in Dresden that a permanent hegemony over the Thuringian states might be secured. All the more painful, therefore, was the perception of the danger that Thuringia might join the Prussian or the South German union.

Out of such calculations originated the design of forming an opposition customs union. Devoid of any positive commercial or political aim, it was to function solely as a wedge driven in between the two other unions, and to form an obstacle to their amalgamation. The essential purpose was to destroy the first beginnings of commercial unity, to perpetuate the shameful condition of German disintegration. The chief supporters of this policy were the brothers Carlowitz, members of one of the most distinguished houses of Upper Saxon nobility. The elder, a minister in the royal Saxon service, had till a year before been federal envoy, and was highly respected in the Eschenheimer Gasse as a well-meaning statesman of the old school, a pedantic representative of the traditional Saxon devotion to formalities. The younger, at this time minister in

Gotha, likewise a man of estimable character, had brought from his home all the ineradicable prejudices of Electoral Saxon nobility. Vainly did the Gotha officials represent to him that their little country was dependent upon Prussia ; vainly did Councillor Braun, a reasonable man, exclaim, " You are behaving as if you were a royal Saxon and not a ducal Saxon statesman." He insisted that " a neutral union " was essential ; that " a mass must be interposed between the two existing customs unions, large enough to inspire respect, and strong enough to dictate terms." It was not difficult to win over the duke of Gotha to the plans of his Saxon adviser. The duke was ill-disposed towards the court of Berlin, for he desired to exchange his remote princedom of Lichtenberg for a portion of Prussian Thuringia, and King Frederick William was still obstinately opposed to the idea. Coburg commercial policy was far from nice in its choice of means. Every three weeks a consignment of newly minted debased coins was despatched to Lichtenberg ; thence the Coburg six-pfennig pieces, in which the copper shone redly through a thin coating of white metal, flooded the neighbouring South German regions where gulden were current, and this systematic issue of false coinage continued for years, notwithstanding all protests. At the Weimar court, too, there was temporarily dominant a party passionately opposed to Prussia, led by the able minister Schweitzer.

Thus in profound secrecy was conceived an extremely dangerous attack upon the commercial unity of Germany, bearing the innocent semblance of a Carlowitz family affair. During the last days of March, 1828, the duke of Gotha, the brothers Carlowitz and Schweitzer, met at the Carlowitz family seat of Oberschöna, not one of them having any clear idea of the weighty consequences of what they were about to do. Fortunately we Germans are united by the obvious ties of common interest and by all our habits of life ; every attempt at open hostility on the part of Germans against Germans assumes the aspect of an unnatural crime, and therefore gives occasion simultaneously for indignation and ridicule. At the very time when at Oberschöna a tariff war against Prussia was decreed, Thon, the Weimar plenipotentiary, was negotiating in Berlin for a friendly abolition of transit dues. Even those who wished to consign the Prussian state to the bottomless pit found that state indispensable. The punctation signed in Oberschöna was to the effect that a commercial union should be formed between Saxony, Electoral Hesse, and Thuringia. The participators " will endeavour to secure the accession of the other countries lying between the Prussian and the Bavarian customs lines." They

pledged themselves " not individually to enter any foreign customs system, nor, without the approval of the union, to make a commercial or customs treaty with any state in which such a system prevails." They agreed to treat their respective subjects upon equal terms, and (article 7) that transit dues upon commerce with states within the union should not be higher than Saxon transit dues. Six months after the formation of the union, negotiations were to take place for common commercial treaties and retaliatory measures.

It was a *pactum de paciscendo*, a treaty devoid of positive content, a pledge to do nothing for the time being, an agreement that the existing state of affairs should not be altered without common consent. There was no question of customs community between the allied states, no talk of serious reforms. Nevertheless the " neutral " union might prove extremely injurious to the Prussian customs system, for its aim was to deprive Prussian commercial policy of its strongest weapon of offence, the transit dues. If it should prove possible to win over to the union all the territories interspersed among Prussian provinces, and above all if the coastal states were to accede to the union, imports from the sea to the interior of Germany would pass by way of the states of the union, for the transit dues of Saxony were much lower than those of Prussia. If recourse should be had in addition to the proposed retaliatory duties, if heavy tolls should be imposed upon trade between Bavaria and Prussia and between the different parts of Prussia, Prussia would be simultaneously deprived of a lucrative source of income and of her most effective means of negotiation; not merely would the expansion of the Prussian system be checked, but the very existence of the system would be endangered. Tariff war was decreed under the mask of neutrality. Solely in order to injure Prussia, the Saxon government pledged itself to leave its own manufactures defenceless, and to sacrifice the industry of the Erzgebirge to English competition. It was not by patriotic sentiment that the lesser states of the German north were ultimately led to adhere to the Prusso-German customs system; no means, however improper, were left unused in the endeavour to destroy the Prussian customs system; and it was not until all attempts to secure this end had failed that German commercial unity was perforce accepted.

The Oberschöna punctation was sent to Bernhard von Lindenau, Saxon federal envoy; in the Eschenheimer Gasse, new recruits were to be gained for the cause of the " Saxon anti-customs-union,"

as Berlin phrased it. Lindenau was a man of fine disposition and high culture, an honest liberal, and an enthusiast for Germany's greatness. He had recently worked sagaciously as member of the Gotha ministry. He had a straightforward desire for German commercial unity, and assured his Darmstadt colleague in Frankfort that had Electoral Hesse joined the Prussian customs union he would himself have approved the accession of Saxony and Thuringia. Now that Electoral Hesse had refused, he hoped that his goal might be attained in another way, namely, by a union of the North German territories, which would be able to force Prussia to mitigate her customs system. He suffered from the primal curse which affects the diplomats of petty states, for he over-estimated the power of Saxony, and failed to recognise that the Prussian government would regard as open hostility any attempt to dictate terms, and that Prussia would be forced to arm in self-defence. Thus the good man devoted his lofty idealism and his indefatigable energy to the service of plans which originated in dynastic envy; and for two years he laboured to form a union of which Stein spoke contemptuously as "a spurious league." Not even the affinities of the extremely unambiguous political personalities who hastened to take up the Oberschöna plan, could serve to open the eyes of the Saxon statesman. Münch and Langenau, Marschall and Rothschild, all the pillars of the Austrian party, were recruiting on behalf of the commercial union. The duke of Nassau visited Langenau several times a week, hoping to secure fresh allies.

Thus was initiated another of those delectable intrigues which served from time to time to provide an interlude in the hopeless tedium of federal affairs. It was soon common knowledge at the Bundestag that all the threads of the conspiracy were in the hands of Austria. With customary disingenuousness, the Hofburg disclaimed all partisanship. Councillor von Kress, leader of Austrian commercial policy, solemnly assured the Prussian chargé d'affaires that Austria had not said a word to hinder the accession of Darmstadt. He (von Kress) had been in charge of the correspondence, and had written to Darmstadt to the effect that the Austrian court would be delighted if Hesse should find an alliance with Prussia advantageous.[1] In view of the disclosures made to Berlin by the Darmstadt court, such asseverations could produce nothing but a smile. Austria's attitude towards the new anti-customs-union was shown plainly enough (if reports from the Frankfort embassy needed any confirmation) by a letter from Lindenau

[1] Maltzan's Report, September 10, 1828.

which became known in Berlin. "I am treating with Holstein and the Netherlands," wrote the Saxon diplomatist to Leonhardi, the federal envoy; "moreover we can be assured that this mutually useful and promising undertaking will receive support from the Austrian government, which desires to promote it.[1] Other foreign enemies of Prussian commercial policy approved the union. The members of the union were assured by Count Reinhard that they had the cordial sympathy of the Paris cabinet. To win over the Netherlands, Lindenau visited Brussels in the autumn, declaring there (though he represented Saxony, the state on the Elbe) that it was necessary to revivify the traffic of the Rhine and the Main, that traffic which had been so seriously injured by commerce on the Elbe and the Weser; the Dutch trade in foreign and colonial groceries must be restored on the Rhine to the level it had attained in the eighteenth century. It was by no means Holland's intention to allow its German province to form part of the union, but the Netherland diplomats in Frankfort were zealous on behalf of the new scheme.

The attitude of England-Hanover was decisive. In London it was still the custom to reckon arrogantly upon Germany's dissensions, and every indication of independent will in German commercial policy was regarded by the British as a blow in the face. What a delightful prospect if the anti-customs-union should serve, not merely to perpetuate the boundless anarchy of the German customs system, but also, on the payment of moderate transit dues, to open a way for English goods into the very heart of Germany, whence the smugglers could introduce them into Prussia and Bavaria. Addington, English envoy at the Bundestag, took up Lindenau's ideas with fiery zeal. In vain did the cautious Milbanke, chargé d'affaires in the town of Frankfort, send warning to the effect that the union had absolutely no positive aim, that it neither could nor would endure, and that reform of the German customs system was inevitable. In London, Addington's views gained the day, for the idea was too alluring, this possibility of extending to the Main the open Hanoverian market which had hitherto been of such inestimable value to English manufacture. As always, Hanover, an English sloop, followed in the wake of the larger vessel. Count Münster slily referred to the Prussian customs union as "a Prussian meeting house," and had to accept reproof for his "lack of straightforwardness" from Bülow, the Prussian envoy. Simultaneously, as Bülow was

[1] Lindenau to Leonhardi, June 3, 1828.

informed by Minister Fitzgerald, the Saxon envoy in London was urging extreme measures against the Prussian customs system, which was, he declared, equally harmful to English trade and to the independence of the German states.[1] Consequently Hanover joined the union, and thus it was that the industrial region of Saxony became subordinated to English commercial interests. Baron von Grote, an able Hanoverian official and the sworn enemy of Prussia, became, next to Lindenau, the soul of the league.

Bremen likewise adhered. The good Smidt had been profoundly influenced by the dreams of Wangenheim, who from his seclusion in Coburg was again working against Prussia. Smidt could not overcome a morbid distrust of the North German capital, and now that the idea of a pure German sonderbund was secretly supported even by Austria, he abandoned himself to the design with less caution than he was accustomed to display. As he several times declared at the Bundestag, he desired the establishment of German consulates and a German flag; but so long as Germany had not yet become a national commercial entity, the loosely organised Hanoverian customs system was more convenient for Bremen free trade than was the stricter Prussian system. It was not unnatural that, at the first glance, the facilitation of transit trade promised by the "neutral" union should seem attractive to Hanseatic statesmen. Yet it could only be at the first glance. Owing to his prejudices against the Prussian customs system, Smidt failed to notice that to participate in the new commercial union was to run counter to traditional Hanseatic commercial policy. The union was not in reality neutral, but was partisan through and through, was anti-Prussian. Smidt's esteem for this still-born league was so great that he procured for its originator, Carlowitz of Saxony, the freedom of the city of Bremen, a rare honour which had not been accorded to any German statesman since Stein. The Hamburg senate took a more dispassionate view, and refused to co-operate in the new union, on the ground that the free port of Hamburg must serve the interests of German trade as a whole. The great firms of Frankfort, on the other hand, hailed with delight the prospect of a facilitation of transit traffic, for this would favour the smuggling trade of the city; moreover, the patricians of the proud republic had long been accustomed to act as servile tools of the Austrian envoy. Burgomaster Thomas and Senator Guaita,

[1] Bülow's Report, July 31, 1828, confirmed by Blittersdorff's Reports from Frankfort.

with the aid of the Austrian faction, carried a resolution to adhere to the union, notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of a Prussian party.

It was only through Electoral Hesse that the union could secure territorial contiguity, and it was in Hesse, therefore, that the strongest influences were brought to bear. The younger Carlowitz went to Cassel in April, and was soon joined by Lindenau. Both statesmen, supported by Hruby, gave the elector the assurances he most desired. The neutral union, they said, did not wish for any alteration in the existing laws of Electoral Hesse; the country was regarded as the kernel of the league, the elector's knowledge of affairs was indispensable to it, and for this reason the deliberations concerning the fundamental law were to take place in Cassel, under his eyes. But the decisive factor was found in the elector's statesmanlike resolve to play a nasty trick upon his brother-in-law in Berlin. The adhesion of Electoral Hesse would do more than compensate for the refusal of Baden. Lindenau wrote to Berstett saying that he hoped all the more confidently for the cooperation of the court of Carlsruhe because the union "will neither injure the independence of Badenese administration nor involve the slightest disturbance of the territory's finances; on the contrary, it will secure its aim of effecting the unaltered maintenance of the status quo." [1] The proposal was rejected. Baden, on hostile terms with Bavaria, and surrounded by territories belonging to the South German and to the Prussian unions, had nothing to hope from the neutral union, but everything to fear from Prussia's anger. Lindenau's recruiting efforts secured favourable audience at all the other minor courts. Some of the timid Thuringian cabinets were won over by the confidential assurance that Prussia was a party to the formation of the union—a pure invention, which nevertheless found credence, for the Prussian diplomats, as before, remained quietly in the background. Even Duke Charles of Brunswick, for the nonce, went hand in hand with the detested junior branch of the Guelph house; a hint from Metternich determined his accession.

Thus it was that in the course of the summer all the lesser states lying between the two halves of the Prussian monarchy were recruited for the league of neutrality, which adopted the name of Mid-German Commercial Union. After several years of fruitless negotiation, within a single year three commercio-political unions suddenly sprang to life in Germany. Baden and the Low German petty states eastward of the Elbe alone remained isolated. On

[1] Lindenau to Berstett, April 19, 1828.

June 25th a triumphant article appeared in the *Frankfurter Oberpostamtszeitung*, from the pen of Lindenau, proclaiming that Saxony, Hanover, Electoral Hesse, Nassau, and Frankfort, were the creators of the new union, through which article 19 of the federal act became a reality. The union did not create new customs lines, but bore freedom of trade as the device upon its banner. "It is a demand of natural law that goods should be exchanged for goods, that freedom should respond to freedom, equality to equality. Should this law be ignored, should obedience to it be refused, the union will not lack means to enforce it, as will be just and right, for the union will be able to furnish either help or hindrance, to distribute advantages and disadvantages." It had a domain inhabited by six million souls; it commanded all the extensive coast of the North Sea; the leading staple and trading towns of Germany were in its hands. It alone was competent to free from all dues the Elbe, the Rhine, the Main, and the Weser!

There was good ground for this boasting! Never before had particularism brought forth so monstrous, so unnatural an abortion. In the form of a huge barbed hook the domain of the union extended from Bremen to Fulda and thence westward to the Rhine; on the east it reached as far as the Silesian frontier; from the English market of Hanover it passed to the industrial districts of Saxony, across a motley mass of territories which, vis-à-vis Prussia, were held together by but a single common interest—fear and envy. Even the petty states of the German north, which had hitherto opposed an inert resistance to the commercio-political endeavours of Prussia, on the one hand, and of Bavaria and Würtemberg on the other, suddenly began to talk about the freedom of German trade. But far from invoking article 19 of the federal act, they swore to maintain the existing disintegration and to destroy Prussian transit trade. And behind this league, as its protectors, stood Austria, England, Holland and France! If any doubt had remained in Berlin as to the hostile sentiments animating the Mid-German union, the masked phraseology of the allied cabinets would have put the matter beyond all doubt. The Dresden court had begun its work in profound stillness, and without giving the slightest intimation to the Prussian embassy. When the Prussian court become aware of what was going on, Count Einsiedel wrote to von Watzdorf, Saxon envoy in Berlin, to convey a solemn assurance that Baden was not being asked to join. Unfortunately, however, the court of Carlsruhe had promptly communicated to the Berlin cabinet Lindenau's letter of invitation to Berstett. The departmental

chief in the foreign office wrote as marginal note on the Saxon despatch: "The contradiction is to be found in our records. Count Bernstorff can give Herr von Watzdorf better information." No less suspicious did it seem that von Reden, Hanoverian envoy in Dresden, should suddenly, and for no apparent reason, send a despatch to Bernstorff conveying an emphatic assurance that Hanover had absolutely no hostile intentions towards Prussia, and heartily disapproved of the detestable programme announced in the *Oberpostamtszeitung*.[1] Why this unsolicited exculpation if there were no sense of guilt? At a later date, in a memorial of the year 1832, Metternich spoke of the Mid-German customs union as having "originated in an attempt to secure protection against the Prussian customs system."

Once again did public opinion display its old and unteachable wrong-headedness. In Arnstadt the people assembled before the dwelling of the hereditary prince, threatening to emigrate in mass unless their ruler would adhere to the Mid-German union. *Die Biene*, the organ of the Saxon opposition, warmly defended the magnanimous aim of the Saxon crown to save the independence of "our fatherland." The Erzgebirge, so the journal declared, would inevitably perish if the Prussian customs dues were to hinder the import of grain from Bohemia—though by the Prussian customs system no burdens whatever were imposed upon the grain trade! Loud were the rejoicings of the liberals over the shameful defeat of Prussian absolutism; Prussia's lust for dominion had led to her humiliation, and the balance of power in Germany had been restored! Even in Bavaria and Würtemberg, whose own customs system was endangered by the Mid-German union, the press defended the new commercial league. In Bavaria, the *Hesperus* railed against Darmstadt, which had committed industrial suicide, and had robbed Swabia and Bavaria of "a portion of the blessings of noble princes." The *Neckarzeitung* hailed the union as evidence of federal loyalty, as an ultimate attempt to carry out the promises of the federal act. Even within the Bavarian government, there was to be found a party ready to support the Saxon-English projects; Lerchenfeld and Oberkamp, the entire federal embassy of King Louis, were in confidential converse with Lindenau. There were few to appreciate the steadfast patriotic pride of Baron vom Stein, who, full of contempt for the vassals of English commercial policy, wrote to Gagern: "It is worthy of the pitiful, envious, anti-national views

[1] Einsiedel, Instruction to Watzdorf, May 14; Reden to Bernstorff, August 16, 1828.

of our petty cabinets to join forces with foreigners in this way, to endure the foreign lash rather than sacrifice their mean jealousies for the sake of the general national interest."

On May 21st, 1828, the allies had signed a preliminary treaty in Frankfort. On August 22nd, the union having meanwhile filled its ranks, the plenipotentiaries met in council, and the definitive treaty was completed on September 24th. The speed of the deliberations contrasted strangely with the usual practice of our federal statesmen; it was manifest that they foresaw danger in delay, and that they thought rather of a move in the diplomatic game than of the construction of a permanent work. The treaty, drafted in Dresden, gave far clearer expression than the Oberschöna punctation to a hostile and aggressive anti-Prussian tendency. The aim of the union, it was declared, was to promote freedom of commerce in the sense of article 19 of the federal act; "To extend to the whole the advantages which in this respect accrue to individual states through geographical situation and in other ways, and at the same time to preserve and secure these advantages." The allies pledged themselves that not one of them would enter any other customs union prior to December 31, 1834 (the date of expiry of the Prusso-Hessian treaty). Roads were to be kept in good repair and new roads were planned. No increase was to be made in the existing transit dues upon goods destined for any member of the union, but each was free to impose higher transit dues upon goods passing from the territory of a non-member to that of another non-member. This unambiguous article VII was the work of England-Hanover. It threatened the destruction of trade between the two halves of the Prussian monarchy, and simultaneously foreshadowed the systematic favouring of English imports. For inasmuch as, upon Hanover's express demand, it was left within the competence of every individual state to conclude commercial treaties with foreigners, there would thus be opened for English goods, by way of Bremen and Hanover, an almost duty-free route towards such inland states as Saxony, Thuringia, Nassau, and Frankfort, which did not as yet possess any properly established frontier customs system. Still plainer was the wording of article IX, which left it open to every individual member to impose retaliatory duties at its own discretion. This article was inserted at the instigation of Electoral Hesse, and by retaliation the elector understood the use of all possible odious and arbitrary measures against his neighbours. There was but one notable advantage conferred upon commerce by the union, namely the facilitation of transit

trade, and this was purchased at the cost of severe injury to native industry, above all to that of the Erzgebirge. For the rest, all the existing excises and dues were retained, it being merely specified that the members of the union might not prohibit the import of one another's goods, and that no taxes were to be imposed upon ordinary agricultural produce.

The essential aim of the treaty was, for the next six years, to hinder the expansion of the Prussian customs system; and it was hoped that, during this period, by the diversion of the transit trade, it might prove possible to lay an axe at the very root of the Prussian customs. A Nassau memorial, composed by Marschall and Röntgen, discussing the relationship of the union to Prussia and Bavaria,[1] furnishes plain evidence of these friendly intentions. In moving terms the document describes how Darmstadt has joined "a system which does not issue out of her own autonomy." It is true that "the outward forms of independence are to be preserved," but the grand duchy "has relinquished for the term of the treaty all material autonomy, can henceforward merely expect a magnanimous regard for her desires, and has consequently advanced a long step towards her ultimate mediatisation." In contrast with such weakness the allies were resolved "not to display any tame spirit of self-sacrifice," and not to adopt "any commercial legislation which is not dictated by their own needs. . . . The essence of the Cassel treaty is to be found in the very formation of the union, in the non plus ultra established for six years. Its import is further to be found in the motive thus furnished, by the close association now established for six years, for the rejection of various unreasonable demands against which, when they proceed from those in a powerful position, the isolated and weakly individual can oppose little more than a plea for mercy." Finally, the significance of the treaty is to be found in the prospect it offers of "the honourable attainment" of a union with other states. Bavaria and Prussia have the same need of close association as have the states of the union; indeed, their need is even greater. For this reason, the union must keep a tight hand upon the lines of communication between Bavaria and Prussia, and must permit the free use of these routes by joint agreement only. In this way will legal order be established throughout Germany, bringing comparatively equal rights to all.

The memorial concludes with the pathetic inquiry: "Is there

[1] Presumably this memorial was written in the beginning of the year 1829. The transcripts in the Carlsruhe and Berlin archives are undated.

any reason to suppose that Prussia is at all inclined to share in or to favour the delirious and arrogant dreams in which the whole of North Germany is conceived of as the rightful prey, too long withheld, of the Prussian eagle?" The terrors of the petty states could hardly secure franker expression. It was not any positive idea, it was nothing but the dread of Prussia and Bavaria, nothing but the weak desire to provide a "tertium aliquid" (as Gagern phrased it), which brought the Mid-German union into being. But the more hopeless the perplexity, the louder was the noise; "a cackling was heard," wrote du Thil, "as if a great work had been completed." A shower of orders and distinctions rewarded all the participators in the Cassel deliberations, the very copying clerks not being overlooked.

Yet the solitary weapon which might have been used against Prussia proved ineffective, for it was impossible to paralyse Prussian transit trade so long as the commercial routes which were to surround Prussian territory were still unconstructed. Numerous schemes were discussed in Cassel. The deliberators dreamed of new roads adjoining Darmstadt's frontiers, of a long highway from Saxony to Electoral Hesse through Altenburg and Gotha, which was to divert commerce from the Prussian road through Kösen and Eckartsberga. But who was to make the roads? The impoverished little Ernestine states did not possess the means, and the larger allies were unwilling to provide the money. Besides, Prussian territory was everywhere in the way; how was it possible to evade the Erfurt region, where Prussia had already constructed an excellent high road? Unceasingly the allied diplomats endeavoured to cut off Bavaria and Würtemberg from Prussia; Stralenheim, Hanoverian envoy in Stuttgart, was indefatigable in warning King William against Prussian lures. The Dresden court, which maintained the leadership of the union, continually reiterated its willingness to entertain proposals for the further development of the league. No one offered any practicable proposals. Even before the Cassel meeting, Lindenau admitted to a Frankfort colleague: "Most of the participators regard the union as a couch of rest, and would prefer that everything should continue in the old way." The Thuringians were now complaining of Saxony's ambition for hegemony, while Frankfort grumbled at the heavy dues of Electoral Hesse. The elector, desiring to secure higher prices for his own wood, forbade the continuance of the old-established lumber trade which was carried on from the Hanoverian forests across Hessian territory. The impossibility of friendly relations with such a prince was obvious

to all. Negotiations continued for nearly a year between the two Hessian houses for the facilitation of trade with some of the enclaves. Then the elector declared that the mutual pledge not to increase the transit dues on certain routes was binding only on Darmstadt and not on Electoral Hesse! Maltzan described the elector's instruction to the negotiators as "characterised by a naive ignorance and a despotic tone worthy of the pen of a Rabener."

The conflict of commercial aims within the union became continually plainer. The merchants of Frankfort and Bremen demanded unrestricted free trade, while Hanover desired preference for English goods. Other states were dreaming of new customs barriers, while yet others were hoping to enforce mitigations of the Prussian customs system and then to secure admission to this system. In all the minor courts there was not a man competent to cling tenaciously to a clear idea; Charles Augustus of Weimar had died in the summer of 1828. Before long the coastal lands and the inland states split into two groups. Thuringia and Saxony concluded a separate treaty, and Hanover and Oldenburg did the same. They undertook that in commercial matters their respective subjects should be upon an identical footing, etc., etc.—trivial concessions which in Prussia were needless, since the freer Prussian customs law made no distinction between Prussian and non-Prussian members of the union. None of these cabinets had yet recognised the simple fact, which had long been known to Berlin, that nothing but the abolition of internal dues could further German trade. The blank inertia of the Austrian statesmen was content with the success of the moment. A barrier which might last for a few years had been established against the Prussian customs system; but a positive development of the Mid-German union was not desired in Vienna, since here every league within the league was regarded as dangerous. Münch-Bellinghausen, thoroughly satisfied, wrote to Blittersdorf: "How cleverly has Austria worked to avoid the collisions which Prussia will not be able to escape!" But the Badenese statesman, far more perspicacious, wrote: "I was astonished at such blindness. To believe that an arrest in national life was possible! To believe that the Prusso-Hessian union would ever be dissolved! Austria alone is responsible for all these troubles. Austria has done nothing to carry out article 19 of the federal act, and has thus delivered us into the hands of Prussia." [1]

[1] Blittersdorff's Reports, March 2 and May 20, 1829.

§ 5. THE VICTORY OF PRUSSIA. PRUSSO-BAVARIAN COMMERCIAL TREATY.

Prussia now raised the gauntlet. The court of Berlin had contemplated with customary equanimity and reserve the first proceedings of the Mid-German states. There was no harm in a Saxon-Thuringian union, and it was only the accession of Hanover which gave the combination dangerous extension. It seemed impossible for Berlin to believe that this cabinet, on terms of intimate friendship, to which Prussia had so recently offered new roads and commercial privileges, would join a league directed against Prussia. But Hanover went over to the alliance at the very time when Bernstorff was still expecting a friendly answer to his offer. No further doubt was possible as to the character of the union. Motz, in his bold and ardent manner, promptly demanded that the opponents should be treated as such, declaring: "Should this union come into existence, Prussia is in a position to treat her customs system as closed, and is not in a position to accept this neutral union, as its adherents desire, under conditions dictated by themselves." [1]

Although as yet the intelligence to hand regarding the designs of the union was but scanty, the minister for finance guessed at the first glance that the allies hoped to destroy Prussian transit trade. For this very reason, he continued, more attention than ever must be paid to the support of this trade; road construction must be vigorously pushed; above all, the macadamisation of the important highway from Magdeburg to Zeitz must be promptly completed. The offers to Hanover must be considered as annulled. He spoke yet more decisively in a despatch to Bernstorff, saying, "Unquestionably it is a remarkable sign of the times that in central and above all in northern Germany, in the very heart of the Germanic Federation and yet under the Austrian flag, a coalition should be formed, whose ostensible aim it is to perfect the conditions of the Federation, but which excludes Prussia from its designs and deliberations, and which shows in every possible way, not merely that it regards the carrying out and expansion of general federal maxims as possible without Prussian participation, but further that it considers Prussia the disturbing principle of such carrying out and expansion, and therefore believes it desirable to establish formal opposition to Prussia." Consequently the union must not be

[1] Motz and Schuckmann to the Foreign Office, May 22, 1828.

ignored; Prussia's righteous hostility must find definite expression; and a resolution must be formed "to oppose by appropriate measures any further development, which might in any way compromise us, of this remarkable system." [1]

The resolute man had long held clear views regarding Austria's aims. He knew that the Austrian victualling officers in Mainz, desiring to injure the Prusso-Hessian union, were making gross misuse of the privilege by which the Austrian garrison was exempted from taxation, issuing passes for tobacco, sugar, and beer on a scale which would have provided for more than the entire needs of Rhenish Hesse.[2] He demanded that the envoy in Vienna should roundly declare that Prussia was not befooled by the hanky panky which was being played with article 19, and would neither allow herself to be flouted nor to be taken advantage of. On November 8th he wrote to the minister for foreign affairs: "I am unable to judge whether and to what extent we may count upon the existence of genuinely friendly dispositions on Austria's part towards us. But this much seems certain, that Austria desires to impose upon the Germanic Federation (too precipitatedly organised) the character of the former league of German princes, and that she hopes to play therein the part of Frederic the Great." In the Coethen customs dispute, he says, Austria's attitude towards Prussia was definitely unfriendly; and without Austrian assistance the Mid-German union would never have come into being.[3]

A glance at these documents enables us to solve the riddle, why the Berlin cabinet preserved so stubborn a silence concerning the secret history of its commercial policy, calmly enduring even the most flatulent boastings of the numerous bodily and spiritual fathers of the customs union. Afterwards, as before, the league of the eastern powers was the leading idea of the king's foreign policy. A breach with Austria would make the Germanic Federation impossible of continuance, and the possibility even of the incipient customs union would become questionable. Consequently, it was the task of Prussian diplomacy to maintain a calm and firm attitude in order to prevent the court of Vienna from undertaking any overt resistance to Prussia's commercial policy. Prussia yielded to the Hofburg the leading place in the phantasmagoria of the Bundestag, demanding for herself leadership in the

[1] Motz to Bernstorff, June 26, 1828.

[2] Witzleben to Motz, May 30; Report from Major von Rochow in Mainz, May 21, 1828.

[3] Motz to Bernstorff, June 29 and November 8, 1828.

real business of German statecraft. So long as there was neither will nor power to resume the warlike methods of Frederician days, this remained the sole possible path of national policy. The king had no mind to do away with German dualism; his aim was no more than to secure for the Prussian state a sphere of independent and untroubled activity in the domain of German politics. For such a system, caution, foresight, and inviolable taciturnity were indispensable requisites; it would collapse as soon as the world learned how skilfully Prussia's commercial policy was being directed towards a definite end and how plainly the best intelligences in the cabinet recognised the conflict of interests which separated the two great powers of the Federation.

The foreign office did not immediately accede to the bellicose desires of the minister of finance. The king insisted upon quiet and careful examination, lest by a premature decision injustice should be done to any German federal state. But as soon as further information came to hand, Eichhorn accepted Motz's view, and issued an instruction to the Prussian envoys throughout Germany, expounding in detail how wrong-headed and hopeless was the undertaking of the Mid-Germans. The allies, he said, would do well to ask themselves what a union comprising six million inhabitants, belonging almost exclusively to inland territories, could expect to gain from a conflict with Prussia; whether it was not likely that their internal trade would be destroyed rather than revived, and that their foreign trade would suffer restriction rather than expansion. The Viennese embassy was instructed to complain of the hostile attitude of the Austrian diplomats, and to address to the chancellor a serious enquiry (whose wording was calculated to play upon to Metternich's terror of the demagogues); "Is it not chiefly through the divisions and separations which issue from trade and commerce, that a mood of uneasiness, dissatisfaction, and longing for change is sustained?" The envoy in London was ordered to convey a decisive intimation that there could now be no idea of negotiations with Hanover: "We must openly declare that our confidence has been poorly repaid by Hanover." In Dresden, Jordan was to announce displeasure on account of the distrustful secrecy of Saxon policy; in Hamburg, Grote was to express to the senate his recognition of the discreet and proper behaviour of that body, and was to convey a hope that this attitude would be maintained.[1]

[1] Eichhorn, Instruction to the Embassies in Germany, August 14, 1828; Motz to Bülow in London, May 2 and 24, 1828.

Simultaneously, orders were issued to the local governments in the frontier districts to keep a sharp watch upon the commercial expedients of the allies, who continued to veil their aims in enigmatic obscurity. Herein was displayed all the unnaturalness of the Mid-German union. The domain of the union lay within the Prussian sphere of influence, was everywhere interrupted by portions of Prussian territory, and was closely connected with Prussia by a thousand bonds of neighbourly intercourse. Large numbers of Prussian diligence employees, Prussian raft inspectors, and Prussian inspectors of navigation, lived in enemy country, and gave trustworthy news of all that took place upon the allies' roads and rivers. The *Staatszeitung* and Buchholz's *Neue Monatsschrift* began a paper war against the commercial union. "Sovereignty which wishes to display itself in nothing but opposition," wrote Buchholz warningly, "is in a state of self-contradiction, and can experience nothing but defeat." Motz also desired to adopt retaliatory measures which would strike home at his opponents; he thought of depriving the Saxon manufacturers of the fair-rebate, and of establishing a fair in Magdeburg. In this matter, however, the king overruled Motz, for Frederick William wished to keep his promise even now, and not to permit any hostile measures against members of the Germanic Federation; he reminded the pugnacious minister of the consideration which must be paid to that body.[1]

It is true that the plain language of Prussian diplomacy aroused anxiety and compunction at some of the smallest courts. The prince of Sondershausen, whose Unterherrschaft was flourishing under the protection of the Prussian customs system, had joined the commercial union with his Oberherrschaft, and, through the instrumentality of his privy council, begged the cabinet of Berlin "not to judge amiss this step taken under duress." The response of the Berlin foreign office was to express the hope "that the council would not hesitate in its choice between the maintenance of the hitherto existing relationship with Prussia and the participation in a new union." In an autograph letter, the prince now begged the king's pardon, beseeching him, "to judge the matter with the greatest leniency and not to withhold the priceless gift of his favour."[2] On December 16, the duke of Gotha wrote to Wittgenstein, saying that he had heard to his "great astonishment" that Prussia disapproved of the commercial union; it would never have entered his

[1] Bernstorff to Motz, December 13, 1828.

[2] Prince Günther of Sondershausen to King Frederick William, December 20, 1828.

mind to do anything that could offend the Prussian court, whose favour he so greatly esteemed.

Gentle measures could not suffice in the case of the larger states of the union. Motz was in the right of it when he wrote to Bernstorff: "I am of opinion that as far as those federal states are concerned which in financial matters are simply our enemies, we can put aside all other considerations than those which are offered us by the existing treaties—for the Prussian state can and may subordinate to its own supreme interests the interests of the federal states, and after the experiences of the last thirteen years we know that the love of these states can only be secured through fear and respect." [1] The fiery man had determined to destroy the commercial union, holding that a waiting policy would no longer serve to meet open hostility. "We shall yet bring it to pass," he confidently exclaimed, "that individual members of the Mid-German union will earnestly beg for admission into the Prussian union!" In January he had still been doubtful whether an alliance with the remote Bavario-Würtemburg union was advisable; but he now conceived the happy thought of stretching out a hand to the South German kingdoms across the commercial union, thus destroying the Mid-German sonderbund by an alliance between north and south.

Fortunately for Germany, at the same hour similar wishes awakened in Munich and Stuttgart. However loudly King Louis, in the first flush of wrath, might rail against the treachery of Prussia and Darmstadt, he could not permanently shut his eyes to the fact that his own bold plans had been frustrated. Now that Electoral Hesse had gone over to the Mid-Germans, it was no longer possible to think of an expansion of the South German union; the pure German league under Wittelsbach colours must remain a dream. It was equally impossible for the union to remain in its isolated situation. Moreover, as Metternich had foreseen, the old enmity between the two kings speedily made itself manifest once more. The hopes of a commercial union with Switzerland came to naught owing to dissensions among the Confederates. Thus to the High German kings the only choice lay between association with Prussia or with the Saxon-English union. But behind Saxony and Hanover stood Austria, and this alone sufficed to turn the king of Würtemberg against the Mid-German allies. His new minister of finance, Baron Carl Varnbüler, the man who had

[1] Motz to Bernstorff, December 19, 1828.

in earlier days been one of the leading advocates of the "good old law," proved an excellent man of affairs, and strongly advised an understanding with Prussia. What notable commercial advantages could the Mid-Germans offer beyond reduction of the transit dues? How could the patriotic king of Bavaria participate in those unsavoury intrigues with France, England, and Holland which the Mid-German union was unashamedly pursuing? In the first access of wrath, King Louis had indeed made a step towards France; but to enter into an alliance with the foreigner, to subordinate German trade to English commercial interests, was no less impossible to the monarch who, despite all his eccentricities, was German to the core, than it was to his trusty minister, Armansperg.

As soon as Munich could think matters over dispassionately, Prussia's conduct even in the Sponheim negotiations became explicable. The Berlin government was pledged by European treaties to the protection of Baden's rights; as King Louis was forced to admit, Prussia had acted with perfect openness; and her envoy now did his best, by conciliatory language, to appease the enraged monarch. Prussia proposed that Bavaria and Baden should mutually renounce their hereditary Sponheim claims, so that the wretched dispute might be permanently settled. King Louis was long reluctant to accept this solution, but at length he began to understand that this was the only way in which he could come with credit out of a lost game. Late in the summer of 1828, the minister and his royal friend were already beginning to turn over in their minds whether an approach to the Prusso-Hessian union was not inevitable. Public opinion in Bavaria was definitely adverse to such a step, but to the friends this was a spur rather than a hindrance. Inspired with lofty enthusiasm, and open to all the suggestions of the extraordinary, it was a delight to both to astonish the world by unexpected decisions. All the more difficult was it for them to accept the humiliation of their ambition, the shipwreck of their pure German plans. Yet they succeeded in constraining their minds to the sacrifice. It was borne in upon the participants in these dry business negotiations that the Germans were parts of one whole, and that nothing but mistrust, ignorance, and that spirit of self-seeking which is always its own worst enemy, could estrange them one from another.

Quite unexpectedly there now appeared a helper competent to favour the change of mood at the court of Munich and to work valiantly in the great cause of Germany. The bookseller, Baron

von Cotta, as a man of business, was more intimately acquainted with personalities and conditions in the German north than were the Swabian and Bavarian officials, and, as he had shown in the Würtemberg constitutional struggle, he had in commercial matters an outlook far wider than that of ordinary South German prejudice. Enterprising and active, a friend of Nebenius and other notable economists in all parts of Germany, he had long recognised that South German trade could never thrive without the friendly assistance of Prussia; and although it was of the utmost importance to him not to lose Metternich's favour for his *Allgemeine Zeitung*, he came to the bold determination to play the part of intermediary. After a private interview with Armansperg, in September, 1828, he went to Berlin to attend the great natural science congress, which was thus to be of importance in the field of German politics. Through the instrumentality of Humboldt, Cotta was introduced to Witzleben and Motz, and, taking the opportunity of asking these statesmen whether an understanding between Bavaria and Prussia might not be possible, secured a favourable reception. A remarkable kinship of views became manifest. Motz recognised that he had long been animated by similar intentions, and that nothing but misunderstandings had hitherto held the two states apart. Cotta returned home and wrote from Munich on October 20th, to the effect that he had communicated the minister's "gracious advances" to the monarchs in Munich and Stuttgart; they were both convinced that it was essential to carry out the design, and had already refused an invitation to join the Mid-German union. Motz now let the foreign office into the secret, declaring, "It is desirable to establish a commercial union with Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden"; for its own sake the south must accept the principles of the Prussian customs, and more particularly must impose high duties upon foreign goods, that is, upon the goods of the Mid-German union. As long as this union continued to prevent complete amalgamation with the south, Prussia-Hesse and Bavaria-Würtemberg must, at least as far as their own produce was concerned, allow one another reciprocal freedom from tariff.[1]

In November the negotiator hastened back to Berlin, this time with formal credentials, and was graciously received by the king. With astonishment the Berliners recounted to one another how a mere bookseller had been invited to dinner. After prolonged negotiations, Motz handed him the punctation of the treaty. On December 17th, Cotta wrote triumphantly from Munich: "All that

[1] Cotta to Motz, October 20; Motz to Bernstorff, November 8, 1828.

I brought back with me secured a most welcome reception here," alike with King Louis and with Minister Armansperg. "Both of them are animated with the great idea of making a union between Prussia, Bavaria, and Würtemberg, in accordance with the principles you laid down, a guiding star of policy. I already foresee the speedy realisation of your splendid thought." On December 20th he wrote once more: "Should Baden also be won over, there will be laid in South Germany the foundation stone of the edifice which, for the benefit and prosperity of Germany, you and your honoured king have designed."

Motz replied that it was his hope "to found a work which will not merely advantage us and our contemporaries, but in which our descendants will also take delight." The Mid-German union must be openly fought, "for our common aim, the establishment in Germany of the widest possible general market, will, as far as Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Prussia are concerned, secure no assistance from the principles of this neutral union, but, further, many obstacles to the realisation of our desires will actually be strengthened by this union." [1] Simultaneously he wrote to the crown prince of Prussia, now a guest at the court of Munich, informing him of Cotta's secret mission, and earnestly begging the prince's support. The treaty, said Motz, would prove of the utmost importance alike politically and economically, although at first the receipts from the customs might be to some extent diminished. The prince, who had long been friendly to the minister, now took an active hand in the negotiations.

On January 8, 1829, Cotta was able to report from Stuttgart that King William, too, had approved the main principles of the Prussian punctation; and towards the end of the month the indefatigable man paid his third visit to Berlin. At times the Prussian minister almost lost patience on account of all the anxious provisos upon which the South German negotiator insisted, complaining bitterly of this "chaffering." [2] Bavaria raised objections to the complete freedom of mutual exchanges, for fears were entertained in Munich of the more vigorous Rhenish manufacturers. Nor could Motz make headway with his proposal that the Bavarian Palatinate should immediately join the Prussian customs union. The pride of the Bavarian crown stood in the way here, and the Munich diet had never voted the indispensable alteration of the Palatine fiscal system. Still less prospect was there of Baden's

[1] Cotta to Motz, December 17 and 20, 1828; Motz's Reply, rough copy, undated.
[2] Motz to Maassen, January 25, 1829.

accession. The little state desired to use the favourable opportunity in order to establish its territorial integrity for all time, and demanded that the Sponheim dispute should be settled before the customs negotiations were concluded. Since King Louis would not agree to this, in the course of the winter the Berlin cabinet came to recognise that it would be well to avoid further complications, and for the time being Baden was left out of the reckoning.

At length on March 6, 1829, official negotiations began in Berlin. The South German crowns were represented by their envoys, Luxberg and Blomberg, whilst Cotta, who had credentials from both kings, had the casting vote. Eichhorn and Schönberg acted for Prussia, also Motz, Maassen, and Councillor Windhorn. Hoffmann came from Darmstadt. The best forces of the government were at work, for a bridge was to be thrown across the Main. The treaty was signed on May 27, 1829. Prussia-Hesse and Bavaria-Würtemberg agreed that until the year 1841 all home products of nature, industry, and art should be mutually freed from duty; but in the case of a number of important manufactured articles it was specified upon the demand of Bavaria that at first the duties should be lowered by twenty-five per cent only, complete freedom from duty to ensue later. All parties pledged themselves to bring their respective customs systems increasingly into harmony; plenipotentiaries were to meet every year " for the support and expansion of this treaty." A subsequent tariff agreement was likewise discussed. In all respects the treaty had a provisional character; it established the narrowest form of commercial union, all that was possible so long as the lands of the allies were not geographically contiguous. The participants felt that they were at the opening of an epoch of joint commercial activities; they undertook that in the case of territories which were coterminous with more than one state of the union (Baden here being especially under consideration), commercial treaties should not be entered into except as a sequel of a common understanding.

Notwithstanding the pettiness of the negotiations, Motz kept his gaze directed towards the wider conditions of the fatherland, well knowing that he had opened for his state the road leading towards a proud future. In June he spoke plainly to the king about the political significance of the treaty that had just been signed.[1] His memorial glances first in retrospect at the utter

[1] Mémoire concerning the importance of the customs and commercial treaty concluded in June, 1829, between Prussia and the South German states. Drafted by Privy Councillor Mentz and much elaborated by Motz in person.

ineffectiveness of the Bundestag, which had never held a formal discussion concerning commercial unity; even during the famine of 1817 all that had been done in Frankfort was the minimum necessary "to prevent federal neighbours from starving in the literal sense of the term. How can it be otherwise, since, at the head of the Federation, there stands a great state which is unwilling to abandon the customs and prohibitive system peculiar to itself, a system which has been in existence for fifty years, and which that state believes to be accordant with its own interests, whereas it is certainly irreconcilable with the interests of the other members of the Federation. How can it be otherwise when the other members of the Federation are unwilling to subordinate the commercial interests of their principal territories to those of their federal lands, and when by nature and circumstance they take the opposite course; and when others among the states look at the matter much more from a fiscal than from a broader economic outlook? The Germanic Federation affords an example how little progress has as yet been made in the science of politics." The result had been a commercial war of all against all, "which is much worse than internal dissensions settled by force of arms could ever be." Motz goes on to recall the patriotic endeavours of the German mercantile class, and to speak of the personal labours of the sovereigns of Bavaria and Würtemberg. When the Bavario-Würtemberg and the Prussio-Hessian unions were constituted, the possibility was established of two great customs unions for the whole of Germany. Then, under Austria's leadership, the neutral union came into existence, and this body aimed at the maintenance of the status quo an intolerable condition of affairs. We were at once compelled to go further, and to found the great commercial system.

This system, continues the memorial, offers in the first place commercial advantages. The union already extends to a population of twenty millions, and thus occupies the third place among the states of Europe—for Austria does not represent a unified market. The population of the customs union will increase to twenty-five millions as soon as the Mid-German union recognises "that its purposes are utterly futile," and as soon as the South German and Central German states, together with Mecklenburg, join us. The population will increase to twenty-seven millions when the other states too (in so far as they are not mere accessory lands), Hanover, that is to say, Brunswick, Oldenburg, and the Hansa states, join the union. Home trade is more important than foreign trade, for the former turns its capital over three times a year, the latter but once

a year. The commercial system will provide for many of the German states a market for their goods increased twenty-fold to two hundred-fold. In the second place, there are financial advantages to be considered. The saying "the lower the expenditure, the higher the profit" will be justified on this occasion also, although it may be that at first, during the period of transition, there will be a certain monetary loss. In the third place, and most important of all, comes political advantage. "If it be a political truth that tariffs are merely the consequences of political separations, it must also be true that the unification of separate states in a customs and commercial union must effect their unification to constitute a single political system."

In broad outline, a sketch is now given of the Frederician policy as compared with that of the Wittelsbachs. The writer describes how Frederick had elevated Charles VII, the first non-Austrian, to the imperial throne; and how subsequently, by the war of the Bavarian succession and the league of princes, he had thrice saved Bavaria from destruction. From all this Prussia had hitherto reaped no fruit. Bavaria's hostile attitude in the time of the Confederation of the Rhine and of the Ansbach-Baireuth dispute is explicable solely through "the utter confusion and aberration of politics" in those days of the revolution. But to-day Prussia could no longer venture to inspire mistrust; it must rather be her desire "to form an intimate union, intimate in all respects alike political and commercial, with those states that have an eye to genuine German interests and regard Prussia with manifest confidence, with those states that do not regard the possession of German provinces simply as an instrument for furthering the interests of the great foreign political corporations whose interests conflict with those of Germany." The possibility still remained open, "barely conceivable" as it seemed, either that a general war might break out, or "that the Germanic Federation may cease to exist in its present form and may be reconstituted with the exclusion of all heterogeneous elements"; in that case our commercial system would become of enormous importance. In the fourth place, the commercial system would bring us an increase of military strength numbering ninety-two thousand men. The wars of 1805 and 1806 were decided in Napoleon's favour through Bavaria having espoused his cause, and similarly the war of 1809 was decided by the action of the Confederation of the Rhine. Only if we were sure of the Bavarian Palatinate could we protect our Rhineland against France; by the commercial union Austria would be surrounded by a wide

orescent, and could be threatened simultaneously from Silesia and Old Bavaria. The memorial concludes as follows: "Through this union, reposing as it does upon identity of interests and upon a natural foundation, and destined as it inevitably is to expansion in the centre of Germany, there comes into existence, under the aegis of Prussia, a truly united Germany, firm and free at once from within and from without. In so far as it is still defective, may it undergo improvement and expansion, and may that which has already been gained be cautiously developed and firmly secured!"

Thus wrote the Prussian minister of finance, a year before the July revolution, and two years before Paul Pfizer published his *Correspondence between two Germans*. Among all the utterances of German statesmen of that day, there is none which breaks more decisively with the policy of peaceful dualism, none which says so bluntly, "Cut loose from Austria!" How accurate, too, was his forecast. As early as 1829, if a trifling error be overlooked, this man foresaw precisely the order in which down to the year 1866 the German states would join the customs union.

In a circular to the envoys, the Prussian government declared in plain terms that the treaty with Bavaria foreshadowed a still closer association, and the gradual realisation of German commercial unity. But at the Bavarian court a thousand difficulties were still to be overcome. King Louis, accustomed to unconditional autocracy, was furious because his negotiators had exceeded their instructions in certain points; he could not overcome the old South German mistrust of Prussian cunning, cavilled at every word, and suspected double meanings everywhere. Moreover, the famous dispute about alternating precedence, which in those days worthily occupied the spare hours of the federal envoys, exercised a disturbing influence. In matters of precedence the royal courts were willing to admit the grand ducal courts to terms of equality, but this equality was not to be conceded in respect of the affixing of signatures. After much heart-burning, a way out of the difficulty was at length discovered; only two chief copies of the treaty were prepared, one for Prussia-Hesse and the other for Bavaria-Würtemberg. There had in addition to be considered the Munich court's comprehensible fear of the formalism of its diet. Cotta urgently begged that the necessity should not be overlooked "for the humouring even of prejudices in order to secure higher and greater ends, above all, the union." In like sense Armansperg wrote to Motz: "The work which through the commercial treaty is at length coming into existence, a work unquestionably full of blessings,

is one which Germany owes mainly to the greatness of your ideas and to the sedulous care with which your excellency has conducted the negotiations and has endeavoured to avoid even the semblance of partiality. If to your excellency's mind much towards which our aspirations are directed should seem petty, you should take into consideration that much pettiness dwells in the halls of the estates, and that it is not always possible to combat and conquer this with the weapons of reason" ; and the writer goes on to request that in the interest of the ironworks of the Upper Palatinate hardware should be scheduled among the excepted articles.[1] In the course of the summer, visiting Brückenau and Friedrichshafen, Cotta was able to overcome the last objections of the two South German monarchs ; they ratified the treaty, and overwhelmed the adroit negotiator with favours. King William was just as open-minded as his minister Varnbüler ; not a word was heard of the old dreams of Caesarism. Prussia now sent two of her leading financiers, Sotzmann and Pochhammer, to Munich, to inaugurate the new customs institutions. The Bavarian officials were astonished to encounter so much patience and consideration from the much-abused Prussians, and men came to understand one another better when engaged upon a common and serious task.

The difficult resolution once formed, King Louis immediately began to navigate in the new channel with restless impetuosity. In hyperbolical terms he extolled the skill, the moderation, the large-mindedness of the Berlin cabinet ; he assured Rauch, the sculptor, of his pride at walking hand in hand with the state of Frederick the Great, paying tribute to the probity and wisdom of King Frederick William. Public opinion in the south accepted the treaty with much suspicion ; a deputation sent to the king to express the gratitude of the good town of Nördlingen, remained an isolated phenomenon. But among the upper circles of Bavarian officialdom the feeling was general that at length, after prolonged driftings, a firm anchorage had been discovered. Lerchenfeld, the federal envoy, received strict instructions to have nothing to do with Mid-German intrigues, and henceforward in Frankfort and in Cassel he collaborated straightforwardly with his Prussian colleagues. Men of keen intelligence at once perceived that this healthy and natural alliance between the two greatest German states could not fail to lead further. During the negotiations in Berlin, Hoffmann had mooted the question whether Prussia's western provinces could not immediately form a genuine customs union with the south. For Prussia, the idea was unaccept-

[1] Cotta to Motz, June, 14 ; Armansperg to Motz, June 22, 1829.

able in this immature form. But as soon as the treaty was carried into effect, it speedily became evident that to stand still half-way towards the goal would be impossible. The Bavarian Rhenish Palatinate was subject to Bavarian customs dues, for Munich had not been able to make up its mind to include this area in the Prussian customs system. The result was disastrous. In the year 1830, the yield of the customs was only 165,000 florins, whilst the supervision of the frontier had cost 248,000 florins. The Landrat of the Palatinate petitioned and complained; the state of affairs could not be suffered to continue. As early as February, 1830, the unresting Cotta addressed a confidential enquiry to Hoffmann, asking what would be the result of complete customs community with the Prussian authorities. Hoffmann rejoined with cordial praise of the Prussian officials, who had at first been suspicious, but who had become quite affable when they had had experience of the trustworthiness of Hessian administration.[1]

The foreign world, and the Mid-Germans, its associates, observed with increasing alarm how within a year Prussia's commercial policy had achieved a second great victory. In vain had the Saxon cabinet, while the Berlin negotiations were still in progress, endeavoured to induce the court of Munich to join the Mid-German union; in vain had Röntgen, of Nassau, Prussia's old and busy enemy, visited Stuttgart, to represent there that Motz, a strong man, ruthless and ambitious, hoped to make Prussia the leading power in Germany through the liberation of the country's industrial energies. Even in Berlin, agents of the Mid-German union were at work, and among them Senator Guaita, of Frankfort. Austria sent Councillor Eichhof to Munich, hoping to detach Bavaria from Prussia by the offer of certain trifling commercial privileges, while the envoy was to remind King Louis how hostile Prussia had been in the Sponheim affair. In Frankfort, Münch once more attempted to turn the Darmstadt court against Hoffmann, "the Prussian tool." English, French, and Dutch diplomats, lead by Lord Erskine and Count Rumigny, in Munich, did not cease to inveigh against Prussia. Of all the foreign powers, it was again Russia alone who showed herself the true friend of Prussia, and in Frankfort Anstett openly and definitely favoured the commercial policy of Berlin.

The completed fact gradually began to exercise its charm. How much longer were the complaints of the misused nation to be ignored? How much longer were people to be fobbed off with vain sonderbunds, whilst Prussia invariably carried her commercial

[1] Maltzan's Report, February 26, 1830.

negotiations to a successful issue? Even Blittersdorff, the unwearied partisan of Austria, was now almost inclined to give up the Hapsburg cause as lost. If Prussia, he wrote, should succeed in uniting all the German states under her commercial system, Austria would *de facto* be expelled from the Germanic Federation. Trade would not thereby be centralised, but, in view of the great number of minor foci, would be equably stimulated throughout. Sovereignty would encounter less danger in a great customs union than if an attempt were made to arrest secular progress.[1]

The Prusso-Bavarian negotiations were nothing but a blow upon the water as long as trade between the two states remained exposed to the arbitrary retaliations of the Mid-German union. The new road from Westphalia through Hesse-Darmstadt served merely to connect the western provinces of Prussia with the territories of the South German allies; and besides, in the neighbourhood of Frankfort, it passed for some miles across the land of the Mid-German union. If the Prusso-Bavarian league were to acquire true vital energy, it was essential that there should be a duty free route between the principal masses of the two allied customs unions. In this critical hour, Motz fortunately recalled to mind the "road arrogance" of the realm of Meiningen and thought of the apologetic missive of the Gotha duke. How would it be if Prussia were to provide Meiningen with means for the actual construction of the desired route for world commerce between Italy and the North Sea? The wish to keep trade in the country was the loftiest idea which, in those days, the commercial policy of the minor states was competent to conceive. How often did the Ernestine statesmen hasten to Munich or Berlin with urgent petitions against the construction of a circuitous highway; how loud were the complaints of Frankfort when in the spring of 1829 a carrier sent goods from Switzerland to Leipzig by way of Nuremberg, quoting lower freights than his Frankfort competitors. This road policy was the most effective arm of the Mid-German union, and Motz determined to fight the allies with their own weapons. He opened negotiations with Meiningen and Gotha even before the Bavarian treaty was completed. The duke of Coburg paid a visit to Berlin. On July 3, 1829, a treaty was signed with Meiningen, and a few days later another with Gotha, "to remove the obstacles which, especially in consequence of local conditions, hinder trade and commerce." The three states mutually undertook to build high roads from

[1] Blittersdorff to Berstett, March 12 and December 17, 1829.

Langensalza through Gotha to Zelle, thence by way of Meiningen to Würzburg, and by way of Suhl, Hildburghausen, and Lichtenfels to Bamberg. Prussia furnished the petty princes with the necessary funds. Transit trade on the new roads was to be duty free. There were in addition to be a number of reductions of tariff, and free intercourse, between Meiningen, Gotha, and the Thuringian enclaves of Prussia. It was this same route, running straight across the crest of the Thuringian forest, which was subsequently destined to play a notable part in the railway policy of the German empire.

These two modest treaties served in reality to destroy the Mid-German union. It was through them that the Prusso-Bavarian treaty first acquired practical value. Motz hastened to Thuringia to push on with the construction of the roads. As soon as the duty free route should be completed, the two allied customs unions would secure geographical connection, and their complete amalgamation would be only a question of time. Simultaneously, the Berlin cabinet had arranged with Mecklenburg for the building of a new road from Hamburg to Magdeburg. The extensive trade between the North Sea and Switzerland was diverted from Hanover, Cassel, and Frankfort to the Magdeburg-Nuremberg route. By a masterstroke of Prussian diplomacy, the Mid-German union, which had intended to keep Bavaria and Prussia apart, was itself cut in twain. Again and again the reflection is forced upon our minds, how much more lengthy a process would have been the untying of these knots, if there had existed a Reichstag to hinder the diplomatic activities of the court of Berlin. He who traces the perplexing course of these subterranean labours will understand, even if he does not approve, how a liberal spirit like Trendelenburg could in those days extol Prussian absolutism as a blessing for Germany.

With these two treaties, Prussia effected a justifiable piece of war strategy against declared enemies, and yet the step she took was not in truth a hostile one, and she did not engage in any vindictive retaliation. The defeat of the Mid-German union was all the more complete because no one had any right to complain of Prussia's conduct. Whereas in most cases the aim of commercial policy is to injure the enemy by imposing obstacles in the way of his trade, Motz and Eichhorn disarmed the Cassel sonderbund by the facilitation of German commerce; they might even demand the thanks of the Mid-Germans for the opening of a duty free road. It is true that the issue was not one to redound to the credit of the two Thuringian princes. Lured by the prospect of owning a great commercial route, the dukes had betrayed their Mid-German allies.

They infringed the spirit though not the letter of the Cassel treaty, for while this treaty gave the allies the option of concluding commercial treaties, its aim unquestionably was to check the expansion of the Prussian customs system. The bad example was soon followed. The Mid-German union, based upon particularist egoism, was to find a worthy end, crumbling to pieces through a light-hearted disregard of faith and honour.

In this eventful summer Motz was to provide the Mid-Germans with yet another surprise, beneficial to their trade, but disastrous to their sonderbund. He came to an understanding with the Netherlands about navigation on the Rhine, and thus secured for his South German allies the prospect of free trade with the North Sea.[1] As soon as British merchants could despatch their goods duty free up the Rhine to Frankfort and Mannheim, England's interest in the Mid-German union would necessarily come to an end, and the sonderbund would lose a powerful supporter.

After defeats so decisive, serious statesmen would promptly have abandoned the sonderbund as an unfortunate failure, and would have endeavoured to come to an understanding with the successful customs unions of the south and the north. But these little courts were animated by an indefatigable spirit of strife; they did not desire peace; their arrogance resented having to make enforced and humiliating admissions, Count Schulenburg, Saxon envoy in Vienna, had wonders to relate of the commercial facilities which, in vague general terms, Metternich promised the union. Similar pledges, equally indefinite, were given to the court of Nassau by Count Fénelon, the French envoy. In Hanover, the old Guelph pride was still unbroken; Count Münster employed all his petty arts in the hope of detaching the Meiningen duke from Prussia through the influence of his sister, the duchess of Clarence. In February, 1829, Varnhagen von Ense was sent by the Prussian court to Cassel and Bonn, to make a renewed attempt to settle the conjugal dispute in the electoral house. He discharged his ungrateful task with astonishing maladroitness, asking information as to the situation from Hruby, the bitter enemy of Prussia. The upshot was that husband and wife were more hopelessly estranged than ever, and the elector, in a fury, swore to be revenged upon his royal brother-in-law. Thus it came to pass that the Mid-Germans continued to play a lost game for several years, until Prussia had taken the opponents' last piece.

[1] Vide supra, p. 273.

Since June, 1829, the congress of the Mid-Germans had been sitting once more in Cassel, a picture of utter ineffectiveness and helpless spite. All the other allies raged against the traitors in Meiningen and Gotha, who had robbed the union of " an important objective " ; commissaries were sent to admonish the two dukes. Everyone trembled at the contemplation of the free Prussian commercial route from Hamburg to Nuremberg. Even the patriotic hope that Denmark might perhaps hinder the construction of the road afforded no consolation, for the small portion of Holstein territory between Hamburg and the Mecklenburg frontier could unfortunately be evaded by way of the Elbe. Röntgen, the Nassau plenipotentiary, made it a practice to keep the friendly Badenese court informed as to the course of the proceedings. From Carlsruhe, these reports were faithfully submitted to the Prussian government, so that Berlin had first-hand information of the hopeless confusion in the hostile camp. In one of the first sittings, a plenipotentiary propounded the naive but reasonable question : " What is, after all, the material purpose of the union ? " [1] The feeling was that "joint autonomy must be established, to safeguard individual autonomy." Demands were made for " a common good," which might serve as a means of negotiation against Prussia. Some of the participants began, indeed, to recognise the ludicrousness of a customs union without a common tariff ; even Nassau expressed the opinion that the advantages of internal free trade were enormously greater than those of any possible facilitation of foreign commerce. But the objection was raised, " If the union should become a real tariff association, we should be forced in the end to adopt Prussian colours ! " Six committees were formed, to discuss in the manner of the Bundestag all possible questions of commercial policy. Exceptional patriotic delight was aroused by the proposal to adopt the twenty-one gulden standard, and thus " to drive out Prussian money."

Again the idea cropped up of constituting several leagues within the league—two, three, or four, what did it matter ? These political fantasies assumed every conceivable form. Hanover desired a sonderbund of the coastal states. In an erudite memorial, Smidt of Bremen proved that the allied states were disposed in part horizontally and in part vertically in relation to the great commercial routes of Germany ; they might therefore form two or three groups. It was obvious that the free town of Bremen must remain independent, for she was a "manifest exception to the rule of the commercial

[1] Röntgen's Report, August 6, 1829.

union." Nevertheless, this adroit politician was beginning to feel uneasy, and he urgently advised the opening of negotiations with the other customs unions.

The anxious disinclination of the Thuringian states found unconcealed expression. Reuss proposed immediate negotiation with Prussia; Meiningen and Gotha threatened to go their own way unless the union came to terms with Prussia. The plenipotentiaries of the petty Thuringian states were busily engaged in conveying to Hänlein, Prussian envoy in Cassel, all the secrets of the union. But the larger states, Hanover, Saxony, Hesse, and Weimar, remained obdurate. At length, on October 11, 1829, the restless intriguers Carlowitz, Grote, and Conta, secured the acceptance of a new treaty of alliance. The pledge that none of the parties to the agreement would separately join any other customs union was prolonged till the year 1841, since the Prusso-Bavarian treaty was in force until this year. The transit dues upon the high roads connecting the territory of the union with the foreign world were not to be altered without mutual consent. It was obvious that the sole purpose of this article was to impose difficulties in the way of trade between Prussia and Bavaria, to prevent the repetition of the Gotha and Meiningen business. Prussia immediately endeavoured to countermine this resolution. Eichhorn wrote to Bülow in London: "We have been accustomed to find that the government of Electoral Hesse always does the perverse thing, and respects no conditions"; but Hanover's conduct was incomprehensible; the envoy was to lodge a definite complaint in London.[1] Nevertheless the proposal was carried through, and after this unambiguous manifestation of hostility, it was further decided in Cassel that Saxony, Hanover, and Electoral Hesse should open negotiations with Prussia in the name of the union—Electoral Hesse, whose mouth was filled with abuse of the court of Berlin.

For the rest, this second treaty, too, was almost entirely devoid of substance, for no agreement was secured concerning even a single step for the facilitation of trade. Consequently, immediately after the conclusion of the treaty, vigorous resistance was everywhere manifest. The ratification could not be effected until April, 1830. Meiningen and Gotha refused their assent. On December 9, 1829, the Reuss territories followed the example of their neighbours, coming to terms with Prussia concerning facilitations of trade and the construction of roads, and promising to join the Prussian or the Bavarian union as soon as they should have discharged their

[1] Eichhorn to Bülow, September 18, 1829.

obligations to the Mid-Germans. In the Frankfort legislative assembly an angry enquiry was made why sensible merchants should pledge themselves to do nothing for twelve years. Influential firms demanded adhesion to Prussia, but not, of course, upon equal terms: the powerful Frankfort was merely to constitute "a free port of the Prussian union." The town was suffering severely, for its carrying trade and its manufactures were being transferred to Offenbach. Nevertheless, the Austrian party maintained the upper hand. Saxony and Weimar, greatly alarmed by the lively Bavario-Prussian commerce just without their frontiers, added to their ratification a proviso to the effect that until the year 1835 they must retain freedom to leave the Mid-German union if before that date Prussia and Bavaria should amalgamate to form a single customs union. The unresting Röntgen journeyed from one Prussian embassy to another, attempting to excuse himself, asking who could have anticipated a year earlier that Prussia would play so fortunate a part in the eastern question, and in the matter of the customs. When to all solicitations, Maltzan merely responded with diplomatic silence, the offended Nassauer exclaimed, "It is a mistake to despise even the smallest enemy," whereupon Maltzan courteously rejoined, "We are, then, to regard you as an enemy?" Ultimately Nassau accepted the treaty, with a declaration that it could not be considered unconditionally binding. Thus secession and treason were threatened on all hands.

These cabinets had so preposterously a high opinion of their own importance that it is by no means easy to decide whether the three leading middle-sized states seriously hoped to force concessions from Prussia, or whether they opened negotiations with the Berlin court solely in order to appease their dissatisfied Thuringian allies. However this may be, as early as August 14th, the Hanoverian ministry enquired of Bernstorff whether Prussia would negotiate with the allies, adding, in the usual lofty style: "The union is in a position to offer advantages which should outweigh any concessions." In Berlin the opportunity was seized to give the Mid-Germans a candid opinion, and at the same time to emphasise more plainly than had been done hitherto the national trend of Prussia's commercial policy. A ministerial despatch of October 31, 1829, pointed out to the Hanoverian government how offensive and disingenuous its conduct had been, and gave an extremely drastic description of the commercial union, saying that the only thing its members had in common was the motive in which the union originated, and that in other respects it represented nothing but

" an aggregate of particular interests." The union had no important advantages to offer Prussia, and must therefore desire to hamper intercourse between the Prussian provinces. " The Prussian government has, however, no anxiety regarding such hostile measures." Prussia was willing to treat with Hanover alone, but not with a plurality of fundamentally diverse states. In view of the recent advantageous treaties, Prussia had even less immediate interest than before in such negotiations, and had indeed but one interest, namely, " that a closer union may be established between the German peoples, and that thereby fresh blessings may be diffused throughout Germany and her individual states. If the principle be followed, to discuss such common measures as may lead to the reciprocal removal of hindrances that have hitherto existed, without imposing any fresh obstacles to commerce with other states, no one can complain of a union established upon such a basis. It will rather be found that every such union will form a stepping-stone to a new one ; and through this practical development, which does not involve any kind of hostile principle, it may be hoped that by degrees the problem of mutual free trade between the German states will secure the most comprehensive solution that the nature of the conditions will permit." [1] Hanover still endeavoured to bring forward mendacious excuses, but Guelph pride rendered impossible any isolated negotiations with the Berlin court.

Saxony and Electoral Hesse made no advances, but the court of Dresden could not refrain from offering a justification of its commercial policy. Privy Councillor von Könneritz (in later years, when he became minister, one of the pillars of the ultra-conservative party) composed a memorial in the forensic style of Electoral Saxony, reiterating the old complaints, refuted already a hundred times, against the Prussian customs system. An assurance was given that the Mid-German union was " an assemblage of several sovereign states, thoroughly accordant with the principles of international law, and by no means without historical precedent, a necessary means for rescuing for the aforesaid land certain nutritive elements indispensable to its manufactures and its commerce " ; and the writer went on to deplore that Prussia should show hostility to this innocent combination. Motz, having been asked by Eichhorn whether he considered negotiations with Saxony to be advisable, replied : " By a customs union with Prussia, Saxony stands to gain in all respects, and Prussia can desire such a union on political grounds alone, or if on financial grounds, to a very slight extent. Even the political

[1] The Hanoverian Ministry to Bernstorff, August 14 ; Reply, October 31, 1829.

advantages consist much more in the way in which the unification of Germany will thus be favoured than in any special outcome of the rapprochement between Saxony and Prussia. Saxony will be apter for friendly and relevant negotiations when she relinquishes her Mid-German responsibilities, for the continuance of these is a definite obstacle to her adhesion to the Prussian customs system. Herr von Könneritz possesses one of those restricted and biased intelligences whose enlightenment, if one had time to devote to the matter, would prove no less unfruitful than is the entire idea of the Mid-German union." [1] The foreign office reprimanded its envoy in Dresden for having accepted the arrogant Saxon document, and contented itself with a brief refutation of the accusations embodied in the memorial.

Hanover, meanwhile, was secretly engaged in founding a union of the coastal states. On March 27, 1830, to the general astonishment, the Eimbeck treaty came into being, the work of Grote, and the foundation of the subsequent North German fiscal union. Hanover, Oldenburg, Brunswick, and Electoral Hesse mutually agreed to form within the Mid-German union a customs union with a joint low tariff. For the moment, indeed, this was still a mere proposal. It was not altogether unnatural that the coastal states should draw together, and even Motz took a lenient view of the Eimbeck treaty. Hanover was not free from subordination to English commercial policy. Moreover, at that time it was a strongly held and widely diffused opinion that the political economy of the North Sea coast was utterly divergent from Prussian conditions, a prejudice not to be overcome until two decades had elapsed. But the participation of Electoral Hesse, an inland state, was all the more offensive. The atmosphere in this unhappy land was sultry. The Reichenbach dreaded a revolt and assured the elector that something must be done to appease the ill-used people.[2] Since the elector would not join hands with Prussia, he signed the Eimbeck treaty, for this at least offered facilitations of trade on the Hanoverian frontier.

Such was the condition of German economic life when the July revolution broke out, to put an end to the old system in the leading states of the Mid-German commercial union, and thus to give that union its coup de grace.

Motz did not survive to witness the complete triumph of his ideas, dying, at the early age of fifty-four, on June 30, 1830. He

[1] Motz to Eichhorn, November 29, 1829.

[2] Thus declares Blittersdorff, May 16, 1830, in conformity with Maltzan's reports.

could enjoy the assured confidence that Prussia's commercial policy would not abandon the road that had been opened up, and during his last days he frequently exclaimed, " It is about my own department that I am least concerned." What a complete change had occurred in the position of Prussia during the five years in which this man had been responsible for the country's finances! Even the foreign press, which was in most respects utterly indifferent to German affairs, had begun to note the transformation. " If these states," wrote the *Constitutionnel,* " are already beginning to recognise the unity of their commercial interests, they will soon likewise discover that their political interests are identical, and this will mean victory over Austria." The *Edinburgh Review,* with that moderation which the English, even when dispensing praise, never fail to exhibit, declared : " Prussian commercial policy, which probably excels that of any other state in the world, perhaps owes its origin to an absolute monarch's desire for self-enrichment." A short while before detested and shunned, Prussia was now allied for a great national purpose with the lands, recently converted, that had formerly constituted the nucleus of the Confederation of the Rhine. The Prussian customs law, ten years earlier assailed by all Germany, was making victorious progress, and it could already be foreseen that its dominion would extend to the lake of Constance. The great affairs of the nation were no longer settled in Frankfort and Vienna, but in Berlin.

In a brief diplomatic struggle, whose widely ramified negotiations conducted with a firm and steady hand remind us of the initiation of the Frederician league of princes, Motz had not merely succeeded in effecting the almost complete destruction of the rival customs union, but, further, had overthrown his opponents with intellectual weapons, had demonstrated the folly of the hostile enterprise, and had proved to all the world that, while Austria had but empty words for the national needs, Prussia could bring material healing. Nor was it a mere chance concatenation of circumstances which was for a brief period to link south and north together, as had happened in earlier days in the case of the associates in the league of princes. The fellowship thus inaugurated was indestructible. It arose out of the vital needs of a hard-working century, and over its inconspicuous beginnings presided the liberal genius of the man who almost alone in a time of weariness and disheartenment had already attained to a clear recognition of the slumbering forces of the Germanic giant, and had foreseen the great future that awaited " a genuinely united Germany."

CHAPTER IX

LITERARY HARBINGERS OF A NEW AGE.

§ 1. LITERATURE AND SCIENCE.

THE treaty between the two customs unions of the south and the north opened for the Germans the prospect of a national market such as had not existed for centuries, and therefore paved the way for an unprecedented development of economic forces. Years, however, were still to elapse before preliminary understanding was to be succeeded by permanent union, and there was to be yet another interval before, under the protection of the new customs barriers, a great manufacturing industry was to rise and flourish. Not until 1840, with the growth of factories and stock exchanges, of railways and newspapers, did there begin to appear in German society also the class struggles, the restless hurry, and the adventurous self-assertiveness of modern economic life. Up to this time most people had persisted in the parochial customs of the first years of peace. They had remained upon paternal acres or quietly engaged in traditional handicrafts, satisfied with the modest joys of their simple homes. But towards the end of the twenties there were already numerous indications that a great transformation in national customs was in course of preparation. Just as had happened after the golden era of poesy in the middle ages, so now were the days of Jena and Weimar to be succeeded by a prosaic epoch, an epoch in which energy was for the most part to be directed outwards, into political, ecclesiastical, and economic struggles.

Our literature has long been the faithful mirror of all the secrets of the German heart, and thus it was that the harbingers of this revolution were earlier perceptible in literature than in practical life. Poetry no longer maintained its dominance in the realm of the spirit. Just as in former days the decline in Italian architecture had disclosed itself in the extensive and yet sterile building activities of the eighteenth

century, so now the vast numbers of light and trivial novels and poetical pocket-companions which flooded the book market showed that our imaginative literature was growing rank and could yield but little good fruit. An evil sign of the times was the increasing desire of women to write. As is the case with all great artistic epochs, the blossoming of German poesy would not have been possible without the invigorating participation of women. But as long as the ambition of the leading men of the nation led them to compete for the poet's crown, the natural rule continued to hold good that artistic creation, like all creation, is the work of men. There were few authoresses among the splendid women who, in a sympathetic and receptive spirit, beautified the lives of our classic and earlier romantic poets. But now, when verse-writing had become an elegant method of killing time, and when every impressionable amateur could readily acquire the artifices of literature, there occurred an alarming increase in the number of bluestockings, to use the English word. Caroline Pichler, Johanna Schopenhauer, Helmine von Chezy, and Caroline von Fouqué, took up the pen in place of the needle, and many of the fashionable pocket-companions were written solely for women and chiefly by women. Goethe noted with concern this new social disease. He did not wish to see the sacred limits of nature infringed, and the profundities of art replaced by futile elegancies, and he vented his opinion regarding this sterile feminine verse-writing, now with good-natured mockery and now with such divine roughness as was permissible to none but the singer of woman's love.

Many serious-minded men were beginning to consider the province of poetry to be one of quite minor importance. How profoundly had the cultured German world once been stirred by the Xenien dispute, but how indifferent was that world now when Platen entered the lists against the neo-romanticists and the writers of fate-tragedies. Aesthetic struggles no longer disturbed the equanimity of the nation. Nothing but the solitary figure of the venerable master in Weimar, who from time to time, with elemental force, continued to draw upon himself the glance of friend and foe, served to remind the younger generation of the days when poesy had been all in all to the Germans; and vigorous men of talent, and among them not a few with considerable artistic endowment, were by the impulses of the time directed for the most part into the paths of learning. With increasing zeal and understanding, science was wrestling with the great problems of public and active life. In theology, circumscribed parties with definite ecclesiastical aims were coming into existence. When the philosophers, jurists, philologists, and archæologists of history had

enlarged the horizon and prepared the matter, the crown of the historical sciences, the writing of descriptive political history, began to experience vigorous development, and the grouping of historians into parties served, in especial, to foreshadow the political conflicts of the opening century. From Hegel, philosophy learned to look upon history as the temple of the omnipresent deity, and it came to idolise the state, which it had formerly despised. Simultaneously there resounded the first alarums of a revolutionary literature, steeped in bias, concerned solely to exercise a momentary influence, emptying the vials of its scorn upon all existing institutions, and declaring war against the dream life of romanticism. As yet all this was in its inception, but it was already plain that the nation was about to break away completely from that aesthetic outlook upon life which had flourished in an ever-memorable epoch.

Goethe, who in his solitude continued to keep a finger on the pulse of the national life, recognised this realistic tendency, and furthered it by developing in *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre* the idea already indicated in the *Lehrjahre,* namely, that man cannot attain happiness unless his own spontaneous efforts enable him freely to discover his own limitations. The Odyssey of universal culture thus concludes with the modern doctrine of the division of labour, that everyone should thoroughly know and cultivate one thing, and should find in himself a centre round which everything should revolve :

> Let thy aspiration be love
> And thy life be action.

The romance and its sequel are related to one another as youth is related to age, as poetry to prose. Because the poet felt that useful activities on behalf of bourgeois society are not per se poetic, and because he was in all the fibres of his nature rooted in the universal culture of the previous century, he was unwilling and unable to give artistic form to the central thought of the *Wanderjahre,* and could do no more than indicate it symbolically. He did not describe the way in which the active-minded man engaged in partial creation is simultaneously limiting himself and vigorously living out his life, but he allowed his hero to overcome the free love of life in conscious renunciation and to forget his ego in the sober pursuit of a calling. In Germany the hour was not yet come for a romance of bourgeois activities. The serene charm of the interspersed tales, the plastic clarity of the picture of the Holy Family and of many of the other descriptions, remind us of the finest days of Goethe's muse. The

didactic passages served to convey, not merely rare turns of thought, but, in addition, an abundance of mature and profound truths. How deeply moved was young Ludwig Richter when he read the exhortation: "Great thoughts and a pure heart; it is for these things that we should pray to God." How keenly did the poet recognise the chief moral danger which threatened the rising generation when he made the development of reverence the principal task of his section on education. He failed, however, to provide a perfect work of art. Once again he was mastered by his old inclination towards fragmentary creation, throwing almost chaotically together the thoughts of many years concerning the problem of culture. The result is a labyrinth through which the reader vainly endeavours to find his way.

For the first time an imaginative work by Goethe was received with general disappointment, and there now came good days for all the small fry who could not forgive the poet his greatness. Of late years, when the nation was still under the spell of *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, envious critics had rarely ventured into the open. The spurious *Wanderjahre* which, in the same year (1821) with the appearance of the first part of the genuine *Wanderjahre*, was placed by the Westphalian pastor Pustkuchen with Basse's celebrated publishing house in Quedlinburg, had a wide sale, and was seriously mentioned by newspapers of repute. The malicious parody gave a not infelicitous imitation of Goethe's formal style, and combated his immorality with the commonplaces of conventional morals. Hengstenberg's *Kirchenzeitung* now brought up the heavy artillery of the only genuine Christianity to discharge its thunders against the great pagan; and Wolfgang Menzel, editor of the literary supplement of Cotta's *Morgenblatt*, wrote in the same sense. Menzel remained throughout life the Christo-Germanic Burschenschafter, and with respectable courage he chided the aberrations of cosmopolitan and infidel radicalism. But the graces had not stood beside the cradle of this unamiable man. To him, classical antiquity was merely a world of sin, and he could never forgive the popes for having adorned the Vatican with the most beautiful collection of sculptures known to the world. He therefore regarded it as a Christian duty to prejudice the Germans against the greatest of their poets, nor did his puritanical zeal in this cause abate when his deadly enemies, the radicals, sounded the same trumpet, and, burning with virtuous indignation, poured forth their censures upon the betitled prince's-henchman in Weimar.

Like Luther and Frederick, Goethe found his last days embittered by the most odious of all German sins, by the incredible ingratitude of the nation, and this at the very time when the foreign world was

beginning to do justice to the poet, when the young writers on the staff of the Paris *Globe* were directing the attention of French art to the natural truth of Goethe and of Shakespeare, and when Thomas Carlyle, the only Briton who has ever fully understood Germany, was expounding to his fellow-countrymen the meaning of *Faust*. The revolutionary youth of Germany hearkened all too readily to the voices of the calumniators. Twice only had Goethe been a young men's darling, in the days of *Werther*, and subsequently with the publication of the first part of *Faust*. His later writings could not please a discontented generation, one eager for political struggle and in its impatience hardly able to esteem beauty of form. In the new Burschenschaft, among the friends of Arnold Ruge, the most industrious man of the age was regarded as an easy-going and selfish epicurean, and this fable remained current for several decades in the circles of the half-cultured, where all who wished to rank as up-to-date liberals were expected to despise Goethe, the aristocrat. It was no compensation for this estrangement of our young men that the highly cultured and the women of Germany were not remiss in their gratitude, and that in many aesthetic circles an idolatrous worship of the poet prevailed. The Goethe Society of Berlin secured at this time a powerful ally in Hegel; in veneration of the absolute philosopher and of the absolute poet, the strict Hegelian was able to enjoy his own superiority, and by good fortune the birthdays of the two heroes fell upon two successive days. Thus, on the evening of August 27th, initiates were able to assemble at a ceremonial feast, and to ponder the nocturnal flights of Minerva's owl; but directly midnight struck an orator rose to his feet to make the joyful announcement that Apollo, the god of song, had arrived in his sun-chariot, bearing with him the glorious day of the twenty-eighth.

Not without bitterness of soul did Goethe note how mediocrity, philistinism, and crude partisanship, were once again, and yet more powerfully than in Kotzebue's day, raising head against him. In keen epigrams he censured the unhappy tendency of the Germans to destroy their own pleasure in the beautiful and the great, exclaiming sometimes with a sigh "German author, German martyr"—for to the creative spirit, to the man who creates for others, the stoic impassivity fabled by the moralists is impossible. For a long time, however, his cheerful vitality prevented his giving way to ill-humour. With a few hearty curses, he shook the clamorous pack from his heels, saying, "The whale has its lice, and I must make the best of mine." He rejected the name of "master," desiring merely to be known as the liberator of German poetry, and for this reason the

critiques of the *Globe* were gratifying to him, for in these he was recognised as the man who had overthrown spurious conventionalism. When, after the French manner, these writers persisted in terming him a romanticist, he exclaimed: "What is all this fuss about classic and romantic? A work that is good through and through, a work that is efficient, is, after all, a classic." When an old man of seventy-four he was once again seized by a mighty passion. He tore himself away and found, as always, solace in song. In the *Trilogie der Leidenschaft* he took leave of those joys and sorrows of love which no other poet had experienced in such intensity as he. The love-songs of his youth had in earlier days made him the darling of all feminine hearts, but the esoteric ardours of this farewell poem could be fully comprehended only by the reflective male reader deeply experienced in sorrow. Once again he conjured up the much-lamented shades of his happy days at Wetzlar, and declared, moved to the heart, that all his life the gods had tantalised him with Pandora's gift:

> They urge me forward to the willing lips;
> They drag me away, and dash me to the ground.

The aphorisms and poems which, like pearls, adorned his declining years were worthy at once of the greatness and the pettiness of human life, worthy alike of its everlasting and of its transitory characteristics. He exhorted his masonic brethren to bear in mind the long succession of the centuries, saying that the perdurable element in our earthly days guarantees us eternal support. Yet he knew also that the weak mortal lives only from day to day, and offered him that cordial consolation which was to dry the tears of so many earnest workers and was to strengthen the nerveless arm:

> Yesterday was clear from sorrow?
> Strong to-day your work and free?
> You may look, too, for a morrow
> Which will no less happy be.

Goethe had outlived all the friends of his youth, and had long since attained an age in which death is contemplated with indifference as the universal lot, but he was profoundly moved, and was unable to recover his equanimity elsewhere than in his customary isolation at Dornburg, when his great princely friend preceded him to the grave. Charles Augustus died on June 28, 1828, on his way home from Berlin, where with youthful curiosity he had examined everything new and beautiful produced in recent years. During these last days

Humboldt had to be in constant attendance. The venerable ruler was never weary of questioning the man of learning about the most intricate problems of natural science. The flames of his great soul burned brightly once more in his frail body. He spoke with scorn of the artificial and spurious piety of his contemporaries, but with reverence of the benignant doctrines of primitive Christianity. He took leave of the world in the castle of Graditz, his face turned towards the setting sun. The old Weimar was no more. . Goethe, feeling that impulse which makes old age desire to settle accounts with the past, now published his correspondence with Schiller. Shortly afterwards, in the spring of 1830, Wilhelm Humboldt, too, gave to the world the letters that had long before passed between him and Schiller describing in the preface with sympathetic understanding the nature of the poet. The younger generation, however, was too much occupied in new cares and struggles to accept with gratitude this legacy of great days, and it was not until quieter times ensued that the nation came to recognise what a treasure of artistic wisdom the letters enshrined.

Goethe was not estranged from the lively activities of the present by the charm of these ancient memories. Grillparzer and other young poets were delighted by his encouragement; and with flashing eyes the old man followed the bold flights of Byron. The revolutionary power of the Byronic muse reminded him of the days when he had himself, as a heaven-stormer, disturbed the dull peace of German poesy. He even prized the English poet too highly, for the healthiness of his own nature made it impossible for him to conceive of a great artist being affected by a futile weltschmerz. He did not know how much the irritable melancholy of the bored man of the world contributed to produce the British poet's gloomy misanthropy; and when he described Byron as "accustomed to bear the most intense sorrow," he really believed that the peer's conscience was heavily burdened. The painters and sculptors he had hitherto taken under his wing had proved of little credit to him, but now Friedrich Preller was led to him under a fortunate star. He promoted the young man's career with paternal solicitude, securing for him the favour of Charles Augustus and recommending him to the study of Claude Lorraine and Poussin, masters of landscape painting in the grand style. Thus from the golden days of Weimar there fell an ultimate ray of sunlight upon the youth of the artist who, many years later, was to provide a beautiful Indian summer for the little town of the muses. Goethe, meanwhile was giving the finishing touches to his *Faust*. Whilst presumptuous young people were already numbering him among the dead, he

younger in spirit than them all, foresaw the coming of that active era which was to control the elements and to find its glory in thought—standing with a free people upon a free soil.

As far as technical perfection was concerned, German lyric poetry had long ere this achieved so secure a footing that it could progress freely in all modes, artistic and inartistic alike. Whereas in earlier days, before the coming of Goethe, it had often sought hesitatingly to attain vigorous expression for its profound sensibilities, it was now in danger of losing vital content while paying excessive attention to form. Joseph von Eichendorff, still quite uncultured, a true son of the Silesia that was famed for merry tales, was singing his fresh songs like a bird upon the bough. He had passed the plastic years of youth at the feet of the Heidelberg romanticists, and like the anonymous singers of the *Wunderhorn* he could command but a narrow circle of images and feelings. But when, in his fortunate hours, he recounted his light-hearted wanderings over hill and dale, or when he described the joys and sorrows of his pious home or the dreamy charm of German mountain landscape, with the mill wheels turning in the cool valleys, he found words that breathed spontaneous music. Among the poets of strictly Catholic romanticism, no other had so direct a knowledge of all that is simply human, and no other could give that knowledge so pleasing an expression. That which in others was doctrine was in him nature. His cordial imagination lived in the world of knights, monks, and travelling scholars. He helped in the rebuilding of the Marienburg with as much delight as if it were to be his own dwelling-place. Even though his works upon the history of literature were couched in the clerical style, describing the Reformation as the source of all evil, classical literature as a mere beautiful aberration, and romanticism as the finest blossoming of German poetry, nevertheless his phrases were so chivalrously loyal as to disarm all opposition.

Incomparably richer was the realm of thought wherein Friedrich Rückert held sway as "king of a quiet world of dreams." He said of himself:

> What has not been voiced in song,
> For me has not been lived.

Rarely has a poet been so utterly immersed in poetic contemplation. When he wandered for hours and days among the flowers of his garden, or when he listened to the songs of the birds or sat pondering in the open, all experience became material for poetry—the little

incidents of domestic life no less than the great struggles of the fatherland and the data of his learned oriental studies. Among the abundance of tones which issued unceasingly from the improviser's "ever-ready lyre," there was much empty jingle, nor were there lacking the commonplaces of the homely meistersinger. Yet there was ground for rejoicing in the way in which the world was illumined by the wisdom of a serenely poetic mind, the mind of one who was no mere sentimental enthusiast for nature, but who lived intelligently in and with nature. He had grown up in the very heart of Germany, in the smiling valleys of the Hassberg region in Lower Franconia a village lad who knew nothing of the wisdom of the town. Two rustic patriarchs, Hohnbaum the theologian and Baron von Truchsess of Bettenburg, were the first to lead him to the heights of German culture. The valiant hero, with bony face, serious mien, and flowing locks, never felt better than when, wearing the cap and the long coarse garment of the Franconian peasant, gnarled stick in hand, he trudged across his native heaths, for he remained as faithful to Franconia as did Uhland to Swabia. In very truth he heard what the swallow sang and what the leaves whispered. In him there still lingered something of that primitive sensibility characteristic of the grey prehistoric age, when the Germans spied upon the struggles and the cunning wiles of the forest beasts; and he worked up this sense of kinship with nature into a poetical view of the universe which has been justly described as Christian pantheism. To him all creation seemed the revelation of the loving All-in-One, and he had an appreciative ear for every song of gratitude which issued from the vital ecstasy of this sparkling, aromatic, and tuneful world:

> "I am thy gleam, O sun; thy scent, O rose so fair;
> O sea, of thee a drop; of thee a breath, O air."

The thoughts of the Germans had already been turned to the east by Byron's glowing descriptions and by Goethe's *Westostliche Diwan*, when Rückert published his *Oestliche Rosen*. This garland of verses, and the numerous imitations of Indian, Persian, and Arabian poems, which subsequently issued from the same indefatigable pen, gave our cultured world an intimate acquaintance with eastern life, and henceforward every youthful lyricist considered it essential to sing the tuneful bulbul in a ghazal (love poem). The German tongue had now attained the goal which had in an earlier generation been pointed out by able romanticist translators.

It had become a language of world poetry, and skilful imitators were even successful in their dealings with the extraordinary plays upon words and letters found in the *Makamat* of Al Hariri. It is true that the permanent gains from these oriental excursions were inconsiderable when compared with the treasures of living form and matter which the earlier romanticists had derived from the kindred races of England and the Latin world. Only under constraint could the vigorous mental activity of the Teutons accommodate itself to the dream life of the east, while the artificial parallelism of oriental prosody, with its monotonous repetitions, conflicted with the passionate nature of our language, which ever insists that the writer should lead up to a definite conclusion. These western singers of oriental thought could only achieve success when, like Goethe in the *Diwan*, they employed the oriental form merely as a frail envelope for the conveyance of German sentiments. From the rose-gardens of Shiraz Rückert continually returned to his Franconian flower-beds, from Fatima and Zuleika to Agnes and Anna Marie; and just as years before he had produced his *Geharnischte Sonette* as an accompaniment to the war against Napoleon, he now penned many of his poems as illustrations of the struggles of the day, into which he entered with zest, though he remained a champion of emperordom, and remained also a middle-class Protestant who never became estranged from the ideals of the War of Liberation.

Slower and more difficult was the poetic ripening of Adelbert von Chamisso, who had to become a German before he could become a German poet. When, in the summer of 1813, he wrote the story of *Peter Schlemihl*, it was as a pure fantasy, and he had no thought of representing himself, son of an emigré and man without a country, in the image of his tragi-comic hero. Nevertheless during the war between France and Germany he did actually feel as rudderless as the man without a shadow; and not until five years later, when he returned from his voyage round the world, were his misgivings completely overcome, not until then did he realise that the only rest for his mortal remains could be found in German earth. When he had taken to his hearth an ardently loved German wife and when he had secured a respected position among the men of science of Berlin, a second and more precious youth blossomed for him in the prime of his years, and yet more plainly than in the case of the many able men of the Huguenot colony did his genius serve to show how choicely French blossoms can flower upon German soil. Happy now were the hours when he rejoiced to be at home in his modest abode near the lonely outer end of the Friedrichstrasse, or when he

sat beneath the ancient trees of the Botanical Gardens, his imagination running free among the figures of his literary creations while the smoke-wreaths rose from his ever-glowing pipe. Without definite purpose he would long treasure some reminiscence of his travels, some domestic experience, significant phrase, or incident read in the newspaper, and everything thus stored in his subconsciousness was sure ultimately to find fruitful expression. Yet unsophisticated as he was in his receptivity, he was extremely careful and artistic in his draftsmanship. To his French origin he owed his flair for dramatic effect, his mischievousness, and the happy lucidity of his descriptions, always expressed with a conciseness which contrasts strongly with Rückert's flow of language. His sensibilities were so thoroughly German, so amiable and gentle, that he could actually give his blessing to the peasants who were driving their ploughs in the demesnes where once had stood his ancestral halls, destroyed in the chateaux-burnings of the Revolution.

Marvellous was the way in which this man of foreign birth, whose tongue never ceased to betray his French origin, was able in his poems to use German with a master hand, owing much of his success to the singular force of his compact diction. Nor did his poems lack that racy smack of the soil which is characteristic of all our leading writers. In youth he had chosen the north star as his emblem, and in adult life he became the darling of the North Germans because he gave such apt expression to their taciturn yet vigorous sensibilities, and we can discern in his poems some reflection of the Berlin spirit of earlier days, a spirit profoundly affected by French culture. Setting out from romanticism, he sought his materials from every corner of the world, now singing in direct, deeply felt, and simple poems the love and life of women (*Frauen Liebe and Leben*), now in elaborate *terza rima* depicting the vendettas of the redskins, and the loneliness of the south sea islands. His finest poems dealt with contemporary life, which was demanding ever more imperiously that art should render it due recognition; and when the foundations of civilisation were being threatened by the violence of faction, Chamisso, though a man of peace-loving nature, did not shrink from writing trenchant battle songs. When in Paris the Jesuits were once more raising their heads, Chamisso, actually excelling his beloved Béranger, produced the *Nachtwächterlied*, singing " the absolute monarch, so long as he does our will ! " Nor did he fail to give ear to the misery of the masses, knocking already at the door of old-established society; and in his terribly bitter poem *Das Hund des Bettlers* he described

the poverty of the common people, returning subsequently in less savage mood to the same theme in his *Lieder von der alten Waschfrau.*

The minds of all these poets were tranquil, for they were happy in the consciousness of God-given artistic faculty. In the melancholy of Count August Platen, on the other hand, was manifest the distraught consciousness of a new generation, the gloomy weltschmerz of the man "to whom life is suffering and suffering life." Of a proud and aspiring spirit, a man who could be satisfied with only the finest laurels, by unremitting diligence Platen cultivated his inborn sense for euphony and form until he attained absolute mastery, bringing the technique of German lyric poetry to the acme of perfection. He wrought with equal dexterity in ghazals and sonnets and in the most difficult lyrical forms of all times and all nations, but his most congenial medium of expression was found in the rhythmical measures of the classics, and he was unrivalled in the art of incorporating lofty ideas in the dignified cadences of the formal ode. But these elaborate melodies leave an impression of coldness. Goethe justly reproached Platen for his lack of love. It was not merely that the poet knew nothing of the love of women, which has ever been the essence of lyric verse, but he lacked also the faculty of self-surrender, the power of completely forgetting for a time the urgent claims of his own ego. He wrote rather for poets and connoisseurs than for average readers in search of simple enjoyment, and this led him to choose topics which had been treated exhaustively by historians and painters. When, in the doge's palace, he leaned against the magnificent balustrade of the Scala dei Giganti, thinking of the kingly people capable of building these marble halls, with a few majestic words he could, for the cultured reader, call up as by magic a world of great memories, could evoke for the mind's eye the chromatic glories of Veronese's pictures; but when he attempted to deal with human life at first hand and to reproduce the sentiments of his old gondolier on the lagoon, he was cold and dull.

His influence extended far beyond the small band of fanatical admirers, and is fully comprehensible to those alone who have glimpsed within the workshops of artistic creators. Platen was the quiet companion of numberless sculptors, painters, and poets; he sustained the aesthetic aspirations of artist life; and he was able to play these parts for the very reason that his poems left the heart unmoved. Many a man with an over-stimulated imagination learned from the abstract beauty of Platen's rhythms to understand once again the laws of moderation, and many a fevered brow was cooled against the marble of these austere forms. But the

poet's ambition could not find satisfaction in such successes. In self-praise alone he was tasteless, and was never weary of commending to his readers the importance of his own services, or, vainer yet, of referring to "the genius which inspires me." His discontent arose, not merely from suffering on account of the paradoxes of life and the riddles of existence, but also from an inner sense of insecurity. Platen felt that his poetic execution did not fulfil the grandeur of his conceptions.

Disheartened by the neglect of his compatriots and charmed by the beauties of the south, he spent the last years of his life in Italy saying what no German should say: "How weary I am of my fatherland!" With him there appeared a new and unpleasant variety of German cosmopolitanism. In the good old days, those German travellers who did not return home troubled little as a rule about the homeland. But now, owing to the greater facilities for travel and the increased activity in political life characteristic of the new century, it resulted that all over the world there were to be found men of German birth who for various reasons (in many cases from wounded vanity or for mere convenience) were permanently domiciled abroad, and yet these men, Germans to the core, considered they had a call to express their opinions about German affairs, little as they knew of them. Political persecution led to a great increase in the number of these homeless patriots, and it gradually became the rule that whatever happened in Germany must be accompanied by a full chorus of German voices from foreign lands. A few of the emigrants, it is true, attained, in favourable circumstances, to a more liberal outlook, and were able to grasp the reasons for Germany's political weakness; but the majority succumbed to the natural bitterness of the exile. Their vociferous lamentations concerning the miseries of Germany, envenomed public opinion at home and increased the unwarranted contempt felt by foreigners.

Platen was animated by a lively sense of national pride, and he frequently gave sublime expression to the vague impulse towards freedom with which the time was seething:

> O golden freedom, I too am thy child.
> The universe as with a tent enfolding,
> Of life and beauty gentle nurse and mild,
> The world thou nourishest, ever anew remoulding!

After the July revolution he actually assumed the role of political poet. In the quiet earlier years he had commonly interwoven his-

political thoughts into the parabases of his dramas. Since his dramatic attempts proved complete failures, he determined " instead of a picture of the world, to give merely a picture of the picture of the world." According to his own explanation, he adopted this method because his days were unillumined by the sunshine of freedom. In actual fact, however, he yielded to the urge of his strong talent for satire. None of his other writings display at once such perfect art and so much natural energy as do his two Aristophanic comedies, *Die verhängnisvolle Gabel* and *Der romantische Œdipus*. Literary disputes speedily become musty, and to posterity are apt to appear repulsive; the sulphurous odour of the powder lingers disagreeably when the forceful thunder of the discharge has passed into silence. The appearance of these dramas showed, indeed, that our imaginative literature was beginning to become over-ripe, but in a world full of books the existence of a literary satire in dramatic form, but not in truth written for performance on the stage, had better justification than had that of the drama " intended solely for mental performance," which was unsuitable for stage production only through the incapacity of the writer. How vigorously, too, did the satirist wield his scourge. Many of the jests had a false ring, and many of the blows fell upon noble heads, as in the case of young Immermann, who as yet, however, had given no indication of the powers that were to find expression in his modern realistic satire *Münchhausen;* but on the whole Platen fought manfully against dulness and vacuity, against elaborate artificiality and pedestrian penmanship. His parabases, packed with thought, were a splendid outcome of the play of his keen intelligence. With unwonted ardour the poet announced how deeply he had entered into the secrets of beauty. Since the publication of Schiller's *Künstler*, no one had spoken more confidently concerning the poet's calling. Like an echo from Weimar's happiest days resounded the glorious prophecy, which time will continue to fulfil as long as the Germans remain true to themselves:

Lo! the lamps of heaven expire as the last of poets dies!

In comparison with these notable achievements in lyric verse, those of contemporary epic poetry seem poor. The epicists, too, had already been affected by the realistic tendencies of the day. After 1821 Tieck wrote social romances which, shunning the realm of pure fable, took as their field the realities of life, and for the most part the life of the author's own day. Thus the very poet who had

at one time lost himself most completely in the magic garden of romanticism now introduced into Germany a new and thoroughly modern literary type—for Kleist's *Erzählungen* had as yet attracted little attention, and the short stories interspersed in the *Wanderjahre* could not claim to rank as independent pieces of imaginative literature. It was Tieck's aim, like that of the story writers of medieval Italy, to retell in terse narrative, rising rapidly to a climax, some striking and extraordinary incident of real life. To his peculiar talent, always far removed from the simple, the short story, with its permissible oddities, and its complicated psychological problems, offered a more grateful soil than the drama had done, for the drama, thoroughly democratic, can deal only with great themes easily comprehensible to all. Yet even here he failed to attain classical perfection. Epic repose, Goethe's veneration for the real, remained foreign to him. He could not refrain from continually peeping out in person from the framework of the narrative, so that the brilliant observations of the writer concerning art, religion, and society, were to the reader apt to seem more important than the story itself. He had long ere this liberated his mind from the credulous fancies of youth, and in his story *Die Verlobung* he attacked the fashionable pietism of the day with such severity that his daughter Dorothea, a strict Catholic, and other pious friends, were horrified; but Goethe expressed his good wishes to the poet, who had "at length opened a clear blue heaven of human reason and cleanly morals." The old romanticist, however, had not completely mastered all his crotchets. Again and again he shook his readers' confidence by the introduction of irrelevant incidents and incredible fabrications, and even by the importation of an absolutely unpoetical madhouse flavour. Nevertheless these stories, which to-day seem to us so alien, obtained great and merited success, for they furnished our story writers with a new goal, in harmony with national sentiment. Our passionate-natured Germans were rarely successful in the production of the easy-going, sustained romance; they found the quicker movement of the short story more congenial, and Tieck soon secured brilliant companions upon the trail he had broken.

At this time, too, the realism of historical science began to exercise an influence upon imaginative literature. There was a notable increase in the number of historical novels, and amid numerous unsatisfactory attempts, there appeared at least one work endowed with healthy vitality. This was *Lichtenstein* by Hauff the Swabian. It deals with Swabia during the epoch of the

Reformation, is by no means rich in ideas, but fascinates the reader by its genial warmth and by the rare charm of its narrative. Still more powerfully attracted by the world of history were the dramatists, not excepting Grillparzer, who in other respects was prone to pursue a solitary course. The heavy atmosphere of old Austria was, indeed, unfavourable to the writing of historical romances and dramas. Banebanus, "the faithful servant of his master," left German readers cold, since to them the invincible servility of the Austrian official, described with perfect realism, appeared incredible to the pitch of lunacy. When, in *König Ottokar*, Grillparzer sang in freer tones, the Viennese censorship intervened, for the authorities were afraid lest the hostility of the Czechs might be aroused. Immermann, Grabbe, and many other youthful authors made experiments in the composition of historical dramas; and in Berlin the industrious Raupach, who never failed to discern in which direction the wind of public favour was setting, was now devoting himself to the task of hammering out in five-footed iambics the entire history of Hohenstaufen days, a work which later was to be artificially reconstructed in the form of five-act tragedies.

There served as storehouse for the majority of these poets Friedrich von Raumer's *Geschichte der Hohenstaufen*, the first successful endeavour at comprehensive political history which had been made since the revival of historico-philological research (1823). The abundance of its material (for this was the historical ideal of the age of romanticism) sufficed at the outset to secure for the work the approval of its readers. The author's outlook was thoroughly modern, although he was on terms of friendly association with Tieck, Eichendorff, and other writers of the romantic school. His judgments were characterised by the well-bred benevolence of a sensible official of Hardenberg's following, for he was inclined neither to the mysticism of Christianity, nor yet to the outlook of the mediævalists in which fickleness and constancy were so strangely mingled. His style was fresh, clear, and vivid, but lacked force and depth; and Raumer, in a spirit of caution and compromise commonly evaded the disputed questions of historical criticism. The book, however, will always be valued for the great service we owe to its primary design. The lofty figures of our old-time emperors were once again made human and visible at close quarters for cultured Germans, the most distinct of all the character sketches being that of Emperor Frederick II. Now that the ice had been broken, other works dealing with political history appeared, and

secured friendly reception, as, for example, Stenzel's *Geschichte Deutschlands unter den fränkischen Kaisern* and Johannes Voigt's *Geschichte Preussens von den ältesten Zeiten bis zum Untergange der Herrschaft des Deutschen Ordens.*

As if foreseeing that the great day of German historical art was approaching, Wilhelm Humboldt now (1822) composed his essay *Ueber die Aufgabe des Geschichtschreibers*, a brilliant writing, representing in respect alike of form and content the transition from the philosophical to the historical outlook upon the world. Contemplating the mysterious dualism whose dominion is so unmistakable in the moral life of our race born in the dust and yet akin to the gods, he endeavoured to explain it by assuming the persistence of an ideal world behind the phenomena of history. Thus history becomes a representation of the attempts of an idea to attain material existence. The historian's task is twofold: he must record the actual course of events, and he must so display the interconnection between the data of his research as to manifest the determinism of events and to enable the reader to recognise the decisions of divine ordinance. This is an imposing conception, an attempt to combine a delicate understanding of individual life with a free grasp of the general forces of history, and it secured for history in the grand style its due place upon the borderland between science and art. The decisive question as to the true relationship between the world of ideas and the conscious activities of men animated by desire, was, indeed, left unelucidated. Hence Alexander Humboldt raised an objection, saying that to him these ideas recalled the undemonstrable vital forces whose existence was assumed by the physiologist directly he began to pass beyond the range of precise observation. Wilhelm, however, stood his ground, for he knew that the mental sciences differ from the natural sciences in not being subject to the laws of logic alone, for in the case of the former their ultimate and highest ideas can be but obscurely indicated, and are not susceptible of complete demonstration.

Meanwhile Schlosser and Ranke, who in the immediate future were to be the two leading German historians, had appeared upon the stage. F. C. Schlosser is one of the most extraordinary phenomena of our literary history, for it is rare indeed that a man who by temperament belongs to a very different age can nevertheless influence the world of his contemporaries. A son of the eighteenth century, he was wholly inspired by Kant's rigid conceptions of duty. In strong contrast with Rotteck, who was ever the spokesman of the middle classes, Schlosser regarded the

party struggles of the day with undisguised contempt. He was little affected even by the patriotic enthusiasm of the wars of liberation, for he was born and brought up at Jever in Frisia, and the Frisians hardly regarded themselves as Germans. Under an uncouth and rough exterior there lay concealed a tender and affectionate disposition. Not until fully mature did he attain, under the influence of gentle and noble-minded women, to inward peace, and thenceforward for many years he lived a quiet and studious life in Heidelberg, regarding self-knowledge and the self-culture of a free personality as the highest aims of existence. His strong mystical tendency, which was no less characteristic of his mind than was the impulse towards the attainment of exact philosophical knowledge, found its satisfaction in the works of Dante. His happiest hours were passed in the poet's company. Being of opinion that the facts of history can acquire meaning solely before the judgment-seat of conscience, he regarded it as his vocation to hold, like Dante, a historical court of assize, and to pass judgment, in accordance with the strict laws of the Kantian doctrine of duty, upon the moral values of all events. From the point of view of exact knowledge his strength lay in his comprehensive acquaintance with the history of literature. He was the first German to attempt a demonstration of the evolution of art and science in their connection with the entire destiny of the nations.

Remote as was this man of learning from political struggles, he became none the less a spokesman of public opinion, for he was the first among German historians of purely middle-class birth. Sprung from a free peasant stock, at the petty court of Varel he had witnessed the disorderly conduct of the émigrés, and his inborn hatred of the nobility had been raised thereby to the pitch of loathing. Among the legal principles of his beloved Kant, he clung above all to the principle of equality before the law for all members of the community. The self-esteem of the bourgeoisie, which had increased so notably since the nation had become dominated by the newer literature (mainly of middle class origin), found its loudest and most defiant expression in Schlosser's writings. Hence he was accounted a liberal, although he never became friendly to constitutionalist ideas; hence, too, despite his well-marked Low German peculiarities, he became almost as dear to the South Germans as was their own Rotteck, for at this period middle-class sentiment was most strongly developed in High Germany. It was a matter of principle with Schlosser to regard the state from below, from the standpoint of the ruled; he never attempted to put himself in the

place of the rulers, or to acquire an imaginative understanding of the force of circumstances by which their actions were dictated. Since, like all men of keen sensibilities, any offence to his moral feelings aroused passionate bitterness, his moral assize of the world possessed but little of the sublimity of the Divine Comedy. An unpolished man, with no sense for nobility of form, he gave way to a tendency to unbalanced recrimination; he lacked understanding of and delight in historical greatness; and there was left upon his readers the painful impression that the multiform glories of history amounted after all to nothing more than the dull uniformity of successful knaveries. But it was precisely this unjust and unstatesmanlike severity of moral judgments which won for him the affections of the middle classes. The Kantian doctrine of duty, diluted and debased, had long ere this penetrated the bourgeois mind, and in the narrow political life of the day, it was a joy to everyone to find that the sins of the mighty ones of the earth were being thoroughly censured by a relentless and honourable man. In Schlosser's *Geschichte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts*, history thus written from a moralising outlook secured its first striking success; but not until the following decade, when the author redrafted his book upon wider lines, did he become a recognised power in the German bourgeoisie.

Leopold Ranke, feeling assured of a great future, declared modestly and firmly in his first work, *Geschichte der romanischen und germanischen Völker von* 1494 *bis* 1535 (1824) that he had no intention of essaying to pass judgment on bygone days, or to instruct his contemporaries for the benefit of posterity. It was his simple desire, "to show what had really happened." Intimately acquainted with the philosophy of Fichte and of Hegel, it was by no means his intention to forbid the historian a demonstration of the ideal content of history; but he considered that the precise elucidation of actual fact was the primary need of the history of modern times, still in an utterly neglected state. He was a pioneer in the critical study of the authorities of this epoch, for, in an investigation which has become a classic, he demonstrated the untrustworthiness of the celebrated historians of the cinquecento, and recommended, as furnishing the sole trustworthy testimony, the reports, letters, and diaries of those who had actually taken part in the events. In his work *Fürsten und Völker von Sudeuropa im sechszehnten und siebzehnten Jahrhundert*, mainly compiled from the incomparable ambassadorial reports of the Venetians, we already possess a characteristic example of the newer history based upon diplomatic

documents. The work was essentially political in character, for it regarded the state from above. It attempted to understand the motives and aims of the actors, the members of the ruling class, and, with a distinguished reserve, usually permitted facts to speak for themselves. Complete mastery of the material gave the relation the quiet beauty of a work of art. There was, of course, a danger that, whereas in Schlosser's writings the voice of conscience was apt to speak too often and too loudly, in the works of the historian of diplomacy that voice would be completely stilled; there was a danger that the broad foundations of society, the common people, with their needs and sorrows, their valour, and their obscure instincts, would not receive sufficient attention; and there was a further danger that the writer would tend to ignore the influences of love and anger, the emotional forces to which due attention must be paid in every realistic description of human life. Still, the foundation had been strongly laid, the foundation upon which German historical science was to build securely. The school of Ranke, at first but little heeded, was destined ultimately to become dominant; and through its influence the widely popular works of Schlosser were to lose their vogue.

The new life of the historico-philological sciences was now undergoing fresh development in every direction, and this development was thoroughly healthy. When Carl Ritter came to Berlin no audience was at first to be found for his lectures on the unknown specialty of geography, but after a few years had elapsed he occupied the position of a recognised master. Among classical philologists, F. G. Welcker was the first to study with cultured understanding the trilogical structure of the tragedies of Æschylus; Lobeck, in his *Aglaophamus*, destroyed the imaginary creations of the symbolists, with a criticism which was incisive but at times somewhat jejune; and Otfried Müller, following in Niebuhr's footsteps, elucidated the political constitutions of the Dorians with reference to the social conditions of the age of the Peloponnesian conquest. In Germanist circles, von der Hagen and the other dilettantes who came to the fore during the first years of the young university of Berlin, gradually lost prestige. Sober investigators, on the other hand, clung together with the tenacity of members of a religious community, still inspired with the delights of youthful zeal, gratefully recognising that for the binding of hearts science is more effective than art, since art tends to isolate creative spirits. The impoverished Wilhelm Wackernagel hardly noticed the severity of the frost as he sat in an unwarmed bowling-alley in the long winter evenings

poring over ancient manuscripts. All were glad to aid one another in their work.

When Uhland had given an account of the life of Walther von der Vogelweide, artistically elucidating the poet's writings from a study of his personality, Lachmann followed up this study by the publication of a critical edition of Walther von der Vogelweide's works, dedicating the book to the Swabian poet. Two wealthy collectors gave assistance by permitting use of their libraries. Whoever wished to study in Baron von Meusebach's library in Berlin was remorselessly locked up in the reading room by that eccentric. The brothers Grimm, whose charm was irresistible, were alone granted unrestricted access to the sanctuary. At Baron von Lassberg's ancient castle of Meersburg on the lake of Constance, research could be carried on under more agreeable conditions, for here the hospitality and the sentiments of the middle ages still prevailed.

In the year 1828, Jacob completed another of his pioneer works, *Deutsche Rechtsaltertümer.* In this book he made the history of their ancient laws live once more for the Germans, showing, as Uhland phrased, it, how the lime tree blossomed above the stone judgment-seat. The industry which amassed this collection of antique legal formulas and symbols was no less astounding than the powerful and yet controlled imagination which was competent to reanimate a legal system after centuries of oblivion, to reunite its torn threads. Delight in the lively, cheerful life of the middle ages is manifest throughout. Just as Grimm never failed to give the preference to folk speech and to folk songs, so also by choice did he derive his knowledge of ancient legal customs from the *Weistümer,* those legal maxims peculiar to the Germans which derive from the very mouth of the people, and which were regarded by Grimm as "a splendid testimony to the free and noble character of our native system of law." Though it was his desire to write rather as an archæologist than as a student of law or politics, his researches concerning the *Mark* and the *Hammerwurf* served to illuminate extensive and hitherto unexplored regions of German political and economic history, belonging to that period when our Teutonic ancestors were abandoning a pastoral for an agricultural life and when wealth that could be driven from place to place was being supplanted by less mobile forms of property. He was the first to discover that in the mingling of different nations the essential framework of law, like that of language, is long enduring, whereas the outward formalities of law, like the forms of words, are susceptible of speedier change.

Through Carl Simrock's translation of the Nibelung saga and other Middle High German poems, some of the data of Germanistic research gradually became common property of the cultured classes. Simrock was a Rhinelander, brilliant, amiable, and roguish, poet and man of learning, an enthusiast for Germany's ancient greatness, and for the beauties of the Rhine, that stream so rich in legendary lore. In his reproductions of mediæval verse, he would not follow the example of the translator from foreign tongues, who presents the ideas in a bald new German; it sufficed him, with a cautious hand, to replace words that would have been unintelligible to his contemporaries, while preserving that atmosphere of antiquity which, in the case of poems from our own country's past, does not estrange us, but serves rather to charm.

For theology, this decade was equally fruitful. In his *Glaubenslehre* (1821), Schleiermacher gave a further methodical exposition of the essential ideas contained in the *Reden über die Religion.* He showed how religion is rooted in the unity of our inner life, in that immediate self-consciousness of man which controls and permeates all volition and all thought. For him the essence of belief was to be found, not in the acceptance of definite dogmas, but in the inward conviction of salvation. This personal experience was the message he wished to convey to reflective minds, thus reconciling with faith the scientific culture of the century. It was impossible that the attempt could be completely successful. More than once the great dialectician transcended the limits of the knowable in his endeavours to prove what lies beyond demonstration. But this thoughtful conception of Christianity gave expression to the ideas of a mighty spirit, and breathed a comprehensive love which revolted against the thought of eternal damnation and refused to abandon the conviction that the souls of all will ultimately be rehabilitated. A few years later, in their *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* (1828), Ullmann and Umbreit provided for the "redemption theology" (*Vermittlungstheologie*) a forum which diverged no less definitely from the school of Paulus than from that of Hengstenberg, and henceforward the three great tendencies of Protestant theology became incorporate in three definite parties.

How great had been the change since those days of ecclesiastical calm in which Schleiermacher had reannounced the long-forgotten truth that religion detests solitude. Plain was now the fulfilment of what Arnim had written after reading the *Reden über die Religion:*

Where gathers a goodly company,
There flames an ardent piety.
As lightnings flash from cloud to cloud,
So fervour thrives amid the crowd.

Religious life became transfused with unwonted energy, and therewith was displayed an excess of ill-feeling. The irreconcilable contrasts which Germany harboured were deplorably displayed when Voss died in the year 1826, and when the factions crossed swords over the old champion's grave. Paulus, Tiedemann, and Schlosser extolled the fighting rationalist in terms which implied that he merited a place beside Luther and Lessing. Görres, on the other hand, turning to account the rationalists' pride, in an able polemic writing acclaimed the deceased as the intellectual king of Low Germany, saying that in him, as aforetime in the Reformation, the homely intelligence of the peasantry of the lowlands had found incorporation. But contrasted with this northern world of matter-of-fact reason, there existed, he said, another and more beautiful Germany, the Germany of the south, rich in imagination, dowered with art, and blessed with the Catholic Church! How was it possible to bridge the chasm between these conflicting views?

§ 2. RADICALISM AND THE JEWS.

Meanwhile radical ideas, which had once more permeated the western world since the revolutions in southern Europe, began to make their influence felt in German literature. After the disappointment of so many hopes it was impossible that the boastful self-complacency of the Teutonist movement should persist; reaction was inevitable; and in Germany, since our people take life seriously, such reversals are apt to be sudden and violent, to be effected with elemental energy. Nevertheless, it was a sign of political immaturity and of perverse conditions that the change of mood should occur so abruptly on this occasion. The new radicalism, which was now becoming predominant among our youth and among the middle classes without affecting the highest strata of our culture, was ungerman to the core. It regarded with contempt all that the heroes of Leipzig and Belle Alliance had held sacred, our art and science, our Christian faith, and even the deeds of the War of Liberation; while it sought its ideals in the very land which to those of the previous generation had been an object of detestation. To both the neighbour peoples it was disastrous, a necessary outcome

of the many unsolved problems of power which still remained open for debate between them, that they could never attain to a peaceful relationship of mutual respect. German judgments of the French oscillated between hatred and over-esteem. In France, the members of a new generation were growing to maturity, the sanguinary horrors of the Revolution had been forgotten, talk of the glories of the storming of the Bastille was again widely current; and a crowd of Germans, whose numbers increased year by year, enthusiastically joined in the French chorus of self-praise. From the middle of the twenties onwards, French political ideas made their way irresistibly across the Rhine.

Never before in history had the victor bent his neck thus willingly beneath the yoke of the vanquished. In the age of Louis XIV, when France dominated our culture, for Germany, depopulated and mutilated, little else was possible but passive acceptance of the Gallic conqueror. But now it was only in the exact sciences that the French occupied the premier position; in all other fields of literature and art they were equalled or excelled by the Germans. While the German might well envy his neighbour for the earlier acquirement of national unity, Prussia at least, in her national crown, her compulsory military service, her educational system, her local self-government, and her upright officialdom, possessed all those foundations of an ordered and free political life which were lacking to the French state. But by the radical youth of Germany, the party struggles so brilliantly conducted by the parliamentary orators and journalists of Paris were not regarded as a proof of hopeless internal restlessness, but as a sign of highly developed liberty; for among wide circles of the half-cultured there still prevailed, as Niebuhr noted with profound regret, a view dating from the early days of the Revolution, a sentiment of hostility to the state, the opinion of those who held "that freedom finds expression in conflict alone—in the struggle of the parliamentary deputies with the government, and in the struggle of the individual with the sovereign." In reality the Germans had little to learn from the unnatural cross between English parliamentary practice and Napoleonic administrative despotism which was extolled by the French as constitutional monarchy. That which now made its way over from France as the last word in political wisdom, should have been recognised as nothing but an anachronism, a new concretion of that formalist doctrine of the state according to which the essence of freedom is to be found in a constitution alone—a doctrine whose scientific foundations had long ere this been over-

thrown by Niebuhr and Savigny. Admiration for French methods could not now fail to confuse and to lead astray. Thereby our young men were estranged from the fatherland; they were robbed of respect for the heroes of the nation; they were deprived of an understanding of the actual beginnings of a sound national political system; while their mood, already sufficiently unwholesome, was in addition artificially corrupted by the revolutionary catchwords and the unmeasured violence of faction which they adopted from their French neighbours. The young Germans who grew to manhood under the spell of these French ideas hardly realised that Gneisenau was still living among us in the full vigour of his prime, and Motz was not even a name to them, whilst they all knew and admired General Foy, who in the Paris chamber had demanded that France should once again adopt the tricolour, the banner of the Marseillais.

The new radicalism found a powerful ally in the youthful energy of literary Judaism. Modern Jewry had long ceased to possess sufficient intellectual energy to generate a sound culture of its own, as had been possible centuries before to the Jews who lived amid the oriental civilisation of the Moorish empire in Spain. The old civilisations of western Europe possessed so definitely national a stamp that in politics and literature the Jews could not venture to display themselves as an independent force. Thus the first German Jew to attain a notable position in our literature, Moses Mendelssohn, followed the current of German national life, helping to the best of his ability in the intellectual tasks of the German philosophy of enlightenment. When he defended the faith of his fathers against Lavater, as he was well entitled to do, it was by no means his intention to permeate the German world with Jewish ideas, and he was far more concerned to diffuse German culture among his co-religionists. Since then, the seed he had sown had ripened, a number of the Jews had become more or less Germanised, and several Jewish writers were already regular contributors to the newspaper press; but in these circles there soon began to prevail a dangerous spirit of aloofness and arrogance! In Germany the Jewish population was far more numerous than in other countries of western Europe, and since the Polish stock of Jewry to which our German Jews belong had always been less ready to adapt itself to western civilisation than had the Spanish Jews (from which stem the majority of Jews then resident in England and France had sprung), it resulted that in Germany, and in Germany alone, a peculiar semi-Jewish literature came into existence, concealing under accidental forms its orientalist outlook and its

hereditary hatred of Christianity. A well-established national pride which would have nipped all such attempts in the bud was non-existent. The patient soil of Germany had served as an arena for all the nations of Europe, and there was no reason why the Jews should not try fortune in their turn.

The finer spirits among the German Jews had long recognised that members of their race could not claim civic equality unless they were prepared to abandon a separatist position and to participate unreservedly in German life. A few decades after Moses Mendelssohn had issued his appeal, talented men of Jewish descent, baptised and unbaptised, men who felt themselves to be Germans and whose work displayed thoroughly German lineaments, had acquired distinguished positions in art and science: in music, Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy; in painting, Veit; and in theology, the simple-minded and pious Neander. But in contrast with these, the crude Jewish geniuses whose pens found a market in the columns of the daily press boldly insisted on the display of Jewish peculiarities, while simultaneously demanding respect as spokesmen of German public opinion. These Jews without a country, vaunting themselves as a nation within the nation, exercised upon the still inchoate national self-esteem of the Germans an influence no less disturbing and disintegrating than similar Jews had exercised of old upon the declining nations of the Roman empire.

In so far as the Jewish cosmopolitan was competent to understand western nations, he was chiefly attracted towards the French, not merely from reasonable gratitude, but also from a sense of inner kinship. To a nation which for centuries had ceased to possess a political history, nothing seemed so alien as the historic sense. To the Jews, German veneration for the past appeared ludicrous; but modern France had broken with her history, here they felt more at home, in this raw new state, created, as it were, by pure reason. Thus it came to pass that the Jewish litterateurs encouraged German radicalism in its uncritical preference for France. Moreover, the cries of haro with which, in accordance with their national custom, the Jewish publicists loved to make the welkin ring, did not serve to ennoble our political manners, more especially since the Germans are themselves prone to become tasteless in polemic. When Jewish hatred of Christianity came to fan the flames of controversy, the well-grounded political discontent of the day found degenerate expression in boundless exaggeration.

Above all corrupting in its influence upon German radicalism was the strange Jewish perversity of self-mockery. This people

without a state, widely scattered throughout the world, adopting the tongues and the customs of other nations while still clinging to its own isolation, lived in perpetual contradiction, which might appear either tragical or comical according to the observer's standpoint. To the nimble Jewish wit, the ludicrous contrast between oriental nature and occidental form was necessarily apparent. The Jews of Europe had long been accustomed to make mock of themselves with utter ruthlessness, and the severest things ever said about Jews proceeded from Jewish lips. The racial pride of the chosen people vis-à-vis the Gentiles was, indeed, so deeply rooted that the Jew remained undisturbed by the bitterest expressions of self-mockery. But now this evil Jewish custom made its way into German literature, where the soil was already prepared by the playful irony of the romanticists and the political bitterness of the liberals. It came to be regarded as a mark of genius to speak dispassionately, with shameless disrespect, of the fatherland, as if the speaker had neither part nor lot therein, as if the mockery of Germany need not inevitably cut every individual German to the heart. But the German jokes with difficulty. Least of all could he understand this orientalist wit, and he consequently took at its face value many a vituperative onslaught which was not really meant in bad part. Our radical youth soon began to look upon impudent abuse of the fatherland as the true index of intellectual ability, simply because the German state, hemmed in by a thousand difficulties, could not instantaneously grant all the wishes of its impatient children. They continued to rail against the cringing humility and the sheeplike patience of the Germans until they believed in their own grotesque caricature of Germany, honestly imagining that the most passionate nation in Europe, the nation of the *furia tedesca*, was phlegmatic.

During the years when everything German was being decried, the national caricature of the German Michael acquired a new and repulsive configuration. The German Michael of old days, as befitted his warrior name, had been a great hulking fellow, clumsy and uncouth, but valiant, downright, and cheerful, like John Bull or Robert Macaire, not unworthy of a great nation, a nation that believed in itself and could therefore venture to laugh at itself from time to time. But now, under the old name, he was portrayed and described as a cowardly and sluggish dolt who, maltreated by everyone he met, pulled down his nightcap over his ears. This caricature had come into vogue during the romanticist campaign against the philistines, making its first appearance on the title page of the

Heidelberger Einsiedlerzeitung, but Achim von Arnim had solemnly declared that this good-for-nothing was intended to typify the well-to-do reading public, "not my people, whom I honour, and about whom I shall never lightly jest." The new generation of radicals knew nothing of such discretions, and was not ashamed to make a mock of the nation whose victorious sword had just overthrown the Napoleonic world empire, depicting it in the repulsive lineaments of a cowardly lazybones.

The stimulating and destructive efficiency of radical Jewry was all the more dangerous because the Germans were subject to a long-standing illusion as to the nature of this new literary force. They ingenuously accepted as German enlightenment and German freedom of thought that which was in reality Jewish hatred of Christianity and Jewish cosmopolitanism. It was only Wolfgang Menzel and a few other publicists whose eyes were open to the danger, but since they all belonged to the high church school their warnings were disregarded. Not until much later did the nation recognise that from the end of the twenties a foreign drop had been mingled with its blood. The Germans had justly prided themselves on their freedom from irreverence, for the liberal spirits among them had spoken boldly, but had always approached sacred things with respect. This could not be said henceforward, for in Germany, too, were to appear writings characterised by all the impudence of Voltaire, though lacking the Frenchman's genius.

The intellectual father of this hybrid Judaico-German literature was Ludwig Börne of Frankfort, a man essentially upright, gentle and warm-hearted, but destined never to rise above a tasteless amalgam of German sentimentalism and Jewish facetiousness, vacillating hopelessly between patriotism and cosmopolitanism, equally incompetent to discover a definite creed and to attain to a genuine national feeling, and ultimately giving himself up to the uncouthness of an arid and stormy radicalism. In a simpler and more vigorous epoch, a character so inharmonious would merely have aroused the interest of the mental pathologist, but amid the confusion and bitterness of German party struggles he was able for a time to play the part of tribune of the people. The great figures of our classical literature were too lofty for his understanding. He gave his admiration to Jean Paul, and in youth was so devoted to lachrymose self-portraiture that when he was in love with pretty Henriette Herz he was careful to describe in his diary all the hours and minutes of his "spiritual hypochondria" and the sublime sentiments by which this state was characterised. Subsequently pulling himself together, as

dramatic critic he acquired a reputation which was not altogether undeserved, though unduly exaggerated by the zealous trumpetings of his co-religionists. Lacking a cultured sense of beauty, he was nevertheless endowed with the healthy naturalism of the human understanding. Not merely did he aptly satirise the absurdities of the fate-tragedy and other gross aberrations of taste, but had in addition an eye for unrecognised talent, as in the cases of Kleist and Immermann.

He now began to write on politics and social questions in the *Wage*, the *Zeitschwingen*, and other newspapers, and these activities soon monopolised his energies, for it was as a political writer that he displayed all the arts of his scorn. But scorn is justified only when it arises from the noble wrath of genius, and this man lacked all the qualities requisite to the publicist—a feeling for realities, a sense of proportion, foresight, and even a common knowledge of affairs. Industry, by which the Jews are usually characterised, he considered superfluous in politics. His political articles are frothy and ephemeral journalism, for not one of them bears witness to a serious study of the matter with which it deals. Börne was the first to establish the dominion of " the sovereign feuilleton " which worked such unspeakable harm to the unripe political culture of the Germans, and emboldened crude smatterers, helping themselves out with a few jests, puns, figures of speech, and cries of indignation, to discuss all the serious problems of statecraft.

Wherever wit could carry him, Börne was in his element. He satirised the Gothamites of the German petty towns amusingly enough, though raising a clamour thereanent which hardly conformed to the triviality of the topic. Wit is a child of the hour which ages prematurely, and to which posterity can rarely do full justice. Börne, however, had the gift of being genuinely amusing about serene highnesses, aulic and commercial councillors, privy councillors' wards, the Taxis postal service, and the epicures at the ordinary; these witty sallies are the immortal elements of his writings, in which there is nothing else to attract even passing attention to-day. Directly he endeavoured to rise above such trivialities into the sphere of politics, he displayed the poverty of a dull understanding, whose only resource when faced by complicated political problems is a barren statement of alternatives. " Is the state our end, or the individual within the state? " seemed to him the great problem of the future, for he could not recognise the futility of such a question, although Kant had demonstrated its absurdity. Thus without ever indicating a definite and

comprehensible goal, he abandoned himself to empty praises of anarchy, the mother of freedom, and to equally vain tirades about the hopeless miseries of Germany, saying, "We are dumb driven cattle, handed down from the past to the present, which the present will bequeath unchanged to the future."

He had but one clear political aim, the emancipation of the Jews. His conversion to Christianity was not dictated by religious conviction, nor yet by the desire to become a thorough German, being merely the outcome of a wish to do away with obstacles to easy social progress. But shame was unknown to him, and though a renegade he had no sense of impropriety in playing the advocate on behalf of the coreligionists he had abandoned. After his conversion he still retained the racial pride of the chosen people, and scarce troubled to conceal that he regarded the Jews as the salt of the German earth—and yet, when the fancy took him, he would roughly attack Jews and Germans in one breath, and would satirise German Jews as eight-footed hares. "I well know how to prize," he wrote on one occasion, "the unmerited good fortune through which I was born both German and Jew, so that I am able to aspire to all the virtues of the Germans without sharing any of their faults!" But he could not endure that Christians should even speak of "Jews," and raised clamorous complaints of intolerance when the newspapers reported as a simple statement of fact that Levi, a Jewish merchant, had gone bankrupt. Among the grievances he was never weary of airing, there were many of which he could justly complain, but there were many others that were simply the outcome of the sensibilities of a morbidly inflated self-esteem. On the occasion of the centenary of a great conflagration, the town of Frankfort proposed a commemorative festival, and the council issued the following decree: "At the close of the festival, on Sunday 27th, a solemn religious service will be held in all Christian churches, and it is likewise ordered that prayers be said in the Jewish synagogues." Both in form and content this proclamation was perfectly innocent, but since the wording in the case of the Jews differed slightly from that used about the Christians, Börne wrote a furious article, and despairingly exclaimed: "Oh, unhappy fatherland in which these things can happen!" Notwithstanding such exaggerations, the persistent iteration of complaints made an impression, and the Jews, so recently regarded with hatred, were now by young men of radical views esteemed as noble fighters for freedom.

In the year 1822 Börne journeyed to Paris, and as soon as he reached Strasburg delightedly exclaimed, "Now I can breathe

freely ! " How remote were the days when Rückert had prophesied to the Germans that here in the ancient imperial city a German princely castle must and should one day arise. Our new champion of German freedom wrote from Paris : " I was no longer shivering among fishes, I was no longer in Germany ! " He was not utterly devoid of appreciation for the greatness of his fatherland, and in his better hours he unquestionably felt the futility of " coquettish glory," recognised the superiority of the German tongue, and even valued German freedom of thought. But after such bursts of German sentiment he invariably relapsed into Judaico-French phrases, bombastic to a degree which none but Victor Hugo has ever excelled, saying, for instance, " Paris is the telegraph of the past, the microscope of the present, and the telescope of the future ! " He was never weary of holding up before the " fragmentary men " of Germany the brilliant example of the " complete men " of France. Without noticing the ludicrous contradiction, he went on to commend to us, in especial, the rigid one-sidedness of French party sentiment. " The Frenchman," he said, " praises and favours everyone belonging to his own side, and censures and injures everyone attached to the opposite party ; this is why the French can do anything, while we can do nothing." Looking over Paris from the Vendôme column, he declared : " This view would do a German good if the reed could grow larger and stronger because the storm has overthrown the oak." Thus within seven years of the second entry of the German army into Paris he had forgotten that we were the storm which overthrew the oak. French vanity had long ere this begun to cherish the illusion that the power of the *grande nation* had been broken solely by the mysterious caprice of destiny, without any cooperation on the part of the Germans ; now the victors were beginning credulously to repeat the fables of the vanquished.

Börne's books served to direct the glances of our German youth towards Paris once again. Before, the splendours of court life had allured to the Seine ; now, the attraction was the parliamentary struggle. It speedily became the rule that every young radical author must prove the soundness of his political faith by a pilgrimage to the Mecca of liberty. Börne was followed by Eduard Gans, a man of much keener political insight, and able to perceive the defects of French political life. Yet he also was bewitched by the theatrical tumult of party struggles. When, in a journalistic prosecution, the loud applause of the liberal-minded public thundered through the court, he imagined himself to be listening to " France's

heart-beat"; and in comparison with the politically awakened young men of Paris, those of Germany seemed to him superficial trifiers. Thus matters went on, German men of letters crossing the Rhine in unending succession, their spirits rising directly they reached Kehl bridge. All of them set out with the fixed determination to admire everything French. Since they learned nothing of France but Paris, and while in Paris associated only with a small circle of radical journalists, they furnished utterly false reports to the German papers. The Prussian officers quartered in France during the war had not failed to observe that most of the inhabitants of the country were thrifty, hard-working, rather timid people, and that the military spirit was incomparably weaker than in Prussia. These sound opinions were now abandoned by the Germans, for Börne and his disciples unceasingly declared that the chivalrous French nation concerned itself little about base economic cares, and was glowing with ardour to win liberty for itself in order to share the acquirement with other peoples. The cult of the so-called ideas of '89, which in Germany during the actual years of the Revolution had been restricted to a group of men of learning, was first diffused throughout the broad masses of our middle classes by this German-French journalistic campaign. It was the worst conceivable of political schools for a nation already prone to doctrinaire excesses.

After his return from Paris, Börne was in a state of feverish excitement, longing for the revolution. He himself did not know how the revolution was to be brought about or what its coming was to effect. Since the Germans remained calm, he abused them as coarsely as had Saul Ascher. In the years following the War of Liberation, the nation had exercised its domestic rights, and had shown Ascher's Jewish impudence the door. But now had come a change of sentiment. Advanced radicals looked at one another with meaning smiles when Börne, in ever-new invective, reiterated Ascher's idea, saying: "The Germans are a nation of servants, and at the word 'fetch' would wag their tails and bring lost crowns back to their masters." They thought it witty when he recommended the burning of the Göttingen library, and announced his intention to abuse the Germans until he had spurred them on to an awakening of national pride. They greeted him with applause when, with a spitefulness which nowise fell short of the zeal exhibited by the persecutors of the demagogues, he examined the political sentiments of the more notable among his contemporaries, bluntly accusing of servility all who held moderate views, and aspersing

with his mean suspicions the leading spirits of the nation, men too great for his understanding. His nickname for Goethe was "the rhyming knave," and for Hegel "the prosy knave." Who could take it amiss of the younger generation that it should use the living man's right in the case of the correspondence between Schiller and Goethe, and should declare, even if crudely and unjustly, that this world of beauty was out-of-date. But Börne did more. He declaimed against the anti-popular sentiments of Goethe and even of Schiller, regarding the latter as a yet more pernicious aristocrat. He dragged the poets' friendship in the mud, sullying their greatness, although in these very letters it spoke so convincingly to all German hearts. "It is tragical," he exclaimed, "that our two greatest geniuses should be so null when we see them at home, so petty that, were it possible, they would be even less than null!" Summarising his judgment of Goethe, he said that for sixty years, favoured by unexampled good fortune, this man had imitated the handwriting of genius and never been found out. He extolled Voltaire, in order to emphasise a contrast with the offensive repose of Goethe's style. "How different is Voltaire! His vanity takes us captive. We are delighted that so great a man should tremble before our criticism, should fawn upon us, should seek to win our approval!"

The hubbub was so senseless that it was hardly possible to say how much of it was seriously meant, and yet herein lay the danger. Börne, though he reviled Germany's greatness, remained a patriot after his own fashion. But our German youths who lent an unnatural ear to this Jewish self-mockery lost all veneration for the fatherland, and thus Börne's influence, though it was in a sense inevitable in the circumstances, was disastrous to the coming generation. Dipping youth in gall, he was unable to offer youth a single new idea. Moreover, he sinned deeply against our language. At the opening of the century Germans for the most part wrote well, though at times somewhat cumbrously (for many of them carried the lengthy periods of the classical tongues from school into everyday life). But Börne formed himself upon Jean Paul's over-elaborate style, and subsequently on French models; not his that refined understanding for the genius of language which is akin to the historic sense. His abstract, journalistic, and cultured writing was brilliant, piquant, elegant, anything you like—except German. It could wrangle, but could not express a noble wrath; could inflict painful pinpricks, but could not overwhelm; played with fanciful images, and yet never acquired expressive warmth;

lacked the soul, the energy of nature. "History numbers great men; they are the index to the book of the past; such are Goethe and Schiller: and history numbers other great men; they are the table of contents to the book of the future; such are Voltaire and Lessing." In sentences of this character everything was ungerman, thoughts, structure, and words; but they shone and dazzled. Soon they found busy imitators. Journalists vied one with another in the use of transcendental images, dislocated words, over-refined allusions; they fell in love with their own unnaturalness; they took as cordial a delight in their own artifices as had of yore Lohenstein and Hoffmannswaldau. Even in Goethe's lifetime the German tongue began to run wild, and only men of science and a few poetic souls were able to withstand the temptations of hyperculture.

In German poesy a loud echo was promptly awakened by the Greek lyrics of the great radical poet of the age; but Lord Byron's weltschmerz, the defiant sèlf-assertion of the revolutionary ego, rebelling now menacingly, now despairingly, against the order of the world, while it secured in the twenties many admirers among the Germans, found but few imitators. Romanticist irony still sufficed discontented spirits as a medium for expression, and doubtless to many young poets the Byronic weltschmerz seemed quite inimitable. The individual appears so small when contrasted with the great moral forces constituting the nexus of historic life that an attempt to stem these forces, when made by any other than a divinely gifted poet who carries the whole world in his heart, seems ridiculous vanity. Byron, as his friend Shelley phrased it, "had gazed on Nature's naked loveliness, Actæon-like," and had then, like Actæon, been torn to pieces by raging hounds. In his finest and most audacious work, *Don Juan*, we find side by side with an abundance of frivolous mockery so wonderful a knowledge of the sweet mysteries of the heart, and side by side with a radicalism which challenges all titles to sanctity so serene an inspiration for true human greatness, that the poem, while it might well lead immature minds astray, could not but fascinate all profound and liberal spirits. All his works breathe that charm of personal experience to which poetry owes its power. He was what he wrote; he, a bold exile, was entitled to declare war against all traditional order. Banned by the hypocritical morality of his own land, he stood alone and self-sufficient, until he found a glorious death in the struggle for the freedom of the nations.

Despite his many failings a great and genuine man, he towers

above the German writer who first endeavoured to inspire our poetry with a flavour of Byronic weltschmerz. Heinrich Heine grew up in Düsseldorf amid the glories of the Rhenish sagas. Like all the younger romaticists he was an enthusiast for the lays of the *Wunderhorn*, but it was impossible for him to accept this world of miracle with the same naivety as did Eichendorff the visionary. His keener Jewish intelligence, trained in the school of Hegel, and the precocious cynicism of a mood influenced by experiences gained among the licentious millionaires of Hamburg, led him to revolt unceasingly against romanticist dreams. He never rose superior to these contradictions. He was altogether devoid of the human greatness of our classical poets. He had talent without profundity ; he had wit without conviction ; he was egotistical, lascivious, untruthful, and withal at times irresistingly charming ; as a poet, too, he lacked character, and was therefore extraordinarily unequal in his creative work. He had moments of real inspiration, when he received the benison of the muse, when he struck the keynote of strong sensibility, and could limn vivid pictures with admirable plastic power. In many cases, however, he prostituted his virtuoso's talent for form to the work of soulless imitation. Still more frequently was he overpowered by an impulse towards self-mockery, so that from the heights of ideal sentiment he would suddenly leap down into the abyss of obscenity or of cheap witticism, and, with faunish grimace, would convey to the reader the insincerity of the assumed mood of lofty emotion.

His verses, which seem so spontaneous, were elaborated with unremitting industry until they satisfied his keen and sure sense of style ; but the supreme artistic diligence which leads a man to devote himself year after year with single-minded energy to a mighty task, was to him unattainable. He lacked the architectonic talent which marks the master ; of all the great works he planned, not one was ever completed, not even the *Der Rabbi von Bacharach* which opened with so much promise. Aware of his own weakness, he positively vaunted his desultoriness. He spoke of himself as a devoted enthusiast, contrasting his own characteristics with Goethe's concentred egoism ; but he was too shrewd and too fine an artist to decry the old man of genius publicly, as did Börne. His zealous journalistic comrades extolled him as the poet with laughing tears in his blazon, who had discovered the secret of being simultaneously drenched and ardent, and his hopeless vacillation between derision and tender yearning was by them termed Heine's sublime weltschmerz. But this weltschmerz did not spring from

the despair of a strong and defiant spirit; it arose from the man's incapacity for the enduring maintenance of the poetic mood.

Heine began by writing insipid love songs to entrancing maidens and all kinds of pretty-pretty humorous newspaper articles. His first notable work was the *Harzreise* (1824), greeted with a storm of applause, in which court society participated. In the dull and oppressive life of those days a sense of liberation was induced by the author's jovial and unrestrained humour, which led him to look at everything from the ludicrous side and to administer his drubbings to high and low alike. Next, in *Die Nordsee*, he utilised his talent for the description of nature in a hitherto untilled field. As yet all our poets had been men of the inlands, and Heine was the first to portray for the Germans the majesty of the ocean. But the continuation of the *Reisebilder* did not fulfil the splendid promise of the opening volume. The author's descriptive faculty was manifestly weakening. Echoes of Sterne's *Sentimental Journey*, fragments of story, political and philosophical observations, were strung loosely together; and this tasteless amalgam of fact and fiction, being easy to write and easy to read, was congenial to the indolence both of the author and of his admirers. It resulted that the German poesy of the next decade volatilised almost exclusively in piquant journalistic trifles. The sole distinctive feature of the concluding volumes of the *Reisebilder* was the impudence of their uncleanness; never before had the temple of the German muse been defiled with sodomitic scurrilities as Heine defiled it in his base polemic against Platen. His worship of the shade of Napoleon was idolatrous to a degree which outrivalled the unctuous flatteries of the Napoleonic senate, and this servility appeared all the more nauseating since it was manifestly due in great part to a wish to ingratiate; in glorifying genius, the vain poet desired incidentally to illuminate his own greatness.

In the *Buch der Lieder* are to be found many futile imitations, but also a few poems which vie with the best productions of the German romantic school. For Heine was not merely a man of incomparably richer endowments than Börne, who poured all the wine of life into the goatskins of politics, but was also far more of a German than his Frankfort fellow-tribesman. In the hours in which he was a poet he was German to the core. German emotion spoke from those few of his love poems which genuinely represented personal experience. It spoke from his spring songs. It radiated from his stanzas on the pine tree and the palm, which gave vivid expression to the nomadic impulse of the Teutons—stanzas

that have lost their witchery solely through perpetual repetition. When, as a skilled technician, he took the lay of the Lorelei, Clemens Brentano's treasure-trove, and reminted it, he could plume himself on giving to a piece of fine material a form accordant with national sentiment, and he asserted the artist's right to seize his inspiration wherever he could find it.

Heine never awoke that spontaneous and joyful understanding which the great poet knows how to induce in his fellow countrymen. The Germans always took him too seriously, and were consequently unable to grasp his drift. The idle fellow desired to amuse his readers, to move them, to astound them, and above all to please them; he cared not a rap whether his words had any real meaning. He early assumed the role of political martyr, although no one had touched a hair of his head, and although the placing of a few of his writings on the index had had the customary effect of increasing their sale. In truth, exercising the humourist's right, he regarded politics merely as a field for the display of his literary talents. Whereas Börne pursued political aims in good faith, and failed only because of his incompetence to discover a single political idea, it was simply in order to dazzle and to titillate that Heine interspersed his writings with empty political chatter. No fault of his that readers sought a profound meaning in his jests. The solitary political idea to which he clung faithfully throughout life was his deadly enmity to Prussia, nor was this enmity utterly frivolous or devoid of elemental energy, for it betrayed in him the instinctive feeling of the Rhinelander. When Heine made fun of the Prussian soldiers, writing "the queue that hung behind of yore now hangs beneath the nose," one seemed to be listening to a Düsseldorf guttersnipe or to a clown in the carnival of Cologne, and was gratified to recognise that this German Jew did after all possess a home. For the rest, his political views were wholly dictated by the caprice of the moment and by æsthetic inclination. Following Byron's example, he sought the finest blossoms of humanity in the heights or the depths of society; the middle classes, the strata in whom the newer German literature was rooted, were to him tedious and ridiculous, and to him middle-class virtue denoted that financial solvency which was the ethical touchstone of the Hamburg bourse. After his manner he loved Germany no less sincerely than did Börne, and he loved with greater penetration; but like Börne he unceasingly showered upon the land of his affection the invectives of his elfin Jewish wit. It seemed funny to radical youths when Heine flung in their faces the saucy sophism: "The Englishman loves liberty as his legal

wife; the Frenchman, as his betrothed; the German, as his aged grandmother."

Like Börne, Heine submitted to baptism on contemptible grounds and without profit; yet the tolerance of public opinion found it nowise amiss that these two regenade Hebrews should make a parade of their "Jewish woes." Heine's hatred of Christianity glowed far more fiercely than Börne's. "Certain species of ideas are dirty," he once wrote. "If you crush one of these bug-ideas it emits a stench which is perceptible for thousands of years. Of such is Christianity, which was trodden under foot eighteen centuries ago, and which has continued ever since to poison the air for us unfortunate Jews." Yet at times he would commend the power of Christian love and would feel the aesthetic attraction of Catholic ritual; the heavenly smile of a Madonna would enthral him no less completely than the mysterious light of the Sabbath lamp. Whereas the great artist gains fresh illumination with the passing of the years, this man, without firm standing-ground and devoid of spiritual peace, declined ever lower towards the level of a vulgar buffoon. His evangel of the joy of life, which in his youth was still ennobled by the cult of beauty, became blunted and coarsened to an unclean and prosaic religion of the flesh, and before long he set the crown upon his self-mockery in the frank confession to his readers:

'Tis rare that you and I foregather
In the abstract realm of mind.
Roll we in the dung together,
Quick we understanding find!

With Börne and Heine, with the inroad of Judaism, there was heralded a new literary epoch, destined happily to be of brief duration, but the most odious and sterile period of our recent literature. Since the days of Lessing, no school of German imaginative thought sowed so many dragon's teeth, and none created so little of permanent value, as that of the radical journalists of the thirties.

§ 3. RISE OF THE HEGELIAN PHILOSOPHY.

The beautiful sunset glow of philosophy continued to illuminate this world of struggles and contrasts. For one and a half decades, from the close of the twenties to the opening of the forties, the school of Hegel exercised in German life an influence

comparable only to that of the sophists in Athens. Abundantly was fulfilled the prophecy made years before by Stein when he declared that as a necessary consequence of the lack of political freedom the speculative sciences would acquire a usurped value. But no less astonishing than Hegel's early prestige was the subsequent ingratitude of the nation which, quaffing the fiery draughts of this idealism, intoxicated at first, on the morrow of sobriety had conceived and was long to retain a profound loathing for all speculation, imagining that with the fall of the Hegelian system philosophy itself had been judged and annihilated. The once idolised master was despised, and even to-day of all our great philosophers he is least read and most grossly misunderstood.

Hegel had opened his career with a heroic confidence resembling that which had formerly animated the youthful Kant. The great Swabian felt secure in the possession of all the powers which constitute the speculative equipment of his branch of the German stock, a talent for profound investigation, an ardent imagination, and a many-sided sensitiveness to which nothing human seemed foreign. While still a young man, in 1802, he bluntly declared that the philosophy of reflexion voiced by Kant, Fichte, and Jacobi had risen only to the concept, and had never attained the realm of the ideal. He was emboldened to attempt the conquest of this highest realm, and as his system unfolded itself he did in truth speak what was long to remain the last word. Along the path in which Kant had been the pioneer, German philosophy could not aspire towards a loftier goal. The riddle of existence seemed solved, the unity of being and thinking proved, as soon as Hegel had represented the world as the unending dialectical process of the self-conceiving absolute spirit. In this system were comprised all spirit and all becoming. It was the most consistent monism ever formulated. The idea first traverses the series of necessary forms of thought, then expresses itself in nature, opposes itself to itself as another and objective life, to return finally, after this lapse from the infinite, freely into itself, into the realm of spirit. Thus everything that has been, is, and will be from eternity to eternity, is nothing but the divine reason as manifested in its self-development. Into the mighty framework of this system, Hegel, vaunted by his disciples as a second Aristotle, with colossal energy now fitted the acquirements of all the scientific experience of his day, so that everything in the world of nature and history was assigned its proper place in the unending developmental process of the absolute spirit.

At this epoch a new philosophical doctrine could still take possession of German minds with all the magic of religious revelation. The faithful were undisturbed by crass contrasts between the system and experience, for they knew that it would be impossible for philosophy to wait until that day which will never dawn when the structure of the empirical sciences should be completed. The Hegelian system excelled all others in its power to make its disciples happy in the consciousness of infallible certainty, for if the life of the world was a great process of thought there no longer remained anything unfathomable to the thinker. Consequently, as an inspired pupil of Hegel's declared, thought was thinking of thinking. The method and the substance of the system appeared identical. The law of tripartition which governed the philosophy in its dialectical method likewise controlled the development of the divine reason, for this in eternal recapitulation traversed the three stages of being-by-itself, being-in-relation-to-the-not-self, and being-by-and-for-itself. One who lost himself in this wonder-world felt uplifted as by an elemental force above the common human understanding; he felt as if the creation of the universe out of nothing was being renewed in his own spirit, as if his thought, self-moved, was by a creative act producing out of itself an objective world and then returning into itself again.

Armed at all points and immeasurably superior in strength was this proud idealism in its conflict with the crude rationalism and utilitarianism of the enlightenment, but it turned no less decisively to attack the desultory fancies of romanticism. This philosophy, seeing spirit and nothing but spirit everywhere, appeared as if it were a last echo from that epoch of pure literature in which the energies of our nation had been almost completely devoted to intellectual pursuits; yet it was at the same time strictly realist. Only in the real world would it recognise the revelation of God; inexorably did it condemn those facile thinkers who imaginatively create for themselves that which neither does nor can exist, and those who deplore what is and cannot possibly be otherwise. Self-evident and almost tautological was the great proposition enunciated to overwhelm the doubter: the real is rational and the rational is real.

Nevertheless this grandiose system, however brilliant, was nothing more than an arbitrary invention. Just as all our other philosophers, with the solitary exception of Kant, had been distinguished rather by the boldness and profundity than by the acuteness or definiteness of their thought, so also was Hegel obscure,

and especially obscure in the exposition of his fundamental concepts. The main principle upon which the entire system was founded was merely an unproved assumption; for the high-sounding assertion that spirit expresses itself in nature, opposing itself to itself, really tells us nothing at all. The great enigma, the question how the real world proceeded from the ideal, was and remained a secret, for it is an ultimate secret of the creator. Schelling had already proved that to deduce nature from thought was a task utterly beyond the scope of the human intellect. But at this time no one listened to Schelling. As soon, however, as the fundamental fallacy of Hegel's system was recognised, the imposing edifice collapsed. The bold attempt to demonstrate the unity of being and thinking had miscarried, and if philosophy were to regain solid ground it must return to Kant and to the modest enquiry how the experience of nature is at all possible.

The system proclaimed itself invulnerable, its propositions were to furnish one another adequate mutual support. But the configuration of the world as represented by Hegel could not really be deduced with logical necessity from the philosopher's first principles; it was a fanciful and arbitrary product of the subjective imagination. The result was that in the carrying out of the system marked inequalities were displayed. Parts were utterly ineffective, while other parts contained the germ of a fruitful outlook upon the universe, one destined to exercise great influence in the future. Hegel's philosophy of nature was an utter failure, for the manifest reality of nature imposed, almost as if in mockery, an insuperable obstacle to any attempt to construct nature out of the idea—besides, in this field the philosopher had no knowledge of his subject. The young masters of exact research who in Berlin were flocking round Alexander Humboldt had good reason for making fun of these dreams, for the real knowledge of nature which Humboldt had just brought home from his Siberian journey was alone sufficient to outweigh the entirety of Hegel's constructions in the realm of the philosophy of nature.

No less unfortunate was Hegel in his philosophy of religion, for in this domain Schleiermacher's religious temperament, working in a congenial medium, enabled him to attain infinitely better results. Hegel started with the assumption, flatly contradicted by experience, that philosophy and religion have the same content, philosophy representing the absolute in the form of thought, and religion representing it in the form of perception. Thus to him religious belief was not a primitive mental energy by which the entire man,

his thought and his will, are determined, but an immature form of knowledge. The irrefutable consequence of this, however adroit the attempt to conceal it by dialectic arts, is the necessity of erastianism, for a church which moves only in the realm of imagination must be unconditionally subordinated to the thinking state. If Altenstein, Hegel's docile disciple, continually endeavoured to regulate the inner life of the churches, his master's teaching unquestionably bore part of the responsibility for this disastrous ecclesiastical policy. The idea of redemption, the central feature of Schleiermacher's religious teaching, passed in Hegel's system quite into the background. He was more concerned with the scientific proof of dogmas, not excepting the most difficult of these, the dogmas which will always be too hard for human reason, not excepting the dogma of the trinity; and the artifices he employed to this end were all the more barren because the pantheistic basis of the system was in manifest contradiction with Christian dogma.

More striking by contrast with these failures was the success attained by Hegel's genius in the sphere of aesthetics. His utterances concerning the unity of idea and form in works of art were great, profound, novel, and so vital that to this day all the aesthetic judgments of the Germans repose consciously on Hegel. His criticism of contemporary poets had the assured justice of a great spirit. Not merely did he understand Goethe; but he appreciated also the pathos of Schiller, which was less accordant with his own nature; while, undisturbed by the current opinion of his day, he would not admit that Jean Paul's established reputation was merited.

Yet more fruitful was his philosophy of law. Among all our philosophers, Hegel had the keenest intelligence in political matters. Before him, indeed, Kant had declared that the perfectionment of the bourgeois order was the ultimate aim of civilisation, and Fichte had towards the close of his life extolled the state as the educator of the human race; while Schelling's writings contained many brilliant expressions concerning the harmony of necessity and freedom in the state considered as a work of art. But none of these men had advanced further than the outer court of politics, and Hegel was the first to enter the very sanctuary. He regarded the state as the actualisation of the moral ideal, as the realisation of the ethical will, and at one blow he shattered the doctrine of natural rights, and overthrew that political romanticism which was fain to derive the state from a primitive contract entered into by individual human beings or else to regard it as a work of divine ordinance. Thus was resurrected the somewhat hyperbolical conception held by

classical antiquity, and an omnipotence accorded to the state which it had never possessed since the Christian world had recognised the right of the individual conscience. But to this people of ours, which had so long sought its ideal in an anarchic freedom, the idolisation of the state could do little harm. Only through the overvaluation of the state could the Germans attain to a vigorous sense of the state. Before all others, Hegel furnished a theoretical justification for the abundant civilising activity which the Prussian state had long been accustomed to display in practice; he scientifically accounted for the energy of the German idea of the state; he routed the arid legalist doctrine of the state; and he provided the historian with an implement wherewith to effect, without philistine pettiness, an ethico-political valuation of the heroes of history. Recent historians and the pupils of Savigny had, indeed, long been aware that the state is a primal and necessary institution, through which alone national morality can attain perfection; but Hegel was the first to provide the philosophical foundation for this great doctrine, and to make it intelligible to the cultured classes in general. The philosopher's acute political insight was displayed even in the details of his doctrine of the state. Before any other German writer he recognised, although by way of suggestion merely, that between the individual and the state there lies a peculiar world of economic interests and relationships of dependence, and to this world he gave the name of bourgeois society. How great a service was it, too, that a Swabian, a professor, who had practically stood aloof from the national movement of the wars of liberation, should expressly indicate to the Germans what they possessed in Prussia, should show them why this state was not simply the most powerful but also the noblest and most rational of the German states, and that its strict order stood on a morally higher level than the celebrated German freedom of old days which fought for its own hand alone. Despite much exaggeration, all his writings on the subject breathed a serious understanding of the state which had been unknown to earlier German philosophers.

This understanding of the nature of the state was the necessary outcome of Hegel's well-developed historical sense. A thinker to whom all the life of the world was a process of becoming, must necessarily be affected even more powerfully than Schelling by the impulse towards historical comprehension which dominated the entire epoch. He saw that mortals can grasp the divine reason only when it is broken up into a thousand rays, and that the idea of humanity finds completion in nothing short of the totality of

history. For this reason he did not pass his time in pondering, as had so many philosophers before him, over the obscure riddle of the genesis and the purport of history. He would neither look back longingly towards the lost innocence of a golden age, nor attempt to console the world with thoughts of a happier future, but, standing firmly upon the soil of historic reality, he found here, in the endless multiformity of civilisation, the unfolding of the divine thought. Hegel's philosophy of history was his greatest scientific achievement, and was hardly less fruitful than had been Kant's doctrine of duty. Like all fertile ideas, it was not absolutely new, for the way had been prepared for its formulation by Kant and Herder. From Kant's essay concerning the beginnings of the human race, Hegel derived the idea of the progress of mankind, but he made it more profound and vital in that he did not conceive of progress as represented by simple ascent in a straight line, but, like Herder, discovered in every nation its own peculiar emanation of the divine thought, and conceded to every epoch its own modicum of morality. In each age of the world he recognised that there had existed one leading nation, which had held the torch of life for a time, and had then yielded it into the hands of another. In this conception, the historic human being appeared at once immeasurably great, as bearer of the idea, and infinitesimally small, in contrast with the creative laws of the divine reason.

It is true that the arbitrariness of the philosopher's constructions is repeatedly manifested in this field also. Although he spoke of the rationality of the real, he had but little respect for facts, and would forcibly amend the historical record, doing this in many cases merely for the sake of the holy triad. A philosophy of history directed only towards the future was of necessity too remote from the human struggle; in such a philosophy the victor was always right; it had no appreciation for the heroism of the vanquished, for the sacred sense of duty which impelled a Hannibal or a Demosthenes to attempt the rescue of a declining nationality; it had no comprehension of the lofty tragedy of historical struggles. Enmeshed in contented optimism, it could find no answer for the heart-searching problem, why, despite the unending progress of the race, the individual human being remains as weakly and sinful as ever. Nevertheless, amid a plenitude of errors, there was left an imperishable gain. Hegel was a pioneer in grasping with admirable scientific penetration the idea of historical evolution, of the progress from lower forms of civilisation to higher forms, the germs of the latter being contained within the former; and he showed at the same time

how this new thought was to be manipulated, giving in masterly outline a sketch of the hidden connection between the epoch of unconscious creation and the epoch of conscious reflection.

For this reason his ideas exercised a direct or indirect influence even upon historians who detested the philosopher's interpretation of history. What was imperishable in Hegel's philosophy of history lived on in the works of Ranke; Droysen, too, and many others among the younger historians, acquired a wider horizon in the school of Hegel. The dominion of the Hegelians in the educational institutions of Prussia and Würtemberg lasted for years, favouring many-sided culture and promoting discipline of thought. Even those who would not accept the formulas of the system, learned nevertheless from its teachings that amorphous knowledge is not knowledge at all.

No less conspicuous, however, were the dangerous consequences of the new doctrine, as displayed in the unbounded sophistical arrogance with which it infected its adherents. The orthodox Hegelian was competent to deal with everything that had happened, everything that had been thought or done, by showing it to be a settled detail, a surpassed standpoint, which had already been treated in some paragraph of the all-embracing system. For him there was but one question remaining insoluble, and this was the one which a pert desciple did actually moot, namely: What remains for the world-spirit to do now it has arrived at perfection in the philosophy of the absolute? The philosophers were encouraged to such excesses by the use of a scholastic jargon intelligible only to initiates. The master, when he let his pen run free in annotations and excursuses, displayed the linguistic powers natural to genius, restoring to modern usage a number of excellent words and phrases that had become obsolete, for instance, the expressive "von Haus aus." At times, however, he made use of monstrous artifices of speech, darkening that which was clear and confusing that which was simple, and his disciples did not hesitate in this respect to outdo the follies of the master. Since the foundations of the system were established in the air, with the aid of the universally effective dialectical method its adherents arrived at conclusions which pointed to all quarters of the compass at once, and this philosophy which prided itself on its objectivity ended by letting loose an unending succession of confused and fluctuating subjective opinions.

The proposition "the rational is real" contains a profound truth, but not the whole truth It does not tell us that in this real

and rational world there exist also the irrational and the speciously rational; still less does it tell us that the vocation of the creative spirit is to discern the completed work in that which is in process of becoming, and in the germs of new life to recognise in advance the reality of the future. Baldly stated, therefore, the proposition may readily be misinterpreted to support an unthinking quietism. Hegel, it is true, nowise merited the reproach of servile sentiments which the envious were not slow to make; in his writings on political science he went far beyond the actualities of Prussian conditions, demanding parliamentary government and trial by jury, conceding to the monarch no more than the right to put dots on the i's. But by temperament he was conservative. In the later years of his life he adhered closely to the side of the government, and did not hesitate to avail himself of the favour of Altenstein and Johannes Schulze for the discomfiture of his scientific opponents; and he would have been glad to see his *Berliner Jahrbücher* transformed into a state undertaking like the *Journal des savants*. When he termed the real "rational," it was certainly with no intention to advocate an arrest of progress, but he desired the establishment of a definite system of statecraft which should base its reforms upon contemporary and extant realities.

There had already appeared, however, a number of intemperate and ultra-conservative disciples, led by Göschel the jurist, and these declared in the name of Hegel that everything was rational which then actually existed in state and church. Simultaneously it became evident that the same ambiguous saying could be twisted also to the uses of the most destructive radicalism. If nothing but the rational was real, a man of crude intelligence might well consider himself justified in remodelling the world in accordance with his own reason, unceremoniously replacing the speciously real by the truth of philosophy. This arrogant conclusion, unquestionably the very opposite of what Hegel intended, was in fact drawn at this early date by isolated hotspurs, young fellows who believed that they understood the master better than he understood himself.

The first inception of young Hegelian radicalism was manifest when Eduard Gans entered the lists against the historical school of law. Gans was a versatile Jew, acute rather than brilliant, and an adept in that art of reproducing others' ideas which secures such facile successes in the professorial chair. Gans detected the weaknesses of Savigny's disciples, who often lost themselves amid a maze of unmeaning details, and he revived, far more adroitly than Rotteck, the old and senseless struggle on behalf of the law of reason

against the historical law—although the essential ideas of Hegel's philosophy of history were in truth far more closely akin to those of the historical school of law. The unedifying dispute strongly recalled the unfortunate misunderstanding between Kant and Herder, but it had one good result in that it led Gans to set seriously to work and to produce in his *Erbrecht* a study in the comparative history of law which furnished a happy complement to Savigny's doctrine. But the enthusiasts of the Hegelian school had now discovered that which is indispensable to every growing party, a common enemy. War against historical doctrinaires became the watchword. Under this device there assembled a troop of radicals who, going far beyond the liberal views of Gans, contested everything which was sacred to the master, above all his prussophil tenets and his lofty sense of order, while continuing to declare that they were fighting in his name. The Hegelian school began to split into a right and a left.

Hegel's great works enshrined a tragical contradiction. He aroused in German science a definite sense of the state, but through the sophistical arts of his dialectical method he likewise fostered that undisciplined spirit of presumption which was beginning to derange and undermine the established order of state and church.

CHAPTER X

PRUSSIA AND THE EASTERN QUESTION.

§ 1. DISINTEGRATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE. NAVARINO.

WHEN the flames of radicalism, which had already manifested themselves here and there in literature, had at length burst fiercely forth, it was inevitable that they should find abundant fuel in the detested federal constitution and in the futility of most of the federal states. In this German chaos, the solitary force competent to exercise any power of resistance was the Prussian state. Resolutely concentrating the economic energies of the nation, it detached itself at the same time from the European policy of the court of Vienna, proving its ability to maintain German interests even against the will of Austria.

First of all, the European situation was modified by two changes in monarchical succession. In France, Charles X ascended the throne in September, 1824. The new king, the youngest brother of Louis XVI, was the notorious Comte d'Artois, who for more than a generation had led all the foolish onslaughts of the émigrés and the ultras. He had not gained wisdom with the years. The priests of the Congregation and the courtiers of the Pavillon Marsan hailed the new regime with delight, confidently anticipating that a splendid revival of old France would be inaugurated with the elaborate coronation ceremony, Frankish in its splendour, that took place at the cathedral of Rheims. However, the day of the coups d'etat had not yet come. The *charte* was still in force, but the prudent moderation displayed during the last few years by Louis XVIII and his minister Villèle was beginning to bear fruit. All the signs were favourable to a conciliatory policy. King Charles pleased the French by his chivalrous amiability. Whereas Louis XVIII, an invalid, had hidden himself in the solitude of the Tuileries, Charles was glad to show himself to the people, and Paris, loving the spectacular, rejoiced in the glitter of the court. In the chambers, the ministers commanded a trustworthy conservative majority, and its

tenure of power seemed secure for a long time to come, for Villèle had just carried a law fixing the life of the electoral chamber at seven years. Nothing more was heard of the conspiracies and the political prosecutions which had so recently been disturbing the country. Even the army, thanks to its easily won Spanish laurels, seemed to be gradually forgetting its Napoleonic traditions.

The favour of circumstances was adroitly turned to account by Villèle, and in the first year of the new reign a law was passed granting the émigrés a milliard francs in compensation for the loss of their estates. This was the most important and most beneficial enactment of the restoration period, for thereby the foundations of the new society, to wit the changes in the conditions of property, first secured frank general recognition, and those parties which termed themselves conservative were enabled for the future to be conservative also in thought. Villèle, however, did not feel secure in the king's favour, for he knew that at heart Charles still belonged to the ultras. To maintain his position, in defiance of his better judgment, he made common cause with this party of the blind, and allowed himself to be led by them into one blunder after another. The chasm between the old France and the new reopened. The sacrilege law conflicted so hopelessly with modern views that no one ventured to think of carrying it into effect. Even well-intentioned legislative proposals encountered resistance, for sinister reports regarding schemes for the reestablishment of feudalism were in circulation. At the same time Count Montlosier issued a fierce pamphlet directed against the alleged danger of Jesuit dominion.

Finally, in 1827, the ultras secured a wholesale creation of peers, and brought about the dissolution of the electoral chamber, which was not sufficiently pliable for their taste despite its royalist majority. A great opposition victory was the country's answer. Villèle resigned. King Charles adapted himself to circumstances, and in January, 1828, appointed the Martignac ministry, which was of moderate conservative tendency. Joy was general. Again, as in the year 1819, France was animated with the hope that its ancient crown was about to come to terms with modern constitutional ideas. The new government, although not one of its members possessed Villèle's talents, was comprised of well-meaning and moderate men, and since they re-enacted the old law, which had never been enforced, for the expulsion of the Jesuits, they seemed firmly established in popular favour. But they never secured that of the king. Charles could not endure the moderates, and he bitterly regretted the expulsion of the Jesuits. Count Blacas,

former leader of émigrés, the papal nuncio, and Count Apponyi, the Austrian envoy, used all their influence to overthrow Martignac. Towards the end of 1828, Prince Polignac, the king's confidant, and the most fanatical of the ultras, returned to Paris from his post as envoy in London, and secretly endeavoured to form a new cabinet. As yet, however, the attempt was a failure.[1]

At the outset Metternich had the most favourable expectations of King Charles's European policy. Visiting Paris shortly after the beginning of the new reign, he was received with open arms by the " clean party," and was accorded many marks of favour by the court. But his hopes remained unfulfilled. The king mistrusted the Austrian, and this mistrust was increased from year to year by the duplicity of the Hofburg. In accordance with Bourbon tradition, Charles considered that the court of Vienna was the natural rival of the house of France, while he admired the Greeks as champions of the cross against the crescent and therefore shared the philhellenist sentiments of the great majority of the nation. The consequence was that Pozzo di Borgo, Metternich's personal and political enemy, speedily regained influence in the Tuileries, becoming almost as powerful as he had been in the early days of the restoration. Moreover, the relationship between France and Prussia was friendly beyond all anticipation, especially during the Martignac ministry. It is true that the court of Berlin was alarmed on account of " the defeat of the throne " which had preceded the formation of this cabinet, and that it occasionally expressed concern as to the weakness of the government ;[2] but since the Troppau congress Count La Ferronays, the new minister for foreign affairs, had possessed the personal confidence of King Frederick William, while Baron von Werther, German envoy in Paris, a cautious man and a keen observer who was under no illusions as to Metternich's character, did his utmost to cement the friendship between Prussia, France, and Russia. In all minor German affairs to which France attached no importance the court of the Tuileries endeavoured to meet the wishes of the Prussian cabinet. When Charles of Brunswick begged the help of the Bourbons, he was advised to display a yielding disposition. Margrave William of Baden, on the other hand, visiting Paris in connection with the Sponheim dispute, secured a most cordial reception, for right was on his side and Prussia was friendly to Baden's claim.[3]

[1] Werther's Reports, Paris, February 6, May 2 and December 16, 1828.
[2] Bernstorff, Instructions to Werther, January 14 and June 25, 1828.
[3] Arnim's Reports, Paris, June 24 and 30, 1829.

Still more rapid and still more extensive were the changes in Russian policy. Czar Alexander died on December 1, 1825, worn out in his prime, and practically overwhelmed by the burden of his high office. His last hours were cheered by the devotion of his consort, to whom he had become reconciled after long estrangement, but they were also darkened by the discovery of a great military conspiracy. After his death, the strange indecision which had characterised almost all the actions of his closing years was found to have left a legacy of confusion for the realm. Two years earlier, Grand Duke Constantine, heir to the throne, had placed his resignation of the succession in the czar's hands, but Alexander had kept the matter to himself, although the dynastic succession had been legally established a few decades earlier. No intimation was given even to Grand Duke Nicholas, upon whom the succession devolved. The world had now to admire an unprecedented spectacle, that of two royal brothers competing with one another, not for the possession, but for the rejection of a mighty throne. Nicholas and the troops in the capital swore allegiance to the elder brother, who remained in Warsaw; for three weeks the gigantic empire had no recognised ruler. At length, upon Constantine's repeated commands, Nicholas resolved to accept the crown, but this new change in the succession induced the conspirators, of whose designs the dying Alexander had received intimation, to take premature action. The prolonged stay of the Russian army in France was now to bear fruit. Colonel Pestel and many others of the ablest and most distinguished officers of the guard had conceived the fantastic notion of establishing a republican constitution, and this with the aid of mutinous soldiers, who in the same breath were wishing long life to the little father Constantine, and to his wife the constitution. After some street fighting, the revolt in St. Petersburg was suppressed, while in the southern provinces the conspirators were arrested before they could take action. A terrible judicial vengeance was taken upon the unhappy decabrists.

Thus striding over corpses did Czar Nicholas ascend the throne, Nicholas, the most rigid autocrat of the century, a man without nerves, severe, sober, tenacious, faithful to duty, strong of will, limited in intelligence, and a man who loomed large, appeared secure and terrible, in an age of ferment and doubt, precisely on account of his poverty in ideas and because of the unhesitating definiteness of his arid conceptions. Educated for the army, the young grand duke could not obtain from his imperial brother, who cherished him like a son, permission to take part in the wars of liberation, and had

therefore been unable to learn by personal experience how inconsiderable had been the fighting forces despatched to western Europe by the dreaded Russia. Not until after the peace did he visit the battlefields, to follow there in imagination the victorious flight of the double eagle from Moscow to the Seine, uncritically believing everything which servile companions related concerning the miracles of Muscovite courage, and he returned home with the firm conviction that Russia alone had liberated the world. It now seemed to him that the power of the white czar knew no limits. This view was encouraged by the exaggerated fancies regarding Russia's strength which he found prevailing at all the courts of the west, and if for an ensuing generation he could luxuriate in the possession of this godlike strength without falling a prey to the madness of the Cæsars, he owed this good fortune solely to the adamantine fortitude of his body and to the uninspired mediocrity of his mind. He certainly became harsher with the passing of the years but never lost equipoise of soul. After his return home he lived exclusively for his military vocation, an unloved and pedantic commander, at bottom nothing but a non-commissioned officer in the grand style, incomparable in all the arts of the drill ground, but neither a great general nor a great organiser.

When he ascended the throne, he unhesitatingly applied to the state the outlook on the world he had formed in the barrack. Utterly foreign to Nicholas were the liberal tendencies of the deceased czar; mute obedience was the universal rule; the frontiers were inexorably closed to protect holy Russia alike from the wares and from the ideas of the revolutionary west; and everywhere was instituted a uniform military organisation, as uniform as were the stone houses which, of identical design and tint, and equidistant from the mile-stones, adorned all the high roads from Warsaw to Tobolsk. Since Nicholas knew nothing of the world of ideas and recognised nothing higher than the order imposed by military drill, he honestly believed that he could make his people happy through the application of such autocratic principles, and it was for this reason that, with the pitilessness of honest hatred, he persecuted anything that diverged from his rules by as much as a hair's breadth. As he went about in his magnificent red gala uniform, tightly laced, wearing close fitting white breeches and jack boots, head erect and over-topping the tallest of his grenadiers, all the women admired this image of perfect masculine beauty, and only on rare occasions did a disrespectful she-imp venture to whisper that the handsome czar looked as if he had swallowed the celebrated Prussian ramrod. No one could

readily face the peculiar leaden glance of his large, severe, grey eyes; and the satisfaction was unmistakable with which the autocrat gloated upon the alarm of the petty mortals who could not endure the twitch of his masterful eyebrows. Even in this prosaic century the sorcery of so imposing an aspect still proved its effective power so that the czar was esteemed to excess both by friend and foe During the first fifteen years of his reign, among the notable personalities to visit the court of St. Petersburg, there were but two Wellington and Friedrich von Gagern, who discerned the ordinary man beneath the mask of greatness. It was perhaps the Prussian officers who took his measure most accurately. In Berlin he had passed hour after hour with them, talking about gaiters and buttons, cleaning-rods and gun-carriages, without giving utterance to any idea of real military importance; the more perspicacious shook their heads wonderingly, but who would have dared to express his opinion openly?

Such geniality as Nicholas possessed was displayed almost exclusively in intercourse with his noble-minded Prussian consort with his father-in-law, and with Prince William. He had nothing in common with his deceased brother beyond a notable dramatic talent and that trait of falseness which characterised all the children of the house of Gottorp. All his words and all his gestures were calculated. Amid his passionate invectives against the revolution, he never forgot that an uprising against the Turkish hereditary foe might advantage holy Russia; and when, with knightly humility, he kissed his father-in-law's hand before all the world in Berlin, it was not in pure hypocrisy (for the experienced old king was perhaps the only human being for whom the czar felt a sentiment of veneration), but he was very well aware how such a spectacle of childlike tenderness was likely to affect the German imagination.

Through the suppression of the St. Petersburg revolt he had acquired a world-wide reputation for unbending energy of will. The terrible hatred visited on him at a later date, after the Polish revolution, had not as yet sprung to life; even the liberals recognised the folly of the decabrists and did not reproach the czar for his defensive measures. But there was a universal feeling that the unrussian policy of Alexander's closing years must now come to an end. The people were murmuring at the preference given to Germans and Poles. The new czar did no more than was necessary in favouring once more Muscovite civilisation; and equally essential was his resolute action against his Turkish neighbour. It was

impossible for him to remain inert vis-à-vis the struggles of his Greek coreligionists, if only for the reason that the Russian army, ruined by faction, needed occupation.

No one recognised the change in the situation sooner than did Canning. The English statesman was now at the zenith of his reputation. The liberals of all lands had hailed with a chorus of delight his toast, "Liberty, political and religious, throughout the world"; and soon came the day when in a threatening speech he alluded to the bag of Æolus, to the revolutionary forces which free England could unchain at will. Encouraged by popular support, he believed himself strong enough to abandon the old traditions of his country's oriental policy and to venture on an understanding with Prussia. Should it be possible to tie the young czar's hands by a friendly treaty, the horrible carnage wrought by the Egyptian troops in the Peloponnesus might be cut short, and the Greeks might be granted a conditional independence, while at the same time the integrity of the inviolable Osmanli empire might be secured and the expansion of Russian power in the east checked. Canning therefore resumed the secret negotiations with the Russian envoy, Prince Lieven, which had been begun before Alexander's death, and then sent to St. Petersburg the duke of Wellington, who, as a strict tory, would be a persona grata to the autocrat. On April 4, 1826, Wellington and Nesselrode signed a secret protocol whereby the two powers were pledged to establish Greece as a semi-sovereign protectorate of the sultan, on the model of Serbia and the Danubian principalities. Canning exulted, for it now seemed impossible that the Russians should undertake single-handed action against the Turks. When the protocol was made public, the liberal world showered approval upon its favourite. Canning was the glorious liberator of the Hellenes; alone he had brought it about that England and Russia, the two ancient opponents, should join forces for the rescue of the Greeks, who would otherwise indubitably have succumbed to the superior military strength of the Egyptians. Throughout Europe philhellenism received a fresh impulse, and even in Berlin Hufeland now ventured upon the public announcement of his collections on behalf of the Greeks.

It soon appeared, however, that Canning's audacious cunning had found its master in the young czar. It was not Russia that was bound by the St. Petersburg protocol but England. Henceforward Canning could not take a step in the Greek negotiations without the assent of his Russian friends. On the other hand, the court of St. Petersburg remained free. Russia had two strings to

her bow. In the east, since a treaty is never honourably kept, excuses for war can never be lacking, and Nicholas did not hesitate to make threatening remonstrances to the Divan on account of the unfulfilled promises of the peace made at Bucharest in the year 1812. As early as March, before the agreement with England had been signed, he declared to the great powers that "the peculiar position" of Russia vis-à-vis Turkey demanded immediate rectification. England could offer no objection, for the St. Petersburg protocol related only to Greek questions.

Metternich, hoodwinked by his doctrinaire dread of the revolution, played unsuspiciously into the czar's hands. He could now see nothing in the world beyond the two great armed camps of legitimacy and the revolution, and since his ideas were restricted within this narrow circle, the rigid policy of self-interest pursued in the east alike by Canning and the czar was beyond his comprehension. Since Canning was idolised by the liberal world, he was regarded by Metternich as the scourge of the universe, as the dazzling meteor of disaster which must soon pale its fires before the great and enduring light of Viennese statecraft. Charmed by the vapours of auto-intoxication, it seemed to the Austrian that the sultan needed protection solely against Canning's revolutionary intrigues, although the English statesman desired the maintenance of the Turkish empire just as honestly as the Hofburg. On ascending the throne, the young czar had crushed the revolution and had repeatedly given plain expression to his loathing of the Greeks, rebels and irredeemable barbarians. In Metternich's view, therefore, he was the man of peace and order; whatever he did or said was "parfait"; it was impossible that, when his own army was corrupted with revolutionary ideas, he could dream of supporting the Greek disturbers of the peace.[1] Metternich therefore urged the Porte to accede to Russia's demands, for if the czar were satisfied he could no longer fall into Canning's ambushes, while the sultan could devote all his forces to the subjugation of the Greeks.

Sultan Mahmud was justly annoyed at the changed language of his Austrian friend. Gentz, who in his despatches had so often warned the Wallachian hospodars against Russia's ambitions, now approved the demands of the czar! Amid his overwhelming difficulties, the padishah had no choice. He had already been compelled to ask the help of his Egyptian vassals against the Greek rebels, and these auxiliaries might readily prove a danger to himself. Moreover, the celebrated force of janizaries, of old the nucleus of

[1] Hatzfeldt's Reports, January 15 and 25, and April 10, 1826.

Osmanli military power, was now characterised by such unbridled pride that the despot was afraid of his own body-guard. The will-power of the great sultans of old flamed high once more and terribly in the last talented son of the house of Osman. Mahmud determined to do away with the janizaries, and annihilated by a gruesome massacre the force that had once been the terror of Christendom. A decayed realm is unable to endure even necessary reforms. The annihilation of the janizaries affected the ancient oriental warrior-state at its very roots, compelling it henceforward to change its character and to imitate western institutions. The old power had been destroyed without the acquirement of a new. Loud were the murmurs of the Moslem faithful, so that their execrations against the giaour padishah reached as far as the ear of Mahmud. The newly formed troops of the line, drilled in the European manner, obeyed the war lord, but this army in the making was not yet equipped for the struggle. In view of his situation, the proud sultan was at length compelled, after prolonged hesitation, to yield to the exhortations of the great powers. In the treaty of Akkerman (October, 1826) he agreed to all Russia's demands: complete fulfilment of the peace of Bucharest; the surrender of certain places on the Circassian frontier; the guarantee of semi-sovereignty for Serbia and the Danubian principalities.

Meanwhile the St. Petersburg protocol had been made public. The outwitted Austrian statesman fell headlong from all his heavens. He had never conceived it possible that the old enemies England and Russia would come to terms, or that the well-disposed czar would move a finger on behalf of the Greek rebels; and since he could never admit having made a mistake, he was now of opinion that the czar had been weak, and that the inexperienced young ruler had been led astray by the evil arts of Canning. He found it impossible to believe that this unnatural league could endure, or could have any effect whatever. After various diplomatic vacillations he declared himself ready to assist the negotiations of the two powers with the Porte, and he now began a transparent double game which was all the more foolish since the young czar was watching him just as suspiciously as was the elderly king of France. Fobbing off the two allied courts with empty assurances, through the instrumentality of Gentz's hospodar letters and that of Ottenfels the internuncio, he secretly exhorted the sultan to hold out. The victorious Ibrahim Pasha was devastating Morea like death the reaper; could the sultan be given another year, the Egyptian scimitars might effect a root and branch extermination of the mutinous Greeks, and in this way

the Greek question would find a solution whose very simplicity could not fail to commend it to the gentle heart of Emperor Francis.

England and Russia, however, would not be stayed by Metternich's procrastinating wiles. To win the court of the Tuileries to the support of the St. Petersburg agreement, Canning paid a visit to Paris, and on July 6, 1827, the three powers signed a formal treaty in London. They pledged themselves to end the Greco-Turkish war by joint mediation, first securing an armistice, and arranging in the peace for the establishment of an autonomous Greek state, whose sole obligation to the sultan should be the payment of tribute; none of the three allies was to derive any special advantages from this treaty. Should the armistice not begin within a month, the powers were to undertake further measures. To be prepared for all eventualities, a joint fleet was to be instantly despatched to the Ionian sea, the three admirals receiving indefinite and extremely elastic powers. Thus Metternich had again made a false computation; the St. Petersburg protocol, which he had estimated of no importance, was now bearing manifest fruit. He gave expression to his disillusionment in arrogant invectives: this childish piece of work, he said, was brought to pass by those who did not know the a b c of their business; "it passes all bounds, this treaty, and verges on idiocy." The passionate Gentz culled even more liberally from the compendious German dictionary of invective, fulminating against this climax of perversity, absurdity, and shamelessness, against perfidy, malice, weakness, blindness, and stupidity. Prokesch, his faithful echo, declared the London treaty to be Pandora's box which that devil of disorder known by the name of liberalism had brought into the world.

All unprejudiced persons, including those quite outside liberal circles, heard of the London treaty with well-grounded satisfaction. It was indeed time that the sense of honour of Christendom should be spurred to action, and that a rout of African bloodhounds should no longer be permitted to slaughter Christian people on European soil. Yet it was impossible that the better informed should fail to recognise how great were the dangers that this treaty concealed in its womb. Its originators were by no means at one. France alone was acting entirely without hidden motives. King Charles was inspired with the honourable enthusiasm of the crusader, and likewise desired to restore the lost prestige of his country by a splendid display of power in the east. Canning, on the other hand, had shortly before, through the instrumentality of Commodore Hamilton, privately asked the Greeks whether they would like to constitute a

republic under English protection. Since the Hellenes, enlightened by the awful example of the Ionian islands, had rejected the proposal with a shudder, the primary aim of England now was to prevent any other influence than her own becoming dominant in the east, and by safeguarding the Osmanli empire to retain an established market for her trade; the question of the Greeks was one of subsidiary importance. Czar Nicholas, in fine, had long been preparing for war, the strengthening and equipment of his forces proceeding without remission. He detested the Hellenes because they were in revolt, and also because an independent Greece might readily impose an obstacle in the way of Muscovy's Byzantine dreams, but he regarded the Greek imbroglio as a means which he might utilise in order to secure for his realm predominance on the Bosphorus. In the existing posture of affairs the czar had good reason to anticipate the fulfilment of his hopes. The sultan was extremely stubborn and was therefore unlikely to agree to an armistice. Should the allies thereupon proceed to the threatened "appropriate measures," a conflict could hardly be avoided; thus a *casus belli* would readily be found for Russia, and then it would become apparent that the western powers had only been tools of the czar. Kindly fortune spared England's leading statesman this great disillusionment. Canning died a few weeks after the signing of the London treaty, at the right hour for his reputation, ere the world had grasped the miscarriage of his last diplomatic campaign, and thus undeservedly did the cold and calculating politician, ever pursuing commercial aims, acquire the name of liberator of the Hellenes.

In the opinion of the Austrian statesmen the triple alliance must either decline into nullity or else bring about war. Had the Hofburg desired to avert the danger of war, it should have used all its influence to induce a yielding disposition in its friend the sultan. But Metternich counted on the disruption of the alliance, and therefore pursued his double game, giving the three powers smooth words while privately encouraging the resistance of the Porte. In the east, however, there are no secrets. The hospodar of Wallachia despatched to St. Petersburg copies of the instructions received from Vienna, while his son sent to Russia some of Gentz's original letters, stolen from the father. The suspicions Nicholas had long harboured of Metternich being abundantly confirmed by this and other irrefutable proofs, the czar, fiercely enraged, wrote as follows to his father-in-law: "I have to assure you, sire, that I unfortunately hold positive proof that we, I say we, sire, have been most shamefully deceived by the Viennese ministry. I like to believe, and am indeed

almost convinced, that the emperor knows nothing of the matter, but what are we to think when a minister ventures to deceive his master to such an extent ? " He went on to say that should war in the south prove inevitable, he proposed to withdraw his troops from the western frontier, and to employ all the men he could spare in watching the Galician border.[1] Little less unfriendly were Emperor Francis' remarks about the czar. " Had Czar Alexander still lived," said he to the Prussian envoy, " matters would never have come to this pass ; but a young prince who at the outset of his career has had the good luck to overcome serious difficulties with ease, will thereafter take advice from no one." [2] The breach between the imperial courts widened month by month. It was soon bruited abroad that the Austrian army was being strengthened. At length the Russian envoy went so far as to take Emperor Francis personally to task about the secret advice that was being given in Constantinople, but Francis, assuming his most honourable mien, flatly denied the aspersion.

These complications, utterly unfruitful for Prussia, and at the same time extremely ominous, came at a very inopportune moment for the peace policy of the Berlin cabinet. As long before as the summer of 1825, the king had declared it to be the leading principle of his eastern policy that it would not be time for the great powers to intervene until either the complete subjugation of the Greeks or the overthrow of the Porte seemed imminent.[3] The time thus specified had now manifestly arrived, for the Greeks had been almost overwhelmed by the Egyptians. The intention of the triple alliance to put an end to the massacre in the east was in conformity with the king's wishes ; moreover, Berlin could take no exception to the moderate conditions of peace which the allies in the first instance proposed. Nevertheless Frederick William was not willing to give his approval to the London treaty unless all the five great powers adhered to it ; and since Austria declined, he also kept aloof. He saw with concern that in ultimate analysis the three powers were held together solely by reciprocal distrust,[4] and it seemed to him inadvisable to forfeit Austria's friendship on account of an affair in which Prussia's interest was not directly involved. For a long time, therefore, he endeavoured to reconcile the two imperial courts, accorded the Austrian chancellor a gracious reception at Teplitz,

[1] Czar Nicholas to King Frederick William, August 4/16, 1827.
[2] Maltzahn's Report, June 15, 1827.
[3] Lottum to Bernstorff, June 24, 1825.
[4] Bernstorff, Instruction to Maltzahn, June 24, 1827.

and when the czar complained of Austrian perfidy, exhorted him paternally that it would be well for him to consider how necessary was a harmonious understanding between the three eastern powers, and how essential was peace after so many wars.[1]

There were two conflicting parties at the court of Berlin. The ultra-conservatives, Wittgenstein, Charles of Mecklenburg, Schuckmann, and Ancillon, swore as usual by the word of their Viennese master; the more liberal spirits, Witzleben, Motz, Bernstorff, and Eichhorn, inclined to the policy of the triple alliance, some because they shared the philhellenist sentiments of the day, and others because they desired that the state should be completely freed from Austrian tutelage. Prince William and the rest of the younger princes of the royal house did not conceal that their good wishes followed the policy of their Russian brother-in-law. Even in the army the philhellenes now ventured into the open, and Gneisenau's son-in-law, the son of Scharnhorst, announced that he had entered Greek service. The crown prince alone appeared undecided, vacillating between Metternich and Nicholas. Before long the party struggle became so fierce that Ancillon asked leave to resign on the ground that Bernstorff no longer gave him any work to do. A few tactful words from the king settled this particular difficulty;[2] but the struggle continued until the autumn of 1827, when the Austrian party lost all influence.

This fortunate issue was brought about by the reports from the embassy in Vienna, for since the death of Prince Hatzfeldt the king had once more had the advantage of receiving unprejudiced tidings concerning affairs and sentiments in Austria. Baron von Maltzahn, the young secretary to legation, and chargé at Vienna pending the arrival of his elder brother as envoy, had discharged his duties for no more than eight weeks before Metternich's duplicity, which the short-sighted Hatzfeldt had not discovered in as many years, became plain to him. "It is my duty," he reported in April, "to declare plainly that Prince Metternich is not acting in good faith in his assurances that there is no doubt about the peaceful intentions of the Porte; nor does he desire that the Porte should be peaceful, for his only wish is that the sultan should have a free hand for the subjugation of the Greeks; and he is convinced that England is pursuing an identical aim, though by other means and for different

[1] King Frederick William's Reply to Czar Nicholas' Despatch of August 4/16, 1827.

[2] Ancillon, Petition to the king, May 12; Cabinet Order to Ancillon, May 19, 1827.

reasons." [1] When subsequently the new envoy, a sturdy Prussian who did not allow his temperamental conservatism to cloud his judgment, had taken over his duties in Vienna, reports of like tenour came to hand week after week. They placed it beyond doubt that Emperor Francis, Metternich, and Gentz were altogether turcophil, and that their attempts at mediation in Constantinople were not straightforward. Still more valuable were Maltzahn's reports concerning economic and military affairs in Austria, for here was the key to the understanding of the fluctuating policy of Vienna. This state, which had so long played the arbiter in Europe, was quite unable to contemplate the conduct of a serious campaign. In order to provide for the enormous cost of the secret police, the army had been grossly neglected; in the very capital some of the cavalry regiments were short of horses to the number of three hundred, and, still more serious, many companies returned as complete mustered but sixty men. Further complications arose from the disorder of the finances and from the character of Emperor Francis, who in earlier years had undertaken many a frivolous war, but who was no longer to be moved to any bold resolve.[2]

It was impossible for an upright government to make common cause with a court at once so untrustworthy and so weak. The Prussian envoy in Constantinople therefore received instructions to disregard the Austrian internuncio and to give definite support to the peace proposals of the triple alliance. Towards the end of the year Bernstorff had drawn so near to the three allied powers as to write bluntly to the embassies: "Although our court neither cooperated in bringing about the London treaty nor acceded to that treaty after it had been drawn up, nevertheless its principles and aims are approved by us without reserve.[3] Relations with Austria grew obviously cooler, the understanding with France and Russia becoming all the more friendly. Metternich could find no explanation but pure folly to account for Prussia's independent attitude, and behind Bernstorff's back abused this "clerk" for his incapacity.

In the interim, however, the calculations of the Austrian statesman had once again proved erroneous. The triple alliance, whose break-up Vienna had anticipated, still held together. As the sultan refused an armistice, the three admirals received orders that in case of need a suspension of hostilities in Morea was to be imposed by force. They interpreted their instructions after the

[1] Report of Baron von Maltzahn, junior, April 14, 1827.
[2] Maltzahn's Reports, May 1 and 25, 1827.
[3] Bernstorff, Instruction to Jordan, December 7, 1827.

manner of bluff seamen. Since Ibrahim Pasha would not return an unambiguous answer to their demands, on October 20, 1827, the sultan's magnificent fleet was annihilated in the bay of Navarino. Public opinion on the continent received this quite unexpected tidings with exultation. As by natural necessity, the fist of enraged Christendom, clenched for years past, at length struck a blow of overwhelming violence; nor was it without reason that the philhellenes ascribed to themselves a share in this victory, which, undesired by the cabinets, would hardly have been brought about but for the abhorrence so long cherished against the crescent. Navarino established Greek independence, and simultaneously established Russia's dominion in the Black Sea; henceforward the sultan did not possess a fleet able to impose obstacles to the czar's advance towards the Balkans. The Russians felt, moreover, that this victory was in reality one of their gaining. In his first joy, Nesselrode wrote to the envoy in Vienna: "What will our friend Metternich say to this triumph of force over the preconceptions of principle?" Metternich could hardly find words to stigmatise the scandalous contempt for international law. His emperor spoke of assassination, of profanation of the sacred word "mediation."[1] He feared that the liberals might have schemed to bring about the war now imminent in order to seize the opportunity of raising disturbances in France. In England, too, after the initial rejoicings over the successes of the favourite national arm, there was general consternation. The old suspicions of Russia reawakened. In conformity with the popular mood Wellington formed a tory cabinet which made advances to the court of Vienna, and as early as January, 1828, King George, in his speech from the throne, referred to the battle of Navarino as "this untoward event."

After all that had happened, it was necessary that the three powers should immediately take further steps, and by a second blow should in case of need compel the Porte to make peace with the Greeks; in this way Russia's warlike plans might still be frustrated. But unanimity was lacking, for England's anxiety continued to increase. In Constantinople the western powers renewed their proposals for peace, which were supported by the Prussian envoy, and when they received a discourteous answer they asked for their papers and departed leaving matters unsettled. The old arrogance of Islam now displayed itself, and the rage of the affronted sultan broke terribly forth. The Christians of the capital were mocked, maltreated, and expelled. A firman issued by the padishah assured

[1] Maltzahn's Reports, November 15 and December 11, 1827.

the faithful: "The unbelievers constitute but a single nation." Invectives were showered upon the European powers, and above all upon Russia, the arch-enemy of the realm of the prophet. When the Prussian envoy attempted to intervene, Reis Effendi Pertew arrogantly responded that the time had come to disregard the treaty of Akkerman. These insults gave the czar the long-desired *casus belli*. The western powers could offer no opposition, for their hands had been tied by the superior diplomatic skill of the Russians. The London treaty was still in force, and contained a proviso that in the Greek affair no one of the three powers should take independent action; but the war which now broke out was represented as a fight to avenge Russia's wounded honour.

§ 2. THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR. THE PEACE OF ADRIANOPLE.

Russia declared war in April, 1828. In his manifesto the czar demanded satisfaction for Turkish military preparations and for the affront to his honour; for the mishandling of his subjects and the interference with commerce in the Bosphorus; and finally demanded precise fulfilment of the earlier treaties. He solemnly renounced all desire for conquest, declaring that he asked no more than complete repayment of the costs of the war. Before the great powers he played the part of an injured person, of an innocent individual challenged by an aggressor. "I shall not take the initiative in attack, sire," he wrote to the king of Prussia in January, "but woe to any who wish to lay hands on Russia." He reported to the English court that he was compelled to take up the struggle because the sultan was rousing the Mohammedan world against him.[1] The real causes of the war were to be found in the difficult mood of the Russian army and in national sentiment, for the Russians had long murmured at the maltreatment of their co-religionists, and now desired to take vengeance upon the arrogant but (as it seemed) powerless hereditary foe. Russia considered herself the leading power in the east. A war of two years duration against Persia had just terminated in a peace favourable to Russia, which acquired important territories south of the Caucasus. The unassuming tenour of the war manifesto was not wholly simulated, for the general situation was unfavourable to a war of annihilation, but arrières pensées were not wanting. Should the fortune of war be

[1] Czar Nicholas to King Frederick William, January 15; Nesselrode, Instruction to Lieven, February 14, 1828.

favourable to the czar, these preliminary assurances would prove valueless. Czar Nicholas was the grandson of that Catharine who had once hoped to restore the Byzantine double eagle of Moscow to its ancient seat of dominion. The court of Berlin was aware of the existence of a Russian secret memorial in which it was defiantly declared that should destiny lead to the overthrow of the Turks a settlement among the great powers would not be difficult to secure.[1] For these reasons the pacifically minded king by no means approved of his son-in-law's action. He considered that to touch this string betrayed extreme levity; he told the czar plainly that war could have been and ought to have been avoided; and he refused to permit Prince William to take part in the campaign.

Had Austrian statecraft been vigorous, matters would never have come to this pass, and Austria would not have given free scope to the Russians for the inevitable destruction of the Turkish realm. Even now the Hofburg made a last attempt to realise the bold designs of Prince Eugene, opportunities for whose fulfilment had so often been thrown away. Had the Austrians made a resolute use of their favourable position on the flank, anticipating the Russians by the prompt occupation of the Danubian principalities, for good or for ill Russia would have been compelled to come to terms with the Danubian realm, which would thus have consolidated its power along its natural line of expansion as far as the mouth of the great river. Roumanian national sentiment was not as yet awakened, and it would therefore still have been possible under the Austrian sceptre to effect the direct or indirect union of all the Roumanians in Hungary, Transylvania, Moldavia, and Wallachia. Czar Nicholas did in fact dread such an attempt, and gave instructions to Wittgenstein, his commander-in-chief, that he was to cut his way through should the Austrians endeavour in the Danubian principalities to oppose the advance of the Russian troops. But the great hour passed unutilised, never to return. The miserable state of the Austrian army rendered a rapid move impossible, and Metternich had so long made a fetich of the doctrine that Turkey was inviolable as to be unable to defend with true impartiality his country's interests in the east. He wasted precious time in futile diplomatic negotiations, urging both in London and Paris the maintenance of the London treaty which so shortly before he had stigmatised as the climax of absurdity. In December he had still been boasting that if he could but spend a few days in Constantinople he would "soon put an end to this bickering"; but he had now lost

[1] Witzleben's Diary, January 17, 1828.

all prestige with the Porte, for none of his forecasts had been realised, and his tool Gentz was bewailing the prospect of the Russian autocrat's coronation on the Bosphorus!

The Russian army occupied the Danubian principalities without molestation from Austria. But it soon became plain how grossly the world had over-estimated Russia's powers for attack. After years of preparation, the czar was only able to effect a tardy beginning of the war, taking the field in June with no more than 100,000 men. Now was seen how magnificent had been the heroism of the Greek rebels. The Turkish army, which had never been able to effect the complete overthrow of the despised klephts, the Turkish army which had been first organised two years earlier, after the annihilation of the janizaries, arrested the Russian advance, defending the strong places of the Balkans with a lionlike courage that recalled the glorious days of Solyman II. Despite or owing to the presence of the czar the Russians secured no notable advantage, though Varna was occupied, while Field-Marshal Paskevitch effected a victorious advance from the Caucasus into Asia Minor. A second campaign was absolutely essential, and this offered assured promise of success, for the reduced Russian army had been strongly reinforced, while Nicholas, recognising his own deficiencies as a commander, had entrusted the supreme leadership in the field to the vigorous hand of a Prussian, General Diebitsch.

The diplomatic situation was however threatening. Since the Russian successes had been so trifling, Metternich, taking fresh heart, had endeavoured to form a league of the four other great powers against Russia. Prussia and France refused to join, but Wellington was glad to meet Austria's wishes, and at the beginning of the year 1829 there was some likelihood of a European war between England and Austria on one side, Russia, France, and perhaps Prussia on the other. Radetzky compiled a memorial in which he considered the prospect of a war against Russia and Prussia, speaking of Prussia as "the most unshapely state which ever existed upon earth." It never occurred even to the most competent general of the Austrian army to ask whether it might not be wise to favour the indispensable rounding-off of this unshapely state, for with the old Ferdinandian arrogance he declared, "We cannot permit any expansion to Prussia." Gentz, meanwhile, in his newspapers, was storming against Russia and against the prorussian court of Berlin; simultaneously he wrote to the king of Prussia begging for a gift of money. Bernstorff, asked his opinion concerning this edifying request, considered that it would be better to grant

it, since the powerful publicist might be of use to the Viennese embassy, and added, "Herr von Gentz is an extremely distinguished and practised beggar; his needs are comprehensive." It would not do, he said, to give him less than four to six thousand thalers.[1]

Quite unexpectedly, Prussia now found herself in an important and yet dangerous diplomatic situation. Should a breach ensue between the two imperial powers, the court of Berlin, since it was not as yet bound to either party, might readily decide the issue in Constantinople; Prussia was for the moment the only power to whose views any attention was paid by the embittered Turks. In the previous spring, the Prussian envoy in Constantinople, Baron von Miltitz, had by the king's orders been cashiered for gross breach of duty. Heavily burdened with debt, he had accepted gifts from a foreign power (probably from Austria), and on one occasion had sent an untruthful report.[2] This incident, which, though repulsive, had no political significance, was speedily forgotten, and Royer, who succeeded Miltitz, was on good terms with the Porte. But how disastrous were the prospects in the event of a general European war! Was Prussia, in alliance with the unprepared Austria, to fritter away her strength on two fronts in a struggle against Russia and France, simply on behalf of Austria's eastern interests, which the Hofburg itself did not understand? Or should the king join Russia and France to fight against Austria? This would destroy the German alliance before anything had been found to replace it.

An alliance with France was open to grave objection. Despite the minor exchange of cordialities which took place from time to time between the two courts, in the Tuileries the old illusion was still cherished that France could not tolerate a strong Germany, as was shown by the masked game of French diplomacy against Prussia's commercial policy. Directly the danger of war became manifest, the French press resounded with the old cry for the Rhine frontier. In the chamber, General Sebastiani, confidant of the duke of Orleans, gave open expression to this covetous thought, while Chateaubriand, in his Roman salon, spoke of it before all the world. In a boastful pamphlet upon the European situation, General Richemont preached war against France's true enemies, England and Austria: the czar was to enter Constantinople; Holland was to be enlarged by the gift of Hanover; Prussia, treated most contemptuously, was to hand over "our Rhine," receiving some

[1] Bernstorff to Lottum, December 25, 1828.

[2] Reports from the Austrian dragoman Huszar, March 18; Ottenfels, March 19; Jordan, August 21, 1828.

sort of territorial compensation at Austria's expense. Even the diplomatic world was not altogether hostile to such ideas. When at Teplitz in the summer of 1828 Bernstorff met Caraman, his old-time colleague at the congress of Troppau, the Frenchman hinted that should the partition of Turkey be effected France must secure her share nearer home; whilst in London Prince Polignac expressed himself even more plainly to von Bülow. These were mere private opinions, but the duc de Mortemart, envoy in St. Petersburg, explained in detail to the czar the necessity for a great territorial exchange; and Pozzo di Borgo wrote from Paris that Prussia must be accustomed to the idea that France would require moderate compensation should Prussia secure any enlargement. Nicholas, however, felt that in this case frankness was the more prudent course. He now had urgent reasons for preserving his father-in-law's friendship, and he addressed a straightforward enquiry to Berlin demanding the king's personal views as to these plans for an exchange. The answer was unconditionally adverse, being to the effect that the king considered his existing possessions a guarantee for European peace, and that every year he felt more intimately bound to his Rhineland subjects by reciprocal sentiments of love and confidence. The French cabinet did not venture upon the slightest hint to the court of Berlin. Two years afterwards, the cautious Werther remained firmly convinced that the French ministers had taken no part in these intrigues, and as far as the Martignac ministry is concerned the view may be sound.[1] But should the sword be drawn, it was obvious that even a cabinet of moderate views would no longer be able to withstand the passionate longing of the nation for the Rhine frontier. Thus, whatever the upshot, a war in such circumstances, waged on behalf of a matter remote from German interests, would involve sacrifices and embarrassments for the Prussian state without any prospect of notable advantage. In Napoleonic days Frederick William's peace policy had been responsible for much disaster, but on this occasion that policy was thoroughly justified.

Nicholas, too, honestly desired peace. Sobered by the exiguity of the successes secured by his first campaign, he had temporarily renounced the ambitious designs which at an earlier date he had unquestionably cherished, and his only wish was to secure an honourable issue from the imbroglio. He contemplated with anxiety

[1] Such is the sense of a number of confidential communications which passed between Bernstorff and Werther in the year 1830. (Bernstorff to Werther, January 3 and April 5; Werther's Report, January 23, 1830.)

the prospect of a general European war, for he could not yet count upon armed assistance from Prussia, and his only certain ally, Charles X, stood on the brink of the grave. As early as December, he assured the king of Prussia of his longing for peace, fiercely declaiming against England and against the "infamous" behaviour of Austria.[1] In the spring, when the war recommenced under more favourable auspices, Nicholas visited Warsaw, receiving sinister impressions which could not fail to fortify his desire for peace. The Poles regarded it as an abomination that their king's coronation should take place in the throne-room of the palace and not in the ancient cathedral of St. John, and that the coronation should be conducted in accordance with the rites of the Greek church. When the prescribed acclamations had to be made, the deputies preserved a stony silence; even the populace displayed a cold and almost threatening mien; it was plain to all what passions were fermenting.

From Warsaw the czar wished to visit Sibyllenort to see his father-in-law. Frederick William hoped that the emperor of Austria would join them there, but so fierce was now the enmity between the two imperial courts that Francis vouchsafed no reply to Maltzahn's suggestions to this intent.[2] The king, meanwhile, had fallen sick, and had to abandon the journey. Nicholas, therefore, visited Berlin on June 6, accompanied by the czarina and the heir to the throne. This was the first of those dramatic surprises which were frequently to be repeated; the czar loved to emerge suddenly from the clouds, like Zeus the thunderer. The Berlinese received their distinguished guests with excessive marks of veneration, and could not see enough of their Charlotte and their king's eldest grandson. The liberator of the Hellenes was hailed by the university with a Greek ode, for the liberal world was so completely dominated by philhellenist sentiment that even Heinrich Heine and his radical friends were rejoicing at the military successes of the grecophil czar. Nicholas attended the wedding of Prince William, leaving for home after a week's stay. With ill-concealed anxiety Metternich remarked to the Prussian chargé d'affaires that this family visit could hardly be expected to have any political consequences.[3]

Once again he was mistaken. The two monarchs had turned their brief meeting to serious account. Frederick William had definitely declared to the czar that if the latter desired peace he

[1] Czar Nicholas to King Frederick William, December 3, 1828.
[2] Maltzahn's Report, May 9, 1829.
[3] Brockhausen's Report, Vienna, June 20, 1829.

must take active measures to secure it.[1] Nicholas, in an autograph memorandum, thereupon assured the king that he desired absolutely nothing beyond the conditions specified in his war manifesto. "I am able to aver that, contrary to the usual practice in such cases, this document contains a precise statement of all my wishes, for my intention was to avert every possible suspicion of ambitious aims and hidden motives, which are as repugnant to my principles as to my sentiments." His chief demand was, therefore, for the repayment of the costs of the war, which he already estimated at one hundred and fifty million paper roubles; but he did not propose to exact the entire sum in cash, being willing to accept timber for ship-building, warships, and certain frontier fortresses in the Caucasus, in lieu of money.[2] Thus, after the Russian manner, a back door was left open. Never yet had a conqueror required a monetary indemnity from the Porte, and since oriental states are unlikely to fulfil such claims, the alternative demands might be of great importance.

In any case, the conditions were by no means unfair, for the fortune of war was everywhere favourable to the Russian arms. Whilst Paskevitch was effecting a further advance in Asia Minor and was already nearing Trebizond, the main Turkish army was defeated by Diebitsch at Kuleftsha (June 11th). The fortress of Silistria had fallen, and the way across the Balkans lay open to the Russian armies. But how was the Porte to be induced to negotiate? By oriental custom it was impossible for the conqueror to make direct approaches, and the attempt would have served only to arouse suspicion in the Divan. Since the battle of Navarino, the enraged sultan had paid no attention to the words of the powers. To Prussia alone was it possible to undertake mediation, but not in the ordinary diplomatic forms, which no longer produced any impression upon Turkish arrogance. The only prospect of success could be offered by the despatch to Stamboul of an able Prussian general, to secure if possible a personal interview with the sultan, to explain to the Turkish ruler how serious was his country's military situation, to assure him on the king's behalf that the victor was prepared to make peace on reasonable terms, and thus to induce the Porte to send a plenipotentiary. In this way the king's uprightness, for its fame had reached as far as the Bosphorus, might again display

[1] This is related by Ancillon in a ministerial despatch to Royer, under date June 18, 1829.

[2] Autograph memorandum by Czar Nicholas, undated, but obviously written in Berlin.

its power. If this prince were to give a solemn assurance in his son-in-law's name, even Sultan Mahmud's gloomy mistrust might be overcome.

The difficult commission was entrusted to Müffling, the well-informed chief of general staff. Not until July 5th, when he was already on the way, and when it was too late for the other powers to forestall him on the Bosphorus, were instructions issued to the embassies to inform the courts of Vienna, London, and Paris regarding the purpose of the mission. It was not Prussia's intention to put forward any peace proposals (for such a step would be misinterpreted by the Porte, by turns suspicious and overbearing), but merely to convince the sultan of the czar's pacific aims. A subsequent instruction declared still more definitely that the Porte could be saved only by being saved from itself.[1] When Müffling reached Constantinople on August 4th, he found the city in a state of feverish excitement. Diebitsch had passed the Balkans, a step in which no enemy of the Osmanli empire had hitherto been successful. The columns of his troops moved southward unceasingly through Bulgaria, the remnants of the Turkish army fled before him in wild disorder, and by August 22nd came tidings of his entry into Adrianople. The sultan was without an army, for the fury of the faithful in the capital now turned against the ruler whose impious new laws had called down upon the realm the wrath of Allah, and the powerful faction of the dissolved janizaries was loudly murmuring. Vainly did Mahmud have the green banner of the prophet borne through the streets; no one was willing to follow the holy standard in a war of religion; the Asiatic recruits, bound to camels, were haled to the capital. Gordon and Guilleminot, the envoys of the western powers, who had in the interim returned to Constantinople, considered that all was lost, nor did Royer or Ottenfels, the internuncio, hold a different opinion. The chief dread was a rising of the mob. An English frigate lay at Seraglio Point in order to convey the grand signior to Asia, and in the sea of Marmora was a British fleet ready to enter the Hellespont should the Russians attack the ancient walls of the Comneni. The tension was terrible and the diplomatic corps greeted the Prussian general as a saviour.

Müffling's actions were far from maladroit, but it is unfortunate that he should have subsequently lessened the value of his services by exaggerated self-commendation. He had at the outset a difficult task in overcoming the pride of the reis effendi, who was inclined to take amiss the Prussian's admonitions concerning the military

[1] Instructions to the embassies, July 5; to Brockhausen, August 27 1829.

situation, but he managed to secure the sultan's confidence and to persuade the Turkish ruler to despatch to the Russian field marshal two peace plenipotentiaries, recommended by himself.[1]

Diebitsch now showed that he could do his master even better service as diplomat than as military commander. His situation was far from being as brilliant as it seemed. He had barely 20,000 men left for a march upon Constantinople, and this insufficient force, devastated by pestilence, was melting away before his eyes. In case of prolonged delay, the conqueror's army was not unlikely to be utterly destroyed should a small Turkish force now assembling in the north near Sofia arrive at a propitious moment. Diebitsch was, however, clever enough to conceal the numbers and the condition of his troops, not merely from the Turks, but also from the two Prussian officers sent by Müffling to Adrianople for the initial negotiations, and he succeeded in deluding everyone—the sultan, Müffling, the diplomatic corps at Pera, and all the European courts. Not even Metternich, who had continued almost to the last to hope for the victory of his Turkish friends, had any suspicion of the Russians' plight. The Porte was at first innocent enough to believe that it would be excused the payment of a war indemnity. Diebitsch, however, in response to Müffling's enquiry, replied to his former comrade-in-arms in amicable but extremely definite terms, saying: "To-day more than ever must the Divan endure the punishment of its blind obstinacy. Two months ago peace was at its disposal, but it preferred to continue the war, and compelled us to carry the struggle across the Balkans. The lofty magnanimity of his majesty Czar Nicholas will know how to lighten for the Porte the burden of the war indemnity provided the Porte prove itself worthy of so enormous a concession." [2] The field marshal firmly maintained this tone of sublime confidence, and down to the conclusion of peace all the diplomats on the Bosphorus remained absolutely convinced that he was exercising unprecedented moderation, whereas in reality he was endeavouring to save his army.

On August 27th, the Turkish plenipotentiaries reached Adrianople for the first conversation with the field marshal. Therewith Müffling's mission was fulfilled. Before his departure, the grateful sultan granted him the further grace of an audience, a privilege which no Frank had enjoyed within the memory of man, holding through an interpreter a colloquy wonderfully friendly according

[1] Müffling's Reports, August 6, 11, 13 and 16, 1829.

[2] Müffling to Diebitsch, Pera, August 16; Diebitsch's Reply, Adrianople, August 11/23, 1829.

to oriental ideas. After an enquiry as to the king's health, he declared that he had given credence to the general bey's assurances, and now had hopes of peace. He concluded by saying: "In this sense the general bey will have the courtesy to inform my old and magnanimous friend the king of Prussia regarding my sentiments, and further to communicate to him that I expressly enquired about the state of his precious health." [1]

The discussions in Adrianople, when they seemed to be drawing to a close, were suddenly arrested after the traditional oriental manner. Diebitsch thereupon set his troops in motion and threatened to attack Stamboul unless a settlement were secured by September 13th. The Porte took alarm, and invited the envoys of England, France, and Prussia to a consultation; the Austrian internuncio was now practically ignored, and Müffling had told him to his face that Austria by her duplicity had utterly lost the confidence of St. Petersburg. At the sultan's request, Royer then decided to go to Adrianople, "as Müffling's successor," to quote Mahmud's phrase; and there, on September 14th, he persuaded the Turkish plenipotentiaries to sign the peace.[2] In the camp, the Russian officers thronged round the Prussian envoy expressing their gratitude and respect for the king. They had good reason for these sentiments, for the seniors, at least, were well aware that Prussia had saved them from a perilous situation.

The conditions of the peace were in conformity with the relative strength of the belligerents. Had warlike operations been resumed Diebitsch's army might have perished; but the czar had reserves at his disposal while the sultan had none, and therefore, as far as human foresight could go, a third appeal to arms could only have resulted in renewed reverses for the Turks and more onerous terms of peace. But the stipulations of the treaty of Adrianople greatly outmeasured the sum of the real military advantages which the victor had at the moment secured. Russia obtained the complete fulfilment of the treaties of Bucharest and Akkerman, with certain important modifications; she secured several frontier fortresses in the Caucasus, and the right of transit through the Dardanelles; and finally, she received a war indemnity which, though subsequently reduced to seven million ducats, sufficed to make the Porte dependent upon the court of St. Petersburg. This was a great step forwards towards the inevitable destruction of the Turkish regime in Europe.

[1] The sultan's address in the audience of September 3, 1829, epitomised by Müffling.

[2] Ministerial Despatch to Maltzahn, October 3, 1829.

The Danubian principalities were granted troops of their own and hospodars appointed for life; they were completely evacuated by the Turks; and since their sole obligation to the Porte remained the payment of tribute, they were henceforward more under Russian than under Turkish influence. In addition, the Russians gained for the fragment of Moldavia as far as the Prut (previously acquired in the peace of Bucharest) a small but extremely valuable supplement. The southern and not the northern arm of the Danube was now to constitute the boundary, so that the Danube delta became Russian. Of great importance, and a boon to the whole of Europe, was the seventh article, ensuring free passage through the Bosphorus for the merchantmen of all nations. The Black Sea was now reintroduced into the domain of world commerce, and the unnatural abuses which the wrangling nations of Christendom had so long tolerated from the crescent came to an end. To the annoyance of the western powers, the tenth article provided that the Porte should accede to the treaty of London, the czar thus making it appear that he was the liberator of the Greeks. In reality the liberation had already been achieved. A year earlier Ibrahim Pasha had withdrawn from the Peloponnesus before a French corps without striking a blow; and in March, 1829, the three signatories to the treaty of London had agreed (the Wellington cabinet somewhat reluctantly) that Greece was to constitute a Turkish tributary state ruled by a Christian prince. The valiant little nation was already enjoying its well-deserved independence under the temporary presidency of Capodistrias, a man highly suspect to the English; and the only question now was whether English pettiness would concede adequate expansion to the growing state.

It was at this epoch that Bernstorff wrote with natural satisfaction: "We do not cherish the ambitious designs with which we are falsely accredited, but we claim the right to pursue an open, straightforward, and independent policy." Now that the king's intervention had averted the threatened European war, Prussia's prestige continually increased. All unprejudiced contemporaries recognised the greatness of this service, most of the courts sending thanks and congratulations to Berlin. Not until a much later date when Polish russophobia and David Urquhart's terror of Russia had falsified the historical judgments of liberalism, did the partisan fable become current that the king of Prussia's sole desire had been to save his son-in-law from certain defeat. Frederick William's resolution had been formed in June, when the military situation of the Russian army was extremely favourable; not for

Russia's sake did he intervene, but to save Germany from a fruitless and disastrous war.

Immediately after the peace there were but two malcontents, French radicalism and the court of Vienna. The Paris papers loudly complained that the coming of the great war and the conquest of natural frontiers had been frustrated—thus proving how rightly Prussia had acted. As for the Hofburg, it was to reap what had been sown with shortsighted cunning in nine years of faithless intrigue. The mouth of the Danube was in Russia's hands; in Bucharest and Jassy the czar's word was law; in Greece the revolution was triumphant; and the last hour of the dear old friend in Turkey seemed imminent. In the days of the Laibach congress, all Europe had admired the great Austrian statesman; now, in Berlin, St. Petersburg, Paris, Constantinople, and even London, there was but a single voice of contempt for the incredible blunders and the utter duplicity of Viennese policy. Emperor Francis, though he wrote a congratulatory letter to Frederick William, took the reverse greatly to heart. Gentz lamented the general political bankruptcy which was awaiting us all, having shortly before uttered shameless jests regarding the Prussian peace mediation. Metternich, in a dolorous memorial addressed to the emperor in October, 1829, admitted that the real reason of the failure was to be found in the internal condition of Austria. He recommended administrative, financial, and military reforms; but since he knew nothing whatever of these matters he contented himself with general locutions. As usual, Francis scrawled his *placet* beneath the document; and, as usual in this auspicious land, all remained as of yore.

Before long, however, the eyes of the world were diverted from eastern affairs, for a great convulsion was preparing in France. The Martignac ministry had resigned in April, 1829. The moderate parties possessed neither the unanimity nor the self-control requisite for the unreserved support of the last straightforward attempt to reconcile the new France with the old. A trifling and almost fortuitous dispute concerning the details of the new organisation of the communes and departments led to the fall of the cabinet, and with malicious delight the ultras could observe the left, the doctrinaires, and the Orleanists following them in blind passion. The blow had hardly fallen when thoughtful men were filled with dismay, for the peaceful development of France had not been so gravely imperilled since Napoleon's return from Elba. The inevit-

able followed. King Charles formed a government after his own heart. In August the conduct of affairs was entrusted to Prince Polignac, the leader of the ultras, a fanatical enthusiast, who fancied that in his dreams he could hear the counsels of the Mother of God. The only thing that could possibly ensure a peaceful future for this distracted land was a throne that stood above party, and now the monarchy had thrown itself into the arms of a party of extremists. Within a few weeks all the courts were dreading that this demented government was aiming at a breach of the constitution. Through the instrumentality of his plenipotentiaries Apponyi and Binder, Metternich had secretly favoured the formation of the new cabinet; and Wellington likewise hailed the ministry of ultras with delight, for Polignac was a declared friend of England. But none of the great powers would listen to talk of a coup d'état, and without exception they warned the Tuileries against hasty resort to force. Yet when has fanaticism been willing to listen to the voice of reason? The coup d'état came and with it the revolution. Thereby the system of the treaty of Vienna was shattered to its foundations, for the whole artificial structure rested upon the Bourbon restoration; but the turn of affairs served to restore the profoundly lowered prestige of Austria. By the common danger, the three eastern powers were led, after long estrangement, to reunite in a firm alliance.

Thus this decade of German history terminated more happily than had the first five years of peace. The days of soul-searching and of blind party politics were over. The monarchy of the Hohenzollerns stood once more on its feet. Strongly and perspicaciously safeguarding peace for the fatherland, it began to open new fields for the economic energies and the independence of the nation, and the time could already be foreseen when, from out the chaos of German states, the German State was at length to arise.

APPENDIXES

TO

VOL. IV.

XV.—RENEWAL OF THE CARLSBAD DECREES.

(APPENDIX TO P. 100, VOL. IV.)

IN Metternich's *Posthumous Papers*, IV, p. 120, there is to be found a "Work by Baron von Zentner" concerning the renewal of the Carlsbad Decrees, with the addition: "Upon the wrapper of the manuscript is an autograph annotation by Prince Metternich, which runs as follows, 'Submitted by Baron von Zentner to Prince Metternich in the conference between Count Rechberg, Prince Wrede, Baron von Zentner, and Prince Metternich. Tegernsee, May 28, 1824.'"

Since there can be no doubt about the truth of this assurance, there are but two alternatives to be considered. Either the papers have been misplaced in the course of years; or else the wrapper contained several documents, and Herr von Klinckowström, with the critical acumen he so frequently displayed in the editing of Metternich's papers, selected the wrong one.

Zentner's genuine memorial is published by Ilse, *History of the German Federal Assembly*, II, p. 341. I can vouch for the authenticity of this document, for Nagler, in his report of July 19th, gives an identical transcript, which I have seen; and Prince Hatzfeldt likewise handed the king an identical transcript which he had received from Metternich.

Moreover, those who are not acquainted with the manuscript material can readily convince themselves that the memorial printed by Ilse is authentic. For Metternich himself relates (op. cit., IV, p. 104) that he had given a personal pledge to Count Münch that in his presidential proposal he

would "as far as possible make use of Zentner's own words," and in actual fact the presidential proposal of August 16th, as reported in the minutes of the Bundestag, contains whole sentences from Zentner's genuine memorial, but not a word corresponding with the document printed by Klinckowström.

This last is a memorandum concerning the treatment of the question. It was sent to the chancellor by von Münch-Bellinghausen on January 6th, and by the chancellor, after some elaboration, communicated to Prince Hatzfeldt on May 12th. Both of these documents are likewise published by Ilse, II, pp. 325 et seq. I am also in a position to affirm the authenticity of the despatch to Hatzfeldt, having found the document bearing Metternich's signature in the privy state archives of Berlin.

XVI.—CANNING AND GERMANY.

(APPENDIX TO P. 15, VOL. IV.)

The remarkable picture of the broad-minded co[illegible] Canning, ever summoning new worlds to freedom, had long vanished from German history when we became acquainted with the satires which during the years 1797 and 1798 Canning had written for William Gifford's journal, *The Anti-Jacobin*. It is not easy in Germany to discover copies of *The Anti-Jacobin*; after prolonged search I have found some in the library of King George in Hanover. But the satirical poems issued in the journal are still widely read in England, and are frequently reprinted under the title *The Poetry of the Anti-Jacobin*; not so many years ago they constituted one of the sources from which, in England, the general reader derived his views of German life. Canning's satire, *The Rovers; or, the Double Arrangement*, is termed by Niebuhr in his *Lectures upon the History of the Revolutionary Epoch* "the most infamous lampoon ever written about Germany, almost as base as *Bahrdt mit der eisernen Stirn*." Profligacy, incest, and atheism are here represented as characteristic of the Germans, but in especial, says Niebuhr, the *Anti-Jacobin* makes a shameful mock of all that is worthiest in foreign life. It is manifest that Niebuhr was basing his judgment upon youthful memories, still bearing in mind how

profoundly he had been mortified to see the leading works of our nascent classical poetry vilified by the tory newspaper. To-day we are less sensitive, but we are still astounded at the insularity and the uncomprehending arrogance of the *Anti-Jacobin*. As the ludicrous German quotations show, Canning did not know a word of German. To all appearance he was even ignorant of the names of Schiller and Goethe, and had merely learned from newspaper articles and bad translations that in Germany certain revolutionary poets were at work, and he dimly realised the kinship between the ideas of the revolution and the enthusiasm of the apostles of our literary Sturm und Drang. Since among the tories he had heard marvellous reports concerning the godless life of the Göttingen students, he seriously believed that all the students of a German university, inspired by *The Robbers*, had sallied forth to make their living as highwaymen. Goethe's *Stella*, whose original draft, as is well known, ended with a bigamy, Schiller's *Robbers, Cabal and Love*, and other German works known to the British public by their titles alone, now gave him an opportunity in his parody of *The Rovers* to describe the German nation as a society of miscreants who allowed people "to set about doing what they like, where they like, when they like, and how they like . . . . . I have omitted only the swearing, to which English ears are not yet sufficiently accustomed." The piece is not devoid of wit, and in isolated passages it hits the mark well enough, but it is nothing more than a vulgar burlesque in the style of our modern comic papers. Fresh vitality is exhibited solely in the interwoven drinking songs, as in the well-known strains which at one time were frequently sung by the English youth:

> Alas! Matilda *then* was true!
> At least I thought so at the U-
> niversity of Gottingen

Far more serious and noteworthy is the satire *New Morality*. In sharp-edged and at times powerful words, it attacks the hazy cosmopolitanism of the revolutionary parties:

> A steady patriot of the World alone,
> The friend of every country—but his own.

Here Canning's most sacred sentiment finds expression, the rough national pride, splendid in its one-sidedness, the

delight in the solitary country which was fearlessly resisting the forces of destruction: *una etenim in mediis gens intemerata ruinis.* To this sentiment Canning remained faithful throughout life, even when at a later date Scott and Byron had rendered possible for the British an understanding of German poetry. His greatness lies in this, that he was the precise opposite of the cosmopolitan described by his continental admirers. It was only because he was English through and through that he was able to resist Metternich's legitimist policy. The fine phrases about national freedom introduced into his speeches were to serve only as a means by which the approval of public opinion on the continent was to be won on behalf of the harsh commercial policy of England.

XVII.—PRINCE WILLIAM AND PRINCESS ELISE RADZIWILL.

(APPENDIX TO P. 173, VOL. IV.)

As long as Emperor William was alive, I considered it inexpedient to say more than was absolutely indispensable about his unhappy youthful love affair. To-day there can no longer be any objection to my reproducing the passages from Prince William's letter of June, 23 1826, which I extracted years ago from the diaries of General Witzleben. To us Germans this intimate experience of the founder of our unity has a similar significance to that of the struggles between Frederick II and his father. The prince writes:

". . . You have, my dearest father, delivered a verdict regarding my destiny which I was forced to anticipate, but which I shrank from anticipating so long as a ray of hope still remained. . . . You need only look into my heart to discern there the inexpressible thankfulness with which it is filled for all the countless proofs of graciousness, love, and longsuffering which you have exhibited towards me during these eventful five years, but above all for your letter of yesterday, a letter which has affected me more profoundly than I can possibly describe. Your fatherly kindness, love, and gentleness, your affectionate sympathy with me in the grave stroke of fortune under which I labour, the calling to

mind of my duties to my order, the recognition of the worthiness of the person upon whom I have bestowed my affections, the recounting of all that you have done to display your affection for your children and to secure the fulfilment of the wishes of my own heart—to find all this in the lines that decided my fate, provided for my shattered heart so much consolation and awakened such inexpressible sentiments of gratitude, that I shall only be able, dearest father, to display to you my true feelings by the most childlike love, and by my whole conduct in the future. I shall justify your confidence, and shall stand this severe test by fighting down my profound sorrow and by steadfast acceptance of the inevitable. I shall appeal to God for assistance. He has never abandoned me in the painful moments of my life, nor will He abandon me on this occasion. . . . I therefore conclude these lines, with a lacerated heart, indeed, but with a heart, dearest father, more devoted to you than ever before! For never was your fatherly love more touchingly displayed than in the manner of this grievous decision."

I cannot venture to give a decisive opinion concerning the much disputed legal question which is involved in this item of family history, but so far as my judgment goes it seems to me that the ministers were right in expressing the view that the birth of Princess Radziwill did not entitle her to a royal marriage. It is true that Louise Charlotte Radziwill, the wealthy inheritrix of the dominions of Tauroggen and Serrey, had married Margrave Louis, son of the Great Elector, and after the margrave's death had married the palsgrave Charles Louis; and that neither by the Brandenburgers nor by the Palatiners was the royal validity of these marriages ever contested. But since that time more drastic legal conceptions had come to prevail in the Prussian house. Frederic II expressly demanded of Emperor Charles VII "that all those princely marriages should be regarded as simply unequal which had been or should be contracted with persons whose rank was below that of the old counts of the empire possessing seat and vote *in comitiis*." This declaration on the part of the supreme head of the dynasty was binding upon his successors so long as it had not been abrogated by a domestic law; and since the princes of Radziwill, while possessing the imperial princely title, had never acquired seat and vote at the Reichstags, it was impossible that hence-

forward, notwithstanding their wealth and historical renown, they could be regarded as of equal rank with the Prussian royal house. Such was Prince William of Prussia's own view. In a letter from St. Petersburg dated February 12, 1826, he begged his royal father that Prince Augustus of Prussia should adopt the princess Elisabeth Radziwill in order to secure her equality in rank, and that the king's sons should approve the adoption. Prince Wittgenstein, relates this in a despatch to Count Bernstorff dated March 28, 1826.

XVIII.—SCHÖN'S MEMORIAL CONCERNING THE PROVINCIAL MINISTRIES.

(APPENDIX TO PP. 207 AND 250, VOL. IV.)

The *Further Contributions and Supplements to the Papers of Minister von Schön* (Berlin, 1881) give an account on pp. 111 et seq. of a great menace of reaction from which the Prussian state suffered in the years 1824-5, and from which Schön fought to save it. But the compiler offers absolutely no proof of his contention, which he fabricated solely out of his own imagination for the greater glory of Schön. As the constitutional problem had been settled in the year 1821, the only question that remained open in 1824 was whether specialist ministers or provincial ministers were to be preferred. In this dispute, Schön was incontestably upon the side of reaction. Like Marwitz and Duke Charles of Mecklenburg, he worked on behalf of the reestablishment of the provincial ministries, although in this endeavour he was actuated by motives which differed from those of the feudalists. Among the manifold plans for the simplification of the administration, it is true that the idea of establishing the prefectural system was mooted on one occasion, but this idea was speedily abandoned, and in the principal report of the economy committee, dated July 4, 1824, the matter is no longer considered. On August 31, 1824, in accordance with the committee's proposals, the king commanded that the specialist ministries and the entire new administrative organisation should in essentials be maintained. Thus the issue had long been decided when Schön wrote his memorial of December 22nd.

XIX.—MOTZ TO ELECTOR WILLIAM I.

(APPENDIX TO P. 346, VOL. IV.)

ERFURT, *January* 22, 1821.

MOST SERENE ELECTOR, MOST GRACIOUS ELECTOR, AND GRAND DUKE!

Your highness has done me the honour to inform me, under date of 14th current, in reply to my letter concerning the claim to a pension advanced by my uncle, General von Motz of Bodenhausen, that this claim must be disallowed because it runs counter to: (1) all considerations of law; (2) all considerations of equity.

In the matter of the legal grounds to which your highness refers in the before-mentioned gracious letter, I feel it incumbent on me (with all due respect to your highness) to reiterate the justice of the disputed claim; and it is my sincere conviction, in view of the striking divergence of opinion regarding the pertinent legal considerations, that it would best accord with your highness's love of justice that the affair should now be referred to the arbitration of the committee appointed by the most exalted and the exalted sovereigns, or to the decision of the Bundestag.

Your highness will not take it amiss that family affection for a most respected uncle should lead me (convinced as I am of the justice of his demand) to fulfil my uncle's commission.

In respect of the relevant considerations of equity, your highness in your gracious letter makes the following charges against my uncle:

a. That during the performance of his military duties in Bienenwald his conduct was open to exception;

b. That when your highness was forced to leave Cassel he did not (as in duty bound) follow your highness.

My uncle, on the other hand, maintains (and is prepared, if need be, to prove) that in Bienenwald, and throughout the French war of that time, his conduct was, not merely exemplary, but one of your highness's most potent weapons. This

assertion is, in his opinion, strongly confirmed by the fact that his conduct during the war was expressly commended by his majesty the king of Prussia, and was rewarded by your highness with the bestowal of the military order of merit. When the war was over, he found it convenient to retire (although your majesty wished him to remain on the active list); during his retirement he was offered, and declined, employment under Prussia; and it was only in response to your highness's most urgent representations that he returned to the service.

With reference to the allegation made under heading *b.*, I venture humbly to point out that, in accordance with your highness's express order, at the time of the enemy's entry my uncle was occupied in saving the money in the war-chest; that he received no command to follow your highness; that he remained without news of any kind from your highness; that he was commissioned by your highness's minister to remain at his post at your highness's war office in order to arrange for the victualling of the foreign troops in the manner best accordant with the welfare of the country (as I have explained in fuller detail in my previous letter); that he did not take service in the now extinct kingdom of Westphalia until that kingdom had been recognised by all the European powers, and until he was convinced that this step was necessary to secure his personal safety and in relation to his peculiar circumstances.

Your highness deigns to state in your gracious letter that your highness does not recognise anything that happened in your highness's state during the seven years of the Westphalian regime, and that this principle must apply also to your highness's servants. I venture most humbly to beg your highness to permit me the candid observation that all your highness's subjects might esteem themselves extremely fortunate could they say the same thing of themselves; and especially would this apply to your highness's faithful servants—had they, with their wives and children, also fallen asleep for seven years, and then reawakened under the changed conditions, refreshed for new services to your highness.

Unfortunately my good fellow-countrymen have had no such experience; during the unhappy interregnum they have had to endure extreme inconvenience and much poverty and distress.

In accordance with the system adopted by your highness in Hesse, public servants are paid upon a very low scale. In most cases, by the time they have attained to a salary which, with the aid of much self-denial, enables them to provide for the exiguous support of themselves and their families, they will have sacrificed whatever private means they may be fortunate enough to possess; thenceforward they remain entirely dependent upon their official positions. It is surely to be regarded as a great misfortune, and not to be censured as a fault, that such officials, suddenly deprived of their previous modest means of support, were compelled (in order to save their families from absolute starvation) to seek and to obtain service in the employment of a foreign government, one forced upon them, and utterly loathsome to the glorious spirit of the Hessian people. During the Westphalian regime, I had myself on several occasions to reside in Cassel for a considerable time as member of the Westphalian estates, and could never sufficiently admire the splendid and sturdy disposition of my fellow-countrymen. When your highness returned to Cassel after the battle of Leipzig, your highness had repeated opportunities of observing this fine disposition.

Your highness is rich, but your servant and subjects are poor. May your highness deign to grant a speedy recognition of the excellent sentiments manifested by your highness's subjects, and above all to grant a speedy reward to your majesty's servants in the shape of donations and salaries calculated in accordance with reasonable needs, and thus to avert the distress and dejection with which so many families are obviously afflicted. What a magnanimous use would your highness make, in the evening of your days, of the great possessions now in your highness's hands; what tears of love and happiness would accompany you when, at the close of your probation on earth, you appear before Him who is Lord over us all, before Him who establishes the thrones of the mighty.

I trust your highness will extend your gracious forgiveness to the digression upon which, confiding in the grace and benevolence your highness has invariably extended towards me, I have ventured in this most humble letter—that your highness will deign to accept this outpouring of heart from one who faithfully loves his fatherland and is well-informed

regarding its circumstances, from one who, formerly a Hessian subject, remains a trusty Hessian, devotedly loyal to your highness.

The desire which I have taken this opportunity of expressing, is in my mind separated completely from my uncle's affair, which must find its decision in the selected manner.

In conclusion I will merely permit myself, most humbly, to make the following observation to your highness. It is hard, in the case of an honoured and respected servant, eighty years of age, who has spent fifty years of his life in the service of his state and his ruler, and who, as he himself judges and as public opinion declares, performed that service faithfully and usefully—it is hard, I say, that shortly before the termination of his earthly career, there should be levelled against him the reproach, in his case hitherto unheard of, of disloyalty. Every man of upright character must feel such a reproach most keenly.

Some time ago your highness made a similar charge against my uncle to a relative, Inspector of Forests von Motz of Hanau.

In our family, which for two centuries has served your highness and your exalted predecessors most faithfully and well in high positions, we are not accustomed to reproaches of this nature, and a member of our family against whom such reproaches could justly be made would not be one whom we ourselves could regard with respect. Inspector of Forests von Motz, having been reared in these sentiments, considered it his duty to acquaint my uncle of what your highness had said. My uncle thereupon wrote immediately to your highness praying for the strictest possible investigation. Your highness ignored his request.

In my uncle's name I petition once more for an investigation, and I beg with particular urgency that your highness will deign to move speedily in the matter, so that this old man of eighty may not be compelled to go down to his grave with his complaints unredressed and his sorrow at such accusations unrelieved.

With the greatest possible devotion I subscribe myself,
your highness's most humble servant,

F. C. A. VON MOTZ,
President in the Prussian Service.

XX.—NEBENIUS AND THE GERMAN CUSTOMS UNION.

(APPENDIX TO PP. 282 ET SEQ. VOL. III AND PP. 465 ET SEQ. VOL. IV.)

"Who founded the German empire? King William and Bismarck, or Fichte and Paul Pfizer? Who was the creator of united Italy? Cavour or Gioberti?" These droll queries arise involuntarily in our minds when we hear how German political wiseacres continue even to-day to engage in serious disputes whether King Frederick William III and his advisers or Nebenius and List are to be regarded as the creators of the German customs union. Whereas in other respects our materialistic age is far too greatly inclined to despise the work of the thinker, in the field of political science, though this is exclusively concerned with the activities of the outwardly directed will, there still prevails a doctrinaire overvaluation of theory, a sorry legacy from the days of our one-sided literary culture. How arid and lifeless is the history of political science as presented in most German books and professorial lectures. Yet if treated in a grand and free manner, this might be the profoundest of all the social sciences. It should demonstrate how the development of ideas is reciprocally interrelated with political conditions, how the apparently free work of the imagination, how even an arbitrary fantasia like More's *Utopia*, is determined by contemporary institutions, interests, and party struggles, and, conversely, how by devious paths the ideals of prophetic thinkers come to influence the sentiments of the masses and the laws of states. Thus only can the necessity, the connection, the continuous progress of political ideas, be explained; thus only does the history of politics fulfil within its own domain the task which Hegel assigned to the history of philosophy when he said, "Philosophy is the ideal expression of its own epoch." Instead of this, many erudite works upon this history of politics are mere storehouses of reference. The titles of books parade in an endless series, and innumerable extracts inform us what A, B, and X have thought about the state; barely a stray word conveys any allusion to those great legislative enactments whereby the habits and opinions of the nations have often been determined for centuries;

and the impression ultimately left upon the reader (if he does not completely lose all thread of connection amid the mass of detail) is that mankind owes the elucidation and elaboration of political ideas solely to the quiet labours of the study, instead of, as is in truth far more the case, to the noisy struggles of battlefields, of cabinets, and of parliaments.

This overvaluation of theory arises out of the continually recurring and fruitless dispute concerning the idle question who is to be regarded as "the spiritual father" of a great political transformation. All political work is art, it is executive activity, it is the impregnation of crude amorphous matter with an idea. Thus unquestionably the *School of Athens* was the creation of Raphael, and not of Pope Julius or of those Roman scholars who may perhaps have furnished the artist with the idea for his work; and it is equally certain that the creator of a great political reform is not the thinker who first conceived its possibility, but the statesman who is competent to give the new thought a living form, to overcome the resistance of hostile forces. In politics, the work of execution is of even more importance than in art. The statesman is rarely in a position to pursue a fixed plan undeviatingly; to him every idea is the mere sketch of a proposal, and he must always be willing to draft fresh outlines. It is the glory of a great political thinker to interpret the signs of the times with the seer's vision, to prepare men's minds for the recognition of the inevitable. Should he succeed in this task, his name will endure in men's memories. As long as the world continues to speak of the movement for Italian unification, Gioberti's *Rinnovamento* will remain unforgotten. But we must not, in uncritical admiration, remove the thinker from the ideal sphere in which he is the ruler; we must not erroneously attribute to his vaticinations the immediate efficacy of action.

This doctrinairism, unable to recognise the enormous chasm between thought and action, has contributed to deprive of the honour due to them those Prussian statesmen who were the real founders of Germany's economic unity, and in this deprivation particularist pettiness has furnished loyal assistance. All the world knows that the German customs union came into being because the Prussian law of May 26, 1818, was, with but few changes, accepted by the other German states; the negotiations, occupying many years, which

effected this unification were all conducted in Berlin. Yet in face of these patent facts, the political wiseacres of Germany burst into a chorus of derisive laughter when King William I expressed the irrefutable opinion that the customs union had been the most cherished idea of King Frederick William III. Not to the royal legislator who promulgated the law that formed the foundation of German commercial policy, not to his indefatigable statesmen who laboured for decades to elaborate this law and diffuse it throughout Germany, not to these must be allotted the honour of recognition as founders of the customs union. The most preposterous suggestions were seized upon in order to avoid giving praise to Prussia. Now people repeated until they believed it the braggart saying of Louis I of Bavaria: "The customs union! I created it." Now to William of Würtemberg, now to some theorist or statesman of the middle-sized states, was assigned the chief credit for a work which nevertheless, as everyone knew, had been originated and perfected in the Prussian capital. In the voluminous literature of the customs union there were published during many years no more than two writings of importance in which Prussia's services received adequate recognition, Ranke's well-known essay in the *Historisch-Politische Zeitschrift*, and Ægidi's book on the *Origins of the Customs Union*. Not until quite recently has the overwhelming demonstration conveyed in the last-mentioned monograph begun to secure general recognition.

Unfortunately the old legends have recently been resuscitated in an admirable work which is in other respects distinguished precisely on account of its campaign against false doctrinairism. In Roscher's *History of Political Economy in Germany*, Nebenius is once more extolled as "the real creator of the customs union"; on the ground that his memorial of 1819 gave expression to ideas which exhibit a certain similarity to those subsequently embodied in the union. Unwilling as I am to contradict my revered master, I feel that a professional historian cannot pass it over in silence when a widely read and influential book closes the chapter upon the foundation of the customs union with the following words: "That which Scharnhorst the Hanoverian, Stein the Rhinelander, Blucher the Mecklenburger, and Gneisenau the Saxon, signify to the wars of liberation, Nebenius the Badenese signifies to the customs union." Those who desire

to place the Badenese upon a pedestal beside these heroes whose services were certainly not limited to the enunciation of a few good ideas, must at least prove that his memorial exercised some kind of influence, direct or indirect, upon the genesis of the customs union. Those who desire to maintain that "the Prussian principle of separate negotiations with the individual states was, as it were, wedded to Nebenius' idea of the customs union," should certainly offer proof of the assertion, should tell us when and where these alleged nuptials took place. But Roscher and others of his way of thinking have never even attempted any such demonstration, which is as a matter of fact impossible.

When Nebenius wrote his memorial he was an opponent of the Prussian tariff policy, for he considered that "no German state except Austria can effectively protect its domain against foreign competition," whereas Maassen started from the correct view that the Prussian customs law would secure this protection. The Badenese desired the abolition of all the extant German customs laws, that of Prussia not excepted, and their replacement by a unified system of federal tariffs. The Prussian government, on the other hand, rightly rejected the idea of a federal customs system as utopian, and desired the establishment of its own customs legislation. Consequently, at the Vienna conferences, Nebenius' memorial was opposed by Count Bernstorff, for this memorial ran counter to the fundamental ideas of Prussian commercial policy—and for fourteen years thereafter it reposed in the archives utterly forgotten. In the national archives I have examined thousands of documents bearing on the history of the customs union, and not one of them refers to the work of Nebenius; nor is his name even mentioned in Motz's *Posthumous Correspondence*. Nebenius took no part in the decisive negotiations of 1828 to 1833, and he gave no advice to any of the statesmen actively engaged in these negotiations.

It was not until the year 1833 that Nebenius rendered an important service to Prussia's commercial policy. The customs treaties between the Prusso-Hessian and the Bavario-Würtemberg unions had just been submitted for approval to the chambers in Stuttgart; negotiations with Baden were still in progress. It was at this juncture that Nebenius published his writing *Concerning the Entry of Baden into the Customs Union*. He had long ere this renounced his former

errors, and he adduced cogent reasons why South Germany should adhere to the Prussian system, desiring that his memorial should simultaneously influence the Würtemberg diet and modify opinion in his own home. The long-forgotten memorial of 1819 was printed as an appendix to the new work. The Badenese government, desiring to secure well-deserved recognition for its excellent privy councillor, submitted the memorial to the Prussian envoy for communication to his court. It was a case of what the English term "fishing for compliments." It was necessary for the Berlin cabinet to say a friendly word to the author; some gratitude was certainly owed him, and at the first decision in Carlsruhe his voice was unquestionably influential. Eichhorn therefore wrote to Otterstedt, the envoy, under date November 28, 1823, saying that he had found the new memorial concerning Baden's accession extremely interesting. "By this publication the author has certainly done much to promote a correct understanding of the important matter of customs unification in his own homeland, and has perhaps contributed to secure recruits from among neighbouring states. It will doubtless afford him gratification to recognise, in the treaties concluded between the states now allied in a common customs and commercial system, how complete has been the realisation of the ideas which, as I gather from the appendix to his memorial, he had as early as the year 1819 cherished and made known to others concerning the conditions of a German customs union." From this studied politeness, Joseph Beck, Nebenius' biographer, draws the conclusion that Prussia recognised the Badenese statesman as the master artificer! Are we quite unfamiliar with the way in which adroit diplomatists are accustomed to modulate their tone when they desire to keep an influential person in a good humour? Could Eichhorn be expected to season his hyperbolical praises with the unpalatable truth that the actual course of affairs had been entirely different from what Nebenius had anticipated? Where does Eichhorn say that the ideas of the Badenese statesman served in any way as guiding principles for the Prussian government? Does not the whole tenour of his despatch indicate that the memorial of 1819 was not known to him before the autumn of 1833. The ideas of Nebenius played no part whatever in the origination of the basic treaties. If we are to speak of the Badenese statesman

as "the creator of the customs union" it can only be in the same sense in which people speak of the Norseman, Eric the Red, as "the discoverer of America," because, long before Columbus, he set foot upon the western continent; he had made a discovery, it is true, but it did not become historically effective until others had remade it independently.

Nor can even this modest fame be properly assigned to Nebenius. It is incorrect to say that his 1819 memorial contains the first exposition of the fundamental ideas subsequently incorporated in the customs union. The expression "creator of the customs union" is an ambiguous one, and we must subject the question to a more detailed analysis.

Who, then, was the first to give expression to the demand that Germany should constitute a commercial unit? It was not Nebenius, for after the Vienna congress this idea was common to the patriots of all parties. It was through the work of F. List above all, through his unwearying agitation, that the notion secured wide acceptance.

Who was it that in the end overcame the resistance that this idea encountered? It was not Nebenius, it was not any individual man, nor was it the power of public opinion (which remained obstinately adverse); it was harsh necessity. Nothing but the extremity of financial need and the deplorable state of trade compelled the reluctant petty courts to seek an understanding with the suspect Prussia.

Who thought out the customs law and the tariff which provided a tolerable compromise between so many conflicting interests? Not Nebenius, but Maassen. The customs law, Maassen's work, is older than Nebenius' memorial; and it is characteristic of the general confusion of those days that the talented Badenese, instead of supporting this existing institution, must needs undertake on his own account to outline a German tariff which differed very little in its principles from the Prussian.

Whose idea was it that the customs revenue should be distributed among the allies proportionally to population? It was not that of Nebenius, but of Maassen, and of J. G. Hoffmann, who, with Motz's collaboration concluded the treaty with Sondershausen before the Badenese statesman's memorial had been presented to the Vienna conferences. From the Prussian treaty was derived the standard of distribution adopted in all the enclave and customs union treaties, for

this was the simplest method and the one most advantageous to the minor states.

Who conceived the idea that the allied states, whilst having identical customs legislation, should have independent customs administrations? Not Nebenius, for his memorial suggested joint customs administration. It was in the course of the South German sonderbund negotiations that, in the Heidelberg protocol, the South-West German courts agreed upon this principle. The Prussian government, which had demanded of its small neighbours subordination to Prussian customs supremacy, gradually came to recognise that it was impossible to sustain such a claim in the case of the greater courts, and it was Motz who first accepted the principle laid down in the Heidelberg protocol.

Who discovered the truth that, in view of the endless multiplicity of interests, it was only through isolated negotiations that there was any hope of attaining the goal? Not Nebenius, who desired the customs system to be regulated by the federal authority, but the Prussian government, which upheld this principle in face of the fiercest opposition.

Who first gave expression to the thought, simple but novel, that freedom of trade was possible only through community of customs? Not Nebenius, for he was anticipated by Maassen, and immediately after the promulgation of the customs law Prussia offered freedom of trade to those states, and to those alone, that were willing to enter into customs community with Prussia.

Who was the first to recognise all that customs community imported for our political future? It was not Nebenius, who never attained to clear views regarding Germany's relationship to Austria; it was Motz.

In view of all these considerations, what is left of Nebenius' claims to parenthood? But this. In the year 1819, like many other doughty patriots, he believed in the utopia of a federal customs system, but furnished forth this plan (in essence utterly wrong-headed) with a few excellent points of detail with which the Prussian statesmen were already familiar. If, on this account, the Badenese is to be denominated the father of the customs union, a historic injustice is perpetrated. First of all, we are unjust to King Frederick William, the Marker; to Maassen, the Rhinelander; to Eichhorn, the Franconian; and to Motz, the Hessian. In the second place, we are

unjust to du Thil and Hoffmann, the Hessians; to King Louis, Armansperg, and Mieg, the Bavarians; to King William and Cotta, the Swabians; to Lindenau and Zeschau, the Saxons. These are the true fathers of the customs union; Nebenius did no more than take part, with scant success, in the sterile negotiations for the formation of the South German sonderbund, and had nothing to do with the history of the great customs union until the ship was already safely launched. It is obvious, therefore, that we are not here concerned, as Roscher suggests, with a defence of Prussian renown, but with doing justice to the services of men belonging to various German stocks, and, above all, with the sober demonstration of historical fact. What the Prussian state was to the customs union is beyond all dispute.

Roscher holds it to be conceivable, though improbable, that among the documents left by Maassen or Eichhorn there may yet be discovered a plan for a customs union belonging to an earlier date than Nebenius' memorial. I do not hesitate to say that I cannot conceive such a possibility. The discovery would do nothing to increase the political reputation of either. The superiority of Eichhorn and of Maassen, when compared with the noisy patriots of other parts of Germany, consists precisely in this, that they scorned to toy with impossibilities. They were content with compacting half of non-Austrian Germany to constitute a unified market, declaring themselves ready to accept other states into this community. At a time when all Germany was raging against the Prussian customs law, and when not one of the middle-sized states was willing or able to transform its administration in conformity with the demands of that law, it was impossible for a practical statesman to do more. Anyone who in the year 1819 projected the design for a German customs union could not fail to indulge in fantasies, and not even the talent of Nebenius could enable him to escape this fate. Like all the spokesmen of the excited public opinion of his day, the Badenese started from a *tabula rasa*, whereas Prussian statesmen desired to maintain the existing customs law and to build further upon this foundation. Ten years later the situation had become clearer. It was now possible to make direct advances towards the commercial unity of Germany as a whole, and it was now that Motz promulgated his design, which veritably possessed horns and teeth.

The excessive admiration accorded by posterity to the memorial of 1819 finds its explanation in the simple fact that among the statesmen of the customs union Nebenius alone was a professional writer. So great was the dearth of documents that historians were forced to pay undue attention to the utterances of Nebenius. His writings on the customs union, valuable as they are, suffer nevertheless from two weaknesses, excessive self-esteem, and great vacillation of judgment. My old friend Carl Mathy, who in truth had little love for men of conciliatory disposition, spoke of Nebenius as being "soft as wax"; and it is far from edifying to note how smoothly he glosses over all the contemptible tricks which, in these shameful commercial wars, were practised by the minor courts, and he is always content to speak of the excellent intentions of the cabinets. To-day, at any rate, now that the archives have been more abundantly opened, an αὐτὸς ἔφα can no longer be taken as decisive.

The opinion regarding the leaders in the great work that prevailed among the collaborators in the foundation of the customs union is shown by an essay which a friendly chance has brought to light among the Motz papers. In the year 1841, when the Berlin journals were discussing whether Motz or Maassen deserved a monument, L. Kühne, who had been a close intimate of the two men during the critical years 1825 to 1834, began a short monograph entitled *Who was the Founder of the Customs Union?*. The work was never completed, and the author subsequently sent the fragment, with a friendly letter, to Motz's family. Kühne takes it as a matter of course that no third name can be mentioned beside those of Motz and Maassen. He reminds his readers of Goethe's word about Schiller, says that the Germans should be proud to possess two such fine fellows, but goes on to insist that no one man can be regarded as the creator of the work: "the union was founded by the force of circumstances." He gives a brief account of the pitiful state of the Bundestag, refers to List's agitation, speaks of the attempts to establish a South German sonderbund, and alludes to Prussia's expectant attitude and to her enclave treaties. Then, in a loftier tone, there follows a description of how, with the coming of Motz, fresh life was breathed into financial administration, how in him the saying *audaces fortuna juvat* was fulfilled, whilst Maassen is depicted as a man of more cautious

nature. After a detailed account of the financial reforms and of the Prusso-Hessian negotiations, the essay breaks off, but the reader derives the impression that the author regarded Motz as the bold pioneer in the undertaking. The monograph is not free from errors; more especially, the activities of the foreign office are unjustly passed over in silence because the financial party was in continual conflict with Eichhorn. But Kühne must have been acquainted with Nebenius' memorial, which had been freshly printed in the year 1833 and sent to the Prussian ministry. He does not, however, vouchsafe a syllable to its author, whilst he speaks with commendation of List, Emil Hoffmann, and the other spokesmen of the union of German merchants! It is obvious that to this practical statesman it seemed inconceivable that anyone could ever dream of acclaiming as "the creator of the customs union" the author of a memorial which advocated an impracticable federal customs system and which remained utterly devoid of political influence.

I believe that Kühne's realistic view will make its way even into historical science as soon as our professors come to study in the school of liberal statecraft, and as soon as they have learned to take a more modest view of the value of theory in the political world. Let me repeat, I should be glad if I could allow myself to be convinced by such a man as Roscher. But this unhappy Nebenius myth is and remains a myth, and it is time for it to take its place beside the good Schweppermann's two eggs and other treasures of particularist saga.

XXI.—BAVARIA'S POLICY DURING 1819 AND SUBSEQUENT YEARS

(APPENDIX TO PP. 244 ET SEQ. AND PP. 632 ET SEQ. VOL III.)

To amplify and fortify my account of Bavarian policy before and after the Carlsbad decrees, I append here certain additional extracts from documents recently brought to light. All of these are so-called Dépêches royales, bearing the autograph signature of King Max Joseph, and countersigned by Count Rechberg, minister for foreign affairs. The first

despatch, addressed to Lieutenant-General Count Rechberg, envoy in Berlin, depicts in glaring colours the democratic movement in South Germany, and proceeds as follows under date May 30, 1819:

J'espère pouvoir clôturer la session à la fin du mois prochain. Il n'est pas douteux qu'il y aurait eu pendant cette séance un éclat formel, si ces hommes n'avaient craint de perdre leur cause en se démasquant complètement; ils ont donc ajourné l'exécution de leurs plus amples projets, espérant que dans l'intervalle de trois ans jusqu'à leur réunion le système représentatif aura pris consistance en Allemagne. Je chercherai à déjouer ces projets en les dissolvant par un acte qui annulera toutes les résolutions inconstitutionnelles qu'ils ont prises. Six années s'écouleront avant que le budget ne doive être voté, et encore n'ont-ils le droit que de voter l'impôt direct. Cependant il est douteux, que ces précautions suffiront et Je crois que l'expérience que J'ai faite et le ton que prennent les états de Bade doivent faire prendre la situation de l'Allemagne en mûre considération et engager les Cours à convenir à Francfort ou partout ailleurs de principes uniformes à arrêter pour que l'art. 13 de l'Acte fédéral ne fraie point la voie à un état de choses qui s'il s'empire ne pourra plus être arrêté.

The envoy is further commissioned to ask Bernstorff's advice concerning these deliberations on the part of the German courts. This demonstrates that the court of Munich shared in the summoning of the Carlsbad conferences.

The second despatch, addressed to Count Bray in Vienna, under date December 13, 1820, gives once more a lively description of the unruly spirits in Italy and South Germany, and especially in Darmstadt, where the chambers had transformed themselves into a constituent assembly. It concludes as follows:

C'est de Troppau, c'est de cette union des puissances qui déjà a été victorieuse d'une grande révolution qu'il faut attendre les mesures propres à consolider leur ouvrage. Le dépit que cette union cause aux agitateurs est la meilleure preuve de son efficacité.

The third despatch, to General Rechberg, dated December 27, 1820, likewise expresses the gratification of the court of Munich on account of the Troppau congress, and refers to the *Manuscript from South Germany* and to the secret aims

of the Würtemberg government. It continues: On peut à peine se refuser de rapprocher ces differentes circonstances avec les doutes, les suppositions et la politique du parti révolutionnaire en Allemagne, et on se demande quelle peut être la tendance d'une opinion aussi peu fondée et aussi divergeante de celle que professent les autres cours d'Allemagne.

Thereafter, Rechberg is instructed to keep a close watch upon the conduct of Würtemberg in Berlin.

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